6 Search Results for "Moscardelli, Luca"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FUN.2026.13
The Berlin Safe House Puzzle: Spycraft via Interval Graphs

Authors: Gennaro Cordasco, Luisa Gargano, and Adele Anna Rescigno

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 366, 13th International Conference on Fun with Algorithms (FUN 2026)

Abstract
We propose a gamified application of the {Identifying Code} problem on {Interval Graphs}, framed as a high-stakes Cold War counter-intelligence operation. We present a polynomial-time algorithm to assign "Listening Devices" (bugs) to "Safe Houses" (intervals) so that every safe house is uniquely identifiable by its bug signature. While the problem is NP-hard on several graph classes, including chordal and bipartite graphs, the interval-graph structure allows us to compute a 2-approximate solution efficiently.
Cite as

Gennaro Cordasco, Luisa Gargano, and Adele Anna Rescigno. The Berlin Safe House Puzzle: Spycraft via Interval Graphs. In 13th International Conference on Fun with Algorithms (FUN 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 366, pp. 13:1-13:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{cordasco_et_al:LIPIcs.FUN.2026.13,
  author =	{Cordasco, Gennaro and Gargano, Luisa and Rescigno, Adele Anna},
  title =	{{The Berlin Safe House Puzzle: Spycraft via Interval Graphs}},
  booktitle =	{13th International Conference on Fun with Algorithms (FUN 2026)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-417-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{366},
  editor =	{Iacono, John},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FUN.2026.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-257325},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FUN.2026.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Interval Graphs, Watching-System, Approximate Algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2026.18
A Modular Framework for Proof-Search via Formalised Modal Completeness in HOL Light

Authors: Antonella Bilotta, Marco Maggesi, and Cosimo Perini Brogi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 363, 34th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2026)

Abstract
We extend the existing HOL Light Library for Modal Systems (HOLMS) to support a modular implementation of modal reasoning within the HOL Light proof assistant. We deeply embed axiomatic calculi and relational semantics for seven normal modal logics (K, T, B, K4, S4, S5, GL) and formalise modal adequacy theorems for these systems. We then leverage those formalisations to implement a mechanism for automated reasoning via proof-search in the associated labelled sequent calculi, which we shallowly embed in HOL Light’s goal-stack mechanism. This way, we equip the general-purpose proof assistant with (semi)decision procedures for these logics that, in case of failure to construct a proof for the input formula, return a certified countermodel within the appropriate class for the logic under consideration. On the methodological side, we propose a precise measure of the modularity of our approach by systematically adopting Christopher Strachey’s distinction between ad hoc and parametric polymorphism throughout the library.
Cite as

Antonella Bilotta, Marco Maggesi, and Cosimo Perini Brogi. A Modular Framework for Proof-Search via Formalised Modal Completeness in HOL Light. In 34th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 363, pp. 18:1-18:29, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{bilotta_et_al:LIPIcs.CSL.2026.18,
  author =	{Bilotta, Antonella and Maggesi, Marco and Perini Brogi, Cosimo},
  title =	{{A Modular Framework for Proof-Search via Formalised Modal Completeness in HOL Light}},
  booktitle =	{34th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2026)},
  pages =	{18:1--18:29},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-411-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{363},
  editor =	{Guerrini, Stefano and K\"{o}nig, Barbara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2026.18},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-254427},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2026.18},
  annote =	{Keywords: Modal logic, HOL Light, Labelled sequent calculi, Logical verification, Interactive theorem proving, Automated proof-search}
}
Document
APPROX
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.9
Optimal Competitive Ratio for Optimization Problems with Congestion Effects

Authors: Miriam Fischer, Dario Paccagnan, and Cosimo Vinci

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 353, Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2025)

Abstract
In this work we study online optimization problems with congestion effects. These are problems where tasks arrive online and a decision maker is required to allocate them on the fly to available resources in order to minimize the cost suffered, which grows with the amount of resources used. This class of problems corresponds to the online counterpart of well-known studied problems, including optimization problems with diseconomies of scale [Konstantin Makarychev and Maxim Sviridenko, 2018], minimum cost in congestion games [Gairing and Paccagnan, 2023], and load balancing problems [Baruch Awerbuch et al., 1995]. Within this setting, our work settles the problem of designing online algorithms with optimal competitive ratio, i.e., algorithms whose incurred cost is as close as possible to that of an oracle with complete knowledge of the future instance ahead of time. We provide three contributions underpinning this result. First, we show that no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio below a given factor depending solely on the resource costs. Second, we show that, when guided by carefully modified cost functions, the greedy algorithm achieves a competitive ratio matching this lower bound and thus is optimal. Finally, we show how to compute such modified cost functions in polynomial time.
Cite as

Miriam Fischer, Dario Paccagnan, and Cosimo Vinci. Optimal Competitive Ratio for Optimization Problems with Congestion Effects. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 353, pp. 9:1-9:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{fischer_et_al:LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.9,
  author =	{Fischer, Miriam and Paccagnan, Dario and Vinci, Cosimo},
  title =	{{Optimal Competitive Ratio for Optimization Problems with Congestion Effects}},
  booktitle =	{Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2025)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-397-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{353},
  editor =	{Ene, Alina and Chattopadhyay, Eshan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-243754},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online Algorithms, Competitive Ratio, Algorithmic Game Theory, Greedy Algorithms, Congestion Games}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21
On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, and Giuseppe F. Italiano

