8 Search Results for "Orlandi, Claudio"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.71
Lower Bounds on FSS from Dynamic Data Structures

Authors: Niv Gilboa and Daniel Weber

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
In Function Secret Sharing (FSS), a dealer with a given function f: {0,1}ⁿ → 𝔾 from n bits to a commutative group 𝔾 such that f is in a function class ℱ shares succinct keys with two properties. Evaluating each key separately on a common input x results in additive shares of f(x) and any subset of the keys does not provide information on f. Two-party FSS schemes which are reducible to One-way Functions (OWF) have applications in cryptography, complexity, and in practical data security systems. We establish a two-way transformation between a two-party FSS scheme for a function class ℱ, which is black-box reducible to an OWF, or even black-box reducible to a family of Pseudo-Random Functions (PRF) and a dynamic data structure that supports range queries on ℱ. A data structure of this type enables dynamically adding functions to a multiset of functions F ⊆ ℱ, and answering range queries on the output of F, i.e., returning ∑_{f ∈ F} f(x) for a query x. The data structures are defined in one of several models which abstract RAM. The correspondence together with known lower bounds on the update time and the query time in data structures leads to the first non-trivial lower bounds on FSS schemes which are black-box reducible to PRF. These lower bounds apply to FSS schemes with polynomial key size and include: - For ℱ^d_{box}, the class of all functions which assign a constant group element β ∈ 𝔾 to any input in a specified d-dimensional box and 0 to all other inputs: if the key sharing function, Gen, runs in time polynomial in n and the evaluation function is Eval then: - If d ≥ 2 and 𝔾 = ℤ₂ then Eval’s running time is Ω ((n^{3/2})/(log³ n)). - If d ≥ 2 and 𝔾 is cyclic such that log |𝔾| = (1 + ε) n then Eval’s running time is Ω ((n/(log n)) ²). - If d > 2 is a constant and further, Gen and Eval correspond to operations on data structures in the Oblivious Group Model (this includes all known FSS from OWF techniques), then the product of Eval’s time and the key size is Ω(n^{d-1}). - For ℱ_{mono}, the class of all monomials ax^b ∈ 𝔽_{2ⁿ}[X] such that b ≤ B, assuming n^{ω(1)} ≤ B ≤ 2^{n/4}: if Gen runs in polynomial time, then Eval’s running time is Ω ((n √{log B})/(log² n)).
Cite as

Niv Gilboa and Daniel Weber. Lower Bounds on FSS from Dynamic Data Structures. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 71:1-71:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{gilboa_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.71,
  author =	{Gilboa, Niv and Weber, Daniel},
  title =	{{Lower Bounds on FSS from Dynamic Data Structures}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{71:1--71:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.71},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253585},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.71},
  annote =	{Keywords: FSS, Data Structures, Lower Bounds, Black-Box Reductions}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.3
Fast, Private and Regulated Payments in Asynchronous Networks

Authors: Maxence Brugeres, Victor Languille, Petr Kuznetsov, and Hamza Zarfaoui

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
We propose a decentralized asset-transfer system that enjoys full privacy: no party can learn the details of a transaction, except for its issuer and its recipient. Furthermore, the recipient is not aware of the sender’s identity. Our system does not rely on consensus or synchrony assumptions, and therefore, it is responsive, since it runs at the actual network speed. Under the hood, every transaction creates a consumable coin equipped with a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) that confirms that the issuer has sufficient funds without revealing any information about her identity, the recipient’s identity, or the payment amount. Moreover, we equip our system with a regulatory enforcement mechanism that can be used to regulate transfer limits or restrict specific addresses from sending or receiving funds, while preserving the system’s privacy guarantees. Finally, we report on PaxPay, our implementation of Fully Private Asset Transfer (FPAT) that uses the Gnark library for the NIZKs. In our benchmark, PaxPay exhibits better performance than earlier proposals that either ensure only partial privacy, require some kind of network synchrony or do not implement regulation features. Our system thus reconciles privacy, responsiveness, regulation enforcement and performance.
Cite as

Maxence Brugeres, Victor Languille, Petr Kuznetsov, and Hamza Zarfaoui. Fast, Private and Regulated Payments in Asynchronous Networks. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 3:1-3:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{brugeres_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.3,
  author =	{Brugeres, Maxence and Languille, Victor and Kuznetsov, Petr and Zarfaoui, Hamza},
  title =	{{Fast, Private and Regulated Payments in Asynchronous Networks}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247227},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Anonymous, Asset Transfer, Asynchronous System, BFT, CBDC, NIZK, Payment System, Privacy, Regulation, Scalability, zk-SNARK}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.1
Cache Timing Leakages in Zero-Knowledge Protocols

Authors: Shibam Mukherjee, Christian Rechberger, and Markus Schofnegger

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
The area of modern zero-knowledge proof systems has seen a significant rise in popularity over the last couple of years, with new techniques and optimized constructions emerging on a regular basis. As the field matures, the aspect of implementation attacks becomes more relevant, however side-channel attacks on zero-knowledge proof systems have seen surprisingly little treatment so far. In this paper, we give an overview of potential attack vectors and show that some of the underlying finite field libraries, and implementations of heavily used components like hash functions using them, are vulnerable w.r.t. cache attacks on CPUs. On the positive side, we demonstrate that the computational overhead to protect against these attacks is relatively small.
Cite as

Shibam Mukherjee, Christian Rechberger, and Markus Schofnegger. Cache Timing Leakages in Zero-Knowledge Protocols. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 1:1-1:26, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{mukherjee_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.1,
  author =	{Mukherjee, Shibam and Rechberger, Christian and Schofnegger, Markus},
  title =	{{Cache Timing Leakages in Zero-Knowledge Protocols}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:26},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247201},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: zero-knowledge, protocol, cache timing, side-channel, leakage}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.2
Zero-Knowledge Authenticator for Blockchain: Policy-Private and Obliviously Updateable

Authors: Kostas Kryptos Chalkias, Deepak Maram, Arnab Roy, Joy Wang, and Aayush Yadav

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
Transaction details and participant identities on the blockchain are often publicly exposed. In this work, we posit that blockchain’s transparency should not come at the cost of privacy. To that end, we introduce zero-knowledge authenticators (zkAt), a new cryptographic primitive for privacy-preserving authentication on public blockchains. zkAt utilizes zero-knowledge proofs to enable users to authenticate transactions, while keeping the underlying authentication policies private. Prior solutions for such policy-private authentication required the use of threshold signatures, which can only hide the threshold access structure itself. In comparison, zkAt provides privacy for arbitrarily complex authentication policies, and offers a richer interface even within the threshold access structure by, for instance, allowing for the combination of signatures under distinct signature schemes. In order to construct zkAt, we design a compiler that transforms the popular Groth16 non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof system into a NIZK with equivocable verification keys, a property that we define in this work. Then, for any zkAt constructed using proof systems with this new property, we show that all public information must be independent of the policy, thereby achieving policy-privacy. Next, we give an extension of zkAt, called zkAt^+ wherein, assuming a trusted authority, policies can be updated obliviously in the sense that a third-party learns no new information when a policy is updated by the policy issuer. We also give a theoretical construction for zkAt^+ using recursive NIZKs, and explore the integration of zkAt into modern blockchains. Finally, to evaluate their feasibility, we implement both our schemes for a specific threshold access structure. Our findings show that zkAt achieves comparable performance to traditional threshold signatures, while also attaining privacy for significantly more complex policies with very little overhead.
Cite as

Kostas Kryptos Chalkias, Deepak Maram, Arnab Roy, Joy Wang, and Aayush Yadav. Zero-Knowledge Authenticator for Blockchain: Policy-Private and Obliviously Updateable. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 2:1-2:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{kryptoschalkias_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.2,
  author =	{Kryptos Chalkias, Kostas and Maram, Deepak and Roy, Arnab and Wang, Joy and Yadav, Aayush},
  title =	{{Zero-Knowledge Authenticator for Blockchain: Policy-Private and Obliviously Updateable}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247218},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain privacy, authentication schemes, threshold wallets, zero knowledge proofs}
}
Document
Survey
DOI: 10.4230/TGDK.3.1.3
Uncertainty Management in the Construction of Knowledge Graphs: A Survey

Authors: Lucas Jarnac, Yoan Chabot, and Miguel Couceiro

Published in: TGDK, Volume 3, Issue 1 (2025). Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge, Volume 3, Issue 1

Abstract
Knowledge Graphs (KGs) are a major asset for companies thanks to their great flexibility in data representation and their numerous applications, e.g., vocabulary sharing, Q&A or recommendation systems. To build a KG, it is a common practice to rely on automatic methods for extracting knowledge from various heterogeneous sources. However, in a noisy and uncertain world, knowledge may not be reliable and conflicts between data sources may occur. Integrating unreliable data would directly impact the use of the KG, therefore such conflicts must be resolved. This could be done manually by selecting the best data to integrate. This first approach is highly accurate, but costly and time-consuming. That is why recent efforts focus on automatic approaches, which represent a challenging task since it requires handling the uncertainty of extracted knowledge throughout its integration into the KG. We survey state-of-the-art approaches in this direction and present constructions of both open and enterprise KGs. We then describe different knowledge extraction methods and discuss downstream tasks after knowledge acquisition, including KG completion using embedding models, knowledge alignment, and knowledge fusion in order to address the problem of knowledge uncertainty in KG construction. We conclude with a discussion on the remaining challenges and perspectives when constructing a KG taking into account uncertainty.
Cite as

Lucas Jarnac, Yoan Chabot, and Miguel Couceiro. Uncertainty Management in the Construction of Knowledge Graphs: A Survey. In Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge (TGDK), Volume 3, Issue 1, pp. 3:1-3:48, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@Article{jarnac_et_al:TGDK.3.1.3,
  author =	{Jarnac, Lucas and Chabot, Yoan and Couceiro, Miguel},
  title =	{{Uncertainty Management in the Construction of Knowledge Graphs: A Survey}},
  journal =	{Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge},
  pages =	{3:1--3:48},
  ISSN =	{2942-7517},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{3},
  number =	{1},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/TGDK.3.1.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-233733},
  doi =		{10.4230/TGDK.3.1.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Knowledge reconciliation, Uncertainty, Heterogeneous sources, Knowledge graph construction}
}
Document
Survey
DOI: 10.4230/TGDK.1.1.11
How Does Knowledge Evolve in Open Knowledge Graphs?

Authors: Axel Polleres, Romana Pernisch, Angela Bonifati, Daniele Dell'Aglio, Daniil Dobriy, Stefania Dumbrava, Lorena Etcheverry, Nicolas Ferranti, Katja Hose, Ernesto Jiménez-Ruiz, Matteo Lissandrini, Ansgar Scherp, Riccardo Tommasini, and Johannes Wachs

Published in: TGDK, Volume 1, Issue 1 (2023): Special Issue on Trends in Graph Data and Knowledge. Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge, Volume 1, Issue 1

Abstract
Openly available, collaboratively edited Knowledge Graphs (KGs) are key platforms for the collective management of evolving knowledge. The present work aims t o provide an analysis of the obstacles related to investigating and processing specifically this central aspect of evolution in KGs. To this end, we discuss (i) the dimensions of evolution in KGs, (ii) the observability of evolution in existing, open, collaboratively constructed Knowledge Graphs over time, and (iii) possible metrics to analyse this evolution. We provide an overview of relevant state-of-the-art research, ranging from metrics developed for Knowledge Graphs specifically to potential methods from related fields such as network science. Additionally, we discuss technical approaches - and their current limitations - related to storing, analysing and processing large and evolving KGs in terms of handling typical KG downstream tasks.
Cite as

Axel Polleres, Romana Pernisch, Angela Bonifati, Daniele Dell'Aglio, Daniil Dobriy, Stefania Dumbrava, Lorena Etcheverry, Nicolas Ferranti, Katja Hose, Ernesto Jiménez-Ruiz, Matteo Lissandrini, Ansgar Scherp, Riccardo Tommasini, and Johannes Wachs. How Does Knowledge Evolve in Open Knowledge Graphs?. In Special Issue on Trends in Graph Data and Knowledge. Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge (TGDK), Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 11:1-11:59, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@Article{polleres_et_al:TGDK.1.1.11,
  author =	{Polleres, Axel and Pernisch, Romana and Bonifati, Angela and Dell'Aglio, Daniele and Dobriy, Daniil and Dumbrava, Stefania and Etcheverry, Lorena and Ferranti, Nicolas and Hose, Katja and Jim\'{e}nez-Ruiz, Ernesto and Lissandrini, Matteo and Scherp, Ansgar and Tommasini, Riccardo and Wachs, Johannes},
  title =	{{How Does Knowledge Evolve in Open Knowledge Graphs?}},
  journal =	{Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge},
  pages =	{11:1--11:59},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{1},
  number =	{1},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/TGDK.1.1.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-194855},
  doi =		{10.4230/TGDK.1.1.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: KG evolution, temporal KG, versioned KG, dynamic KG}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.11
MPC with Low Bottleneck-Complexity: Information-Theoretic Security and More

