13 Search Results for "Filos-Ratsikas, Aris"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.27
The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions in Graphs

Authors: George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamária Kovács, and Ioannis Vlachos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 364, 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)

Abstract
We study truthful and non-truthful protocols for combinatorial auctions in which every item can be allocated to one of two agents (multigraphs), or more generally to a fixed number of agents (hypergraphs). We show some tight - both positive and impossibility - results for the communication complexity of approximating the optimal social welfare for general monotone, subadditive, or XOS valuations.
Cite as

George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamária Kovács, and Ioannis Vlachos. The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions in Graphs. In 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 364, pp. 27:1-27:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{christodoulou_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2026.27,
  author =	{Christodoulou, George and Koutsoupias, Elias and Kov\'{a}cs, Annam\'{a}ria and Vlachos, Ioannis},
  title =	{{The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions in Graphs}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)},
  pages =	{27:1--27:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-412-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{364},
  editor =	{Mahajan, Meena and Manea, Florin and McIver, Annabelle and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.27},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-255163},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.27},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Communication Complexity, Mechanism Design, Graphs}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15
Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes

Authors: Umang Bhaskar and Yeshwant Pandit

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
The existence of EFX allocations is one of the most significant open questions in fair division. Recent work by Christodoulou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa ("Fair allocation in graphs," EC 2023) establishes the existence of EFX allocations for graphical valuations, when agents are vertices in a graph, items are edges, and each item has zero value for all agents other than those at its endpoints. Thus, in this setting, each good has non-zero value for at most two agents, and there is at most one good valued by any pair of agents. This marks one of the few cases when an exact and complete EFX allocation is known to exist for more than three agents. In this work, we partially extend these results to multi-graphs, when each pair of vertices can have more than one edge between them. The existence of EFX allocations in multi-graphs is a natural open question given their existence in simple graphs. We show that EFX allocations exist, and can be computed in polynomial time, for agents with cancelable valuations in the following cases: (i) bipartite multi-graphs, (ii) multi-trees with monotone valuations, and (iii) multi-graphs with girth (2t-1), where t is the chromatic number of the multi-graph. The existence of EFX in cycle multi-graphs follows from (i), (iii), and the known existence of EFX for three agents.
Cite as

Umang Bhaskar and Yeshwant Pandit. Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 15:1-15:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{bhaskar_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15,
  author =	{Bhaskar, Umang and Pandit, Yeshwant},
  title =	{{Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{15:1--15:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-250958},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair Division, EFX, Multi-graphs}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29
Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division

Authors: Ajaykrishnan E S and Daniel Lokshtanov

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the problem of Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, where exactly p vertices of an undirected graph must be allocated to agents such that each agent receives a connected share and does not envy another agent’s share. Focusing on agents with additive valuations, we show that the problem remains computationally hard when parameterized by p and the number of agents. This result holds even for star graphs and with the input numbers given in unary representation, thereby resolving an open problem posed by Gahlawat and Zehavi (FSTTCS 2023). In stark contrast, we show that if one is willing to tolerate even the slightest amount of envy, then the problem becomes efficient with respect to the natural parameters. Specifically, we design an Efficient Parameterized Approximation Scheme parameterized by p and the number of agent types. Our algorithm works on general graphs and remains efficient even when the input numbers are provided in binary representation.
Cite as

Ajaykrishnan E S and Daniel Lokshtanov. Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 29:1-29:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{es_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29,
  author =	{E S, Ajaykrishnan and Lokshtanov, Daniel},
  title =	{{Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{29:1--29:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251101},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29},
  annote =	{Keywords: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, Efficient Parameterized Approximation Scheme, W\lbrack1\rbrack-hardness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.32
Fair Rent Division: New Budget and Rent Constraints

Authors: Rohith Reddy Gangam, Shayan Taherijam, and Vijay V. Vazirani

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the classical rent division problem, where n agents must allocate n indivisible rooms and split a fixed total rent R. The goal is to compute an envy-free (EF) allocation, where no agent prefers another agent’s room and rent to their own. This problem has been extensively studied under standard assumptions, where efficient algorithms for computing EF allocations are known. We extend this framework by introducing two practically motivated constraints: (i) lower and upper bounds on room rents, and (ii) room-specific budget for agents. We develop efficient combinatorial algorithms that either compute a feasible EF allocation or certify infeasibility. We further design algorithms to optimize over EF allocations using natural fairness objectives such as maximin utility, leximin utility, and minimum utility spread. Our approach unifies both constraint types within a single algorithmic framework, advancing the applicability of fair division methods in real-world platforms such as Spliddit.
Cite as

Rohith Reddy Gangam, Shayan Taherijam, and Vijay V. Vazirani. Fair Rent Division: New Budget and Rent Constraints. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 32:1-32:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{gangam_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.32,
  author =	{Gangam, Rohith Reddy and Taherijam, Shayan and Vazirani, Vijay V.},
  title =	{{Fair Rent Division: New Budget and Rent Constraints}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{32:1--32:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.32},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251136},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.32},
  annote =	{Keywords: Rent Division, Envy‑Free, Fair Division}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.41
Simultaneously Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Across Multiple Dimensions

Authors: Yasushi Kawase, Bodhayan Roy, and Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
This paper explores the fair allocation of indivisible items in a multidimensional setting, motivated by the need to address fairness in complex environments where agents assess bundles according to multiple criteria. Such multidimensional settings are not merely of theoretical interest but are central to many real-world applications. For example, cloud computing resources are evaluated based on multiple criteria such as CPU cores, memory, and network bandwidth. In such cases, traditional one-dimensional fairness notions fail to capture fairness across multiple attributes. To address these challenges, we study two relaxed variants of envy-freeness: weak simultaneously envy-free up to c goods (weak sEFc) and strong simultaneously envy-free up to c goods (strong sEFc), which accommodate the multidimensionality of agents’ preferences. Under the weak notion, for every pair of agents and for each dimension, any perceived envy can be eliminated by removing, if necessary, a different set of goods from the envied agent’s allocation. In contrast, the strong version requires selecting a single set of goods whose removal from the envied bundle simultaneously eliminates envy in every dimension. We provide upper and lower bounds on the relaxation parameter c that guarantee the existence of weak or strong sEFc allocations, where these bounds are independent of the total number of items. In addition, we present algorithms for checking whether a weak or strong sEFc allocation exists. Moreover, we establish NP-hardness results for checking the existence of weak sEF1 and strong sEF1 allocations.
Cite as

Yasushi Kawase, Bodhayan Roy, and Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui. Simultaneously Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Across Multiple Dimensions. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 41:1-41:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{kawase_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.41,
  author =	{Kawase, Yasushi and Roy, Bodhayan and Sanpui, Mohammad Azharuddin},
  title =	{{Simultaneously Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Across Multiple Dimensions}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{41:1--41:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.41},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251210},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.41},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair allocation, Envy-free up to one good, Multi-dimensional criteria, Linear programming, NP-hardness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38
Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets

Authors: Pallavi Jain, Palash Jha, and Shubham Solanki

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
We propose a new fairness notion, motivated by the practical challenge of allocating teaching assistants (TAs) to courses in a department. Each course requires a certain number of TAs and each TA has preferences over the courses they want to assist. Similarly, each course instructor has preferences over the TAs who applied for their course. We demand fairness and efficiency for both sides separately, giving rise to the following criteria: (i) every course gets the required number of TAs and the average utility of the assigned TAs meets a threshold; (ii) the allocation of courses to TAs is envy-free, where a TA envies another TA if the former prefers the latter’s course and has a higher or equal grade in that course. Note that the definition of envy-freeness here differs from the one in the literature, and we call it merit-based envy-freeness. We show that the problem of finding a merit-based envy-free and efficient matching is NP-hard even for very restricted settings, such as two courses and uniform valuations; constant degree, constant capacity of TAs for every course, valuations in the range {0,1,2,3}, identical valuations from TAs, and even more. To find tractable results, we consider some restricted instances, such as, strict valuation of TAs for courses, the difference between the number of positively valued TAs for a course and the capacity, the number of positively valued TAs/courses, types of valuation functions, and obtained some polynomial-time solvable cases, showing the contrast with intractable results. We further studied the problem in the paradigm of parameterized algorithms and designed some exact and approximation algorithms.
Cite as

