5 Search Results for "Bhaskar, Siddharth"


Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
Bayesian Calibrated Click-Through Auctions

Authors: Junjie Chen, Minming Li, Haifeng Xu, and Song Zuo

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 297, 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)


Abstract
We study information design in click-through auctions, in which the bidders/advertisers bid for winning an opportunity to show their ads but only pay for realized clicks. The payment may or may not happen, and its probability is called the click-through rate (CTR). This auction format is widely used in the industry of online advertising. Bidders have private values, whereas the seller has private information about each bidder’s CTRs. We are interested in the seller’s problem of partially revealing CTR information to maximize revenue. Information design in click-through auctions turns out to be intriguingly different from almost all previous studies in this space since any revealed information about CTRs will never affect bidders' bidding behaviors - they will always bid their true value per click - but only affect the auction’s allocation and payment rule. In some sense, this makes information design effectively a constrained mechanism design problem. Our first result is an FPTAS to compute an approximately optimal mechanism under a constant number of bidders. The design of this algorithm leverages Bayesian bidder values which help to "smooth" the seller’s revenue function and lead to better tractability. The design of this FPTAS is complex and primarily algorithmic. Our second main result pursues the design of "simple" mechanisms that are approximately optimal yet more practical. We primarily focus on the two-bidder situation, which is already notoriously challenging as demonstrated in recent works. When bidders' CTR distribution is symmetric, we develop a simple prior-free signaling scheme, whose construction relies on a parameter termed optimal signal ratio. The constructed scheme provably obtains a good approximation as long as the maximum and minimum of bidders' value density functions do not differ much.

Cite as

Junjie Chen, Minming Li, Haifeng Xu, and Song Zuo. Bayesian Calibrated Click-Through Auctions. In 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 297, pp. 44:1-44:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{chen_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.44,
  author =	{Chen, Junjie and Li, Minming and Xu, Haifeng and Zuo, Song},
  title =	{{Bayesian Calibrated Click-Through Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)},
  pages =	{44:1--44:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-322-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{297},
  editor =	{Bringmann, Karl and Grohe, Martin and Puppis, Gabriele and Svensson, Ola},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.44},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-201878},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.44},
  annote =	{Keywords: information design, ad auctions, online advertising, mechanism design}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
Minimizing Symmetric Convex Functions over Hybrid of Continuous and Discrete Convex Sets

Authors: Yasushi Kawase, Koichi Nishimura, and Hanna Sumita

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 297, 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)


Abstract
We study the problem of minimizing a given symmetric strictly convex function over the Minkowski sum of an integral base-polyhedron and an M-convex set. This problem has a hybrid of continuous and discrete structures. This emerges from the problem of allocating mixed goods, consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods, to agents with binary valuations so that the fairness measure, such as the Nash welfare, is maximized. It is known that both an integral base-polyhedron and an M-convex set have similar and nice properties, and the non-hybrid case can be solved in polynomial time. While the hybrid case lacks some of these properties, we show the structure of an optimal solution. Moreover, we exploit a proximity inherent in the problem. Through our findings, we demonstrate that our problem is NP-hard even in the fair allocation setting where all indivisible goods are identical. Moreover, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for the fair allocation problem when all divisible goods are identical.

Cite as

Yasushi Kawase, Koichi Nishimura, and Hanna Sumita. Minimizing Symmetric Convex Functions over Hybrid of Continuous and Discrete Convex Sets. In 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 297, pp. 96:1-96:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{kawase_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.96,
  author =	{Kawase, Yasushi and Nishimura, Koichi and Sumita, Hanna},
  title =	{{Minimizing Symmetric Convex Functions over Hybrid of Continuous and Discrete Convex Sets}},
  booktitle =	{51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)},
  pages =	{96:1--96:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-322-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{297},
  editor =	{Bringmann, Karl and Grohe, Martin and Puppis, Gabriele and Svensson, Ola},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.96},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-202393},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.96},
  annote =	{Keywords: Integral base-polyhedron, Fair allocation, Matroid}
}
Document
Traversal-Invariant Characterizations of Logarithmic Space

Authors: Siddharth Bhaskar, Steven Lindell, and Scott Weinstein

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 119, The Provenance of Elegance in Computation - Essays Dedicated to Val Tannen (2024)


Abstract
We give a novel descriptive-complexity theoretic characterization of L and NL computable queries over finite structures using traversal invariance. We summarize this as (N)L = FO + (breadth-first) traversal-invariance.

