3 Search Results for "Pistoia, Marco"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.85
Cutoff Theorems for the Equivalence of Parameterized Quantum Circuits

Authors: Neil J. Ross and Scott Wesley

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
Many promising quantum algorithms in economics, medical science, and material science rely on circuits that are parameterized by a large number of angles. To ensure that these algorithms are efficient, these parameterized circuits must be heavily optimized. However, most quantum circuit optimizers are not verified, so this procedure is known to be error-prone. For this reason, there is growing interest in the design of equivalence checking algorithms for parameterized quantum circuits. In this paper, we define a generalized class of parameterized circuits with arbitrary rotations and show that this problem is decidable for cyclotomic gate sets. We propose a cutoff-based procedure which reduces the problem of verifying the equivalence of parameterized quantum circuits to the problem of verifying the equivalence of finitely many parameter-free quantum circuits. Because the number of parameter-free circuits grows exponentially with the number of parameters, we also propose a probabilistic variant of the algorithm for cases when the number of parameters is intractably large. We show that our techniques extend to equivalence modulo global phase, and describe an efficient angle sampling procedure for cyclotomic gate sets.
Cite as

Neil J. Ross and Scott Wesley. Cutoff Theorems for the Equivalence of Parameterized Quantum Circuits. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 85:1-85:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{ross_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.85,
  author =	{Ross, Neil J. and Wesley, Scott},
  title =	{{Cutoff Theorems for the Equivalence of Parameterized Quantum Circuits}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{85:1--85:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.85},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241921},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.85},
  annote =	{Keywords: Quantum Circuits, Parameterized Equivalence Checking}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.18
Practical Type-Based Taint Checking and Inference

Authors: Nima Karimipour, Kanak Das, Manu Sridharan, and Behnaz Hassanshahi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 333, 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)

Abstract
Many important security properties can be formulated in terms of flows of tainted data, and improved taint analysis tools to prevent such flows are of critical need. Most existing taint analyses use whole-program static analysis, leading to scalability challenges. Type-based checking is a promising alternative, as it enables modular and incremental checking for fast performance. However, type-based approaches have not been widely adopted in practice, due to challenges with false positives and annotating existing codebases. In this paper, we present a new approach to type-based checking of taint properties that addresses these challenges, based on two key techniques. First, we present a new type-based tainting checker with significantly reduced false positives, via more practical handling of third-party libraries and other language constructs. Second, we present a novel technique to automatically infer tainting type qualifiers for existing code. Our technique supports inference of generic type argument annotations, crucial for tainting properties. We implemented our techniques in a tool TaintTyper and evaluated it on real-world benchmarks. TaintTyper exceeds the recall of a state-of-the-art whole-program taint analyzer, with comparable precision, and 2.93X-22.9X faster checking time. Further, TaintTyper infers annotations comparable to those written by hand, suitable for insertion into source code. TaintTyper is a promising new approach to efficient and practical taint checking.
Cite as

Nima Karimipour, Kanak Das, Manu Sridharan, and Behnaz Hassanshahi. Practical Type-Based Taint Checking and Inference. In 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 333, pp. 18:1-18:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{karimipour_et_al:LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.18,
  author =	{Karimipour, Nima and Das, Kanak and Sridharan, Manu and Hassanshahi, Behnaz},
  title =	{{Practical Type-Based Taint Checking and Inference}},
  booktitle =	{39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)},
  pages =	{18:1--18:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-373-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{333},
  editor =	{Aldrich, Jonathan and Silva, Alexandra},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.18},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-233119},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.18},
  annote =	{Keywords: Static analysis, Taint Analysis, Pluggable type systems, Security, Inference}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2015.222
Access-rights Analysis in the Presence of Subjects

Authors: Paolina Centonze, Marco Pistoia, and Omer Tripp

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 37, 29th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2015)

Abstract
Modern software development and run-time environments, such as Java and the Microsoft .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR), have adopted a declarative form of access control. Permissions are granted to code providers, and during execution, the platform verifies compatibility between the permissions required by a security-sensitive operation and those granted to the executing code. While convenient, configuring the access-control policy of a program is not easy. If a code component is not granted sufficient permissions, authorization failures may occur. Thus, security administrators tend to define overly permissive policies, which violate the Principle of Least Privilege (PLP). A considerable body of research has been devoted to building program-analysis tools for computing the optimal policy for a program. However, Java and the CLR also allow executing code under the authority of a subject (user or service), and no program-analysis solution has addressed the challenges of determining the policy of a program in the presence of subjects. This paper introduces Subject Access Rights Analysis (SARA), a novel analysis algorithm for statically computing the permissions required by subjects at run time. We have applied SARA to 348 libraries in IBM WebSphere Application Server - a commercial enterprise application server written in Java that consists of >2 million lines of code and is required to support the Java permission- and subject-based security model. SARA detected 263 PLP violations, 219 cases of policies with missing permissions, and 29 bugs that led code to be unnecessarily executed under the authority of a subject. SARA corrected all these vulnerabilities automatically, and additionally synthesized fresh policies for all the libraries, with a false-positive rate of 5% and an average running time of 103 seconds per library. SARA also implements mechanisms for mitigating the risk of false negatives due to reflection and native code; according to a thorough result evaluation based on testing, no false negative was detected. SARA enabled IBM WebSphere Application Server to receive the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Assurance Level 4 certification.
Cite as

Paolina Centonze, Marco Pistoia, and Omer Tripp. Access-rights Analysis in the Presence of Subjects. In 29th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2015). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 37, pp. 222-246, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2015)

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@InProceedings{centonze_et_al:LIPIcs.ECOOP.2015.222,
  author =	{Centonze, Paolina and Pistoia, Marco and Tripp, Omer},
  title =	{{Access-rights Analysis in the Presence of Subjects}},
  booktitle =	{29th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2015)},
  pages =	{222--246},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-86-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2015},
  volume =	{37},
  editor =	{Boyland, John Tang},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2015.222},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-52249},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2015.222},
  annote =	{Keywords: Static Analysis, Security, Access Control}
}
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