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Documents authored by Mamageishvili, Akaki


Document
BoLD: Fast and Cheap Dispute Resolution

Authors: Mario M. Alvarez, Henry Arneson, Ben Berger, Lee Bousfield, Chris Buckland, Yafah Edelman, Edward W. Felten, Daniel Goldman, Raul Jordan, Mahimna Kelkar, Akaki Mamageishvili, Harry Ng, Aman Sanghi, Victor Shoup, and Terence Tsao

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)


Abstract
BoLD is a new dispute resolution protocol that is designed to replace the originally deployed Arbitrum dispute resolution protocol. Unlike that protocol, BoLD is resistant to delay attacks. It achieves this resistance without a significant increase in onchain computation costs and with reduced staking costs.

Cite as

Mario M. Alvarez, Henry Arneson, Ben Berger, Lee Bousfield, Chris Buckland, Yafah Edelman, Edward W. Felten, Daniel Goldman, Raul Jordan, Mahimna Kelkar, Akaki Mamageishvili, Harry Ng, Aman Sanghi, Victor Shoup, and Terence Tsao. BoLD: Fast and Cheap Dispute Resolution. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 2:1-2:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{alvarez_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.2,
  author =	{Alvarez, Mario M. and Arneson, Henry and Berger, Ben and Bousfield, Lee and Buckland, Chris and Edelman, Yafah and Felten, Edward W. and Goldman, Daniel and Jordan, Raul and Kelkar, Mahimna and Mamageishvili, Akaki and Ng, Harry and Sanghi, Aman and Shoup, Victor and Tsao, Terence},
  title =	{{BoLD: Fast and Cheap Dispute Resolution}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209389},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Optimistic rollups, fraud proofs}
}
Document
Searcher Competition in Block Building

Authors: Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, and Benny Sudakov

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)


Abstract
We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher (or order flow provider) competition in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as Ethereum. We argue that the core is a suitable solution concept in this context that makes robust predictions that are independent of implementation details or specific mechanisms chosen. We characterize how much value validators extract in the core and quantify the surplus share of validators as a function of searcher competition. Searchers can obtain at most the marginal value increase of the winning block relative to the best block that can be built without their bundles. Dually this gives a lower bound on the value extracted by the validator. If arbitrages are easy to find and many searchers find similar bundles, the validator gets paid all value almost surely, while searchers can capture most value if there is little searcher competition per arbitrage. For the case of passive block-proposers we study, moreover, mechanisms that implement core allocations in dominant strategies and find that for submodular value, there is a unique dominant-strategy incentive compatible core-selecting mechanism that gives each searcher exactly their marginal value contribution to the winning block.

Cite as

Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, and Benny Sudakov. Searcher Competition in Block Building. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 21:1-21:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{mamageishvili_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.21,
  author =	{Mamageishvili, Akaki and Schlegel, Christoph and Sudakov, Benny},
  title =	{{Searcher Competition in Block Building}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:12},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209579},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: MEV, Block Building, Searchers, Proposer Builder Separation, Core}
}
Document
Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding for Transaction Ordering

Authors: Akaki Mamageishvili, Mahimna Kelkar, Jan Christoph Schlegel, and Edward W. Felten

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 282, 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)


Abstract
We design TimeBoost: a practical transaction ordering policy for rollup sequencers that takes into account both transaction timestamps and bids; it works by creating a score from timestamps and bids, and orders transactions based on this score. TimeBoost is transaction-data-independent (i.e., can work with encrypted transactions) and supports low transaction finalization times similar to a first-come first-serve (FCFS or pure-latency) ordering policy. At the same time, it avoids the inefficient latency competition created by an FCFS policy. It further satisfies useful economic properties of first-price auctions that come with a pure-bidding policy. We show through rigorous economic analyses how TimeBoost allows players to compete on arbitrage opportunities in a way that results in better guarantees compared to both pure-latency and pure-bidding approaches.

Cite as

Akaki Mamageishvili, Mahimna Kelkar, Jan Christoph Schlegel, and Edward W. Felten. Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding for Transaction Ordering. In 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 282, pp. 23:1-23:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)


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@InProceedings{mamageishvili_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2023.23,
  author =	{Mamageishvili, Akaki and Kelkar, Mahimna and Schlegel, Jan Christoph and Felten, Edward W.},
  title =	{{Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding for Transaction Ordering}},
  booktitle =	{5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-303-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{282},
  editor =	{Bonneau, Joseph and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-192120},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: Transaction ordering, First-come-first-serve, First-price auctions}
}
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