4 Search Results for "Fusco, Federico"


Document
Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion

Authors: Yingxi Li, Ellen Vitercik, and Mingwei Yang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)


Abstract
In the online metric matching problem, n servers and n requests lie in a metric space. Servers are available upfront, and requests arrive sequentially. An arriving request must be matched immediately and irrevocably to an available server, incurring a cost equal to their distance. The goal is to minimize the total matching cost. We study this problem in [0, 1]^d with the Euclidean metric, when servers are adversarial and requests are independently drawn from distinct distributions that satisfy a mild smoothness condition. Our main result is an O(1)-competitive algorithm for d ≠ 2 that requires no distributional knowledge, relying only on a single sample from each request distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first algorithm to achieve an o(log n) competitive ratio for non-trivial metrics beyond the i.i.d. setting. Our approach bypasses the Ω(log n) barrier introduced by probabilistic metric embeddings: instead of analyzing the embedding distortion and the algorithm separately, we directly bound the cost of the algorithm on the target metric space of a simple deterministic embedding. We then combine this analysis with lower bounds on the offline optimum for Euclidean metrics, derived via majorization arguments, to obtain our guarantees.

Cite as

Yingxi Li, Ellen Vitercik, and Mingwei Yang. Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 94:1-94:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{li_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94,
  author =	{Li, Yingxi and Vitercik, Ellen and Yang, Mingwei},
  title =	{{Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{94:1--94:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253815},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online algorithm, Metric matching, Competitive analysis, Smoothed analysis}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
Dynamic Algorithms for Submodular Matching

Authors: Kiarash Banihashem, Leyla Biabani, Samira Goudarzi, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Peyman Jabbarzade, and Morteza Monemizadeh

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)


Abstract
The Maximum Submodular Matching (MSM) problem is a generalization of the classical Maximum Weight Matching (MWM) problem. In this problem, given a monotone submodular function f: 2^E → ℝ^{≥ 0} defined over subsets of edges of a graph G(V, E), we are asked to return a matching whose submodular value is maximum among all matchings in graph G(V, E). In this paper, we consider this problem in a fully dynamic setting against an oblivious adversary. In this setting, we are given a sequence 𝒮 of insertions and deletions of edges of the underlying graph G(V, E), along with an oracle access to the monotone submodular function f. The goal is to maintain a matching M such that, at any time t of sequence 𝒮, its submodular value is a good approximation of the value of the optimal submodular matching while keeping the number of operations minimal. We develop the first dynamic algorithm for the submodular matching problem, in which we maintain a matching whose submodular value is within expected (8 + ε)-approximation of the optimal submodular matching at any time t of sequence 𝒮 using expected amortized poly(log n, 1/(ε)) update time. Our approach incorporates a range of novel techniques, notably the concept of Uniform Hierarchical Caches (UHC) data structure along with its invariants, which lead to the first algorithm for fully dynamic submodular matching and may be of independent interest for designing dynamic algorithms for other problems.

Cite as

Kiarash Banihashem, Leyla Biabani, Samira Goudarzi, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Peyman Jabbarzade, and Morteza Monemizadeh. Dynamic Algorithms for Submodular Matching. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 19:1-19:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{banihashem_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.19,
  author =	{Banihashem, Kiarash and Biabani, Leyla and Goudarzi, Samira and Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi and Jabbarzade, Peyman and Monemizadeh, Morteza},
  title =	{{Dynamic Algorithms for Submodular Matching}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{19:1--19:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-233969},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: Matching, Submodular, Dynamic, Polylogarithmic}
}
Document
Designing Exploration Contracts

Authors: Martin Hoefer, Conrad Schecker, and Kevin Schewior

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 327, 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)


Abstract
We study a natural application of contract design in the context of sequential exploration problems. In our principal-agent setting, a search task is delegated to an agent. The agent performs a sequential exploration of n boxes, suffers the exploration cost for each inspected box, and selects the content (called the prize) of one inspected box as outcome. Agent and principal obtain an individual value based on the selected prize. To influence the search, the principal a-priori designs a contract with a non-negative payment to the agent for each potential prize. The goal of the principal is to maximize her expected reward, i.e., value minus payment. Interestingly, this natural contract scenario shares close relations with the Pandora’s Box problem. We show how to compute optimal contracts for the principal in several scenarios. A popular and important subclass is that of linear contracts, and we show how to compute optimal linear contracts in polynomial time. For general contracts, we obtain optimal contracts under the standard assumption that the agent suffers cost but obtains value only from the transfers by the principal. More generally, for general contracts with non-zero agent values for outcomes we show how to compute an optimal contract in two cases: (1) when each box has only one prize with non-zero value for principal and agent, (2) for i.i.d. boxes with a single prize with positive value for the principal.

Cite as

Martin Hoefer, Conrad Schecker, and Kevin Schewior. Designing Exploration Contracts. In 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 327, pp. 50:1-50:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{hoefer_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2025.50,
  author =	{Hoefer, Martin and Schecker, Conrad and Schewior, Kevin},
  title =	{{Designing Exploration Contracts}},
  booktitle =	{42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)},
  pages =	{50:1--50:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-365-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{327},
  editor =	{Beyersdorff, Olaf and Pilipczuk, Micha{\l} and Pimentel, Elaine and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.50},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-228755},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.50},
  annote =	{Keywords: Exploration, Contract Design, Pandora’s Box Problem}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents

Authors: Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Simon Mauras, and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 261, 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023)


Abstract
We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an item in her desired set. Unlike most online matching settings, where agents arrive online, in our setting the items arrive online in an adversarial order while the buyers are present for the entire duration of the process. This poses a significant challenge to the design of truthful mechanisms, due to the ability of buyers to strategize over future rounds. We provide an almost full picture of the competitive ratios in different scenarios, including myopic vs. non-myopic agents, tardy vs. prompt payments, and private vs. public desired sets. Among other results, we identify the frontier up to which the celebrated e/(e-1) competitive ratio for the vertex-weighted online matching of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani extends to truthful agents and online items.

Cite as

Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Simon Mauras, and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser. Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. In 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 261, pp. 58:1-58:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)


Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{feldman_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.58,
  author =	{Feldman, Michal and Fusco, Federico and Mauras, Simon and Reiffenh\"{a}user, Rebecca},
  title =	{{Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023)},
  pages =	{58:1--58:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-278-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{261},
  editor =	{Etessami, Kousha and Feige, Uriel and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.58},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-181106},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.58},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online matching, Karp-Vazirani-Vazirani, truthfulness}
}
  • Refine by Type
  • 4 Document/PDF
  • 3 Document/HTML

  • Refine by Publication Year
  • 1 2026
  • 2 2025
  • 1 2023

  • Refine by Author
  • 1 Banihashem, Kiarash
  • 1 Biabani, Leyla
  • 1 Feldman, Michal
  • 1 Fusco, Federico
  • 1 Goudarzi, Samira
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Series/Journal
  • 4 LIPIcs

  • Refine by Classification
  • 2 Theory of computation → Online algorithms
  • 1 Applied computing → Online auctions
  • 1 Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
  • 1 Theory of computation → Dynamic graph algorithms

  • Refine by Keyword
  • 1 Competitive analysis
  • 1 Contract Design
  • 1 Dynamic
  • 1 Exploration
  • 1 Karp-Vazirani-Vazirani
  • Show More...

Any Issues?
X

Feedback on the Current Page

CAPTCHA

Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted to Dagstuhl Publishing

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail