9 Search Results for "Segal, Michael"


Document
Exact Minimum Weight Spanners via Column Generation

Authors: Fritz Bökler, Markus Chimani, Henning Jasper, and Mirko H. Wagner

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 308, 32nd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2024)


Abstract
Given a weighted graph G, a minimum weight α-spanner is a least-weight subgraph H ⊆ G that preserves minimum distances between all node pairs up to a factor of α. There are many results on heuristics and approximation algorithms, including a recent investigation of their practical performance [Markus Chimani and Finn Stutzenstein, 2022]. Exact approaches, in contrast, have long been denounced as impractical: The first exact ILP (integer linear program) method [Sigurd and Zachariasen, 2004] from 2004 is based on a model with exponentially many path variables, solved via column generation. A second approach [Ahmed et al., 2019], modeling via arc-based multicommodity flow, was presented in 2019. In both cases, only graphs with 40-100 nodes were reported to be solvable. In this paper, we briefly report on a theoretical comparison between these two models from a polyhedral point of view, and then concentrate on improvements and engineering aspects. We evaluate their performance in a large-scale empirical study. We report that our tuned column generation approach, based on multicriteria shortest path computations, is able to solve instances with over 16 000 nodes within 13 min. Furthermore, now knowing optimal solutions for larger graphs, we are able to investigate the quality of the strongest known heuristic on reasonably sized instances for the first time.

Cite as

Fritz Bökler, Markus Chimani, Henning Jasper, and Mirko H. Wagner. Exact Minimum Weight Spanners via Column Generation. In 32nd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 308, pp. 30:1-30:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{bokler_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2024.30,
  author =	{B\"{o}kler, Fritz and Chimani, Markus and Jasper, Henning and Wagner, Mirko H.},
  title =	{{Exact Minimum Weight Spanners via Column Generation}},
  booktitle =	{32nd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2024)},
  pages =	{30:1--30:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-338-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{308},
  editor =	{Chan, Timothy and Fischer, Johannes and Iacono, John and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2024.30},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-211012},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2024.30},
  annote =	{Keywords: Graph spanners, ILP, algorithm engineering, experimental study}
}
Document
Optimizing Throughput and Makespan of Queuing Systems by Information Design

Authors: Svenja M. Griesbach, Max Klimm, Philipp Warode, and Theresa Ziemke

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 308, 32nd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2024)


Abstract
We study the optimal provision of information for two natural performance measures of queuing systems: throughput and makespan. A set of parallel links (queues) is equipped with deterministic capacities and stochastic offsets where the latter depend on a realized state, and the number of states is assumed to be constant. A continuum of flow particles (agents) arrives at the system at a constant rate. A system operator knows the realization of the state and may (partially) reveal this information via a public signaling scheme to the flow particles. Upon arrival, the flow particles observe the signal issued by the system operator, form an updated belief about the realized state, and decide on which link they use. Inflow into a link exceeding the link’s capacity builds up in a queue that increases the cost (total travel time) on the link. Dynamic inflow rates are in a Bayesian dynamic equilibrium when the expected cost along all links with positive inflow is equal at every point in time and not larger than the expected cost of any unused link. For a given time horizon T, the throughput induced by a signaling scheme is the total volume of flow that leaves the links in the interval [0,T]. The public signaling scheme maximizing the throughput may involve irrational numbers. We provide an additive polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) that approximates the optimal throughput by an arbitrary additive constant ε > 0. The algorithm solves a Lagrangian dual of the signaling problem with the Ellipsoid method whose separation oracle is implemented by a cell decomposition technique. We also provide a multiplicative fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) that does not rely on strong duality and, thus, allows to compute the optimal signals. It uses a different cell decomposition technique together with a piecewise convex under-estimator of the optimal value function. Finally, we consider the makespan of a Bayesian dynamic equilibrium which is defined as the last point in time when a total given value of flow leaves the system. Using a variational inequality argument, we show that full information revelation is a public signaling scheme that minimizes the makespan.

