3 Search Results for "Sulamy, Moshe"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30
Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences

Authors: Juho Hirvonen and Sara Ranjbaran

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 324, 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)

Abstract
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair of agents prefer each other over their current matches. The deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley solves this problem in polynomial time. Further, it is a mechanism: the proposing side in the algorithm is always incentivised to report their preferences truthfully. The deferred acceptance algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm (and thus a distributed mechanism). However, the algorithm is slow in the worst case and it is known that the stable matching problem cannot be solved efficiently in the distributed setting. In this work we study a natural special case of the stable matching problem where all agents on one of the two sides share common preferences. We show that in this case the deferred acceptance algorithm does yield a fast and truthful distributed mechanism for finding a stable matching. We show how algorithms for sampling random colorings can be used to break ties fairly and extend the results to fractional stable matching.
Cite as

Juho Hirvonen and Sara Ranjbaran. Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences. In 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 324, pp. 30:1-30:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{hirvonen_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30,
  author =	{Hirvonen, Juho and Ranjbaran, Sara},
  title =	{{Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)},
  pages =	{30:1--30:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-360-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{324},
  editor =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-225666},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matching, deferred acceptance, local algorithm, mechanism design}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2019.20
Consensus in Equilibrium: Can One Against All Decide Fairly?

Authors: Itay Harel, Amit Jacob-Fanani, Moshe Sulamy, and Yehuda Afek

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 153, 23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2019)

Abstract
Is there an equilibrium for distributed consensus when all agents except one collude to steer the decision value towards their preference? If an equilibrium exists, then an n-1 size coalition cannot do better by deviating from the algorithm, even if it prefers a different decision value. We show that an equilibrium exists under this condition only if the number of agents in the network is odd and the decision is binary (among two possible input values). That is, in this framework we provide a separation between binary and multi-valued consensus. Moreover, the input and output distribution must be uniform, regardless of the communication model (synchronous or asynchronous). Furthermore, we define a new problem - Resilient Input Sharing (RIS), and use it to find an iff condition for the (n-1)-resilient equilibrium for deterministic binary consensus, essentially showing that an equilibrium for deterministic consensus is equivalent to each agent learning all the other inputs in some strong sense. Finally, we note that (n-2)-resilient equilibrium for binary consensus is possible for any n. The case of (n-2)-resilient equilibrium for multi-valued consensus is left open.
Cite as

Itay Harel, Amit Jacob-Fanani, Moshe Sulamy, and Yehuda Afek. Consensus in Equilibrium: Can One Against All Decide Fairly?. In 23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 153, pp. 20:1-20:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{harel_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2019.20,
  author =	{Harel, Itay and Jacob-Fanani, Amit and Sulamy, Moshe and Afek, Yehuda},
  title =	{{Consensus in Equilibrium: Can One Against All Decide Fairly?}},
  booktitle =	{23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2019)},
  pages =	{20:1--20:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-133-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{153},
  editor =	{Felber, Pascal and Friedman, Roy and Gilbert, Seth and Miller, Avery},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2019.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-118065},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2019.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: distributed computing, game theory, rational agents, consensus}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2018.5
The Role of A-priori Information in Networks of Rational Agents

Authors: Yehuda Afek, Shaked Rafaeli, and Moshe Sulamy

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 121, 32nd International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2018)

Abstract
Until now, distributed algorithms for rational agents have assumed a-priori knowledge of n, the size of the network. This assumption is challenged here by proving how much a-priori knowledge is necessary for equilibrium in different distributed computing problems. Duplication - pretending to be more than one agent - is the main tool used by agents to deviate and increase their utility when not enough knowledge about n is given. We begin by proving that when no information on n is given, equilibrium is impossible for both Coloring and Knowledge Sharing. We then provide new algorithms for both problems when n is a-priori known to all agents. However, what if agents have partial knowledge about n? We provide tight upper and lower bounds that must be a-priori known on n for equilibrium to be possible in Leader Election, Knowledge Sharing, Coloring, Partition and Orientation.
Cite as

Yehuda Afek, Shaked Rafaeli, and Moshe Sulamy. The Role of A-priori Information in Networks of Rational Agents. In 32nd International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 121, pp. 5:1-5:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{afek_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2018.5,
  author =	{Afek, Yehuda and Rafaeli, Shaked and Sulamy, Moshe},
  title =	{{The Role of A-priori Information in Networks of Rational Agents}},
  booktitle =	{32nd International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2018)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-092-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{121},
  editor =	{Schmid, Ulrich and Widder, Josef},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2018.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-97945},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2018.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: rational agents, distributed game theory, coloring, knowledge sharing}
}
  • Refine by Type
  • 3 Document/PDF
  • 1 Document/HTML

  • Refine by Publication Year
  • 1 2025
  • 1 2020
  • 1 2018

  • Refine by Author
  • 2 Afek, Yehuda
  • 2 Sulamy, Moshe
  • 1 Harel, Itay
  • 1 Hirvonen, Juho
  • 1 Jacob-Fanani, Amit
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Series/Journal
  • 3 LIPIcs

  • Refine by Classification
  • 2 Theory of computation → Distributed computing models
  • 1 Theory of computation → Algorithmic mechanism design
  • 1 Theory of computation → Distributed algorithms

  • Refine by Keyword
  • 2 rational agents
  • 1 coloring
  • 1 consensus
  • 1 deferred acceptance
  • 1 distributed computing
  • Show More...

Any Issues?
X

Feedback on the Current Page

CAPTCHA

Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted to Dagstuhl Publishing

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2026 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH About DROPS Imprint Privacy Contact