10 Search Results for "Del Pozzo, Antonella"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.9
Contention-Aware Cooperation

Authors: Timothé Albouy, Davide Frey, Mathieu Gestin, Michel Raynal, and François Taïani

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 361, 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)

Abstract
As shown by Reliable Broadcast and Consensus, cooperation among a set of independent computing entities (sequential processes) is crucial in fault-tolerant distributed computing. Considering n-process asynchronous message-passing systems where some processes may be Byzantine, this paper introduces a novel cooperation abstraction, Contention-Aware Cooperation (CAC). While Reliable Broadcast is a one-to-n cooperation abstraction and Consensus is an n-to-n cooperation abstraction, CAC is a d-to-n cooperation abstraction where d (1 ≤ d ≤ n) varies with each run and remains unknown to the processes. Correct processes accept the same set of 𝓁 pairs ⟨ v,i ⟩ (v is the value proposed by p_i) from the d proposer processes, where 1 ≤ 𝓁 ≤ d and (as d) 𝓁 remains unknown to the processes (except in specific cases). Those 𝓁 values are accepted one at a time, potentially in different orders at each process. In addition, CAC provides each process with an imperfect oracle that provides insights into the values that they may accept in the future. Interestingly, the CAC abstraction is particularly efficient in favorable circumstances, when the oracle becomes accurate, which processes can detect. To illustrate its practical utility, the paper details two applications leveraging CAC: a fast consensus implementation optimized for low contention (named Cascading Consensus), and a novel naming problem that can be solved under full asynchrony. All algorithms presented require signatures.
Cite as

Timothé Albouy, Davide Frey, Mathieu Gestin, Michel Raynal, and François Taïani. Contention-Aware Cooperation. In 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 361, pp. 9:1-9:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{albouy_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.9,
  author =	{Albouy, Timoth\'{e} and Frey, Davide and Gestin, Mathieu and Raynal, Michel and Ta\"{i}ani, Fran\c{c}ois},
  title =	{{Contention-Aware Cooperation}},
  booktitle =	{29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-409-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{361},
  editor =	{Arusoaie, Andrei and Onica, Emanuel and Spear, Michael and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251823},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Agreement, Asynchronous message-passing system, Byzantine processes, Conflict detection, Consensus, Cooperation abstraction, Distributed computing, Fault tolerance, Optimistically terminating consensus, Short-naming}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.8
Auditable Shared Objects: From Registers to Synchronization Primitives

Authors: Hagit Attiya, Antonio Fernández Anta, Alessia Milani, Alexandre Rapetti, and Corentin Travers

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 356, 39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025)

Abstract
Auditability allows to track operations performed on a shared object, recording who accessed which information. This gives data owners more control on their data. Initially studied in the context of single-writer registers, this work extends the notion of auditability to other shared objects, and studies their properties. We start by moving from single-writer to multi-writer registers, and provide an implementation of an auditable n-writer m-reader read / write register, with O(n+m) step complexity. This implementation uses (m+n)-sliding registers, which have consensus number m+n. We show that this consensus number is necessary. The implementation extends naturally to support an auditable load-linked / store-conditional (LL/SC) shared object. LL/SC is a primitive that supports efficient implementation of many shared objects. Finally, we relate auditable registers to other access control objects, by implementing an anti-flickering deny list from auditable registers.
Cite as

Hagit Attiya, Antonio Fernández Anta, Alessia Milani, Alexandre Rapetti, and Corentin Travers. Auditable Shared Objects: From Registers to Synchronization Primitives. In 39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 356, pp. 8:1-8:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{attiya_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2025.8,
  author =	{Attiya, Hagit and Anta, Antonio Fern\'{a}ndez and Milani, Alessia and Rapetti, Alexandre and Travers, Corentin},
  title =	{{Auditable Shared Objects: From Registers to Synchronization Primitives}},
  booktitle =	{39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-402-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{356},
  editor =	{Kowalski, Dariusz R.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-248253},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auditability, Wait-free implementation, Synchronization power, Distributed objects, Shared memory, LL/SC, Deny List}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.7
Incentive Compatibility of Ethereum’s PoS Consensus Protocol

Authors: Ulysse Pavloff, Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 324, 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)

Abstract
This paper investigates whether following the fork-choice rule in the Ethereum PoS consensus protocol constitutes a Nash equilibrium - i.e., whether the protocol that maintains the canonical chain in Ethereum is incentive-compatible. Specifically, we explore whether selfish participants may attempt to manipulate the fork-choice rule by forking out previous blocks and capturing the rewards associated with those blocks. Our analysis considers two strategies for participants: the obedient strategy, which adheres to the prescribed protocol, and the cunning strategy, which attempts to manipulate the fork-choice rule to gain more rewards. We evaluate the conditions under which selfish participants might deviate from the obedient strategy. We found that, in a synchronous system, following the prescribed fork-choice rule is incentive-compatible. However, in an eventually synchronous system, the protocol is eventually incentive-compatible - that is, only a limited number of proposers will find it profitable to fork the chain during the synchronous period. After this sequence of cunning proposers, subsequent proposers will find it more profitable to follow the protocol.
Cite as

Ulysse Pavloff, Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. Incentive Compatibility of Ethereum’s PoS Consensus Protocol. In 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 324, pp. 7:1-7:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{pavloff_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.7,
  author =	{Pavloff, Ulysse and Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{Incentive Compatibility of Ethereum’s PoS Consensus Protocol}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-360-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{324},
  editor =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-225431},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Ethereum PoS, Game Theory, Block Reward}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.8
Optimal Multilevel Slashing for Blockchains

Authors: Kenan Wood, Hammurabi Mendes, and Jonad Pulaj

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 324, 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)

Abstract
We present the notion of multilevel slashing, where proof-of-stake blockchain validators can obtain gradual levels of assurance that a certain block is bound to be finalized in a global consensus procedure, unless an increasing and optimally large number of Byzantine processes have their staked assets slashed - that is, deducted - due to provably incorrect behavior. Our construction is a highly parameterized generalization of combinatorial intersection systems based on finite projective spaces, with asymptotic high availability and optimal slashing properties. Even under weak conditions, we show that our construction has asymptotically optimal slashing properties with respect to message complexity and validator load; this result also illustrates a fundamental trade off between message complexity, load, and slashing. In addition, we show that any intersection system whose ground elements are disjoint subsets of nodes (e.g. "committees" in committee-based consensus protocols) has asymptotic high availability under similarly weak conditions. Finally, our multilevel construction gives the flexibility to blockchain validators to decide how many "levels" of finalization assurance they wish to obtain. This functionality can be seen either as (i) a form of an early, slashing-based block finalization; or (ii) a service to support reorg tolerance.
Cite as

Kenan Wood, Hammurabi Mendes, and Jonad Pulaj. Optimal Multilevel Slashing for Blockchains. In 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 324, pp. 8:1-8:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{wood_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.8,
  author =	{Wood, Kenan and Mendes, Hammurabi and Pulaj, Jonad},
  title =	{{Optimal Multilevel Slashing for Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-360-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{324},
  editor =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-225445},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchains, Finality, Slashablility, Committees, Availability}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.4
The Synchronization Power of Auditable Registers

Authors: Hagit Attiya, Antonella Del Pozzo, Alessia Milani, Ulysse Pavloff, and Alexandre Rapetti

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 286, 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023)

Abstract
Auditability allows to track all the read operations performed on a register. It abstracts the need of data owners to control access to their data, tracking who read which information. This work considers possible formalizations of auditing and their ramification for the possibility of providing it. The natural definition is to require a linearization of all write, read and audit operations together (atomic auditing). The paper shows that atomic auditing is a powerful tool, as it can be used to solve consensus. The number of processes that can solve consensus using atomic audit depends on the number of processes that can read or audit the register. If there is a single reader or a single auditor (the writer), then consensus can be solved among two processes. If multiple readers and auditors are possible, then consensus can be solved among the same number of processes. This means that strong synchronization primitives are needed to support atomic auditing. We give implementations of atomic audit when there are either multiple readers or multiple auditors (but not both) using primitives with consensus number 2 (swap and fetch&add). When there are multiple readers and multiple auditors, the implementation uses compare&swap. These findings motivate a weaker definition, in which audit operations are not linearized together with read and write operations (regular auditing). We prove that regular auditing can be implemented from ordinary reads and writes on atomic registers.
Cite as

Hagit Attiya, Antonella Del Pozzo, Alessia Milani, Ulysse Pavloff, and Alexandre Rapetti. The Synchronization Power of Auditable Registers. In 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 286, pp. 4:1-4:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{attiya_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.4,
  author =	{Attiya, Hagit and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Milani, Alessia and Pavloff, Ulysse and Rapetti, Alexandre},
  title =	{{The Synchronization Power of Auditable Registers}},
  booktitle =	{27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2023)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-308-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{286},
  editor =	{Bessani, Alysson and D\'{e}fago, Xavier and Nakamura, Junya and Wada, Koichi and Yamauchi, Yukiko},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-194940},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auditability, atomic register, fault tolerance, consensus number}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2022.5
Fork Accountability in Tenderbake

Authors: Antonella Del Pozzo and Thibault Rieutord

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 101, 5th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2022 (FAB 2022)

Abstract
This work investigates the Fork Accountability problem in the BFT-Consensus-based Blockchain context. When there are more attackers than the tolerated ones, BFT-Consensus may fail in delivering safety. When this occurs, Fork Accountability aims to account for the responsible processes for that safety violation. As a case study, we consider Tenderbake when the assumption on the maximum number of Byzantine validators - participants involved in creating the next block - does not hold anymore. When a fork occurs, there are more than one-third of Byzantine validators, and we aim to account for the responsible validators to remove them from the system. In this work, we compare three different approaches to implementing accountability in the case of a fork. In particular, we show that in the case of a fork, if we do not modify Tenderbake or we enrich it with a reliable broadcast communication abstraction, then we can account Byzantine processes only in particular scenarios. Contrarily, if we change Tenderbake such that the exchanged messages also carry extra information (which size is proportional to the duration of the current consensus computation), then we can account for Byzantine processes in all kinds of scenarios; however, at the cost of unbounded message size and unbounded local memory.
Cite as

Antonella Del Pozzo and Thibault Rieutord. Fork Accountability in Tenderbake. In 5th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2022 (FAB 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 101, pp. 5:1-5:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{delpozzo_et_al:OASIcs.FAB.2022.5,
  author =	{Del Pozzo, Antonella and Rieutord, Thibault},
  title =	{{Fork Accountability in Tenderbake}},
  booktitle =	{5th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2022 (FAB 2022)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:22},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-248-8},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{101},
  editor =	{Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara and Crooks, Natacha},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2022.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-162723},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2022.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, BFT-Consensus, Fork Accountability}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2021.6
On Finality in Blockchains

Authors: Emmanuelle Anceaume, Antonella Del Pozzo, Thibault Rieutord, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 217, 25th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2021)

Abstract
This paper focuses on blockchain finality, which refers to the time when it becomes impossible to remove a block that has previously been appended to the blockchain. Blockchain finality can be deterministic or probabilistic, immediate or eventual. To favor availability against consistency in the face of partitions, most blockchains only offer probabilistic eventual finality: blocks may be revoked after being appended to the blockchain, yet with decreasing probability as they sink deeper into the chain. Other blockchains favor consistency by leveraging the immediate finality of Consensus - a block appended is never revoked - at the cost of additional synchronization. The quest for "good" deterministic finality properties for blockchains is still in its infancy, though. Our motivation is to provide a thorough study of several possible deterministic finality properties and explore their solvability. This is achieved by introducing the notion of bounded revocation, which informally says that the number of blocks that can be revoked from the current blockchain is bounded. Based on the requirements we impose on this revocation number, we provide reductions between different forms of eventual finality, Consensus and Eventual Consensus. From these reductions, we show some related impossibility results in presence of Byzantine processes, and provide non-trivial results. In particular, we provide an algorithm that solves a weak form of eventual finality in an asynchronous system in presence of an unbounded number of Byzantine processes. We also provide an algorithm that solves eventual finality with a bounded revocation number in an eventually synchronous environment in presence of less than half of Byzantine processes. The simplicity of the arguments should better guide blockchain designs and link them to clear formal properties of finality.
Cite as

Emmanuelle Anceaume, Antonella Del Pozzo, Thibault Rieutord, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. On Finality in Blockchains. In 25th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 217, pp. 6:1-6:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{anceaume_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2021.6,
  author =	{Anceaume, Emmanuelle and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Rieutord, Thibault and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{On Finality in Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{25th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2021)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-219-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{217},
  editor =	{Bramas, Quentin and Gramoli, Vincent and Milani, Alessia},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2021.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-157810},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2021.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, consistency properties, Byzantine tolerant implementations}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2021.1
Tenderbake - A Solution to Dynamic Repeated Consensus for Blockchains

Authors: Lăcrămioara Aştefănoaei, Pierre Chambart, Antonella Del Pozzo, Thibault Rieutord, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni, and Eugen Zălinescu

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 92, 4th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2021 (FAB 2021)

Abstract
First-generation blockchains provide probabilistic finality: a block can be revoked, albeit the probability decreases as the block "sinks" deeper into the chain. Recent proposals revisited committee-based BFT consensus to provide deterministic finality: as soon as a block is validated, it is never revoked. A distinguishing characteristic of these second-generation blockchains over classical BFT protocols is that committees change over time as the participation and the blockchain state evolve. In this paper, we push forward in this direction by proposing a formalization of the Dynamic Repeated Consensus problem and by providing generic procedures to solve it in the context of blockchains. Our approach is modular in that one can plug in different synchronizers and single-shot consensus. To offer a complete solution, we provide a concrete instantiation, called {{Tenderbake}}, and present a blockchain synchronizer and a single-shot consensus algorithm, working in a Byzantine and partially synchronous system model with eventually synchronous clocks. In contrast to recent proposals, our methodology is driven by the need to bound the message buffers. This is essential in preventing spamming and run-time memory errors. Moreover, {{Tenderbake}} processes can synchronize with each other without exchanging messages, leveraging instead the information stored in the blockchain.
Cite as

Lăcrămioara Aştefănoaei, Pierre Chambart, Antonella Del Pozzo, Thibault Rieutord, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni, and Eugen Zălinescu. Tenderbake - A Solution to Dynamic Repeated Consensus for Blockchains. In 4th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2021 (FAB 2021). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 92, pp. 1:1-1:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{astefanoaei_et_al:OASIcs.FAB.2021.1,
  author =	{A\c{s}tef\u{a}noaei, L\u{a}cr\u{a}mioara and Chambart, Pierre and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Rieutord, Thibault and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara and Z\u{a}linescu, Eugen},
  title =	{{Tenderbake - A Solution to Dynamic Repeated Consensus for Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Blockchain 2021 (FAB 2021)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:23},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-196-2},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{92},
  editor =	{Gramoli, Vincent and Sadoghi, Mohammad},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2021.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-139877},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FAB.2021.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, BFT-Consensus, Dynamic Repeated Consensus}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4
On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 82, 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)

Abstract
Committee-based blockchains are among the most popular alternatives of proof-of-work based blockchains, such as Bitcoin. They provide strong consistency (no fork) under classical assumptions, and avoid using energy-consuming mechanisms to add new blocks in the blockchain. For each block, these blockchains use a committee that executes Byzantine-fault tolerant distributed consensus to decide the next block they will add in the blockchain. Unlike Bitcoin, where there is only one creator per block, in committee-based blockchain any block is cooperatively created. In order to incentivize committee members to participate in the creation of new blocks, rewarding schemes have to be designed. In this paper, we study the fairness of rewarding in committee-based blockchains and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the system communication under which it is possible to have a fair reward mechanism.
Cite as

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains. In 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 82, pp. 4:1-4:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{On Fairness in Committee-Based Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2020)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:15},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-157-3},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{82},
  editor =	{Anceaume, Emmanuelle and Bisi\`{e}re, Christophe and Bouvard, Matthieu and Bramas, Quentin and Casamatta, Catherine},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135261},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Consensus, Committee, Fairness, Proof-of-Stake, Reward, Selection}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16
Correctness of Tendermint-Core Blockchains

Authors: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 125, 22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018)

Abstract
Tendermint-core blockchains (e.g. Cosmos) are considered today one of the most viable alternatives for the highly energy consuming proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Their particularity is that they aim at offering strong consistency (no forks) in an open system combining two ingredients (i) a set of validators that generate blocks via a variant of Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (PBFT) consensus protocol and (ii) a selection strategy that dynamically selects nodes to be validators for the next block via a proof-of-stake mechanism. The exact assumptions on the system model under which Tendermint underlying algorithms are correct and the exact properties Tendermint verifies, however, have never been formally analyzed. The contribution of this paper is as follows. First, while formalizing Tendermint algorithms we precisely characterize the system model and the exact problem solved by Tendermint, then, we prove that in eventual synchronous systems a modified version of Tendermint solves (i) under additional assumptions, a variant of one-shot consensus for the validation of one single block and (ii) a variant of the repeated consensus problem for multiple blocks. These results hold even if the set of validators is hit by Byzantine failures, provided that for each one-shot consensus instance less than one third of the validators is Byzantine.
Cite as

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. Correctness of Tendermint-Core Blockchains. In 22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 125, pp. 16:1-16:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{amoussouguenou_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16,
  author =	{Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley and Del Pozzo, Antonella and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  title =	{{Correctness of Tendermint-Core Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{22nd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2018)},
  pages =	{16:1--16:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-098-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{125},
  editor =	{Cao, Jiannong and Ellen, Faith and Rodrigues, Luis and Ferreira, Bernardo},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-100764},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2018.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Consensus, Proof-of-Stake, Fairness}
}
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