4 Search Results for "Tan, Xizhi"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86
The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order

Authors: Helia Karisani, Mohammadreza Daneshvaramoli, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Mohammad Hajiesmaili, and Cameron Musco

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
We study a learning-augmented variant of the secretary problem, recently introduced by Fujii and Yoshida (2023). In this variant, the decision-maker has access to machine-learned predictions of candidate values in advance. The key challenge is to balance consistency and robustness: when the predictions are accurate, the algorithm should hire a near-best secretary; however, if they are inaccurate, the algorithm should still achieve a bounded competitive ratio. We consider both the standard Random Order Secretary Problem (ROSP), where candidates arrive in a uniform random order, and a more natural model in the learning-augmented setting, where the decision-maker can choose the arrival order based on the predicted candidate values. This model, which we call the Chosen Order Secretary Problem (COSP), can capture scenarios such as an interview schedule that is set by the decision-maker. We propose a novel algorithm that applies to both ROSP and COSP. Building on the approach of Fujii and Yoshida, our method switches from fully trusting predictions to a threshold-based rule when a large deviation of a prediction is observed. Importantly, unlike the algorithm of Fujii and Yoshida, our algorithm uses randomization as part of its decision logic. We show that if ε ∈ [0,1] denotes the maximum multiplicative prediction error, then for ROSP our algorithm achieves competitive ratio max {0.221, (1-ε)/(1+ε)}, improving on a previous bound of max {0.215, (1-ε)/(1+ε)} due to Fujii and Yoshida [Fujii and Yoshida, 2023]. For COSP, our algorithm achieves max {0.262, (1-ε)/(1+ε)}. This surpasses a 0.25 upper bound on the worst-case competitive ratio that applies to the approach of Fujii and Yoshida, and gets closer to the classical secretary benchmark of 1/e ≈ 0.368, which is an upper bound for any algorithm. Our result for COSP highlights the benefit of integrating predictions with arrival-order control in online decision-making.
Cite as

Helia Karisani, Mohammadreza Daneshvaramoli, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Mohammad Hajiesmaili, and Cameron Musco. The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 86:1-86:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{karisani_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86,
  author =	{Karisani, Helia and Daneshvaramoli, Mohammadreza and Beyhaghi, Hedyeh and Hajiesmaili, Mohammad and Musco, Cameron},
  title =	{{The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{86:1--86:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253734},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secretary problem, learning-augmented algorithms, online algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.12
Online Knapsack Problems with Estimates

Authors: Jakub Balabán, Matthias Gehnen, Henri Lotze, Finn Seesemann, and Moritz Stocker

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
Imagine you are a computer scientist who enjoys attending conferences or workshops within the year. Sadly, your travel budget is limited, so you must select a subset of events you can travel to. When you are aware of all possible events and their costs at the beginning of the year, you can select the subset of the possible events that maximizes your happiness and is within your budget. On the other hand, if you are blind about the options, you will likely have a hard time when trying to decide if you want to register somewhere or not, and will likely regret decisions you made in the future. These scenarios can be modeled by knapsack variants, either by an offline or an online problem. However, both scenarios are somewhat unrealistic: Usually, you will not know the exact costs of each workshop at the beginning of the year. The online version, however, is too pessimistic, as you might already know which options there are and how much they cost roughly. At some point, you have to decide whether to register for some workshop, but then you are aware of the conference fee and the flight and hotel prices. We model this problem within the setting of online knapsack problems with estimates: in the beginning, you receive a list of potential items with their estimated size as well as the accuracy of the estimates. Then, the items are revealed one by one in an online fashion with their actual size, and you need to decide whether to take one or not. In this article, we show a best-possible algorithm for each estimate accuracy δ (i.e., when each actual item size can deviate by ± δ from the announced size) for both the simple knapsack (also known as subset sum problem) and the simple knapsack with removability.
Cite as

Jakub Balabán, Matthias Gehnen, Henri Lotze, Finn Seesemann, and Moritz Stocker. Online Knapsack Problems with Estimates. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 12:1-12:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{balaban_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.12,
  author =	{Balab\'{a}n, Jakub and Gehnen, Matthias and Lotze, Henri and Seesemann, Finn and Stocker, Moritz},
  title =	{{Online Knapsack Problems with Estimates}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241190},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Knapsack, Online Knapsack, Removability, Estimate, Prediction}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.98
The Long Arm of Nashian Allocation in Online p-Mean Welfare Maximization

Authors: Zhiyi Huang, Chui Shan Lee, Xinkai Shu, and Zhaozi Wang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
We study the online allocation of divisible items to n agents with additive valuations for p-mean welfare maximization, a problem introduced by Barman, Khan, and Maiti (2022). Our algorithmic and hardness results characterize the optimal competitive ratios for the entire spectrum of -∞ ≤ p ≤ 1. Surprisingly, our improved algorithms for all p ≤ (1)/(log n) are simply the greedy algorithm for the Nash welfare, supplemented with two auxiliary components to ensure all agents have non-zero utilities and to help a small number of agents with low utilities. In this sense, the long arm of Nashian allocation achieves near-optimal competitive ratios not only for Nash welfare but also all the way to egalitarian welfare.
Cite as

Zhiyi Huang, Chui Shan Lee, Xinkai Shu, and Zhaozi Wang. The Long Arm of Nashian Allocation in Online p-Mean Welfare Maximization. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 98:1-98:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{huang_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.98,
  author =	{Huang, Zhiyi and Lee, Chui Shan and Shu, Xinkai and Wang, Zhaozi},
  title =	{{The Long Arm of Nashian Allocation in Online p-Mean Welfare Maximization}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{98:1--98:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.98},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234754},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.98},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online Algorithms, Fair Division, Nash Welfare}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.11
Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions

Authors: Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, and Xizhi Tan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 251, 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)

Abstract
In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design, Nisan and Ronen [Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen, 1999] studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on unrelated machines aiming to minimize the makespan. They provided a strategyproof mechanism that achieves an n-approximation and they made the bold conjecture that this is the best approximation achievable by any deterministic strategyproof scheduling mechanism. After more than two decades and several efforts, n remains the best known approximation and very recent work by Christodoulou et al. [George Christodoulou et al., 2021] has been able to prove an Ω(√n) approximation lower bound for all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. This strong negative result, however, heavily depends on the fact that the performance of these mechanisms is evaluated using worst-case analysis. To overcome such overly pessimistic, and often uninformative, worst-case bounds, a surge of recent work has focused on the "learning-augmented framework", whose goal is to leverage machine-learned predictions to obtain improved approximations when these predictions are accurate (consistency), while also achieving near-optimal worst-case approximations even when the predictions are arbitrarily wrong (robustness). In this work, we study the classic strategic scheduling problem of Nisan and Ronen [Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen, 1999] using the learning-augmented framework and give a deterministic polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism that is 6-consistent and 2n-robust. We thus achieve the "best of both worlds": an O(1) consistency and an O(n) robustness that asymptotically matches the best-known approximation. We then extend this result to provide more general worst-case approximation guarantees as a function of the prediction error. Finally, we complement our positive results by showing that any 1-consistent deterministic strategyproof mechanism has unbounded robustness.
Cite as

Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, and Xizhi Tan. Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions. In 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 251, pp. 11:1-11:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{balkanski_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.11,
  author =	{Balkanski, Eric and Gkatzelis, Vasilis and Tan, Xizhi},
  title =	{{Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions}},
  booktitle =	{14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)},
  pages =	{11:1--11:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-263-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{251},
  editor =	{Tauman Kalai, Yael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-175143},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design with Predictions, Strategyproof Scheduling}
}
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