Cite as

Svenja M. Griesbach, Max Klimm, Philipp Warode, and Theresa Ziemke. Optimizing Throughput and Makespan of Queuing Systems by Information Design. In 32nd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 308, pp. 62:1-62:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{griesbach_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2024.62,
  author =	{Griesbach, Svenja M. and Klimm, Max and Warode, Philipp and Ziemke, Theresa},
  title =	{{Optimizing Throughput and Makespan of Queuing Systems by Information Design}},
  booktitle =	{32nd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2024)},
  pages =	{62:1--62:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-338-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{308},
  editor =	{Chan, Timothy and Fischer, Johannes and Iacono, John and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2024.62},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-211336},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2024.62},
  annote =	{Keywords: Information Design, Dynamic Flows, Public Signals, Convex Envelope}
}
Document
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design in a Post-MEV World

Authors: Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, and Tim Roughgarden

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)


Abstract
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model of active block producers that have their own private valuations for blocks (representing, for example, additional value derived from the application layer). The block producer surplus in our model can be interpreted as one of the more common colloquial meanings of the phrase "maximal extractable value (MEV)." We first prove that transaction fee mechanism design is fundamentally more difficult with active block producers than with passive ones: With active block producers, no non-trivial or approximately welfare-maximizing transaction fee mechanism can be incentive-compatible for both users and block producers. These results can be interpreted as a mathematical justification for augmenting transaction fee mechanisms with additional components such as order flow auctions, block producer competition, trusted hardware, or cryptographic techniques. We then consider a more fine-grained model of block production that more accurately reflects current practice, in which we distinguish the roles of "searchers" (who actively identify opportunities for value extraction from the application layer and compete for the right to take advantage of them) and "proposers" (who participate directly in the blockchain protocol and make the final choice of the published block). Searchers can effectively act as an "MEV oracle" for a transaction fee mechanism, thereby enlarging the design space. Here, we first consider a TFM that is inspired by how searchers have traditionally been incorporated into the block production process, with each transaction effectively sold off to a searcher through a first-price auction. We then explore the TFM design space with searchers more generally, and design a mechanism that circumvents our impossibility results for TFMs without searchers. Our mechanism (the "SAKA" mechanism) is incentive-compatible (for users, searchers, and the block producer), sybil-proof, and guarantees roughly 50% of the maximum-possible welfare when transaction sizes are small relative to block sizes. We conclude with a matching negative result: even when transaction sizes are small, no DSIC and sybil-proof deterministic TFM can guarantee more than 50% of the maximum-possible welfare.

Cite as

Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, and Tim Roughgarden. Transaction Fee Mechanism Design in a Post-MEV World. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 29:1-29:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{bahrani_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.29,
  author =	{Bahrani, Maryam and Garimidi, Pranav and Roughgarden, Tim},
  title =	{{Transaction Fee Mechanism Design in a Post-MEV World}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{29:1--29:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.29},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209658},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.29},
  annote =	{Keywords: MEV, Transaction Fee Mechanisms, Auctions}
}
Document
Profitable Manipulations of Cryptographic Self-Selection Are Statistically Detectable

Authors: Linda Cai, Jingyi Liu, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Chenghan Zhou

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)


Abstract
Cryptographic Self-Selection is a common primitive underlying leader-selection for Proof-of-Stake blockchain protocols. The concept was first popularized in Algorand [Jing Chen and Silvio Micali, 2019], who also observed that the protocol might be manipulable. [Matheus V. X. Ferreira et al., 2022] provide a concrete manipulation that is strictly profitable for a staker of any size (and also prove upper bounds on the gains from manipulation). Separately, [Maryam Bahrani and S. Matthew Weinberg, 2024; Aviv Yaish et al., 2023] initiate the study of undetectable profitable manipulations of consensus protocols with a focus on the seminal Selfish Mining strategy [Eyal and Sirer, 2014] for Bitcoin’s Proof-of-Work longest-chain protocol. They design a Selfish Mining variant that, for sufficiently large miners, is strictly profitable yet also indistinguishable to an onlooker from routine latency (that is, a sufficiently large profit-maximizing miner could use their strategy to strictly profit over being honest in a way that still appears to the rest of the network as though everyone is honest but experiencing mildly higher latency. This avoids any risk of negatively impacting the value of the underlying cryptocurrency due to attack detection). We investigate the detectability of profitable manipulations of the canonical cryptographic self-selection leader selection protocol introduced in [Jing Chen and Silvio Micali, 2019] and studied in [Matheus V. X. Ferreira et al., 2022], and establish that for any player with α < (3-√5)/2 ≈ 0.38 fraction of the total stake, every strictly profitable manipulation is statistically detectable. Specifically, we consider an onlooker who sees only the random seed of each round (and does not need to see any other broadcasts by any other players). We show that the distribution of the sequence of random seeds when any player is profitably manipulating the protocol is inconsistent with any distribution that could arise by honest stakers being offline or timing out (for a natural stylized model of honest timeouts).

