Volume

Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282

Publication Details

  • published at: 2010-01-13
  • Publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik

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Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.1
09282 Abstracts Collection – Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware

Authors: Jorge Guajardo, Bart Preneel, Pim Tuyls, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

Abstract
From 05.07 to 08.07.2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09282 "Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware" was held in Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available
Cite as

Jorge Guajardo, Bart Preneel, Pim Tuyls, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi. 09282 Abstracts Collection – Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, pp. 1-11, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{guajardo_et_al:DagSemProc.09282.1,
  author =	{Guajardo, Jorge and Preneel, Bart and Tuyls, Pim and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza},
  title =	{{09282 Abstracts Collection – Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  pages =	{1--11},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24073},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Foundations, PUF models, PUF applications, anti-counterfeiting, forgery resilience, side-channel attack models}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.2
09282 Executive Summary – Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware

Authors: Jorge Guajardo, Bart Preneel, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Pim Tuyls

Abstract
From 05.07 to 08.07.2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09282 ``Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware '' was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. This paper provides a summary of the motivation for the seminar and the importance of the research area, a list of the participants and the program of talks given during the seminar.
Cite as

Jorge Guajardo, Bart Preneel, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Pim Tuyls. 09282 Executive Summary – Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, pp. 1-7, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{guajardo_et_al:DagSemProc.09282.2,
  author =	{Guajardo, Jorge and Preneel, Bart and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Tuyls, Pim},
  title =	{{09282 Executive Summary – Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  pages =	{1--7},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24086},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Foundations, PUF models, PUF applications, anti-counterfeiting,forgery resilience, side-channel attack models}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.3
An efficient fuzzy extractor for limited noise

Authors: Boris Skoric and Pim Tuyls

Abstract
A fuzzy extractor is a security primitive that allows for reproducible extraction of an almost uniform key from a non-uniform noisy source. We analyze a fuzzy extractor scheme that uses universal hash functions for both information reconciliation and privacy amplification. This is a useful scheme when the number of error patterns likely to occur is limited, regardless of the error probabilities. We derive a sharp bound on the uniformity of the extracted key, making use of the concatenation property of universal hash functions and a recent tight formulation of the leftover hash lemma.
Cite as

Boris Skoric and Pim Tuyls. An efficient fuzzy extractor for limited noise. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{skoric_et_al:DagSemProc.09282.3,
  author =	{Skoric, Boris and Tuyls, Pim},
  title =	{{An efficient fuzzy extractor for limited noise}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24094},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fuzzy Extractor, PUF, physical unclonable function, universal hash}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.4
Anti-Counterfeiting: Mixing the Physical and the Digital World

Authors: Darko Kirovski

Abstract
In this paper, we overview a set of desiderata for building digital anti-counterfeiting technologies that rely upon the difficulty of manufacturing randomized complex 3D objects. Then, we observe how this set is addressed by RF-DNA, an anti-counterfeiting technology recently proposed by DeJean and Kirovski. RF-DNA constructs certificates of authenticity as random objects that exhibit substantial uniqueness in the electromagnetic domain.
Cite as

Darko Kirovski. Anti-Counterfeiting: Mixing the Physical and the Digital World. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, pp. 1-11, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{kirovski:DagSemProc.09282.4,
  author =	{Kirovski, Darko},
  title =	{{Anti-Counterfeiting: Mixing the Physical and the Digital World}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  pages =	{1--11},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24063},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Certificates of authenticity, RF-DNA, physically unique one-way functions}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.5
Engineering On-Chip Thermal Effects

Authors: Patrick Schaumont

Abstract
Temperature effects can be used to maliciously affect the behavior of digital crypto-circuits. For example, temperature effects can create covert communication channels, and they can affect the stability of physical unclonable functions (PUFs). This talk observes that these thermal effects can be engineered, and we describe two techniques. The first technique shows how to filter the information through a covert temperature channel. This leads to detectors for very specific events, for example, someone touching the chip package. The second technique shows how to mitigate the impact of temperature on a PUF design while avoiding costly post-processing. We discuss the design of a compact ring-oscillator PUF for FPGA which is tolerant to temperature variations.
Cite as

Patrick Schaumont. Engineering On-Chip Thermal Effects. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{schaumont:DagSemProc.09282.5,
  author =	{Schaumont, Patrick},
  title =	{{Engineering On-Chip Thermal Effects}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24032},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: PUFs, temperature effects, covert temperature channel, ring oscillator PUF, FPGAs}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.6
How to Make Smartcards Resistant to Hackers' Lightsabers?

Authors: Philippe Teuwen

Abstract
Cracking smartcards has always been a prized hobby, for the academic glory , for fun (ha, breaking the self-claimed unbreakable...) and for profit (ask the mafia). State-of-the-art techniques include laser blasts that inject various transient or permanent faults in a program execution, potentially making the smartcard do whatever the attacker wants. After a brief recap of the attack tools and their effects, we'll see how the programmer can protect his code with software techniques ranging from cookbook recipes to tool chain automation and how he can evaluate the robustness of his code by means of fault injection simulators.
Cite as

Philippe Teuwen. How to Make Smartcards Resistant to Hackers' Lightsabers?. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, pp. 1-8, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{teuwen:DagSemProc.09282.6,
  author =	{Teuwen, Philippe},
  title =	{{How to Make Smartcards Resistant to Hackers' Lightsabers?}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  pages =	{1--8},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24010},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fault-injection, smartcard, simulator}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.7
Simplification of Controlled PUF primitives

Authors: Boris Skoric and Marc X. Makkes

Abstract
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are physical objects that are unique, practically unclonable and that behave like a random function when subjected to a challenge. Their use has been proposed for authentication tokens and anti-counterfeiting. A Controlled PUF (CPUF) consists of a PUF and a control layer that restricts a user's access to the PUF input and output. CPUFs can be used for secure key storage, authentication, certified execution of programs, and certified measurements. In this paper we modify a number of protocols involving CPUFs in order to improve their security. Our modifications mainly consist of encryption of a larger portion of the message traffic, and additional restrictions on the CPUF accessibility. We simplify the description of CPUF protocols by using flowchart notation. Furthermore we explicitly show how the helper data for the PUFs is handled.
Cite as

Boris Skoric and Marc X. Makkes. Simplification of Controlled PUF primitives. In Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9282, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{skoric_et_al:DagSemProc.09282.7,
  author =	{Skoric, Boris and Makkes, Marc X.},
  title =	{{Simplification of Controlled PUF primitives}},
  booktitle =	{Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{9282},
  editor =	{Jorge Guajardo and Bart Preneel and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24044},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.09282.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: PUF, physical unclonable function, controlled PUF, CPUF}
}

Filters

  • Authors
  • G
  • Guajardo, Jorge
  • K
  • Kirovski, Darko
  • M
  • Makkes, Marc X.
  • P
  • Preneel, Bart
  • S
  • Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza
  • Schaumont, Patrick
  • Skoric, Boris
  • T
  • Teuwen, Philippe
  • Tuyls, Pim

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