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the performance of mildly greedy players in k-coloring games, a relevant subclass of anti-coordination games. A mildly greedy player is a selfish agent who is willing to deviate from a certain strategy profile only if her payoff improves by a factor of more than ε, for some given ε ≥ 0. In presence of mildly greedy players, stability is captured by the concept of (1+ε)-approximate Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we first show that, for any k-coloring game, the (1+ε)-approximate price of anarchy, i.e., the price of anarchy of (1+ε)-approximate pure Nash equilibria, is at least (k-1)/((k-1)ε +k), and that this bound is tight for any ε ≥ 0. Then, we evaluate the approximation ratio of the solutions achieved after a (1 + ϵ)-approximate one-round walk starting from any initial strategy profile, where a (1 + ϵ)-approximate one-round walk is a sequence of (1 + ε)-approximate best-responses, one for each player. We provide a lower bound of min{(k-2)/k, (k-1)/((k-1)ε+k)} on this ratio, for any ε ≥ 0 and k ≥ 5; for the cases of k = 3 and k = 4, we give finer bounds depending on ε. Our work generalizes the results known for cut games, the special case of k-coloring games restricted to k = 2.
Cite as

Vittorio Bilò, Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, and Giuseppe F. Italiano. On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 21:1-21:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and D'Ascenzo, Andrea and D'Emidio, Mattia and Italiano, Giuseppe F.},
  title =	{{On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241287},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Coloring games, (Approximate) Nash Equilibria, Price of Anarchy}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.47
Pricing Problems with Buyer Preselection

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, and Luca Moscardelli

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 117, 43rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2018)

Abstract
We investigate the problem of preselecting a subset of buyers participating in a market so as to optimize the performance of stable outcomes. We consider four scenarios arising from the combination of two stability notions, item and bundle envy-freeness, with the two classical objective functions, i.e., the social welfare and the seller's revenue. When adopting the notion of item envy-freeness, we prove that, for both the two objective functions, the problem cannot be approximated within n^(1-epsilon) for any epsilon >0, and provide tight or nearly tight approximation algorithms. We also prove that maximizing the seller's revenue is NP-hard even for a single buyer, thus closing an open question. Under bundle envy-freeness, instead, we show how to transform in polynomial time any stable outcome for a market involving only a subset of buyers to a stable one for the whole market without worsening its performance, both for the social welfare and the seller's revenue. Finally, we consider multi-unit markets, where all items are of the same type and are assigned the same price. For this specific case, we show that buyer preselection can improve the performance of stable outcomes in all of the four considered scenarios, and we design corresponding approximation algorithms.
Cite as

Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, and Luca Moscardelli. Pricing Problems with Buyer Preselection. In 43rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 117, pp. 47:1-47:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.47,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and Flammini, Michele and Monaco, Gianpiero and Moscardelli, Luca},
  title =	{{Pricing Problems with Buyer Preselection}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2018)},
  pages =	{47:1--47:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-086-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{117},
  editor =	{Potapov, Igor and Spirakis, Paul and Worrell, James},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.47},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-96292},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.47},
  annote =	{Keywords: Pricing problems, Envy-freeness, Revenue maximization, Social Welfare maximization}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.146
Uniform Mixed Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Link Failures

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Luca Moscardelli, and Cosimo Vinci

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 107, 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)

Abstract
Motivated by possible applications in fault-tolerant routing, we introduce the notion of uniform mixed equilibria in network congestion games with adversarial link failures, where players need to route traffic from a source to a destination node. Given an integer rho >= 1, a rho-uniform mixed strategy is a mixed strategy in which a player plays exactly rho edge disjoint paths with uniform probabilities, so that a rho-uniform mixed equilibrium is a tuple of rho-uniform mixed strategies, one for each player, in which no player can lower her cost by deviating to another rho-uniform mixed strategy. For games with weighted players and affine latency functions, we show existence of rho-uniform mixed equilibria and provide a tight characterization of their price of anarchy. For games with unweighted players, instead, we extend the existential guarantee to any class of latency functions and, restricted to games with affine latencies, we derive a tight characterization of both the prices of anarchy and stability.
Cite as

Vittorio Bilò, Luca Moscardelli, and Cosimo Vinci. Uniform Mixed Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Link Failures. In 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 107, pp. 146:1-146:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.146,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and Moscardelli, Luca and Vinci, Cosimo},
  title =	{{Uniform Mixed Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Link Failures}},
  booktitle =	{45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)},
  pages =	{146:1--146:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-076-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{107},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Kaklamanis, Christos and Marx, D\'{a}niel and Sannella, Donald},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.146},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-91508},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.146},
  annote =	{Keywords: Network Congestion Games, Fault-Tolerant Routing, Nash Equilibria, Price of Anarchy, Price of Stability}
}
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