Pallavi Jain, Palash Jha, and Shubham Solanki. Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 38:1-38:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{jain_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38,
  author =	{Jain, Pallavi and Jha, Palash and Solanki, Shubham},
  title =	{{Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{38:1--38:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251186},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair Matching, Envy-Freeness, Efficiency}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.44
Approximation Schemes for k-Subset Sum Ratio and k-Way Number Partitioning Ratio

Authors: Sotiris Kanellopoulos, Giorgos Mitropoulos, Antonis Antonopoulos, Nikos Leonardos, Aris Pagourtzis, Christos Pergaminelis, Stavros Petsalakis, and Kanellos Tsitouras

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 359, 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)

Abstract
The Subset Sum Ratio problem (SSR) asks, given a multiset A of positive integers, to find two disjoint subsets of A such that the largest-to-smallest ratio of their sums is minimized. In this paper we study the k-version of SSR, namely k-Subset Sum Ratio (k-SSR), which asks to minimize the largest-to-smallest ratio of sums of k disjoint subsets of A. We develop an approximation scheme for k-SSR running in O(n^{2k}/ε^{k-1}) time, where n = |A| and ε is the error parameter. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first FPTAS for k-SSR for fixed k > 2. We also study the k-way Number Partitioning Ratio (k-PART) problem, which differs from k-SSR in that the k subsets must constitute a partition of A; this problem in fact corresponds to the objective of minimizing the largest-to-smallest sum ratio in the family of Multiway Number Partitioning problems. We present a more involved FPTAS for k-PART, also achieving O(n^{2k}/ε^{k-1}) time complexity. Notably, k-PART is also equivalent to the Minimum Envy-Ratio problem with identical valuation functions, which has been studied in the context of fair division of indivisible goods. Thus, for the case of identical valuations, our FPTAS represents a significant improvement over the O(n^{4k²+1}/ε^{2k²}) bound obtained by Nguyen and Rothe’s FPTAS [Trung Thanh Nguyen and Jörg Rothe, 2014] for Minimum Envy-Ratio with general additive valuations. Lastly, we propose a second FPTAS for k-SSR, which employs carefully designed calls to the first one; the new scheme has a time complexity of Õ(n/ε^{3k-1}), thus being much faster when n≫ 1/ ε.
Cite as

Sotiris Kanellopoulos, Giorgos Mitropoulos, Antonis Antonopoulos, Nikos Leonardos, Aris Pagourtzis, Christos Pergaminelis, Stavros Petsalakis, and Kanellos Tsitouras. Approximation Schemes for k-Subset Sum Ratio and k-Way Number Partitioning Ratio. In 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 359, pp. 44:1-44:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{kanellopoulos_et_al:LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.44,
  author =	{Kanellopoulos, Sotiris and Mitropoulos, Giorgos and Antonopoulos, Antonis and Leonardos, Nikos and Pagourtzis, Aris and Pergaminelis, Christos and Petsalakis, Stavros and Tsitouras, Kanellos},
  title =	{{Approximation Schemes for k-Subset Sum Ratio and k-Way Number Partitioning Ratio}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)},
  pages =	{44:1--44:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-408-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{359},
  editor =	{Chen, Ho-Lin and Hon, Wing-Kai and Tsai, Meng-Tsung},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.44},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-249521},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.44},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fully polynomial-time approximation schemes, Subset Sum Ratio, Number Partitioning, Fair division, