8 Search Results for "de Keijzer, Bart"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.14
Computing Tarski Fixed Points in Financial Networks

Authors: Leander Besting, Martin Hoefer, and Lars Huth

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 364, 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)

Abstract
Modern financial networks are highly connected and result in complex interdependencies of the involved institutions. In the prominent Eisenberg-Noe model [Eisenberg and Noe, 2001], a fundamental aspect is clearing - to determine the amount of assets available to each financial institution in the presence of potential defaults and bankruptcy. A clearing state represents a fixed point that satisfies a set of natural axioms. Existence can be established (even in broad generalizations of the model) using Tarski’s theorem. While a maximal fixed point can be computed in polynomial time, the complexity of computing other fixed points is open. In this paper, we provide an efficient algorithm to compute a minimal fixed point. Our algorithm applies in a broad generalization of the Eisenberg-Noe model with any monotone, piecewise-linear payment functions and default costs. We also study claims trading, a local network adjustment to improve clearing, when networks are evaluated with minimal clearing. We provide an efficient algorithm to decide existence of Pareto-improving trades and compute optimal ones if they exist.
Cite as

Leander Besting, Martin Hoefer, and Lars Huth. Computing Tarski Fixed Points in Financial Networks. In 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 364, pp. 14:1-14:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{besting_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2026.14,
  author =	{Besting, Leander and Hoefer, Martin and Huth, Lars},
  title =	{{Computing Tarski Fixed Points in Financial Networks}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-412-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{364},
  editor =	{Mahajan, Meena and Manea, Florin and McIver, Annabelle and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-255038},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Tarski Fixed Points, Financial Networks, Minimal Clearing, Claims Trade}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21
On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, and Giuseppe F. Italiano

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the performance of mildly greedy players in k-coloring games, a relevant subclass of anti-coordination games. A mildly greedy player is a selfish agent who is willing to deviate from a certain strategy profile only if her payoff improves by a factor of more than ε, for some given ε ≥ 0. In presence of mildly greedy players, stability is captured by the concept of (1+ε)-approximate Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we first show that, for any k-coloring game, the (1+ε)-approximate price of anarchy, i.e., the price of anarchy of (1+ε)-approximate pure Nash equilibria, is at least (k-1)/((k-1)ε +k), and that this bound is tight for any ε ≥ 0. Then, we evaluate the approximation ratio of the solutions achieved after a (1 + ϵ)-approximate one-round walk starting from any initial strategy profile, where a (1 + ϵ)-approximate one-round walk is a sequence of (1 + ε)-approximate best-responses, one for each player. We provide a lower bound of min{(k-2)/k, (k-1)/((k-1)ε+k)} on this ratio, for any ε ≥ 0 and k ≥ 5; for the cases of k = 3 and k = 4, we give finer bounds depending on ε. Our work generalizes the results known for cut games, the special case of k-coloring games restricted to k = 2.
Cite as

Vittorio Bilò, Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, and Giuseppe F. Italiano. On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 21:1-21:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and D'Ascenzo, Andrea and D'Emidio, Mattia and Italiano, Giuseppe F.},
  title =	{{On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241287},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Coloring games, (Approximate) Nash Equilibria, Price of Anarchy}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CALCO.2025.14
Pareto Fronts for Compositionally Solving String Diagrams of Parity Games

Authors: Kazuki Watanabe

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 342, 11th Conference on Algebra and Coalgebra in Computer Science (CALCO 2025)

Abstract
Open parity games are proposed as a compositional extension of parity games with algebraic operations, forming string diagrams of parity games. A potential application of string diagrams of parity games is to describe a large parity game with a given compositional structure and solve it efficiently as a divide-and-conquer algorithm by exploiting its compositional structure. Building on our recent progress in open Markov decision processes, we introduce Pareto fronts of open parity games, offering a framework for multi-objective solutions. We establish the positional determinacy of open parity games with respect to their Pareto fronts through a novel translation method. Our translation converts an open parity game into a parity game tailored to a given single-objective. Furthermore, we present a simple algorithm for solving open parity games, derived from this translation that allows the application of existing efficient algorithms for parity games. Expanding on this foundation, we develop a compositional algorithm for string diagrams of parity games.
Cite as

Kazuki Watanabe. Pareto Fronts for Compositionally Solving String Diagrams of Parity Games. In 11th Conference on Algebra and Coalgebra in Computer Science (CALCO 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 342, pp. 14:1-14:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{watanabe:LIPIcs.CALCO.2025.14,
  author =	{Watanabe, Kazuki},
  title =	{{Pareto Fronts for Compositionally Solving String Diagrams of Parity Games}},
  booktitle =	{11th Conference on Algebra and Coalgebra in Computer Science (CALCO 2025)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-383-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{342},
  editor =	{C\^{i}rstea, Corina and Knapp, Alexander},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CALCO.2025.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-235734},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CALCO.2025.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: parity game, compositionality, string diagram}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SAND.2025.2
Dynamic Debt Swapping in Financial Networks

