Document

**Published in:** LIPIcs, Volume 287, 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024)

We study two recent combinatorial contract design models, which highlight different sources of complexity that may arise in contract design, where a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to others. In both settings, the principal cannot observe the choices of the agent(s), only the project’s outcome (success or failure), and incentivizes the agent(s) using a contract, a payment scheme that specifies the payment to the agent(s) upon a project’s success. We present results that resolve open problems and advance our understanding of the computational complexity of both settings.
In the multi-agent setting, the project is delegated to a team of agents, where each agent chooses whether or not to exert effort. A success probability function maps any subset of agents who exert effort to a probability of the project’s success. For the family of submodular success probability functions, Dütting et al. [2023] established a poly-time constant factor approximation to the optimal contract, and left open whether this problem admits a PTAS. We answer this question on the negative, by showing that no poly-time algorithm guarantees a better than 0.7-approximation to the optimal contract. For XOS functions, they give a poly-time constant approximation with value and demand queries. We show that with value queries only, one cannot get any constant approximation.
In the multi-action setting, the project is delegated to a single agent, who can take any subset of a given set of actions. Here, a success probability function maps any subset of actions to a probability of the project’s success. Dütting et al. [2021a] showed a poly-time algorithm for computing an optimal contract for gross substitutes success probability functions, and showed that the problem is NP-hard for submodular functions. We further strengthen this hardness result by showing that this problem does not admit any constant factor approximation. Furthermore, for the broader class of XOS functions, we establish the hardness of obtaining a n^{-1/2+ε}-approximation for any ε > 0.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Maya Schlesinger. On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts. In 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 287, pp. 44:1-44:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{ezra_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.44, author = {Ezra, Tomer and Feldman, Michal and Schlesinger, Maya}, title = {{On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts}}, booktitle = {15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024)}, pages = {44:1--44:22}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-309-6}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2024}, volume = {287}, editor = {Guruswami, Venkatesan}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.44}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-195724}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.44}, annote = {Keywords: algorithmic contract design, combinatorial contracts, moral hazard} }

Document

Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games

**Published in:** LIPIcs, Volume 261, 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023)

We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an item in her desired set. Unlike most online matching settings, where agents arrive online, in our setting the items arrive online in an adversarial order while the buyers are present for the entire duration of the process. This poses a significant challenge to the design of truthful mechanisms, due to the ability of buyers to strategize over future rounds. We provide an almost full picture of the competitive ratios in different scenarios, including myopic vs. non-myopic agents, tardy vs. prompt payments, and private vs. public desired sets. Among other results, we identify the frontier up to which the celebrated e/(e-1) competitive ratio for the vertex-weighted online matching of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani extends to truthful agents and online items.

Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Simon Mauras, and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser. Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. In 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 261, pp. 58:1-58:20, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{feldman_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.58, author = {Feldman, Michal and Fusco, Federico and Mauras, Simon and Reiffenh\"{a}user, Rebecca}, title = {{Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents}}, booktitle = {50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023)}, pages = {58:1--58:20}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-278-5}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2023}, volume = {261}, editor = {Etessami, Kousha and Feige, Uriel and Puppis, Gabriele}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.58}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-181106}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.58}, annote = {Keywords: Online matching, Karp-Vazirani-Vazirani, truthfulness} }

Document

APPROX

**Published in:** LIPIcs, Volume 145, Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2019)

A bipartite graph G(U,V;E) that admits a perfect matching is given. One player imposes a permutation pi over V, the other player imposes a permutation sigma over U. In the greedy matching algorithm, vertices of U arrive in order sigma and each vertex is matched to the highest (under pi) yet unmatched neighbor in V (or left unmatched, if all its neighbors are already matched). The obtained matching is maximal, thus matches at least a half of the vertices. The max-min greedy matching problem asks: suppose the first (max) player reveals pi, and the second (min) player responds with the worst possible sigma for pi, does there exist a permutation pi ensuring to match strictly more than a half of the vertices? Can such a permutation be computed in polynomial time?
The main result of this paper is an affirmative answer for these questions: we show that there exists a polytime algorithm to compute pi for which for every sigma at least rho > 0.51 fraction of the vertices of V are matched. We provide additional lower and upper bounds for special families of graphs, including regular and Hamiltonian graphs. Our solution solves an open problem regarding the welfare guarantees attainable by pricing in sequential markets with binary unit-demand valuations.

Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, and Michal Feldman. Max-Min Greedy Matching. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 145, pp. 7:1-7:23, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{eden_et_al:LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2019.7, author = {Eden, Alon and Feige, Uriel and Feldman, Michal}, title = {{Max-Min Greedy Matching}}, booktitle = {Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2019)}, pages = {7:1--7:23}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-125-2}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2019}, volume = {145}, editor = {Achlioptas, Dimitris and V\'{e}gh, L\'{a}szl\'{o} A.}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2019.7}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-112229}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2019.7}, annote = {Keywords: Online matching, Pricing mechanism, Markets} }

Document

Invited Talk

**Published in:** LIPIcs, Volume 132, 46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2019)

We study combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations. In such settings, every agent has a private signal, and every agent has a valuation function that depends on the private signals of all the agents. Interdependent valuations capture settings where agents lack information to determine their own valuations. Examples include auctions for artwork or oil drilling rights. For single item auctions and assume some restrictive conditions (the so-called single-crossing condition), full welfare can be achieved. However, in general, there are strong impossibility results on welfare maximization in the interdependent setting. This is in contrast to settings where agents are aware of their own valuations, where the optimal welfare can always be obtained by an incentive compatible mechanism.
Motivated by these impossibility results, we study welfare maximization for interdependent valuations through the lens of approximation. We introduce two valuation properties that enable positive results. The first is a relaxed, parameterized version of single crossing; the second is a submodularity condition over the signals. We obtain a host of approximation guarantees under these two notions for various scenarios.
Related publications: [Alon Eden et al., 2018; Alon Eden et al., 2019]

Michal Feldman. Auction Design under Interdependent Values (Invited Talk). In 46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 132, p. 1:1, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{feldman:LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.1, author = {Feldman, Michal}, title = {{Auction Design under Interdependent Values}}, booktitle = {46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2019)}, pages = {1:1--1:1}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-109-2}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2019}, volume = {132}, editor = {Baier, Christel and Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Flocchini, Paola and Leonardi, Stefano}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.1}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-105778}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.1}, annote = {Keywords: Combinatorial auctions, Interdependent values, Welfare approximation} }

Document

**Published in:** LIPIcs, Volume 112, 26th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2018)

We give a prompt online mechanism for minimizing the sum of [weighted] completion times. This is the first prompt online algorithm for the problem. When such jobs are strategic agents, delaying scheduling decisions makes little sense. Moreover, the mechanism has a particularly simple form of an anonymous menu of options.

Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, and Tzahi Taub. Truthful Prompt Scheduling for Minimizing Sum of Completion Times. In 26th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 112, pp. 27:1-27:14, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{eden_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2018.27, author = {Eden, Alon and Feldman, Michal and Fiat, Amos and Taub, Tzahi}, title = {{Truthful Prompt Scheduling for Minimizing Sum of Completion Times}}, booktitle = {26th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2018)}, pages = {27:1--27:14}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-081-1}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2018}, volume = {112}, editor = {Azar, Yossi and Bast, Hannah and Herman, Grzegorz}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2018.27}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-94905}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2018.27}, annote = {Keywords: Scheduling, Mechanism design, Online algorithms} }

Document

**Published in:** LIPIcs, Volume 87, 25th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2017)

Social goods are goods that grant value not only to their owners but also to the owners' surroundings, be it their families, friends or office mates. The benefit a non-owner derives from the good is affected by many factors, including the type of the good, its availability, and the social status of the non-owner. Depending on the magnitude of the benefit and on the price of the good, a potential buyer might stay away from purchasing the good, hoping to free ride on others' purchases. A revenue-maximizing seller who sells social goods must take these considerations into account when setting prices for the good. The literature on optimal pricing has advanced considerably over the last decade, but little is known about optimal pricing schemes for selling social goods. In this paper, we conduct a systematic study of revenue-maximizing pricing schemes for social goods: we introduce a Bayesian model for this scenario, and devise nearly-optimal pricing schemes for various types of externalities, both for simultaneous sales and for sequential sales.

Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, and Michal Feldman. Pricing Social Goods. In 25th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 87, pp. 35:1-35:14, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{eden_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2017.35, author = {Eden, Alon and Ezra, Tomer and Feldman, Michal}, title = {{Pricing Social Goods}}, booktitle = {25th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2017)}, pages = {35:1--35:14}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-049-1}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2017}, volume = {87}, editor = {Pruhs, Kirk and Sohler, Christian}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2017.35}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-78717}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2017.35}, annote = {Keywords: Public Goods, Posted Prices, Revenue Maximization, Externalities} }

Document

**Published in:** LIPIcs, Volume 60, Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2016)

The following paradigm is often used for handling NP-hard combinatorial optimization problems. One first formulates the problem as an integer program, then one relaxes it to a linear program (LP, or more generally, a convex program), then one solves the LP relaxation in polynomial time, and finally one rounds the optimal LP solution, obtaining a feasible solution to the original problem. Many of the commonly used rounding schemes (such as randomized rounding, threshold rounding and others) are "oblivious" in the sense that the rounding is performed based on the LP solution alone, disregarding the objective function. The goal of our work is to better understand in which cases oblivious rounding suffices in order to obtain approximation ratios that match the integrality gap of the underlying LP. Our study is information theoretic - the rounding is restricted to be oblivious but not restricted to run in polynomial time. In this information theoretic setting we characterize the approximation ratio achievable by oblivious rounding. It turns out to equal the integrality gap of the underlying LP on a problem that is the closure of the original combinatorial optimization problem. We apply our findings to the study of the approximation ratios obtainable by oblivious rounding for the maximum welfare problem, showing that when valuation functions are submodular oblivious rounding can match the integrality gap of the configuration LP (though we do not know what this integrality gap is), but when valuation functions are gross substitutes oblivious rounding cannot match the integrality gap (which is 1).

Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 60, pp. 8:1-8:23, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{feige_et_al:LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2016.8, author = {Feige, Uriel and Feldman, Michal and Talgam-Cohen, Inbal}, title = {{Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap}}, booktitle = {Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2016)}, pages = {8:1--8:23}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-018-7}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2016}, volume = {60}, editor = {Jansen, Klaus and Mathieu, Claire and Rolim, Jos\'{e} D. P. and Umans, Chris}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2016.8}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-66319}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2016.8}, annote = {Keywords: Welfare-maximization} }

Document

**Published in:** LIPIcs, Volume 28, Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2014)

We study the outcomes of information aggregation in online social networks. Our main result is that networks with certain realistic structural properties avoid information cascades and enable a population to effectively aggregate information. In our model, each individual in a network holds a private, independent opinion about a product or idea, biased toward a ground truth. Individuals
declare their opinions asynchronously, can observe the stated opinions of their neighbors, and are free to update their declarations over time. Supposing that individuals conform with the majority report of their neighbors, we ask whether the population will eventually arrive at consensus on the ground truth. We show that the answer depends on the network structure: there exist networks for which consensus is unlikely, or for which declarations converge on the incorrect opinion with positive probability. On the other hand, we prove that for networks that are sparse and expansive, the population will converge to the correct opinion with high probability.

Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2014). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 28, pp. 192-208, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2014)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{feldman_et_al:LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.192, author = {Feldman, Michal and Immorlica, Nicole and Lucier, Brendan and Weinberg, S. Matthew}, title = {{Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks}}, booktitle = {Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2014)}, pages = {192--208}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-939897-74-3}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2014}, volume = {28}, editor = {Jansen, Klaus and Rolim, Jos\'{e} and Devanur, Nikhil R. and Moore, Cristopher}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.192}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-46976}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.192}, annote = {Keywords: Information Cascades, Social Networks, non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning, Expander Graphs, Stochastic Processes} }

X

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing

Feedback submitted

Please try again later or send an E-mail