2 Search Results for "Plaxton, C. Gregory"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54
Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods

Authors: Sheung Man Yuen, Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama, and Warut Suksompong

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 359, 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)

Abstract
Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequence of exchanges to attain fairness in the form of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). We present a vast array of results on the complexity of determining whether it is possible to reach an EF1 allocation from the initial allocation and, if so, the minimum number of exchanges required. In particular, we uncover several distinctions based on the number of agents involved and their utility functions. Furthermore, we derive essentially tight bounds on the worst-case number of exchanges needed to achieve EF1.
Cite as

Sheung Man Yuen, Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama, and Warut Suksompong. Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods. In 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 359, pp. 54:1-54:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{yuen_et_al:LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54,
  author =	{Yuen, Sheung Man and Igarashi, Ayumi and Kamiyama, Naoyuki and Suksompong, Warut},
  title =	{{Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)},
  pages =	{54:1--54:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-408-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{359},
  editor =	{Chen, Ho-Lin and Hon, Wing-Kai and Tsai, Meng-Tsung},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-249626},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54},
  annote =	{Keywords: fair division, indivisible goods, envy-freeness, exchanges}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2016.28
Bipartite Matching with Linear Edge Weights

Authors: Nevzat Onur Domanic, Chi-Kit Lam, and C. Gregory Plaxton

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 64, 27th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2016)

Abstract
Consider a complete weighted bipartite graph G in which each left vertex u has two real numbers intercept and slope, each right vertex v has a real number quality, and the weight of any edge (u, v) is defined as the intercept of u plus the slope of u times the quality of v. Let m (resp., n) denote the number of left (resp., right) vertices, and assume that m geq n. We develop a fast algorithm for computing a maximum weight matching (MWM) of such a graph. Our algorithm begins by computing an MWM of the subgraph induced by the n right vertices and an arbitrary subset of n left vertices; this step is straightforward to perform in O(n log n) time. The remaining m - n left vertices are then inserted into the graph one at a time, in arbitrary order. As each left vertex is inserted, the MWM is updated. It is relatively straightforward to process each such insertion in O(n) time; our main technical contribution is to improve this time bound to O(sqrt{n} log^2 n). This result has an application related to unit-demand auctions. It is well known that the VCG mechanism yields a suitable solution (allocation and prices) for any unit-demand auction. The graph G may be viewed as encoding a special kind of unit-demand auction in which each left vertex u represents a unit-demand bid, each right vertex v represents an item, and the weight of an edge (u, v) represents the offer of bid u on item v. In this context, our fast insertion algorithm immediately provides an O(sqrt{n} log^2 n)-time algorithm for updating a VCG allocation when a new bid is received. We show how to generalize the insertion algorithm to update (an efficient representation of) the VCG prices within the same time bound.
Cite as

Nevzat Onur Domanic, Chi-Kit Lam, and C. Gregory Plaxton. Bipartite Matching with Linear Edge Weights. In 27th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 64, pp. 28:1-28:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{domanic_et_al:LIPIcs.ISAAC.2016.28,
  author =	{Domanic, Nevzat Onur and Lam, Chi-Kit and Plaxton, C. Gregory},
  title =	{{Bipartite Matching with Linear Edge Weights}},
  booktitle =	{27th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2016)},
  pages =	{28:1--28:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-026-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{64},
  editor =	{Hong, Seok-Hee},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2016.28},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-67989},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2016.28},
  annote =	{Keywords: Weighted bipartite matching, Unit-demand auctions, VCG allocation and pricing}
}
  • Refine by Type
  • 2 Document/PDF
  • 1 Document/HTML

  • Refine by Publication Year
  • 1 2025
  • 1 2016

  • Refine by Author
  • 1 Domanic, Nevzat Onur
  • 1 Igarashi, Ayumi
  • 1 Kamiyama, Naoyuki
  • 1 Lam, Chi-Kit
  • 1 Plaxton, C. Gregory
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Series/Journal
  • 2 LIPIcs

  • Refine by Classification
  • 1 Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory
  • 1 Theory of computation → Design and analysis of algorithms
  • 1 Theory of computation → Problems, reductions and completeness

  • Refine by Keyword
  • 1 Unit-demand auctions
  • 1 VCG allocation and pricing
  • 1 Weighted bipartite matching
  • 1 envy-freeness
  • 1 exchanges
  • Show More...

Any Issues?
X

Feedback on the Current Page

CAPTCHA

Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted to Dagstuhl Publishing

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2026 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH About DROPS Imprint Privacy Contact