Cite as

Siddharth Bhaskar, Steven Lindell, and Scott Weinstein. Traversal-Invariant Characterizations of Logarithmic Space. In The Provenance of Elegance in Computation - Essays Dedicated to Val Tannen. Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 119, pp. 2:1-2:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{bhaskar_et_al:OASIcs.Tannen.2,
  author =	{Bhaskar, Siddharth and Lindell, Steven and Weinstein, Scott},
  title =	{{Traversal-Invariant Characterizations of Logarithmic Space}},
  booktitle =	{The Provenance of Elegance in Computation - Essays Dedicated to Val Tannen},
  pages =	{2:1--2:17},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-320-1},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{119},
  editor =	{Amarilli, Antoine and Deutsch, Alin},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tannen.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-200984},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tannen.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Model theory, finite model theory, descriptive complexity theory, logarithmic space, graph traversals}
}
Document
Graph Traversals as Universal Constructions

Authors: Siddharth Bhaskar and Robin Kaarsgaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 202, 46th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2021)


Abstract
We exploit a decomposition of graph traversals to give a novel characterization of depth-first and breadth-first traversals by means of universal constructions. Specifically, we introduce functors from two different categories of edge-ordered directed graphs into two different categories of transitively closed edge-ordered graphs; one defines the lexicographic depth-first traversal and the other the lexicographic breadth-first traversal. We show that each functor factors as a composition of universal constructions, and that the usual presentation of traversals as linear orders on vertices can be recovered with the addition of an inclusion functor. Finally, we raise the question of to what extent we can recover search algorithms from the categorical description of the traversal they compute.

Cite as

Siddharth Bhaskar and Robin Kaarsgaard. Graph Traversals as Universal Constructions. In 46th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 202, pp. 17:1-17:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)


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@InProceedings{bhaskar_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2021.17,
  author =	{Bhaskar, Siddharth and Kaarsgaard, Robin},
  title =	{{Graph Traversals as Universal Constructions}},
  booktitle =	{46th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2021)},
  pages =	{17:1--17:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-201-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{202},
  editor =	{Bonchi, Filippo and Puglisi, Simon J.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2021.17},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-144573},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2021.17},
  annote =	{Keywords: graph traversals, adjunctions, universal constructions, category theory}
}
Document
Tight Approximation Algorithms for p-Mean Welfare Under Subadditive Valuations

Authors: Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Anand Krishna, and Ranjani G. Sundaram

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 173, 28th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2020)


Abstract
We develop polynomial-time algorithms for the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods among n agents that have subadditive valuations over the goods. We first consider the Nash social welfare as our objective and design a polynomial-time algorithm that, in the value oracle model, finds an 8n-approximation to the Nash optimal allocation. Subadditive valuations include XOS (fractionally subadditive) and submodular valuations as special cases. Our result, even for the special case of submodular valuations, improves upon the previously best known O(n log n)-approximation ratio of Garg et al. (2020). More generally, we study maximization of p-mean welfare. The p-mean welfare is parameterized by an exponent term p ∈ (-∞, 1] and encompasses a range of welfare functions, such as social welfare (p = 1), Nash social welfare (p → 0), and egalitarian welfare (p → -∞). We give an algorithm that, for subadditive valuations and any given p ∈ (-∞, 1], computes (in the value oracle model and in polynomial time) an allocation with p-mean welfare at least 1/(8n) times the optimal. Further, we show that our approximation guarantees are essentially tight for XOS and, hence, subadditive valuations. We adapt a result of Dobzinski et al. (2010) to show that, under XOS valuations, an O (n^{1-ε}) approximation for the p-mean welfare for any p ∈ (-∞,1] (including the Nash social welfare) requires exponentially many value queries; here, ε > 0 is any fixed constant.

Cite as

Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Anand Krishna, and Ranjani G. Sundaram. Tight Approximation Algorithms for p-Mean Welfare Under Subadditive Valuations. In 28th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 173, pp. 11:1-11:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)


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@InProceedings{barman_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2020.11,
  author =	{Barman, Siddharth and Bhaskar, Umang and Krishna, Anand and Sundaram, Ranjani G.},
  title =	{{Tight Approximation Algorithms for p-Mean Welfare Under Subadditive Valuations}},
  booktitle =	{28th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2020)},
  pages =	{11:1--11:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-162-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{173},
  editor =	{Grandoni, Fabrizio and Herman, Grzegorz and Sanders, Peter},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2020.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-128775},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2020.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Discrete Fair Division, Nash Social Welfare, Subadditive Valuations, Submodular Valuations}
}
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