2 Search Results for "Levin, Ezra"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84
Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions

Authors: Aviad Rubinstein and Zixin Zhou

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the fundamental, classical mechanism design problem of single-buyer multi-item Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity between the buyer and the seller. Specifically, we ask whether using quantum communication can be more efficient than classical communication. We have two sets of results, revealing a surprisingly rich landscape - which looks quite different from both quantum communication in non-strategic parties, and classical communication in mechanism design. We first study the expected communication complexity of approximately optimal auctions. We give quantum auction protocols for buyers with unit-demand or combinatorial valuations that obtain an arbitrarily good approximation of the optimal revenue while running in exponentially more efficient communication compared to classical approximately optimal auctions. However, these auctions come with the caveat that they may require the seller to charge exponentially large payments from a deviating buyer. We show that this caveat is necessary - we give an exponential lower bound on the product of the expected quantum communication and the maximum payment. We then study the worst-case communication complexity of exactly optimal auctions in an extremely simple setting: additive buyer’s valuations over two items. We show the following separations: - There exists a prior where the optimal classical auction protocol requires infinitely many bits, but a one-way message of 1 qubit and 2 classical bits suffices. - There exists a prior where no finite one-way quantum auction protocol can obtain the optimal revenue. However, there is a barely-interactive revenue-optimal quantum auction protocol with the following simple structure: the seller prepares a pair of qubits in the EPR state, sends one of them to the buyer, and then the buyer sends 1 qubit and 2 classical bits. - There exists a prior where no multi-round quantum auction protocol with a finite bound on communication complexity can obtain the optimal revenue.
Cite as

Aviad Rubinstein and Zixin Zhou. Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 84:1-84:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{rubinstein_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84,
  author =	{Rubinstein, Aviad and Zhou, Zixin},
  title =	{{Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{84:1--84:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-227124},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism design, Communication complexity, Quantum computing}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICDT.2016.12
Filtering With the Crowd: CrowdScreen Revisited

Authors: Benoit Groz, Ezra Levin, Isaac Meilijson, and Tova Milo

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 48, 19th International Conference on Database Theory (ICDT 2016)

Abstract
Filtering a set of items, based on a set of properties that can be verified by humans, is a common application of CrowdSourcing. When the workers are error-prone, each item is presented to multiple users, to limit the probability of misclassification. Since the Crowd is a relatively expensive resource, minimizing the number of questions per item may naturally result in big savings. Several algorithms to address this minimization problem have been presented in the CrowdScreen framework by Parameswaran et al. However, those algorithms do not scale well and therefore cannot be used in scenarios where high accuracy is required in spite of high user error rates. The goal of this paper is thus to devise algorithms that can cope with such situations. To achieve this, we provide new theoretical insights to the problem, then use them to develop a new efficient algorithm. We also propose novel optimizations for the algorithms of CrowdScreen that improve their scalability. We complement our theoretical study by an experimental evaluation of the algorithms on a large set of synthetic parameters as well as real-life crowdsourcing scenarios, demonstrating the advantages of our solution.
Cite as

Benoit Groz, Ezra Levin, Isaac Meilijson, and Tova Milo. Filtering With the Crowd: CrowdScreen Revisited. In 19th International Conference on Database Theory (ICDT 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 48, pp. 12:1-12:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{groz_et_al:LIPIcs.ICDT.2016.12,
  author =	{Groz, Benoit and Levin, Ezra and Meilijson, Isaac and Milo, Tova},
  title =	{{Filtering With the Crowd: CrowdScreen Revisited}},
  booktitle =	{19th International Conference on Database Theory (ICDT 2016)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-002-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{48},
  editor =	{Martens, Wim and Zeume, Thomas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICDT.2016.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-57817},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICDT.2016.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: CrowdSourcing, filtering, algorithms, sprt, hypothesis testing}
}
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