5 Search Results for "Filos-Ratsikas, Aris"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2024.26
Achieving Envy-Freeness Through Items Sale

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Evangelos Markakis, and Cosimo Vinci

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 308, 32nd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2024)

Abstract
We consider a fair division setting of allocating indivisible items to a set of agents. In order to cope with the well-known impossibility results related to the non-existence of envy-free allocations, we allow the option of selling some of the items so as to compensate envious agents with monetary rewards. In fact, this approach is not new in practice, as it is applied in some countries in inheritance or divorce cases. A drawback of this approach is that it may create a value loss, since the market value derived by selling an item can be less than the value perceived by the agents. Therefore, given the market values of all items, a natural goal is to identify which items to sell so as to arrive at an envy-free allocation, while at the same time maximizing the overall social welfare. Our work is focused on the algorithmic study of this problem, and we provide both positive and negative results on its approximability. When the agents have a commonly accepted value for each item, our results show a sharp separation between the cases of two or more agents. In particular, we establish a PTAS for two agents, and we complement this with a hardness result, that for three or more agents, the best approximation guarantee is provided by essentially selling all items. This hardness barrier, however, is relieved when the number of distinct item values is constant, as we provide an efficient algorithm for any number of agents. We also explore the generalization to heterogeneous valuations, where the hardness result continues to hold, and where we provide positive results for certain special cases.
Cite as

Vittorio Bilò, Evangelos Markakis, and Cosimo Vinci. Achieving Envy-Freeness Through Items Sale. In 32nd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 308, pp. 26:1-26:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2024.26,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and Markakis, Evangelos and Vinci, Cosimo},
  title =	{{Achieving Envy-Freeness Through Items Sale}},
  booktitle =	{32nd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2024)},
  pages =	{26:1--26:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-338-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{308},
  editor =	{Chan, Timothy and Fischer, Johannes and Iacono, John and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2024.26},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-210977},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2024.26},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair Item Allocation, Approximation Algorithms, Envy-freeness, Markets}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.60
The Chromatic Number of Kneser Hypergraphs via Consensus Division

Authors: Ishay Haviv

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 287, 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024)

Abstract
We show that the Consensus Division theorem implies lower bounds on the chromatic number of Kneser hypergraphs, offering a novel proof for a result of Alon, Frankl, and Lovász (Trans. Amer. Math. Soc., 1986) and for its generalization by Kriz (Trans. Amer. Math. Soc., 1992). Our approach is applied to study the computational complexity of the total search problem Kneser^p, which given a succinct representation of a coloring of a p-uniform Kneser hypergraph with fewer colors than its chromatic number, asks to find a monochromatic hyperedge. We prove that for every prime p, the Kneser^p problem with an extended access to the input coloring is efficiently reducible to a quite weak approximation of the Consensus Division problem with p shares. In particular, for p = 2, the problem is efficiently reducible to any non-trivial approximation of the Consensus Halving problem on normalized monotone functions. We further show that for every prime p, the Kneser^p problem lies in the complexity class PPA-p. As an application, we establish limitations on the complexity of the Kneser^p problem, restricted to colorings with a bounded number of colors.
Cite as

Ishay Haviv. The Chromatic Number of Kneser Hypergraphs via Consensus Division. In 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 287, pp. 60:1-60:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{haviv:LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.60,
  author =	{Haviv, Ishay},
  title =	{{The Chromatic Number of Kneser Hypergraphs via Consensus Division}},
  booktitle =	{15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024)},
  pages =	{60:1--60:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-309-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{287},
  editor =	{Guruswami, Venkatesan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.60},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-195883},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.60},
  annote =	{Keywords: Kneser hypergraphs, consensus division, the complexity classes PPA-p}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.4
The Complexity of Finding Fair Independent Sets in Cycles

Authors: Ishay Haviv

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 185, 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021)

