2 Search Results for "Meunier, Noémie"


Document
The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and ω-Regular Objectives

Authors: Véronique Bruyère, Jean-François Raskin, Alexis Reynouard, and Marie Van Den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 348, 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)


Abstract
This paper studies the rational synthesis problem for multi-player games played on graphs when rational players are following subgame perfect equilibria. In these games, one player, the system, declares his strategy upfront, and the other players, composing the environment, then rationally respond by playing strategies forming a subgame perfect equilibrium. We study the complexity of the rational synthesis problem when the players have ω-regular objectives encoded as parity objectives. Our algorithm is based on an encoding into a three-player game with imperfect information, showing that the problem is in 2ExpTime. When the number of environment players is fixed, the problem is in ExpTime and is NP- and coNP-hard. Moreover, for a fixed number of players and reachability objectives, we get a polynomial algorithm.

Cite as

Véronique Bruyère, Jean-François Raskin, Alexis Reynouard, and Marie Van Den Bogaard. The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and ω-Regular Objectives. In 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 348, pp. 12:1-12:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


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@InProceedings{bruyere_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12,
  author =	{Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and Reynouard, Alexis and Van Den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and \omega-Regular Objectives}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-389-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{348},
  editor =	{Bouyer, Patricia and van de Pol, Jaco},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-239622},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: non-zero-sum games, subgame perfect equilibria, rational synthesis}
}
Document
Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria and their Application to Quantitative Reachability

Authors: Thomas Brihaye, Véronique Bruyère, Noémie Meunier, and Jean-Francois Raskin

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 41, 24th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2015)


Abstract
We study n-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), a refinement of NE well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. We also study natural variants of SPE, named weak (resp. very weak) SPE, where players who deviate cannot use the full class of strategies but only a subclass with a finite number of (resp. a unique) deviation step(s). Our results are threefold. Firstly, we characterize in the form of a Folk theorem the set of all plays that are the outcome of a weak SPE. Secondly, for the class of quantitative reachability games, we prove the existence of a finite-memory SPE and provide an algorithm for computing it (only existence was known with no information regarding the memory). Moreover, we show that the existence of a constrained SPE, i.e. an SPE such that each player pays a cost less than a given constant, can be decided. The proofs rely on our Folk theorem for weak SPEs (which coincide with SPEs in the case of quantitative reachability games) and on the decidability of MSO logic on infinite words. Finally with similar techniques, we provide a second general class of games for which the existence of a (constrained) weak SPE is decidable.

Cite as

Thomas Brihaye, Véronique Bruyère, Noémie Meunier, and Jean-Francois Raskin. Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria and their Application to Quantitative Reachability. In 24th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2015). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 41, pp. 504-518, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2015)


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@InProceedings{brihaye_et_al:LIPIcs.CSL.2015.504,
  author =	{Brihaye, Thomas and Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Meunier, No\'{e}mie and Raskin, Jean-Francois},
  title =	{{Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria and their Application to Quantitative Reachability}},
  booktitle =	{24th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2015)},
  pages =	{504--518},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-90-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2015},
  volume =	{41},
  editor =	{Kreutzer, Stephan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2015.504},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-54345},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2015.504},
  annote =	{Keywords: multi-player games on graphs, quantitative objectives, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, quantitative reachability}
}
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