3 Search Results for "Gan, Jiarui"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29
Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division

Authors: Ajaykrishnan E S and Daniel Lokshtanov

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the problem of Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, where exactly p vertices of an undirected graph must be allocated to agents such that each agent receives a connected share and does not envy another agent’s share. Focusing on agents with additive valuations, we show that the problem remains computationally hard when parameterized by p and the number of agents. This result holds even for star graphs and with the input numbers given in unary representation, thereby resolving an open problem posed by Gahlawat and Zehavi (FSTTCS 2023). In stark contrast, we show that if one is willing to tolerate even the slightest amount of envy, then the problem becomes efficient with respect to the natural parameters. Specifically, we design an Efficient Parameterized Approximation Scheme parameterized by p and the number of agent types. Our algorithm works on general graphs and remains efficient even when the input numbers are provided in binary representation.
Cite as

Ajaykrishnan E S and Daniel Lokshtanov. Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 29:1-29:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{es_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29,
  author =	{E S, Ajaykrishnan and Lokshtanov, Daniel},
  title =	{{Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{29:1--29:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251101},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29},
  annote =	{Keywords: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, Efficient Parameterized Approximation Scheme, W\lbrack1\rbrack-hardness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54
Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods

Authors: Sheung Man Yuen, Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama, and Warut Suksompong

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 359, 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)

Abstract
Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequence of exchanges to attain fairness in the form of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). We present a vast array of results on the complexity of determining whether it is possible to reach an EF1 allocation from the initial allocation and, if so, the minimum number of exchanges required. In particular, we uncover several distinctions based on the number of agents involved and their utility functions. Furthermore, we derive essentially tight bounds on the worst-case number of exchanges needed to achieve EF1.
Cite as

Sheung Man Yuen, Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama, and Warut Suksompong. Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods. In 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 359, pp. 54:1-54:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{yuen_et_al:LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54,
  author =	{Yuen, Sheung Man and Igarashi, Ayumi and Kamiyama, Naoyuki and Suksompong, Warut},
  title =	{{Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)},
  pages =	{54:1--54:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-408-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{359},
  editor =	{Chen, Ho-Lin and Hon, Wing-Kai and Tsai, Meng-Tsung},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-249626},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54},
  annote =	{Keywords: fair division, indivisible goods, envy-freeness, exchanges}
}
Document
Invited Talk
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2022.4
Sequential Decision Making With Information Asymmetry (Invited Talk)

Authors: Jiarui Gan, Rupak Majumdar, Goran Radanovic, and Adish Singla

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 243, 33rd International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2022)

Abstract
We survey some recent results in sequential decision making under uncertainty, where there is an information asymmetry among the decision-makers. We consider two versions of the problem: persuasion and mechanism design. In persuasion, a more-informed principal influences the actions of a less-informed agent by signaling information. In mechanism design, a less-informed principal incentivizes a more-informed agent to reveal information by committing to a mechanism, so that the principal can make more informed decisions. We define Markov persuasion processes and Markov mechanism processes that model persuasion and mechanism design into dynamic models. Then we survey results on optimal persuasion and optimal mechanism design on myopic and far-sighted agents. These problems are solvable in polynomial time for myopic agents but hard for far-sighted agents.
Cite as

Jiarui Gan, Rupak Majumdar, Goran Radanovic, and Adish Singla. Sequential Decision Making With Information Asymmetry (Invited Talk). In 33rd International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 243, pp. 4:1-4:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{gan_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2022.4,
  author =	{Gan, Jiarui and Majumdar, Rupak and Radanovic, Goran and Singla, Adish},
  title =	{{Sequential Decision Making With Information Asymmetry}},
  booktitle =	{33rd International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2022)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-246-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{243},
  editor =	{Klin, Bartek and Lasota, S{\l}awomir and Muscholl, Anca},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2022.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-170673},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2022.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, Automated mechanism design, Markov persuasion processes, Markov mechanism processes, Myopic agents}
}
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