Cite as

Linda Cai, Jingyi Liu, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Chenghan Zhou. Profitable Manipulations of Cryptographic Self-Selection Are Statistically Detectable. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 30:1-30:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{cai_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.30,
  author =	{Cai, Linda and Liu, Jingyi and Weinberg, S. Matthew and Zhou, Chenghan},
  title =	{{Profitable Manipulations of Cryptographic Self-Selection Are Statistically Detectable}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{30:1--30:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.30},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209660},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.30},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, Proof-of-Stake, Strategic Mining, Statistical Detection}
}
Document
Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum

Authors: Kaya Alpturer and S. Matthew Weinberg

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)


Abstract
It is well-known that RANDAO manipulation is possible in Ethereum if an adversary controls the proposers assigned to the last slots in an epoch. We provide a methodology to compute, for any fraction α of stake owned by an adversary, the maximum fraction f(α) of rounds that a strategic adversary can propose. We further implement our methodology and compute f(⋅) for all α. For example, we conclude that an optimal strategic participant with 5% of the stake can propose a 5.048% fraction of rounds, 10% of the stake can propose a 10.19% fraction of rounds, and 20% of the stake can propose a 20.68% fraction of rounds.

Cite as

Kaya Alpturer and S. Matthew Weinberg. Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 10:1-10:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{alpturer_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.10,
  author =	{Alpturer, Kaya and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  title =	{{Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209467},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Proof of Stake, Consensus, Blockchain, Ethereum, Randomness manipulation}
}
Document
Capturing the Shape of a Point Set with a Line Segment

Authors: Nathan van Beusekom, Marc van Kreveld, Max van Mulken, Marcel Roeloffzen, Bettina Speckmann, and Jules Wulms

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 306, 49th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2024)


Abstract
Detecting location-correlated groups in point sets is an important task in a wide variety of applications areas. In addition to merely detecting such groups, the group’s shape carries meaning as well. In this paper, we represent a group’s shape using a simple geometric object, a line segment. Specifically, given a radius r, we say a line segment is representative of a point set P of n points if it is within distance r of each point p ∈ P. We aim to find the shortest such line segment. This problem is equivalent to stabbing a set of circles of radius r using the shortest line segment. We describe an algorithm to find the shortest representative segment in O(n log h + h log³h) time, where h is the size of the convex hull of P. Additionally, we show how to maintain a stable approximation of the shortest representative segment when the points in P move.

Cite as

Nathan van Beusekom, Marc van Kreveld, Max van Mulken, Marcel Roeloffzen, Bettina Speckmann, and Jules Wulms. Capturing the Shape of a Point Set with a Line Segment. In 49th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 306, pp. 26:1-26:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{vanbeusekom_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2024.26,
  author =	{van Beusekom, Nathan and van Kreveld, Marc and van Mulken, Max and Roeloffzen, Marcel and Speckmann, Bettina and Wulms, Jules},
  title =	{{Capturing the Shape of a Point Set with a Line Segment}},
  booktitle =	{49th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2024)},
  pages =	{26:1--26:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-335-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{306},
  editor =	{Kr\'{a}lovi\v{c}, Rastislav and Ku\v{c}era, Anton{\'\i}n},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2024.26},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-205820},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2024.26},
  annote =	{Keywords: Shape descriptor, Stabbing, Rotating calipers}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
New Tradeoffs for Decremental Approximate All-Pairs Shortest Paths

Authors: Michal Dory, Sebastian Forster, Yasamin Nazari, and Tijn de Vos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 297, 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)


Abstract
We provide new tradeoffs between approximation and running time for the decremental all-pairs shortest paths (APSP) problem. For undirected graphs with m edges and n nodes undergoing edge deletions, we provide four new approximate decremental APSP algorithms, two for weighted and two for unweighted graphs. Our first result is (2+ε)-APSP with total update time Õ(m^{1/2}n^{3/2}) (when m = n^{1+c} for any constant 0 < c < 1). Prior to our work the fastest algorithm for weighted graphs with approximation at most 3 had total Õ(mn) update time for (1+ε)-APSP [Bernstein, SICOMP 2016]. Our second result is (2+ε, W_{u,v})-APSP with total update time Õ(nm^{3/4}), where the second term is an additive stretch with respect to W_{u,v}, the maximum weight on the shortest path from u to v. Our third result is (2+ε)-APSP for unweighted graphs in Õ(m^{7/4}) update time, which for sparse graphs (m = o(n^{8/7})) is the first subquadratic (2+ε)-approximation. Our last result for unweighted graphs is (1+ε, 2(k-1))-APSP, for k ≥ 2, with Õ(n^{2-1/k}m^{1/k}) total update time (when m = n^{1+c} for any constant c > 0). For comparison, in the special case of (1+ε, 2)-approximation, this improves over the state-of-the-art algorithm by [Henzinger, Krinninger, Nanongkai, SICOMP 2016] with total update time of Õ(n^{2.5}). All of our results are randomized, work against an oblivious adversary, and have constant query time.

