3 Search Results for "Chambart, Pierre"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.7
Incentive Compatibility of Ethereum’s PoS Consensus Protocol

Authors: Ulysse Pavloff, Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 324, 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)

Abstract
This paper investigates whether following the fork-choice rule in the Ethereum PoS consensus protocol constitutes a Nash equilibrium - i.e., whether the protocol that maintains the canonical chain in Ethereum is incentive-compatible. Specifically, we explore whether selfish participants may attempt to manipulate the fork-choice rule by forking out previous blocks and capturing the rewards associated with those blocks. Our analysis considers two strategies for participants: the obedient strategy, which adheres to the prescribed protocol, and the cunning strategy, which attempts to manipulate the fork-choice rule to gain more rewards. We evaluate the conditions under which selfish participants might deviate from the obedient strategy. We found that, in a synchronous system, following the prescribed fork-choice rule is incentive-compatible. However, in an eventually synchronous system, the protocol is eventually incentive-compatible - that is, only a limited number of proposers will find it profitable to fork the chain during the synchronous period. After this sequence of cunning proposers, subsequent proposers will find it more profitable to follow the protocol.
Cite as

Ulysse Pavloff, Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. Incentive Compatibility of Ethereum’s PoS Consensus Protocol. In 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 324, pp. 7:1-7:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{pavloff_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.7,
  author =	{Pavloff, Ulysse and Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{Incentive Compatibility of Ethereum’s PoS Consensus Protocol}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-360-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{324},
  editor =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-225431},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Ethereum PoS, Game Theory, Block Reward}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.8
Optimal Multilevel Slashing for Blockchains

Authors: Kenan Wood, Hammurabi Mendes, and Jonad Pulaj

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 324, 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)

Abstract
We present the notion of multilevel slashing, where proof-of-stake blockchain validators can obtain gradual levels of assurance that a certain block is bound to be finalized in a global consensus procedure, unless an increasing and optimally large number of Byzantine processes have their staked assets slashed - that is, deducted - due to provably incorrect behavior. Our construction is a highly parameterized generalization of combinatorial intersection systems based on finite projective spaces, with asymptotic high availability and optimal slashing properties. Even under weak conditions, we show that our construction has asymptotically optimal slashing properties with respect to message complexity and validator load; this result also illustrates a fundamental trade off between message complexity, load, and slashing. In addition, we show that any intersection system whose ground elements are disjoint subsets of nodes (e.g. "committees" in committee-based consensus protocols) has asymptotic high availability under similarly weak conditions. Finally, our multilevel construction gives the flexibility to blockchain validators to decide how many "levels" of finalization assurance they wish to obtain. This functionality can be seen either as (i) a form of an early, slashing-based block finalization; or (ii) a service to support reorg tolerance.
Cite as

Kenan Wood, Hammurabi Mendes, and Jonad Pulaj. Optimal Multilevel Slashing for Blockchains. In 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 324, pp. 8:1-8:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{wood_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.8,
  author =	{Wood, Kenan and Mendes, Hammurabi and Pulaj, Jonad},
  title =	{{Optimal Multilevel Slashing for Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-360-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{324},
  editor =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-225445},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchains, Finality, Slashablility, Committees, Availability}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2021.1
Tenderbake - A Solution to Dynamic Repeated Consensus for Blockchains

Authors: Lăcrămioara Aştefănoaei, Pierre Chambart, Antonella Del Pozzo, Thibault Rieutord, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni, and Eugen Zălinescu

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 92, 4th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2021 (FAB 2021)

Abstract
First-generation blockchains provide probabilistic finality: a block can be revoked, albeit the probability decreases as the block "sinks" deeper into the chain. Recent proposals revisited committee-based BFT consensus to provide deterministic finality: as soon as a block is validated, it is never revoked. A distinguishing characteristic of these second-generation blockchains over classical BFT protocols is that committees change over time as the participation and the blockchain state evolve. In this paper, we push forward in this direction by proposing a formalization of the Dynamic Repeated Consensus problem and by providing generic procedures to solve it in the context of blockchains. Our approach is modular in that one can plug in different synchronizers and single-shot consensus. To offer a complete solution, we provide a concrete instantiation, called {{Tenderbake}}, and present a blockchain synchronizer and a single-shot consensus algorithm, working in a Byzantine and partially synchronous system model with eventually synchronous clocks. In contrast to recent proposals, our methodology is driven by the need to bound the message buffers. This is essential in preventing spamming and run-time memory errors. Moreover, {{Tenderbake}} processes can synchronize with each other without exchanging messages, leveraging instead the information stored in the blockchain.
Cite as

Lăcrămioara Aştefănoaei, Pierre Chambart, Antonella Del Pozzo, Thibault Rieutord, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni, and Eugen Zălinescu. Tenderbake - A Solution to Dynamic Repeated Consensus for Blockchains. In 4th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2021 (FAB 2021). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 92, pp. 1:1-1:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{astefanoaei_et_al:OASIcs.FAB.2021.1,
  author =	{A\c{s}tef\u{a}noaei, L\u{a}cr\u{a}mioara and Chambart, Pierre and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Rieutord, Thibault and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara and Z\u{a}linescu, Eugen},
  title =	{{Tenderbake - A Solution to Dynamic Repeated Consensus for Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2021 (FAB 2021)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:23},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-196-2},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{92},
  editor =	{Gramoli, Vincent and Sadoghi, Mohammad},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2021.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-139877},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2021.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, BFT-Consensus, Dynamic Repeated Consensus}
}
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