Authors: Henri Froese, Martin Hoefer, and Lisa Wilhelmi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 330, 4th Symposium on Algorithmic Foundations of Dynamic Networks (SAND 2025)

Abstract
A debt swap is an elementary edge swap in a directed, weighted graph, where two edges with the same weight swap their targets. Debt swaps are a natural and appealing operation in financial networks, in which nodes are banks and edges represent debt contracts. They can improve the clearing payments and the stability of these networks. However, their algorithmic properties are not well-understood. We analyze the computational complexity of debt swapping. Our main interest lies in semi-positive swaps, in which no creditor strictly suffers and at least one strictly profits. These swaps lead to a Pareto-improvement in the entire network. We consider network optimization via sequences of v-improving debt swaps from which a given bank v strictly profits. For ranking-based clearing, we show that every sequence of semi-positive v-improving swaps has polynomial length. In contrast, for arbitrary v-improving swaps, the problem of reaching a network configuration that allows no further swaps is PLS-complete. We identify cases in which short sequences of semi-positive swaps exist even without the v-improving property.
Cite as

Henri Froese, Martin Hoefer, and Lisa Wilhelmi. Dynamic Debt Swapping in Financial Networks. In 4th Symposium on Algorithmic Foundations of Dynamic Networks (SAND 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 330, pp. 2:1-2:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{froese_et_al:LIPIcs.SAND.2025.2,
  author =	{Froese, Henri and Hoefer, Martin and Wilhelmi, Lisa},
  title =	{{Dynamic Debt Swapping in Financial Networks}},
  booktitle =	{4th Symposium on Algorithmic Foundations of Dynamic Networks (SAND 2025)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-368-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{330},
  editor =	{Meeks, Kitty and Scheideler, Christian},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SAND.2025.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-230550},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SAND.2025.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Debt Swap, Financial Networks, Local Search}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.76
Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Derivatives

Authors: Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, and Carmine Ventre

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 229, 49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022)

Abstract
Financial networks model a set of financial institutions (firms) interconnected by obligations. Recent work has introduced to this model a class of obligations called credit default swaps, a certain kind of financial derivatives. The main computational challenge for such systems is known as the clearing problem, which is to determine which firms are in default and to compute their exposure to systemic risk, technically known as their recovery rates. It is known that the recovery rates form the set of fixed points of a simple function, and that these fixed points can be irrational. Furthermore, Schuldenzucker et al. (2016) have shown that finding a weakly (or "almost") approximate (rational) fixed point is PPAD-complete. We further study the clearing problem from the point of view of irrationality and approximation strength. Firstly, we observe that weakly approximate solutions may misrepresent the actual financial state of an institution. On this basis, we study the complexity of finding a strongly (or "near") approximate solution, and show FIXP-completeness. We then study the structural properties required for irrationality, and we give necessary conditions for irrational solutions to emerge: The presence of certain types of cycles in a financial network forces the recovery rates to take the form of roots of non-linear polynomials. In the absence of a large subclass of such cycles, we study the complexity of finding an exact fixed point, which we show to be a problem close to, albeit outside of, PPAD.
Cite as

Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, and Carmine Ventre. Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Derivatives. In 49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 229, pp. 76:1-76:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{ioannidis_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.76,
  author =	{Ioannidis, Stavros D. and de Keijzer, Bart and Ventre, Carmine},
  title =	{{Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Derivatives}},
  booktitle =	{49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022)},
  pages =	{76:1--76:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-235-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{229},
  editor =	{Boja\'{n}czyk, Miko{\l}aj and Merelli, Emanuela and Woodruff, David P.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.76},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-164172},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.76},
  annote =	{Keywords: FIXP, Financial Networks, Systemic Risk}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.71
Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions

Authors: Bart de Keijzer, Maria Kyropoulou, and Carmine Ventre

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 168, 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020)

Abstract
We consider the setting of combinatorial auctions when the agents are single-minded and have no contingent reasoning skills. We are interested in mechanisms that provide the right incentives to these imperfectly rational agents, and therefore focus our attention to obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms. These mechanisms require that at each point during the execution where an agent is queried to communicate information, it should be "obvious" for the agent what strategy to adopt in order to maximise her utility. In this paper we study the potential of OSP mechanisms with respect to the approximability of the optimal social welfare. We consider two cases depending on whether the desired bundles of the agents are known or unknown to the mechanism. For the case of known-bundle single-minded agents we show that OSP can actually be as powerful as (plain) strategyproofness (SP). In particular, we show that we can implement the very same algorithm used for SP to achieve a √m-approximation of the optimal social welfare with an OSP mechanism, m being the total number of items. Restricting our attention to declaration domains with two values, we provide a 2-approximate OSP mechanism, and prove that this approximation bound is tight. We also present a randomised mechanism that is universally OSP and achieves a finite approximation of the optimal social welfare for the case of arbitrary size finite domains. This mechanism also provides a bounded approximation ratio when the valuations lie in a bounded interval (even if the declaration domain is infinitely large). For the case of unknown-bundle single-minded agents, we show how we can achieve an approximation ratio equal to the size of the largest desired set, in an OSP way. We remark this is the first known application of OSP to multi-dimensional settings, i.e., settings where agents have to declare more than one parameter. Our results paint a rather positive picture regarding the power of OSP mechanisms in this context, particularly for known-bundle single-minded agents. All our results are constructive, and even though some known strategyproof algorithms are used, implementing them in an OSP way is a non-trivial task.
Cite as

Bart de Keijzer, Maria Kyropoulou, and Carmine Ventre. Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions. In 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 168, pp. 71:1-71:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{dekeijzer_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.71,
  author =	{de Keijzer, Bart and Kyropoulou, Maria and Ventre, Carmine},
  title =	{{Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020)},
  pages =	{71:1--71:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-138-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{168},
  editor =	{Czumaj, Artur and Dawar, Anuj and Merelli, Emanuela},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.71},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-124781},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.71},
  annote =	{Keywords: OSP Mechanisms, Extensive-form Mechanisms, Single-minded Combinatorial Auctions, Greedy algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.50
The Ground-Set-Cost Budgeted Maximum Coverage Problem

Authors: Irving van Heuven van Staereling, Bart de Keijzer, and Guido Schäfer

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 58, 41st International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2016)

Abstract
We study the following natural variant of the budgeted maximum coverage problem: We are given a budget B and a hypergraph G = (V, E), where each vertex has a non-negative cost and a non-negative profit. The goal is to select a set of hyperedges T subseteq E such that the total cost of the vertices covered by T is at most B and the total profit of all covered vertices is maximized. Besides being a natural generalization of the well-studied maximum coverage problem, our motivation for investigating this problem originates from its application in the context of bid optimization in sponsored search auctions, such as Google AdWords. It is easily seen that this problem is strictly harder than budgeted max coverage, which means that the problem is (1-1/e)-inapproximable. The difference of our problem to the budgeted maximum coverage problem is that the costs are associated with the covered vertices instead of the selected hyperedges. As it turns out, this difference refutes the applicability of standard greedy approaches which are used to obtain constant factor approximation algorithms for several other variants of the maximum coverage problem. Our main results are as follows: - We obtain a (1 - 1/sqrt(e))/2-approximation algorithm for graphs. - We derive a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) if the incidence graph of the hypergraph is a forest (i.e., the hypergraph is Berge-acyclic). We also extend this result to incidence graphs with a fixed-size feedback hyperedge node set. - We give a (1-epsilon)/(2d^2)-approximation algorithm for every epsilon > 0, where d is the maximum degree of a vertex in the hypergraph.
Cite as

Irving van Heuven van Staereling, Bart de Keijzer, and Guido Schäfer. The Ground-Set-Cost Budgeted Maximum Coverage Problem. In 41st International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 58, pp. 50:1-50:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

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@InProceedings{vanheuvenvanstaereling_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.50,
  author =	{van Heuven van Staereling, Irving and de Keijzer, Bart and Sch\"{a}fer, Guido},
  title =	{{The Ground-Set-Cost Budgeted Maximum Coverage Problem}},
  booktitle =	{41st International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2016)},
  pages =	{50:1--50:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-016-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{58},
  editor =	{Faliszewski, Piotr and Muscholl, Anca and Niedermeier, Rolf},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.50},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-65020},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2016.50},
  annote =	{Keywords: maximum coverage problem, approximation algorithms, hypergraphs, submodular optimization, sponsored search}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2014.99
Shapley meets Shapley

Authors: Haris Aziz and Bart de Keijzer

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 25, 31st International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2014)

Abstract
This paper concerns the analysis of the Shapley value in matching games. Matching games constitute a fundamental class of cooperative games which help understand and model auctions and assignments. In a matching game, the value of a coalition of vertices is the weight of the maximum size matching in the subgraph induced by the coalition. The Shapley value is one of the most important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. After establishing some general insights, we show that the Shapley value of matching games can be computed in polynomial time for some special cases: graphs with maximum degree two, and graphs that have a small modular decomposition into cliques or cocliques (complete k-partite graphs are a notable special case of this). The latter result extends to various other well-known classes of graph-based cooperative games. We continue by showing that computing the Shapley value of unweighted matching games is #P-complete in general. Finally, a fully polynomial-time randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS) is presented. This FPRAS can be considered the best positive result conceivable, in view of the #P-completeness result.
Cite as

Haris Aziz and Bart de Keijzer. Shapley meets Shapley. In 31st International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2014). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 25, pp. 99-111, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2014)

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@InProceedings{aziz_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2014.99,
  author =	{Aziz, Haris and de Keijzer, Bart},
  title =	{{Shapley meets Shapley}},
  booktitle =	{31st International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2014)},
  pages =	{99--111},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-65-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2014},
  volume =	{25},
  editor =	{Mayr, Ernst W. and Portier, Natacha},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2014.99},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-44504},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2014.99},
  annote =	{Keywords: matching games, Shapley, counting complexity}
}
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