2 Search Results for "Foley, Sean"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.22
Single-Token vs Two-Token Blockchain Tokenomics

Authors: Aggelos Kiayias, Philip Lazos, and Paolo Penna

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
We study long-term equilibria that arise in the token monetary policy, or tokenomics, design of proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain systems that engage utility maximizing users and validators. Validators are system maintainers who get rewarded with tokens for performing the work necessary for the system to function properly, while users compete and pay with such tokens for getting a desired portion of the system service. We study how the system service provision and suitable rewards schemes together can lead to equilibria with the following desirable characteristics (1) viability: the system keeps parties engaged, (2) decentralization and skin-in-the-game: multiple sufficiently invested validators are participating, (3) stability: the price path of the underlying token used to transact with the system does not change widely over time, and (4) feasibility: the mechanism is easy to implement as a smart contract, e.g., it does not require a fiat reserve on-chain to perform token buybacks or to perform bookkeeping of exponentially growing token holdings. Our analysis enables us to put forward a novel generic mechanism for blockchain monetary policy that we call quantitative rewarding (QR). We investigate how to implement QR in single-token and two-token proof of stake (PoS) blockchain systems. The latter are systems that utilize one token for the users to pay the transaction fees and a different token for the validators to participate in the PoS protocol and get rewarded. Our approach demonstrates a concrete advantage of the two-token setting in terms of the ability of the QR mechanism to be realized effectively and provide good equilibria. Our analysis also reveals an inherent limitation of the single token setting in terms of implementing an effective blockchain monetary policy - a distinction that is, to the best of our knowledge, highlighted for the first time.
Cite as

Aggelos Kiayias, Philip Lazos, and Paolo Penna. Single-Token vs Two-Token Blockchain Tokenomics. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 22:1-22:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{kiayias_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.22,
  author =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Lazos, Philip and Penna, Paolo},
  title =	{{Single-Token vs Two-Token Blockchain Tokenomics}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{22:1--22:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.22},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247412},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.22},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, tokenomics, buyback, equilibria, price path, stable price, discounted game, dual-token, proof-of-stake, validator}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9
The Impact of Ethereum Throughput and Fees on Transaction Latency During ICOs

Authors: Michael Spain, Sean Foley, and Vincent Gramoli

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
The Ethereum blockchain has gained popularity for its ability to implement Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), whereby a buyer enters a market order agreement with a seller in order to purchase cryptographic tokens at an agreed price. The popularity of ICOs in 2017 has created an increasingly adversarial environment among potential buyers, who compete for what is often a fixed supply of tokens offered for a limited period of time. We study the impact of a series of ICOs in order to understand the relationship between transaction fees, throughput and latency in Ethereum. Our analysis considers the effects on both Ethereum’s service providers, known as miners, and users who issue transactions in the network. Our results show that while buyers incentivise miners generously to include their transactions during ICOs, the latency of these transactions is predominantly determined by the levels of supply and demand in the network.
Cite as

Michael Spain, Sean Foley, and Vincent Gramoli. The Impact of Ethereum Throughput and Fees on Transaction Latency During ICOs. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 9:1-9:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{spain_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9,
  author =	{Spain, Michael and Foley, Sean and Gramoli, Vincent},
  title =	{{The Impact of Ethereum Throughput and Fees on Transaction Latency During ICOs}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:15},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119735},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: ICO, Gas, Ethereum, Transaction Fee, Latency, Fairness}
}
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