Cite as

Michal Dory, Sebastian Forster, Yasamin Nazari, and Tijn de Vos. New Tradeoffs for Decremental Approximate All-Pairs Shortest Paths. In 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 297, pp. 58:1-58:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{dory_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.58,
  author =	{Dory, Michal and Forster, Sebastian and Nazari, Yasamin and de Vos, Tijn},
  title =	{{New Tradeoffs for Decremental Approximate All-Pairs Shortest Paths}},
  booktitle =	{51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)},
  pages =	{58:1--58:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-322-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{297},
  editor =	{Bringmann, Karl and Grohe, Martin and Puppis, Gabriele and Svensson, Ola},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.58},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-202012},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.58},
  annote =	{Keywords: Decremental Shortest Path, All-Pairs Shortest Paths}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
Minimizing Symmetric Convex Functions over Hybrid of Continuous and Discrete Convex Sets

Authors: Yasushi Kawase, Koichi Nishimura, and Hanna Sumita

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 297, 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)


Abstract
We study the problem of minimizing a given symmetric strictly convex function over the Minkowski sum of an integral base-polyhedron and an M-convex set. This problem has a hybrid of continuous and discrete structures. This emerges from the problem of allocating mixed goods, consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods, to agents with binary valuations so that the fairness measure, such as the Nash welfare, is maximized. It is known that both an integral base-polyhedron and an M-convex set have similar and nice properties, and the non-hybrid case can be solved in polynomial time. While the hybrid case lacks some of these properties, we show the structure of an optimal solution. Moreover, we exploit a proximity inherent in the problem. Through our findings, we demonstrate that our problem is NP-hard even in the fair allocation setting where all indivisible goods are identical. Moreover, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for the fair allocation problem when all divisible goods are identical.

Cite as

Yasushi Kawase, Koichi Nishimura, and Hanna Sumita. Minimizing Symmetric Convex Functions over Hybrid of Continuous and Discrete Convex Sets. In 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 297, pp. 96:1-96:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{kawase_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.96,
  author =	{Kawase, Yasushi and Nishimura, Koichi and Sumita, Hanna},
  title =	{{Minimizing Symmetric Convex Functions over Hybrid of Continuous and Discrete Convex Sets}},
  booktitle =	{51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)},
  pages =	{96:1--96:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-322-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{297},
  editor =	{Bringmann, Karl and Grohe, Martin and Puppis, Gabriele and Svensson, Ola},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.96},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-202393},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.96},
  annote =	{Keywords: Integral base-polyhedron, Fair allocation, Matroid}
}
Document
Locating Battery Charging Stations to Facilitate Almost Shortest Paths

Authors: Esther M. Arkin, Paz Carmi, Matthew J. Katz, Joseph S. B. Mitchell, and Michael Segal

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 42, 14th Workshop on Algorithmic Approaches for Transportation Modelling, Optimization, and Systems (2014)


Abstract
We study a facility location problem motivated by requirements pertaining to the distribution of charging stations for electric vehicles: Place a minimum number of battery charging stations at a subset of nodes of a network, so that battery-powered electric vehicles will be able to move between destinations using "t-spanning" routes, of lengths within a factor t > 1 of the length of a shortest path, while having sufficient charging stations along the way. We give constant-factor approximation algorithms for minimizing the number of charging stations, subject to the t-spanning constraint. We study two versions of the problem, one in which the stations are required to support a single ride (to a single destination), and one in which the stations are to support multiple rides through a sequence of destinations, where the destinations are revealed one at a time.

Cite as

Esther M. Arkin, Paz Carmi, Matthew J. Katz, Joseph S. B. Mitchell, and Michael Segal. Locating Battery Charging Stations to Facilitate Almost Shortest Paths. In 14th Workshop on Algorithmic Approaches for Transportation Modelling, Optimization, and Systems. Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 42, pp. 25-33, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2014)


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@InProceedings{arkin_et_al:OASIcs.ATMOS.2014.25,
  author =	{Arkin, Esther M. and Carmi, Paz and Katz, Matthew J. and Mitchell, Joseph S. B. and Segal, Michael},
  title =	{{Locating Battery Charging Stations to Facilitate Almost Shortest Paths}},
  booktitle =	{14th Workshop on Algorithmic Approaches for Transportation Modelling, Optimization, and Systems},
  pages =	{25--33},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-75-0},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2014},
  volume =	{42},
  editor =	{Funke, Stefan and Mihal\'{a}k, Mat\'{u}s},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.ATMOS.2014.25},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-47500},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.ATMOS.2014.25},
  annote =	{Keywords: approximation algorithms; geometric spanners; transportation networks}
}
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