8 Search Results for "Ventre, Carmine"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.14
Computing Tarski Fixed Points in Financial Networks

Authors: Leander Besting, Martin Hoefer, and Lars Huth

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 364, 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)

Abstract
Modern financial networks are highly connected and result in complex interdependencies of the involved institutions. In the prominent Eisenberg-Noe model [Eisenberg and Noe, 2001], a fundamental aspect is clearing - to determine the amount of assets available to each financial institution in the presence of potential defaults and bankruptcy. A clearing state represents a fixed point that satisfies a set of natural axioms. Existence can be established (even in broad generalizations of the model) using Tarski’s theorem. While a maximal fixed point can be computed in polynomial time, the complexity of computing other fixed points is open. In this paper, we provide an efficient algorithm to compute a minimal fixed point. Our algorithm applies in a broad generalization of the Eisenberg-Noe model with any monotone, piecewise-linear payment functions and default costs. We also study claims trading, a local network adjustment to improve clearing, when networks are evaluated with minimal clearing. We provide an efficient algorithm to decide existence of Pareto-improving trades and compute optimal ones if they exist.
Cite as

Leander Besting, Martin Hoefer, and Lars Huth. Computing Tarski Fixed Points in Financial Networks. In 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 364, pp. 14:1-14:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{besting_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2026.14,
  author =	{Besting, Leander and Hoefer, Martin and Huth, Lars},
  title =	{{Computing Tarski Fixed Points in Financial Networks}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-412-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{364},
  editor =	{Mahajan, Meena and Manea, Florin and McIver, Annabelle and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-255038},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Tarski Fixed Points, Financial Networks, Minimal Clearing, Claims Trade}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.27
Where to Place Your TEE? In Search of a Censorship-Resilient Design for Rollup Sequencers

Authors: Andrei Arusoaie, Claudiu-Nicu Bărbieru, Oana-Otilia Captarencu, Pascal Felber, Corentin Libert, Emanuel Onica, Etienne Rivière, Valerio Schiavoni, and Peterson Yuhala

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 361, 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)

Abstract
Ethereum is the dominant blockchain ecosystem capable of executing Turing-complete smart contracts. Rollups gained significant traction as the primary layer 2 (L2) solution meant to bring horizontal scalability to the main Ethereum network (L1). A core component of any rollup is the sequencer, which creates new L2 blocks to be submitted in rollup batches to L1. In most of the current rollup architectures, this component is centralised. As a result, these designs are prone to inconspicuous censorship practices by the sequencer. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) can guarantee the integrity of various sequencer components, which is instrumental in addressing censorship. However, the reaction of the system design to censorship attempts depends on where a TEE is integrated and which components it protects. In particular, this reaction is limited in the case of a monolithic TEE-protected sequencer design. Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is a non-monolithic paradigm adopted on L1, which separates the production of blocks from proposing them for inclusion in the blockchain. Recently, PBS has been considered for integration with L2 sequencers, with an impact on alleviating censorship. In this paper, we explore the design space of TEE-integrating PBS and non-PBS sequencer variants. First, we introduce a formal framework for the censorship actions that captures the specificity of the L2 sequencer. Then, we analyse to what extent the different designs address these censorship actions. Our main contribution is a novel design variation that allows for a precise observation of censored transactions. In the presence of TEEs, in a PBS setting, we demonstrate this precise observability, which is necessary to enable resilience to censorship.
Cite as

Andrei Arusoaie, Claudiu-Nicu Bărbieru, Oana-Otilia Captarencu, Pascal Felber, Corentin Libert, Emanuel Onica, Etienne Rivière, Valerio Schiavoni, and Peterson Yuhala. Where to Place Your TEE? In Search of a Censorship-Resilient Design for Rollup Sequencers. In 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 361, pp. 27:1-27:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{arusoaie_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.27,
  author =	{Arusoaie, Andrei and B\u{a}rbieru, Claudiu-Nicu and Captarencu, Oana-Otilia and Felber, Pascal and Libert, Corentin and Onica, Emanuel and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio and Yuhala, Peterson},
  title =	{{Where to Place Your TEE? In Search of a Censorship-Resilient Design for Rollup Sequencers}},
  booktitle =	{29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)},
  pages =	{27:1--27:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-409-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{361},
  editor =	{Arusoaie, Andrei and Onica, Emanuel and Spear, Michael and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.27},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-252000},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.27},
  annote =	{Keywords: Rollups, Trusted Execution Environments, Censorship}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26
Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest

Authors: Fei Wu, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Mallesh Pai

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics and dynamics behind arbitrages between centralized and decentralized exchanges (CEX-DEX) on Ethereum. We refine heuristics to identify arbitrage transactions from on-chain data and introduce a robust empirical framework to estimate arbitrage revenue without knowing traders' actual behaviors on CEX. Leveraging an extensive dataset spanning 19 months from August 2023 to March 2025, we estimate a total of 233.8M USD extracted by 19 major CEX-DEX searchers from 7,203,560 identified CEX-DEX arbitrages. Our analysis reveals increasing centralization trends as three searchers captured three-quarters of both volume and extracted value. We also demonstrate that searchers' profitability is tied to their integration level with block builders and uncover exclusive searcher-builder relationships and their market impact. Finally, we correct the previously underestimated profitability of block builders who vertically integrate with a searcher. These insights illuminate the darkest corner of the MEV landscape and highlight the critical implications for Ethereum’s decentralization.
Cite as

Fei Wu, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Mallesh Pai. Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 26:1-26:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{wu_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26,
  author =	{Wu, Fei and Sui, Danning and Thiery, Thomas and Pai, Mallesh},
  title =	{{Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{26:1--26:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247450},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26},
  annote =	{Keywords: Decentralized Finance, Maximal Extractable Value, CEX-DEX arbitrages}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SAND.2025.2
Dynamic Debt Swapping in Financial Networks

Authors: Henri Froese, Martin Hoefer, and Lisa Wilhelmi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 330, 4th Symposium on Algorithmic Foundations of Dynamic Networks (SAND 2025)

Abstract
A debt swap is an elementary edge swap in a directed, weighted graph, where two edges with the same weight swap their targets. Debt swaps are a natural and appealing operation in financial networks, in which nodes are banks and edges represent debt contracts. They can improve the clearing payments and the stability of these networks. However, their algorithmic properties are not well-understood. We analyze the computational complexity of debt swapping. Our main interest lies in semi-positive swaps, in which no creditor strictly suffers and at least one strictly profits. These swaps lead to a Pareto-improvement in the entire network. We consider network optimization via sequences of v-improving debt swaps from which a given bank v strictly profits. For ranking-based clearing, we show that every sequence of semi-positive v-improving swaps has polynomial length. In contrast, for arbitrary v-improving swaps, the problem of reaching a network configuration that allows no further swaps is PLS-complete. We identify cases in which short sequences of semi-positive swaps exist even without the v-improving property.
Cite as

Henri Froese, Martin Hoefer, and Lisa Wilhelmi. Dynamic Debt Swapping in Financial Networks. In 4th Symposium on Algorithmic Foundations of Dynamic Networks (SAND 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 330, pp. 2:1-2:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{froese_et_al:LIPIcs.SAND.2025.2,
  author =	{Froese, Henri and Hoefer, Martin and Wilhelmi, Lisa},
  title =	{{Dynamic Debt Swapping in Financial Networks}},
  booktitle =	{4th Symposium on Algorithmic Foundations of Dynamic Networks (SAND 2025)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-368-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{330},
  editor =	{Meeks, Kitty and Scheideler, Christian},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SAND.2025.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-230550},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SAND.2025.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Debt Swap, Financial Networks, Local Search}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2024.42
Algorithms for Claims Trading

Authors: Martin Hoefer, Carmine Ventre, and Lisa Wilhelmi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 289, 41st International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2024)

Abstract
The recent banking crisis has again emphasized the importance of understanding and mitigating systemic risk in financial networks. In this paper, we study a market-driven approach to rescue a bank in distress based on the idea of claims trading, a notion defined in Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. We formalize the idea in the context of the seminal model of financial networks by Eisenberg and Noe [Eisenberg and Noe, 2001]. For two given banks v and w, we consider the operation that w takes over some claims of v and in return gives liquidity to v (or creditors of v) to ultimately rescue v (or mitigate contagion effects). We study the structural properties and computational complexity of decision and optimization problems for several variants of claims trading. When trading incoming edges of v (i.e., claims for which v is the creditor), we show that there is no trade in which both banks v and w strictly improve their assets. We therefore consider creditor-positive trades, in which v profits strictly and w remains indifferent. For a given set C of incoming edges of v, we provide an efficient algorithm to compute payments by w that result in a creditor-positive trade and maximal assets of v. When the set C must also be chosen, the problem becomes weakly NP-hard. Our main result here is a bicriteria FPTAS to compute an approximate trade, which allows for slightly increased payments by w. The approximate trade results in nearly the optimal amount of assets of v in any exact trade. Our results extend to the case in which banks use general monotone payment functions to settle their debt and the emerging clearing state can be computed efficiently. In contrast, for trading outgoing edges of v (i.e., claims for which v is the debtor), the goal is to maximize the increase in assets for the creditors of v. Notably, for these results the characteristics of the payment functions of the banks are essential. For payments ranking creditors one by one, we show NP-hardness of approximation within a factor polynomial in the network size, in both problem variants when the set of claims C is part of the input or not. Instead, for payments proportional to the value of each debt, our results indicate more favorable conditions.
Cite as

Martin Hoefer, Carmine Ventre, and Lisa Wilhelmi. Algorithms for Claims Trading. In 41st International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 289, pp. 42:1-42:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{hoefer_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2024.42,
  author =	{Hoefer, Martin and Ventre, Carmine and Wilhelmi, Lisa},
  title =	{{Algorithms for Claims Trading}},
  booktitle =	{41st International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2024)},
  pages =	{42:1--42:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-311-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{289},
  editor =	{Beyersdorff, Olaf and Kant\'{e}, Mamadou Moustapha and Kupferman, Orna and Lokshtanov, Daniel},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2024.42},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-197523},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2024.42},
  annote =	{Keywords: Financial Networks, Claims Trade, Systemic Risk}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.76
Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Derivatives

Authors: Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, and Carmine Ventre

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 229, 49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022)

Abstract
Financial networks model a set of financial institutions (firms) interconnected by obligations. Recent work has introduced to this model a class of obligations called credit default swaps, a certain kind of financial derivatives. The main computational challenge for such systems is known as the clearing problem, which is to determine which firms are in default and to compute their exposure to systemic risk, technically known as their recovery rates. It is known that the recovery rates form the set of fixed points of a simple function, and that these fixed points can be irrational. Furthermore, Schuldenzucker et al. (2016) have shown that finding a weakly (or "almost") approximate (rational) fixed point is PPAD-complete. We further study the clearing problem from the point of view of irrationality and approximation strength. Firstly, we observe that weakly approximate solutions may misrepresent the actual financial state of an institution. On this basis, we study the complexity of finding a strongly (or "near") approximate solution, and show FIXP-completeness. We then study the structural properties required for irrationality, and we give necessary conditions for irrational solutions to emerge: The presence of certain types of cycles in a financial network forces the recovery rates to take the form of roots of non-linear polynomials. In the absence of a large subclass of such cycles, we study the complexity of finding an exact fixed point, which we show to be a problem close to, albeit outside of, PPAD.
Cite as

Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, and Carmine Ventre. Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Derivatives. In 49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 229, pp. 76:1-76:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{ioannidis_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.76,
  author =	{Ioannidis, Stavros D. and de Keijzer, Bart and Ventre, Carmine},
  title =	{{Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Derivatives}},
  booktitle =	{49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022)},
  pages =	{76:1--76:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-235-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{229},
  editor =	{Boja\'{n}czyk, Miko{\l}aj and Merelli, Emanuela and Woodruff, David P.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.76},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-164172},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.76},
  annote =	{Keywords: FIXP, Financial Networks, Systemic Risk}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.71
Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions

Authors: Bart de Keijzer, Maria Kyropoulou, and Carmine Ventre

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 168, 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020)

Abstract
We consider the setting of combinatorial auctions when the agents are single-minded and have no contingent reasoning skills. We are interested in mechanisms that provide the right incentives to these imperfectly rational agents, and therefore focus our attention to obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms. These mechanisms require that at each point during the execution where an agent is queried to communicate information, it should be "obvious" for the agent what strategy to adopt in order to maximise her utility. In this paper we study the potential of OSP mechanisms with respect to the approximability of the optimal social welfare. We consider two cases depending on whether the desired bundles of the agents are known or unknown to the mechanism. For the case of known-bundle single-minded agents we show that OSP can actually be as powerful as (plain) strategyproofness (SP). In particular, we show that we can implement the very same algorithm used for SP to achieve a √m-approximation of the optimal social welfare with an OSP mechanism, m being the total number of items. Restricting our attention to declaration domains with two values, we provide a 2-approximate OSP mechanism, and prove that this approximation bound is tight. We also present a randomised mechanism that is universally OSP and achieves a finite approximation of the optimal social welfare for the case of arbitrary size finite domains. This mechanism also provides a bounded approximation ratio when the valuations lie in a bounded interval (even if the declaration domain is infinitely large). For the case of unknown-bundle single-minded agents, we show how we can achieve an approximation ratio equal to the size of the largest desired set, in an OSP way. We remark this is the first known application of OSP to multi-dimensional settings, i.e., settings where agents have to declare more than one parameter. Our results paint a rather positive picture regarding the power of OSP mechanisms in this context, particularly for known-bundle single-minded agents. All our results are constructive, and even though some known strategyproof algorithms are used, implementing them in an OSP way is a non-trivial task.
Cite as

Bart de Keijzer, Maria Kyropoulou, and Carmine Ventre. Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions. In 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 168, pp. 71:1-71:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{dekeijzer_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.71,
  author =	{de Keijzer, Bart and Kyropoulou, Maria and Ventre, Carmine},
  title =	{{Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020)},
  pages =	{71:1--71:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-138-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{168},
  editor =	{Czumaj, Artur and Dawar, Anuj and Merelli, Emanuela},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.71},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-124781},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2020.71},
  annote =	{Keywords: OSP Mechanisms, Extensive-form Mechanisms, Single-minded Combinatorial Auctions, Greedy algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.46
Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling

Authors: Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, and Carmine Ventre

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 144, 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019)

Abstract
Catering to the incentives of people with limited rationality is a challenging research direction that requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms and approximation algorithms. Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms have recently emerged as the concept of interest to this research agenda. However, the majority of the literature in the area has either highlighted the shortcomings of OSP or focused on the "right" definition rather than on the construction of these mechanisms. We here give the first set of tight results on the approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms for scheduling related machines. By extending the well-known cycle monotonicity technique, we are able to concentrate on the algorithmic component of OSP mechanisms and provide some novel paradigms for their design.
Cite as

Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, and Carmine Ventre. Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling. In 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 144, pp. 46:1-46:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{ferraioli_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2019.46,
  author =	{Ferraioli, Diodato and Meier, Adrian and Penna, Paolo and Ventre, Carmine},
  title =	{{Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling}},
  booktitle =	{27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019)},
  pages =	{46:1--46:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-124-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{144},
  editor =	{Bender, Michael A. and Svensson, Ola and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.46},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-111677},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.46},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bounded Rationality, Extensive-form Mechanisms, Approximate Mechanism Design}
}
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