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Documents authored by Mamageishvili, Akaki

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.7
The Cost of Secure Restaking vs. Proof-Of-Stake

Authors: Akaki Mamageishvili and Benny Sudakov

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 395, 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)

Abstract
We compare the total capital efficiency of secure restaking and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols. First, we consider the sufficient condition by EigenLayer project for the restaking graph to be secure, that can be checked in a polynomial time in the restaking graph size. The condition implies that it is always possible to transform such a restaking graph into separate secure PoS protocols. We derive two main results: upper and lower bounds on the required extra stakes to add to the validators of the secure restaking graph to be able to transform it into secure PoS protocols. In particular, we show that the restaking savings compared to PoS protocols can be very large and can asymptotically grow as a square root of the number of validators. We also study a complementary question of aggregating secure PoS protocols into a secure restaking graph and provide matching lower and upper bounds on the PoS savings.
Cite as

Akaki Mamageishvili and Benny Sudakov. The Cost of Secure Restaking vs. Proof-Of-Stake. In 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 395, pp. 7:1-7:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{mamageishvili_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2026.7,
  author =	{Mamageishvili, Akaki and Sudakov, Benny},
  title =	{{The Cost of Secure Restaking vs. Proof-Of-Stake}},
  booktitle =	{8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-451-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{395},
  editor =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Kyropoulou, Maria},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-278610},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Proof-of-Stake, Restaking, Efficiency}
}
Document
Extended Abstract
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.16
On Sybil-Proof Mechanisms (Extended Abstract)

Authors: Minghao Pan, Bruno Mazorra, Christoph Schlegel, and Akaki Mamageishvili

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 395, 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)

Abstract
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof direct mechanism is a second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private information, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate to a highest-value bidder are not Sybil-proof or not incentive compatible. Moreover, we show that our main (im)possibility result extends beyond linear valuations, but not to multi-unit object allocation with unit-demand bidders. We also provide examples of mechanisms (with higher interim payoff for the bidders than a second price auction) that satisfy all of the other axioms and a weaker, Bayesian notion of Sybil-proofness. Thus, our (im)possibility result does not generalise to the Bayesian setting and we have a larger design space: With Sybil constraints, equivalence between dominant strategy and Bayesian implementation (that holds in classical single-parameter mechanism design without Sybils) no longer holds.
Cite as

Minghao Pan, Bruno Mazorra, Christoph Schlegel, and Akaki Mamageishvili. On Sybil-Proof Mechanisms (Extended Abstract). In 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 395, pp. 16:1-16:3, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{pan_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2026.16,
  author =	{Pan, Minghao and Mazorra, Bruno and Schlegel, Christoph and Mamageishvili, Akaki},
  title =	{{On Sybil-Proof Mechanisms}},
  booktitle =	{8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)},
  pages =	{16:1--16:3},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-451-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{395},
  editor =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Kyropoulou, Maria},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-278700},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Sybils, Mechanism Design, Blockchain}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.20
Just-In-Time Resale in an Ahead-Of-Time Auction for Faster Execution

Authors: Burak Öz, Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, and Ali Taslimi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 395, 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)

Abstract
We study Arbitrum’s Timeboost auction, an ahead-of-time mechanism that sells a 200 ms ordering advantage in an otherwise first-come, first-served transaction ordering policy. The market naturally divides into two phases: a competition phase, in which the dominant searchers compete directly in the primary auction, and a coordination phase, in which they source fast-lane access through Kairos, a Just-in-Time resale intermediary. We use auction bids, time-boosted transactions, and on-chain payment traces to study how well ahead-of-time bids predict realized CEX-DEX arbitrage profits and how the emergence of resale changes surplus allocation. We find that ahead-of-time bids are noisy predictors of short-horizon arbitrage profits. During the competition phase, bid-profit correlations are statistically significant but economically modest at the round level, while correlations increase when profits are aggregated over longer horizons. This suggests that bidders can identify favorable market conditions but face substantial uncertainty about the realized value of any individual one-minute fast-lane interval. After the Kairos transition, competition in the primary auction weakens sharply: in our focused transition-analysis window, paid bids fall from 62.7% of the top bid before the transition to 14.8% thereafter, while total searcher profits remain broadly similar. The resulting dynamics are most consistent with coordination through a common intermediary rather than direct competition in the primary auction. More broadly, our findings suggest that ahead-of-time allocation mechanisms can be vulnerable to secondary-market intermediation when competition among dominant participants is weak.
Cite as

Burak Öz, Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, and Ali Taslimi. Just-In-Time Resale in an Ahead-Of-Time Auction for Faster Execution. In 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 395, pp. 20:1-20:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{oz_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2026.20,
  author =	{\"{O}z, Burak and Mamageishvili, Akaki and Schlegel, Christoph and Taslimi, Ali},
  title =	{{Just-In-Time Resale in an Ahead-Of-Time Auction for Faster Execution}},
  booktitle =	{8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)},
  pages =	{20:1--20:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-451-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{395},
  editor =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Kyropoulou, Maria},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-278740},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: ahead-of-time auctions, secondary markets, Timeboost, arbitrage}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.35
Price Elasticity of Gas Demand on L1 and L2: Evidence from Ethereum and Arbitrum

Authors: Pranay Anchuri and Akaki Mamageishvili

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 395, 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)

Abstract
We estimate the causal price elasticity of gas demand on Ethereum mainnet (L1) and Arbitrum One (L2), a quantity necessary for calibrating fee mechanism simulations, evaluating resource pricing reforms, and explaining observed usage patterns. A two-way fixed effects panel regression instrumented by each wallet’s own lagged base fee removes the congestion-driven endogeneity that causes naive regressions to substantially underestimate demand sensitivity. On Ethereum mainnet (full year 2025), the pooled IV elasticity is -0.006^{***}, near-inelastic: a 10% fee increase reduces total gas demand by approximately 0.06%. On Arbitrum One (October 2025-April 2026), the pooled IV elasticity is -0.036^{**}. Both chains are inelastic in the aggregate, with L2 measurably more responsive than L1. A per-resource decomposition of L2 demand reveals elasticities ranging from modestly elastic computation (-0.027^{*}) to -0.27^{***} for refunds, with storage growth (-0.15^{***}) and calldata (-0.06^{*}) in between. Behavioral clustering identifies always-on protocol wallets as near-inelastic and high-volume operators as substantially more responsive, with cluster-level elasticities up to roughly 6× the pooled estimate. These results establish an empirical foundation for downstream simulations and for evaluating fee mechanism designs.
Cite as

Pranay Anchuri and Akaki Mamageishvili. Price Elasticity of Gas Demand on L1 and L2: Evidence from Ethereum and Arbitrum. In 8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 395, pp. 35:1-35:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{anchuri_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2026.35,
  author =	{Anchuri, Pranay and Mamageishvili, Akaki},
  title =	{{Price Elasticity of Gas Demand on L1 and L2: Evidence from Ethereum and Arbitrum}},
  booktitle =	{8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)},
  pages =	{35:1--35:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-451-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{395},
  editor =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Kyropoulou, Maria},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.35},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-278895},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.35},
  annote =	{Keywords: gas pricing, demand elasticity, instrumental variables, panel data, fixed effects, Arbitrum, Ethereum, transaction fee mechanism}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.2
BoLD: Fast and Cheap Dispute Resolution

Authors: Mario M. Alvarez, Henry Arneson, Ben Berger, Lee Bousfield, Chris Buckland, Yafah Edelman, Edward W. Felten, Daniel Goldman, Raul Jordan, Mahimna Kelkar, Akaki Mamageishvili, Harry Ng, Aman Sanghi, Victor Shoup, and Terence Tsao

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
BoLD is a new dispute resolution protocol that is designed to replace the originally deployed Arbitrum dispute resolution protocol. Unlike that protocol, BoLD is resistant to delay attacks. It achieves this resistance without a significant increase in onchain computation costs and with reduced staking costs.
Cite as

Mario M. Alvarez, Henry Arneson, Ben Berger, Lee Bousfield, Chris Buckland, Yafah Edelman, Edward W. Felten, Daniel Goldman, Raul Jordan, Mahimna Kelkar, Akaki Mamageishvili, Harry Ng, Aman Sanghi, Victor Shoup, and Terence Tsao. BoLD: Fast and Cheap Dispute Resolution. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 2:1-2:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{alvarez_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.2,
  author =	{Alvarez, Mario M. and Arneson, Henry and Berger, Ben and Bousfield, Lee and Buckland, Chris and Edelman, Yafah and Felten, Edward W. and Goldman, Daniel and Jordan, Raul and Kelkar, Mahimna and Mamageishvili, Akaki and Ng, Harry and Sanghi, Aman and Shoup, Victor and Tsao, Terence},
  title =	{{BoLD: Fast and Cheap Dispute Resolution}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209389},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Optimistic rollups, fraud proofs}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.21
Searcher Competition in Block Building

Authors: Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, and Benny Sudakov

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher (or order flow provider) competition in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as Ethereum. We argue that the core is a suitable solution concept in this context that makes robust predictions that are independent of implementation details or specific mechanisms chosen. We characterize how much value validators extract in the core and quantify the surplus share of validators as a function of searcher competition. Searchers can obtain at most the marginal value increase of the winning block relative to the best block that can be built without their bundles. Dually this gives a lower bound on the value extracted by the validator. If arbitrages are easy to find and many searchers find similar bundles, the validator gets paid all value almost surely, while searchers can capture most value if there is little searcher competition per arbitrage. For the case of passive block-proposers we study, moreover, mechanisms that implement core allocations in dominant strategies and find that for submodular value, there is a unique dominant-strategy incentive compatible core-selecting mechanism that gives each searcher exactly their marginal value contribution to the winning block.
Cite as

Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel, and Benny Sudakov. Searcher Competition in Block Building. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 21:1-21:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{mamageishvili_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.21,
  author =	{Mamageishvili, Akaki and Schlegel, Christoph and Sudakov, Benny},
  title =	{{Searcher Competition in Block Building}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:12},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209579},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: MEV, Block Building, Searchers, Proposer Builder Separation, Core}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.23
Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding for Transaction Ordering

Authors: Akaki Mamageishvili, Mahimna Kelkar, Jan Christoph Schlegel, and Edward W. Felten

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 282, 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)

Abstract
We design TimeBoost: a practical transaction ordering policy for rollup sequencers that takes into account both transaction timestamps and bids; it works by creating a score from timestamps and bids, and orders transactions based on this score. TimeBoost is transaction-data-independent (i.e., can work with encrypted transactions) and supports low transaction finalization times similar to a first-come first-serve (FCFS or pure-latency) ordering policy. At the same time, it avoids the inefficient latency competition created by an FCFS policy. It further satisfies useful economic properties of first-price auctions that come with a pure-bidding policy. We show through rigorous economic analyses how TimeBoost allows players to compete on arbitrage opportunities in a way that results in better guarantees compared to both pure-latency and pure-bidding approaches.
Cite as

Akaki Mamageishvili, Mahimna Kelkar, Jan Christoph Schlegel, and Edward W. Felten. Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding for Transaction Ordering. In 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 282, pp. 23:1-23:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{mamageishvili_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2023.23,
  author =	{Mamageishvili, Akaki and Kelkar, Mahimna and Schlegel, Jan Christoph and Felten, Edward W.},
  title =	{{Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding for Transaction Ordering}},
  booktitle =	{5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-303-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{282},
  editor =	{Bonneau, Joseph and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-192120},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: Transaction ordering, First-come-first-serve, First-price auctions}
}

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