2 Search Results for "Collet, Simon"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30
Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences

Authors: Juho Hirvonen and Sara Ranjbaran

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 324, 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)

Abstract
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair of agents prefer each other over their current matches. The deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley solves this problem in polynomial time. Further, it is a mechanism: the proposing side in the algorithm is always incentivised to report their preferences truthfully. The deferred acceptance algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm (and thus a distributed mechanism). However, the algorithm is slow in the worst case and it is known that the stable matching problem cannot be solved efficiently in the distributed setting. In this work we study a natural special case of the stable matching problem where all agents on one of the two sides share common preferences. We show that in this case the deferred acceptance algorithm does yield a fast and truthful distributed mechanism for finding a stable matching. We show how algorithms for sampling random colorings can be used to break ties fairly and extend the results to fractional stable matching.
Cite as

Juho Hirvonen and Sara Ranjbaran. Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences. In 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 324, pp. 30:1-30:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{hirvonen_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30,
  author =	{Hirvonen, Juho and Ranjbaran, Sara},
  title =	{{Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)},
  pages =	{30:1--30:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-360-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{324},
  editor =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-225666},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matching, deferred acceptance, local algorithm, mechanism design}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.6
Equilibria of Games in Networks for Local Tasks

Authors: Simon Collet, Pierre Fraigniaud, and Paolo Penna

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 125, 22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018)

Abstract
Distributed tasks such as constructing a maximal independent set (MIS) in a network, or properly coloring the nodes or the edges of a network with reasonably few colors, are known to admit efficient distributed randomized algorithms. Those algorithms essentially proceed according to some simple generic rules, by letting each node choosing a temptative value at random, and checking whether this choice is consistent with the choices of the nodes in its vicinity. If this is the case, then the node outputs the chosen value, else it repeats the same process. Although such algorithms are, with high probability, running in a polylogarithmic number of rounds, they are not robust against actions performed by rational but selfish nodes. Indeed, such nodes may prefer specific individual outputs over others, e.g., because the formers suit better with some individual constraints. For instance, a node may prefer not being placed in a MIS as it is not willing to serve as a relay node. Similarly, a node may prefer not being assigned some radio frequencies (i.e., colors) as these frequencies would interfere with other devices running at that node. In this paper, we show that the probability distribution governing the choices of the output values in the generic algorithm can be tuned such that no nodes will rationally deviate from this distribution. More formally, and more generally, we prove that the large class of so-called LCL tasks, including MIS and coloring, admit simple "Luby's style" algorithms where the probability distribution governing the individual choices of the output values forms a Nash equilibrium. In fact, we establish the existence of a stronger form of equilibria, called symmetric trembling-hand perfect equilibria for those games.
Cite as

Simon Collet, Pierre Fraigniaud, and Paolo Penna. Equilibria of Games in Networks for Local Tasks. In 22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 125, pp. 6:1-6:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{collet_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.6,
  author =	{Collet, Simon and Fraigniaud, Pierre and Penna, Paolo},
  title =	{{Equilibria of Games in Networks for Local Tasks}},
  booktitle =	{22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-098-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{125},
  editor =	{Cao, Jiannong and Ellen, Faith and Rodrigues, Luis and Ferreira, Bernardo},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-100668},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Local distributed computing, Locally checkable labelings}
}
  • Refine by Type
  • 2 Document/PDF
  • 1 Document/HTML

  • Refine by Publication Year
  • 1 2025
  • 1 2019

  • Refine by Author
  • 1 Collet, Simon
  • 1 Fraigniaud, Pierre
  • 1 Hirvonen, Juho
  • 1 Penna, Paolo
  • 1 Ranjbaran, Sara

  • Refine by Series/Journal
  • 2 LIPIcs

  • Refine by Classification
  • 2 Theory of computation → Distributed algorithms
  • 1 Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory
  • 1 Theory of computation → Algorithmic mechanism design
  • 1 Theory of computation → Network games

  • Refine by Keyword
  • 1 Local distributed computing
  • 1 Locally checkable labelings
  • 1 deferred acceptance
  • 1 local algorithm
  • 1 mechanism design
  • Show More...

Any Issues?
X

Feedback on the Current Page

CAPTCHA

Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted to Dagstuhl Publishing

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2025 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH About DROPS Imprint Privacy Contact