5 Search Results for "Altman, Alon"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.10
Packing Compact Subgraphs with Applications to Districting

Authors: Ho-Lin Chen, Po-Yu Chou, Prathamesh Dharangutte, Jie Gao, Shang-En Huang, and Fang-Yi Yu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 368, 7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026)

Abstract
Packing disjoint subgraphs in a given graph is a fundamental problem with many applications. Motivated by political districting, we focus on connected subgraphs that are compact (e.g., having constant radius from a single center vertex) and that satisfy additional composition requirements, such as a minimum population/weight threshold or balanced weight types (e.g., political affiliations). We aim to maximize coverage by disjoint districts that meet these requirements. In this work, we present new results that substantially improve the previously known bounds on balanced star districts for planar and minor-free graphs [Prathamesh Dharangutte et al., 2025]. In particular, we improve the approximation factor from O(log n) to O(1) for packing balanced star districts using the exact same algorithm, but with a refined analysis. We also extend the results beyond planar graphs to minor-free graphs and an even broader family of graphs of bounded expansion. Additionally, we obtain an O(1) approximation for packing radius-k districts (with a constant k) in planar and apex-minor-free graphs. In order to get a (1+ε) approximation on the max coverage, we show that this can be achieved if we allow a slight relaxation of the balancedness parameters (by a factor that can be made arbitrarily close to 1), for bounded radius-k districts on planar and apex-minor-free graphs. We show that all of these results can also be obtained if we enforce a minimum weight threshold for each district as the composition requirement, rather than balancedness. We present various results on hardness and hardness of approximation for this variant, by graph and district types.
Cite as

Ho-Lin Chen, Po-Yu Chou, Prathamesh Dharangutte, Jie Gao, Shang-En Huang, and Fang-Yi Yu. Packing Compact Subgraphs with Applications to Districting. In 7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 368, pp. 10:1-10:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{chen_et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2026.10,
  author =	{Chen, Ho-Lin and Chou, Po-Yu and Dharangutte, Prathamesh and Gao, Jie and Huang, Shang-En and Yu, Fang-Yi},
  title =	{{Packing Compact Subgraphs with Applications to Districting}},
  booktitle =	{7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-419-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{368},
  editor =	{Lin, Huijia (Rachel)},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-259820},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Approximation algorithms, algorithmic fairness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.11
Limitations on Accurate, Trusted, Human-Level Reasoning

Authors: Rina Panigrahy and Vatsal Sharan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 368, 7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026)

Abstract
We identify a fundamental incompatibility between the goals of accuracy, trust, and human-level reasoning in artificial intelligence (AI) systems, for strict mathematical definitions of these notions. We define accuracy of a system as the property that it never makes any false claims when it has the ability to abstain from making a prediction on any input, and trust as the assumption that the system is accurate. We define human-level reasoning as the property of an AI system always matching or exceeding human capability. Our core finding is that - for our formal definitions of these notions - an accurate and trusted AI system cannot be a human-level reasoning system: for such an accurate, trusted system there are task instances which are easily and provably solvable by a human but not by the system. Our proofs draw parallels to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and Turing’s proof of the undecidability of the halting problem, and can be regarded as interpretations of Gödel’s and Turing’s results. Key to our proof is the formalization of the notion of trust, which allows us to separate the intrinsic property of a system (being accurate) from its epistemic status (being trusted).
Cite as

Rina Panigrahy and Vatsal Sharan. Limitations on Accurate, Trusted, Human-Level Reasoning. In 7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 368, pp. 11:1-11:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{panigrahy_et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2026.11,
  author =	{Panigrahy, Rina and Sharan, Vatsal},
  title =	{{Limitations on Accurate, Trusted, Human-Level Reasoning}},
  booktitle =	{7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026)},
  pages =	{11:1--11:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-419-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{368},
  editor =	{Lin, Huijia (Rachel)},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-259840},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Accuracy, Safety, Trust, Complexity-theoretic limitations}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.5
Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament

Authors: Alon Altman, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010)

Abstract
A tournament is a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. Tournaments arise in many contexts that are relevant to AI, most notably in voting (as a method to aggregate the preferences of agents). There are many works that deal with choice rules that select a desirable alternative from a tournament, but very few of them deal directly with incentive issues, despite the fact that game-theoretic considerations are crucial with respect to systems populated by selfish agents. We deal with the problem of the manipulation of choice rules by considering two types of manipulation. We say that a choice rule is emph{monotonic} if an alternative cannot get itself selected by losing on purpose, and emph{pairwise nonmanipulable} if a pair of alternatives cannot make one of them the winner by reversing the outcome of the match between them. Our main result is a combinatorial construction of a choice rule that is monotonic, pairwise nonmanipulable, and onto the set of alternatives, for any number of alternatives besides three.
Cite as

Alon Altman, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-6, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{altman_et_al:DagSemProc.10101.5,
  author =	{Altman, Alon and Procaccia, Ariel D. and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--6},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10101},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25607},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Tournament, manipulation}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3
An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems

Authors: Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
Personalized ranking systems and trust systems are an essential tool for collaboration in a multi-agent environment. In these systems, trust relations between many agents are aggregated to produce a personalized trust rating of the agents. In this paper we introduce the first extensive axiomatic study of this setting, and explore a wide array of well-known and new personalized ranking systems. We adapt several axioms (basic criteria) from the literature on global ranking systems to the context of personalized ranking systems, and fully classify the set of systems that satisfy all of these axioms. We further show that all these axioms are necessary for this result.
Cite as

Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz. An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{altman_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.3,
  author =	{Altman, Alon and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--25},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11527},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Ranking systems, trust, axiomatization, incentives, mechanism design, game theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.18
The PageRank Axioms

Authors: Alon Altman

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, Computing and Markets (2005)

Abstract
This talk introduces the first graph-theoretic, ordinal representation theorem for the PageRank algorithm, bridging the gap between page ranking algorithms and the formal theory of social choice.
Cite as

Alon Altman. The PageRank Axioms. In Computing and Markets. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2005)

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@InProceedings{altman:DagSemProc.05011.18,
  author =	{Altman, Alon},
  title =	{{The PageRank Axioms}},
  booktitle =	{Computing and Markets},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2005},
  volume =	{5011},
  editor =	{Daniel Lehmann and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Tuomas Sandholm},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.18},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-1972},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.18},
  annote =	{Keywords: pagerank , social choice , ranking system}
}
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