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Documents authored by Mavronicolas, Marios


Document
Existential-R-Complete Decision Problems about Symmetric Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Multi-Player Games

Authors: Vittorio Bilò and Marios Mavronicolas

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 66, 34th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2017)


Abstract
We study the complexity of decision problems about symmetric Nash equilibria for symmetric multi-player games. These decision problems concern the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium with certain natural properties. We show that a handful of such decision problems are Existential-R-complete; that is, they are exactly as hard as deciding the Existential Theory of the Reals.

Cite as

Vittorio Bilò and Marios Mavronicolas. Existential-R-Complete Decision Problems about Symmetric Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Multi-Player Games. In 34th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 66, pp. 13:1-13:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)


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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2017.13,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and Mavronicolas, Marios},
  title =	{{Existential-R-Complete Decision Problems about Symmetric Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Multi-Player Games}},
  booktitle =	{34th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2017)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-028-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{66},
  editor =	{Vollmer, Heribert and Vall\'{e}e, Brigitte},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2017.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-70200},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2017.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Nash equilibrium, complexity of equilibria, ExistentialR-completeness}
}
Document
A Catalog of EXISTS-R-Complete Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Games

Authors: Vittorio Bilò and Marios Mavronicolas

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 47, 33rd Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2016)


Abstract
[Schaefer and Stefankovic, Theory of Computing Systems, 2015] provided an explicit formulation of EXISTS-R as the class capturing the complexity of deciding the Existential Theory of the Reals, and established that deciding, given a 3-player game, whether or not it has a Nash equilibrium with no probability exceeding a given rational is EXISTS-R-complete. Four more decision problems about Nash equilibria for 3-player games were very recently shown EXISTS-R-complete via a chain of individual, problem-specific reductions in [Garg et al., Proceedings of ICALP 2015]; determining more such EXISTS-R-complete problems was posed there as an open problem. In this work, we deliver an extensive catalog of EXISTS-R-complete decision problems about Nash equilibria in 3-player games, thus resolving completely the open problem from [Garg et al., Proceedings of ICALP 2015]. Towards this end, we present a single and very simple, unifying reduction from the EXISTS-R-complete decision problem from [Schaefer and Stefankovic, Theory of Computing Systems, 2015] to (almost) all the decision problems about Nash equilibria that were before shown NP-complete for 2-player games in [Bilo and Mavronicolas, Proceedings of SAGT 2012; Conitzer and Sandholm, Games and Economic Behavior, 2008; Gilboa and Zemel, Games and Economic Behavior, 1989]. Encompassed in the catalog are the four decision problems shown EXISTS-R-complete in [Garg et al., Proceedings of ICALP 2015].

Cite as

Vittorio Bilò and Marios Mavronicolas. A Catalog of EXISTS-R-Complete Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Games. In 33rd Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 47, pp. 17:1-17:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)


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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2016.17,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and Mavronicolas, Marios},
  title =	{{A Catalog of EXISTS-R-Complete Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Games}},
  booktitle =	{33rd Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2016)},
  pages =	{17:1--17:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-001-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{47},
  editor =	{Ollinger, Nicolas and Vollmer, Heribert},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2016.17},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-57189},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2016.17},
  annote =	{Keywords: Nash equilibrium, complexity of equilibria, EXISTS-R-completeness}
}
Document
A Cost Mechanism for Fair Pricing of Resource Usage

Authors: Marios Mavronicolas, Panagiota Panagopoulou, and Paul G. Spirakis

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5361, Algorithmic Aspects of Large and Complex Networks (2006)


Abstract
We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which assigns costs for the competitive usage of $m$ resources by $n$ selfish agents. Each agent has an individual demand; demands are drawn according to some probability distribution. The cost paid by an agent for a resource she chooses is the total demand put on the resource divided by the number of agents who chose that same resource. So, resources charge costs in an equitable, fair way, while each resource makes no profit out of the agents. We call our model the Fair Pricing model. Its fair cost mechanism induces a non-cooperative game among the agents. To evaluate the Nash equilibria of this game, we introduce the Diffuse Price of Anarchy, as an extension of the Price of Anarchy that takes into account the probability distribution on the demands. We prove: (1) Pure Nash equilibria may not exist, unless all chosen demands are identical; in contrast, a fully mixed Nash equilibrium exists for all possible choices of the demands. Further on, the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium in case there are only two agents. (2) In the worst-case choice of demands, the Price of Anarchy is $Theta (n)$; for the special case of two agents, the Price of Anarchy is less than $2 - frac{1}{m}$. (3) Assume now that demands are drawn from a bounded, independent probability distribution, where all demands are identically distributed and each is at most a (universal for the class) constant times its expectation. Then, the Diffuse Price of Anarchy is at most that same constant, which is just $2$ when each demand is distributed symmetrically around its expectation.

Cite as

Marios Mavronicolas, Panagiota Panagopoulou, and Paul G. Spirakis. A Cost Mechanism for Fair Pricing of Resource Usage. In Algorithmic Aspects of Large and Complex Networks. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5361, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2006)


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@InProceedings{mavronicolas_et_al:DagSemProc.05361.2,
  author =	{Mavronicolas, Marios and Panagopoulou, Panagiota and Spirakis, Paul G.},
  title =	{{A Cost Mechanism for Fair Pricing of Resource Usage}},
  booktitle =	{Algorithmic Aspects of Large and Complex Networks},
  pages =	{1--15},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2006},
  volume =	{5361},
  editor =	{Stefano Leonardi and Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide and Dorothea Wagner},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.05361.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-5646},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.05361.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cost Sharing, Diffuse Price of Anarchy, Fair Pricing, Resources}
}
Document
Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Fair Pricing of Resources Usage

Authors: Marios Mavronicolas, Panagiota Panagopoulou, and Paul G. Spirakis

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5361, Algorithmic Aspects of Large and Complex Networks (2006)


Abstract
We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which assigns costs for the competitive usage of $m$ resources by $n$ selfish agents. Each agent has an individual demand; demands are drawn according to some probability distribution. The cost paid by an agent for a resource she chooses is the total demand put on the resource divided by the number of agents who chose that same resource. So, resources charge costs in an equitable, fair way, while each resource makes no profit out of the agents. We call our model the Fair Pricing model. Its fair cost mechanism induces a non-cooperative game among the agents. To evaluate the Nash equilibria of this game, we introduce the Diffuse Price of Anarchy, as an extension of the Price of Anarchy that takes into account the probability distribution on the demands. We prove: (1) Pure Nash equilibria may not exist, unless all chosen demands are identical. In contrast, we have been able to prove that pure Nash equilibria do exist for two closely related cost sharing models, namely the Average Cost Pricing and the Serial Cost Sharing models. (2) A fully mixed Nash equilibrium exists for all possible choices of the demands. Further on, the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium in case there are only two agents. (3) In the worst-case choice of demands, the Price of Anarchy is $Theta (n)$; for the special case of two agents, the Price of Anarchy is less than $2 - frac{1}{m}$. (4) Assume now that demands are drawn from a bounded, independent probability distribution, where all demands are identically distributed and each is at most a (universal for the class) constant times its expectation. Then, the Diffuse Price of Anarchy is at most that same constant, which is just 2 when each demand is distributed symmetrically around its expectation.

Cite as

Marios Mavronicolas, Panagiota Panagopoulou, and Paul G. Spirakis. Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Fair Pricing of Resources Usage. In Algorithmic Aspects of Large and Complex Networks. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5361, pp. 1-18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2006)


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@InProceedings{mavronicolas_et_al:DagSemProc.05361.5,
  author =	{Mavronicolas, Marios and Panagopoulou, Panagiota and Spirakis, Paul G.},
  title =	{{Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Fair Pricing of Resources Usage}},
  booktitle =	{Algorithmic Aspects of Large and Complex Networks},
  pages =	{1--18},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2006},
  volume =	{5361},
  editor =	{Stefano Leonardi and Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide and Dorothea Wagner},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.05361.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-5665},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.05361.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cost Sharing, Diffuse Price of Anarchy, Fair Pricing, Resources}
}
Document
The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost

Authors: Martin Gairing, Thomas Lücking, Marios Mavronicolas, and Burkhard Monien

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, Computing and Markets (2005)


Abstract
In this work, we consider an interesting variant of the well-studied KP model [KP99] for selfish routing that reflects some influence from the much older Wardrop [War52]. In the new model, user traffics are still unsplittable, while social cost is now the expectation of the sum, over all links, of a certain polynomial evaluated at the total latency incurred by all users choosing the link; we call it polynomial social cost. The polynomials that we consider have non-negative coefficients. We are interested in evaluating Nash equilibria in this model, and we use the Price of Anarchy as our evaluation measure. We prove the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for identical users and two links, and establish an approximate version of the conjecture for arbitrary many links. Moreover, we give upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy.

Cite as

Martin Gairing, Thomas Lücking, Marios Mavronicolas, and Burkhard Monien. The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost. In Computing and Markets. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, pp. 1-12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2005)


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@InProceedings{gairing_et_al:DagSemProc.05011.19,
  author =	{Gairing, Martin and L\"{u}cking, Thomas and Mavronicolas, Marios and Monien, Burkhard},
  title =	{{The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost}},
  booktitle =	{Computing and Markets},
  pages =	{1--12},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2005},
  volume =	{5011},
  editor =	{Daniel Lehmann and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Tuomas Sandholm},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-2005},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: selfish routing , KP-model , price of anarchy , fully mixed Nash Equilibrium}
}
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