3 Search Results for "Moore, Tyler W."

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16
Nakamoto Consensus from Multiple Resources

Authors: Mirza Ahad Baig, Christoph U. Günther, and Krzysztof Pietrzak

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
The blocks in the Bitcoin blockchain "record" the amount of work W that went into creating them through proofs of work. When honest parties control a majority of the work, consensus is achieved by picking the chain with the highest recorded weight. Resources other than work have been considered to secure such longest-chain blockchains. In Chia, blocks record the amount of disk-space S (via a proof of space) and sequential computational steps V (through a VDF). In this paper, we ask what weight functions Γ(S,V,W) (that assign a weight to a block as a function of the recorded space, speed, and work) are secure in the sense that whenever the weight of the resources controlled by honest parties is larger than the weight of adversarial parties, the blockchain is secure against private double-spending attacks. We completely classify such functions in an idealized "continuous" model: Γ(S,V,W) is secure against private double-spending attacks if and only if it is homogeneous of degree one in the "timed" resources V and W, i.e., αΓ(S,V,W) = Γ(S,α V, α W). This includes the Bitcoin rule Γ(S,V,W) = W and the Chia rule Γ(S,V,W) = S ⋅ V. In a more realistic model where blocks are created at discrete time-points, one additionally needs some mild assumptions on the dependency on S (basically, the weight should not grow too much if S is slightly increased, say linear as in Chia). Our classification is more general and allows various instantiations of the same resource. It provides a powerful tool for designing new longest-chain blockchains. E.g., consider combining different PoWs to counter centralization, say the Bitcoin PoW W₁ and a memory-hard PoW W₂. Previous work suggested to use W₁+W₂ as weight. Our results show that using e.g., √{W₁}⋅ √{W₂} or min{W₁,W₂} are also secure, and we argue that in practice these are much better choices.
Cite as

Mirza Ahad Baig, Christoph U. Günther, and Krzysztof Pietrzak. Nakamoto Consensus from Multiple Resources. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 16:1-16:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{baig_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16,
  author =	{Baig, Mirza Ahad and G\"{u}nther, Christoph U. and Pietrzak, Krzysztof},
  title =	{{Nakamoto Consensus from Multiple Resources}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{16:1--16:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247353},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Nakamoto Consensus, Heaviest-chain Rule, Resource Theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2025.23
Formalizing the Hidden Number Problem in Isabelle/HOL

Authors: Sage Binder, Eric Ren, and Katherine Kosaian

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 352, 16th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2025)

Abstract
We formalize the hidden number problem (HNP), as introduced in a seminal work by Boneh and Venkatesan in 1996, in Isabelle/HOL. Intuitively, the HNP involves demonstrating the existence of an algorithm (the "adversary") which can compute (with high probability) a hidden number α given access to a bit-leaking oracle. Originally developed to establish the security of Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the HNP has since been used not only for protocol security but also in cryptographic attacks, including notable ones on DSA and ECDSA. Further, as the HNP establishes an expressive paradigm for reasoning about security in the context of information leakage, many HNP variants for other specialized cryptographic applications have since been developed. A main contribution of our work is explicating and clarifying the HNP proof blueprint from the original source material; naturally, formalization forces us to make all assumptions and proof steps precise and transparent. For example, the source material did not explicitly define the adversary and only abstractly defined what information is being leaked; our formalization concretizes both definitions. Additionally, the HNP makes use of an instance of Babai’s nearest plane algorithm, which solves the approximate closest vector problem; we formalize this as a result of independent interest. Our formalizations of Babai’s algorithm and the HNP adversary are executable, setting up potential future work, e.g. in developing formally verified instances of cryptographic attacks.
Cite as

Sage Binder, Eric Ren, and Katherine Kosaian. Formalizing the Hidden Number Problem in Isabelle/HOL. In 16th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 352, pp. 23:1-23:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{binder_et_al:LIPIcs.ITP.2025.23,
  author =	{Binder, Sage and Ren, Eric and Kosaian, Katherine},
  title =	{{Formalizing the Hidden Number Problem in Isabelle/HOL}},
  booktitle =	{16th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2025)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-396-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{352},
  editor =	{Forster, Yannick and Keller, Chantal},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2025.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-246216},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2025.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: hidden number problem, Babai’s nearest plane algorithm, cryptography, interactive theorem proving, Isabelle/HOL}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagRep.6.11.63
Assessing ICT Security Risks in Socio-Technical Systems (Dagstuhl Seminar 16461)

Authors: Tyler W. Moore, Christian W. Probst, Kai Rannenberg, and Michel van Eeten

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 6, Issue 11 (2017)

Abstract
This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 16461 "Assessing ICT Security Risks in Socio-Technical Systems". As we progress from classic mechanical or electrical production systems, over ICT systems, to socio-technical systems, risk assessment becomes increasingly complex and difficult. Risk assessment for traditional engineering systems assumes the systems to be deterministic. In non-deterministic systems, standard procedure is to fix those factors that are not deterministic. These techniques do not scale to ICT systems where many risks are hard to trace due to the immaterial nature of information. Beyond ICT systems, socio-technical systems also contain human actors as integral parts of the system. In such socio-technical systems there may occur unforeseen interactions between the system, the environment, and the human actors, especially insiders. Assessing ICT security risks for socio-technical systems and their economic environment requires methods and tools that integrate relevant socio-technical security metrics. In this seminar we investigated systematic methods and tools to estimate those ICT security risks in socio-technical systems and their economic environment. In particular, we searched for novel security risk assessment methods that integrate different types of socio-technical security metrics.
Cite as

Tyler W. Moore, Christian W. Probst, Kai Rannenberg, and Michel van Eeten. Assessing ICT Security Risks in Socio-Technical Systems (Dagstuhl Seminar 16461). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 6, Issue 11, pp. 63-89, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)

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@Article{moore_et_al:DagRep.6.11.63,
  author =	{Moore, Tyler W. and Probst, Christian W. and Rannenberg, Kai and van Eeten, Michel},
  title =	{{Assessing ICT Security Risks in Socio-Technical Systems (Dagstuhl Seminar 16461)}},
  pages =	{63--89},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{6},
  number =	{11},
  editor =	{Moore, Tyler W. and Probst, Christian W. and Rannenberg, Kai and van Eeten, Michel},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.6.11.63},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-70390},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.6.11.63},
  annote =	{Keywords: economics of risk assessment, human factor, return on security investment, security risk management, socio-technical security}
}
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