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Documents authored by Klamler, Christian

Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagRep.2.3.1
Computation and Incentives in Social Choice (Dagstuhl Seminar 12101)

Authors: Edith Elkind, Christian Klamler, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, and M. Remzi Sanver

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 2, Issue 3 (2012)

Abstract
Computational social choice is an active research area that combines tools and techniques of theoretical computer science and AI with those of mathematics, social sciences and economics. The aim of the Dagstuhl Seminar 12101 ``Computation and Incentives in Social Choice'' was to bring together the experts in these areas in order to discuss recent advances in this field and share open problems. This report collects the material presented during the course of the seminar.
Cite as

Edith Elkind, Christian Klamler, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, and M. Remzi Sanver. Computation and Incentives in Social Choice (Dagstuhl Seminar 12101). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 2, Issue 3, pp. 1-22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2012)

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@Article{elkind_et_al:DagRep.2.3.1,
  author =	{Elkind, Edith and Klamler, Christian and Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. and Sanver, M. Remzi},
  title =	{{Computation and Incentives in Social Choice (Dagstuhl Seminar 12101)}},
  pages =	{1--22},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2012},
  volume =	{2},
  number =	{3},
  editor =	{Elkind, Edith and Klamler, Christian and Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. and Sanver, M. Remzi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.2.3.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-35322},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.2.3.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Computational Social Choice, Voting, Incentives, Algorithmic Game Theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.5
Better Ways to Cut a Cake - Revisited

Authors: Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, and Christian Klamler

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, Fair Division (2007)

Abstract
Procedures to divide a cake among n people with n-1 cuts (the minimum number) are analyzed and compared. For 2 persons, cut-and-choose, while envy-free and efficient, limits the cutter to exactly 50% if he or she is ignorant of the chooser's preferences, whereas the chooser can generally obtain more. By comparison, a new 2-person surplus procedure (SP'), which induces the players to be truthful in order to maximize their minimum allocations, leads to a proportionally equitable division of the surplus - the part that remains after each player receives 50% - by giving each person a certain proportion of the surplus as he or she values it. For n geq 3 persons, a new equitable procedure (EP) yields a maximally equitable division of a cake. This division gives all players the highest common value that they can achieve and induces truthfulness, but it may not be envy-free. The applicability of SP' and EP to the fair division of a heterogeneous, divisible good, like land, is briefly discussed.
Cite as

Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, and Christian Klamler. Better Ways to Cut a Cake - Revisited. In Fair Division. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, pp. 1-24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{brams_et_al:DagSemProc.07261.5,
  author =	{Brams, Steven J. and Jones, Michael A. and Klamler, Christian},
  title =	{{Better Ways to Cut a Cake - Revisited}},
  booktitle =	{Fair Division},
  pages =	{1--24},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7261},
  editor =	{Steven Brams and Kirk Pruhs and Gerhard Woeginger},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12278},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair division, cake-cutting, envy-freeness, strategy-proofness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.6
Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure

Authors: Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, and Christian Klamler

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, Fair Division (2007)

Abstract
Properties of discrete cake-cutting procedures that use a minimal number of cuts (n-1 if there are n players) are analyzed. None is always envy-free or efficient, but divide-and-conquer (D&C) minimizes the maximum number of players that any single player may envy. It works by asking n ≥ 2 players successively to place marks on a cake that divide it into equal or approximately equal halves, then halves of these halves, and so on. Among other properties, D&C (i) ensures players of more than 1/n shares if their marks are different and (ii) is strategyproof for risk-averse players. However, D&C may not allow players to obtain proportional, connected pieces if they have unequal entitlements. Possible applications of D&C to land division are briefly discussed.
Cite as

Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, and Christian Klamler. Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure. In Fair Division. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, pp. 1-31, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{brams_et_al:DagSemProc.07261.6,
  author =	{Brams, Steven J. and Jones, Michael A. and Klamler, Christian},
  title =	{{Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure}},
  booktitle =	{Fair Division},
  pages =	{1--31},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7261},
  editor =	{Steven Brams and Kirk Pruhs and Gerhard Woeginger},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12211},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cake-cutting, proportionality, envy-freeness, efficiency, strategy-proofness}
}
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