Authors: Hannah Keller, Claudio Orlandi, Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky, and Divya Ravi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 267, 4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023)

Abstract
The bottleneck-complexity (BC) of secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols is a measure of the maximum number of bits which are sent and received by any party in protocol. As the name suggests, the goal of studying BC-efficient protocols is to increase overall efficiency by making sure that the workload in the protocol is somehow "amortized" by the protocol participants. Orlandi et al. [Orlandi et al., 2022] initiated the study of BC-efficient protocols from simple assumptions in the correlated randomness model and for semi-honest adversaries. In this work, we extend the study of [Orlandi et al., 2022] in two primary directions: (a) to a larger and more general class of functions and (b) to the information-theoretic setting. In particular, we offer semi-honest secure protocols for the useful function classes of abelian programs, "read-k" non-abelian programs, and "read-k" generalized formulas. Our constructions use a novel abstraction, called incremental function secret-sharing (IFSS), that can be instantiated with unconditional security or from one-way functions (with different efficiency trade-offs).
Cite as

Hannah Keller, Claudio Orlandi, Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky, and Divya Ravi. MPC with Low Bottleneck-Complexity: Information-Theoretic Security and More. In 4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 267, pp. 11:1-11:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{keller_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2023.11,
  author =	{Keller, Hannah and Orlandi, Claudio and Paskin-Cherniavsky, Anat and Ravi, Divya},
  title =	{{MPC with Low Bottleneck-Complexity: Information-Theoretic Security and More}},
  booktitle =	{4th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2023)},
  pages =	{11:1--11:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-271-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{267},
  editor =	{Chung, Kai-Min},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-183391},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2023.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secure Multiparty Computation, Bottleneck Complexity, Information-theoretic}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2020.5
Use Your Brain! Arithmetic 3PC for Any Modulus with Active Security

Authors: Hendrik Eerikson, Marcel Keller, Claudio Orlandi, Pille Pullonen, Joonas Puura, and Mark Simkin

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 163, 1st Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2020)

Abstract
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows a set of mutually distrustful parties to compute a public function on their private inputs without revealing anything beyond the output of the computation. This paper focuses on the specific case of actively secure three-party computation with an honest majority. In particular, we are interested in solutions which allow to evaluate arithmetic circuits over real-world CPU word sizes, like 32- and 64-bit words. Our starting point is the novel compiler of Damgård et al. from CRYPTO 2018. First, we present an improved version of it which reduces the online communication complexity by a factor of 2. Next, we replace their preprocessing protocol (with arithmetic modulo a large prime) with a more efficient preprocessing which only performs arithmetic modulo powers of two. Finally, we present a novel "postprocessing" check which replaces the preprocessing phase. These protocols offer different efficiency tradeoffs and can therefore outperform each other in different deployment settings. We demonstrate this with benchmarks in a LAN and different WAN settings. Concretely, we achieve a throughput of 1 million 64-bit multiplications per second with parties located in different continents and 3 million in one location.
Cite as

Hendrik Eerikson, Marcel Keller, Claudio Orlandi, Pille Pullonen, Joonas Puura, and Mark Simkin. Use Your Brain! Arithmetic 3PC for Any Modulus with Active Security. In 1st Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 163, pp. 5:1-5:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{eerikson_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2020.5,
  author =	{Eerikson, Hendrik and Keller, Marcel and Orlandi, Claudio and Pullonen, Pille and Puura, Joonas and Simkin, Mark},
  title =	{{Use Your Brain! Arithmetic 3PC for Any Modulus with Active Security}},
  booktitle =	{1st Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2020)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-151-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{163},
  editor =	{Tauman Kalai, Yael and Smith, Adam D. and Wichs, Daniel},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2020.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-121104},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2020.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secure Multiparty Computation, Information Theoretic Security}
}
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