6 Search Results for "Birmpas, Georgios"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38
Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets

Authors: Pallavi Jain, Palash Jha, and Shubham Solanki

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
We propose a new fairness notion, motivated by the practical challenge of allocating teaching assistants (TAs) to courses in a department. Each course requires a certain number of TAs and each TA has preferences over the courses they want to assist. Similarly, each course instructor has preferences over the TAs who applied for their course. We demand fairness and efficiency for both sides separately, giving rise to the following criteria: (i) every course gets the required number of TAs and the average utility of the assigned TAs meets a threshold; (ii) the allocation of courses to TAs is envy-free, where a TA envies another TA if the former prefers the latter’s course and has a higher or equal grade in that course. Note that the definition of envy-freeness here differs from the one in the literature, and we call it merit-based envy-freeness. We show that the problem of finding a merit-based envy-free and efficient matching is NP-hard even for very restricted settings, such as two courses and uniform valuations; constant degree, constant capacity of TAs for every course, valuations in the range {0,1,2,3}, identical valuations from TAs, and even more. To find tractable results, we consider some restricted instances, such as, strict valuation of TAs for courses, the difference between the number of positively valued TAs for a course and the capacity, the number of positively valued TAs/courses, types of valuation functions, and obtained some polynomial-time solvable cases, showing the contrast with intractable results. We further studied the problem in the paradigm of parameterized algorithms and designed some exact and approximation algorithms.
Cite as

Pallavi Jain, Palash Jha, and Shubham Solanki. Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 38:1-38:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{jain_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38,
  author =	{Jain, Pallavi and Jha, Palash and Solanki, Shubham},
  title =	{{Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{38:1--38:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251186},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair Matching, Envy-Freeness, Efficiency}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29
Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division

Authors: Ajaykrishnan E S and Daniel Lokshtanov

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the problem of Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, where exactly p vertices of an undirected graph must be allocated to agents such that each agent receives a connected share and does not envy another agent’s share. Focusing on agents with additive valuations, we show that the problem remains computationally hard when parameterized by p and the number of agents. This result holds even for star graphs and with the input numbers given in unary representation, thereby resolving an open problem posed by Gahlawat and Zehavi (FSTTCS 2023). In stark contrast, we show that if one is willing to tolerate even the slightest amount of envy, then the problem becomes efficient with respect to the natural parameters. Specifically, we design an Efficient Parameterized Approximation Scheme parameterized by p and the number of agent types. Our algorithm works on general graphs and remains efficient even when the input numbers are provided in binary representation.
Cite as

Ajaykrishnan E S and Daniel Lokshtanov. Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 29:1-29:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{es_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29,
  author =	{E S, Ajaykrishnan and Lokshtanov, Daniel},
  title =	{{Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{29:1--29:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251101},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29},
  annote =	{Keywords: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, Efficient Parameterized Approximation Scheme, W\lbrack1\rbrack-hardness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.32
Fair Rent Division: New Budget and Rent Constraints

Authors: Rohith Reddy Gangam, Shayan Taherijam, and Vijay V. Vazirani

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the classical rent division problem, where n agents must allocate n indivisible rooms and split a fixed total rent R. The goal is to compute an envy-free (EF) allocation, where no agent prefers another agent’s room and rent to their own. This problem has been extensively studied under standard assumptions, where efficient algorithms for computing EF allocations are known. We extend this framework by introducing two practically motivated constraints: (i) lower and upper bounds on room rents, and (ii) room-specific budget for agents. We develop efficient combinatorial algorithms that either compute a feasible EF allocation or certify infeasibility. We further design algorithms to optimize over EF allocations using natural fairness objectives such as maximin utility, leximin utility, and minimum utility spread. Our approach unifies both constraint types within a single algorithmic framework, advancing the applicability of fair division methods in real-world platforms such as Spliddit.
Cite as

Rohith Reddy Gangam, Shayan Taherijam, and Vijay V. Vazirani. Fair Rent Division: New Budget and Rent Constraints. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 32:1-32:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{gangam_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.32,
  author =	{Gangam, Rohith Reddy and Taherijam, Shayan and Vazirani, Vijay V.},
  title =	{{Fair Rent Division: New Budget and Rent Constraints}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{32:1--32:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.32},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251136},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.32},
  annote =	{Keywords: Rent Division, Envy‑Free, Fair Division}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.41
Simultaneously Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Across Multiple Dimensions

Authors: Yasushi Kawase, Bodhayan Roy, and Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
This paper explores the fair allocation of indivisible items in a multidimensional setting, motivated by the need to address fairness in complex environments where agents assess bundles according to multiple criteria. Such multidimensional settings are not merely of theoretical interest but are central to many real-world applications. For example, cloud computing resources are evaluated based on multiple criteria such as CPU cores, memory, and network bandwidth. In such cases, traditional one-dimensional fairness notions fail to capture fairness across multiple attributes. To address these challenges, we study two relaxed variants of envy-freeness: weak simultaneously envy-free up to c goods (weak sEFc) and strong simultaneously envy-free up to c goods (strong sEFc), which accommodate the multidimensionality of agents’ preferences. Under the weak notion, for every pair of agents and for each dimension, any perceived envy can be eliminated by removing, if necessary, a different set of goods from the envied agent’s allocation. In contrast, the strong version requires selecting a single set of goods whose removal from the envied bundle simultaneously eliminates envy in every dimension. We provide upper and lower bounds on the relaxation parameter c that guarantee the existence of weak or strong sEFc allocations, where these bounds are independent of the total number of items. In addition, we present algorithms for checking whether a weak or strong sEFc allocation exists. Moreover, we establish NP-hardness results for checking the existence of weak sEF1 and strong sEF1 allocations.
Cite as

Yasushi Kawase, Bodhayan Roy, and Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui. Simultaneously Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Across Multiple Dimensions. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 41:1-41:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{kawase_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.41,
  author =	{Kawase, Yasushi and Roy, Bodhayan and Sanpui, Mohammad Azharuddin},
  title =	{{Simultaneously Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Across Multiple Dimensions}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{41:1--41:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.41},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251210},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.41},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair allocation, Envy-free up to one good, Multi-dimensional criteria, Linear programming, NP-hardness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15
Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes

Authors: Umang Bhaskar and Yeshwant Pandit

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
The existence of EFX allocations is one of the most significant open questions in fair division. Recent work by Christodoulou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa ("Fair allocation in graphs," EC 2023) establishes the existence of EFX allocations for graphical valuations, when agents are vertices in a graph, items are edges, and each item has zero value for all agents other than those at its endpoints. Thus, in this setting, each good has non-zero value for at most two agents, and there is at most one good valued by any pair of agents. This marks one of the few cases when an exact and complete EFX allocation is known to exist for more than three agents. In this work, we partially extend these results to multi-graphs, when each pair of vertices can have more than one edge between them. The existence of EFX allocations in multi-graphs is a natural open question given their existence in simple graphs. We show that EFX allocations exist, and can be computed in polynomial time, for agents with cancelable valuations in the following cases: (i) bipartite multi-graphs, (ii) multi-trees with monotone valuations, and (iii) multi-graphs with girth (2t-1), where t is the chromatic number of the multi-graph. The existence of EFX in cycle multi-graphs follows from (i), (iii), and the known existence of EFX for three agents.
Cite as

Umang Bhaskar and Yeshwant Pandit. Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 15:1-15:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bhaskar_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15,
  author =	{Bhaskar, Umang and Pandit, Yeshwant},
  title =	{{Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{15:1--15:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-250958},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair Division, EFX, Multi-graphs}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.20
Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains: Complement-Free Cost Functions and Beyond

Authors: Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis, and Guido Schäfer

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 144, 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019)

Abstract
We study mechanism design for combinatorial cost sharing models. Imagine that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested agents. The outcome of a mechanism in this setting consists of an assignment, determining for each item the set of players who are granted service, together with respective payments. Although there are several works studying specialized versions of such problems, there has been almost no progress for general combinatorial cost sharing domains until recently [S. Dobzinski and S. Ovadia, 2017]. Still, many questions about the interplay between strategyproofness, cost recovery and economic efficiency remain unanswered. The main goal of our work is to further understand this interplay in terms of budget balance and social cost approximation. Towards this, we provide a refinement of cross-monotonicity (which we term trace-monotonicity) that is applicable to iterative mechanisms. The trace here refers to the order in which players become finalized. On top of this, we also provide two parameterizations (complementary to a certain extent) of cost functions which capture the behavior of their average cost-shares. Based on our trace-monotonicity property, we design a scheme of ascending cost sharing mechanisms which is applicable to the combinatorial cost sharing setting with symmetric submodular valuations. Using our first cost function parameterization, we identify conditions under which our mechanism is weakly group-strategyproof, O(1)-budget-balanced and O(H_n)-approximate with respect to the social cost. Further, we show that our mechanism is budget-balanced and H_n-approximate if both the valuations and the cost functions are symmetric submodular; given existing impossibility results, this is best possible. Finally, we consider general valuation functions and exploit our second parameterization to derive a more fine-grained analysis of the Sequential Mechanism introduced by Moulin. This mechanism is budget balanced by construction, but in general only guarantees a poor social cost approximation of n. We identify conditions under which the mechanism achieves improved social cost approximation guarantees. In particular, we derive improved mechanisms for fundamental cost sharing problems, including Vertex Cover and Set Cover.
Cite as

Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis, and Guido Schäfer. Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains: Complement-Free Cost Functions and Beyond. In 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 144, pp. 20:1-20:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{birmpas_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2019.20,
  author =	{Birmpas, Georgios and Markakis, Evangelos and Sch\"{a}fer, Guido},
  title =	{{Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains: Complement-Free Cost Functions and Beyond}},
  booktitle =	{27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019)},
  pages =	{20:1--20:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-124-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{144},
  editor =	{Bender, Michael A. and Svensson, Ola and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-111419},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: Approximation Algorithms, Combinatorial Cost Sharing, Mechanism Design, Truthfulness}
}
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