Abstract
Let G be a cycle graph and let V₁,…,V_m be a partition of its vertex set into m sets. An independent set S of G is said to fairly represent the partition if |S ∩ V_i| ≥ 1/2⋅|V_i| - 1 for all i ∈ [m]. It is known that for every cycle and every partition of its vertex set, there exists an independent set that fairly represents the partition (Aharoni et al., A Journey through Discrete Math., 2017). We prove that the problem of finding such an independent set is PPA-complete. As an application, we show that the problem of finding a monochromatic edge in a Schrijver graph, given a succinct representation of a coloring that uses fewer colors than its chromatic number, is PPA-complete as well. The work is motivated by the computational aspects of the "cycle plus triangles" problem and of its extensions.
Cite as

Ishay Haviv. The Complexity of Finding Fair Independent Sets in Cycles. In 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 185, pp. 4:1-4:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{haviv:LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.4,
  author =	{Haviv, Ishay},
  title =	{{The Complexity of Finding Fair Independent Sets in Cycles}},
  booktitle =	{12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-177-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{185},
  editor =	{Lee, James R.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135431},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair independent sets in cycles, the complexity class \{PPA\}, Schrijver graphs}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.24
Hardness Results for Consensus-Halving

Authors: Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Paul W. Goldberg, and Jie Zhang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 117, 43rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2018)

Abstract
The Consensus-halving problem is the problem of dividing an object into two portions, such that each of n agents has equal valuation for the two portions. We study the epsilon-approximate version, which allows each agent to have an epsilon discrepancy on the values of the portions. It was recently proven in [Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg, 2018] that the problem of computing an epsilon-approximate Consensus-halving solution (for n agents and n cuts) is PPA-complete when epsilon is inverse-exponential. In this paper, we prove that when epsilon is constant, the problem is PPAD-hard and the problem remains PPAD-hard when we allow a constant number of additional cuts. Additionally, we prove that deciding whether a solution with n-1 cuts exists for the problem is NP-hard.
Cite as

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Paul W. Goldberg, and Jie Zhang. Hardness Results for Consensus-Halving. In 43rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 117, pp. 24:1-24:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{filosratsikas_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.24,
  author =	{Filos-Ratsikas, Aris and Frederiksen, S{\o}ren Kristoffer Stiil and Goldberg, Paul W. and Zhang, Jie},
  title =	{{Hardness Results for Consensus-Halving}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2018)},
  pages =	{24:1--24:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-086-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{117},
  editor =	{Potapov, Igor and Spirakis, Paul and Worrell, James},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.24},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-96069},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.24},
  annote =	{Keywords: PPAD, PPA, consensus halving, generalized-circuit, reduction}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.80
Walrasian Pricing in Multi-Unit Auctions

Authors: Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen, and Yulong Zeng

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 83, 42nd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2017)

Abstract
Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling relaxations such as Walrasian envy-free pricing do. In this paper we design an optimal envy-free mechanism for multi-unit auctions with budgets. When the market is even mildly competitive, the approximation ratios of this mechanism are small constants for both the revenue and welfare objectives, and in fact for welfare the approximation converges to 1 as the market becomes fully competitive. We also give an impossibility theorem, showing that truthfulness requires discarding resources, and in particular, is incompatible with (Pareto) efficiency.
Cite as

Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen, and Yulong Zeng. Walrasian Pricing in Multi-Unit Auctions. In 42nd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 83, pp. 80:1-80:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)

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@InProceedings{branzei_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.80,
  author =	{Br\^{a}nzei, Simina and Filos-Ratsikas, Aris and Miltersen, Peter Bro and Zeng, Yulong},
  title =	{{Walrasian Pricing in Multi-Unit Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{42nd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2017)},
  pages =	{80:1--80:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-046-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{83},
  editor =	{Larsen, Kim G. and Bodlaender, Hans L. and Raskin, Jean-Francois},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.80},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-81197},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.80},
  annote =	{Keywords: mechanism design, multi-unit auctions, Walrasian pricing, market share}
}
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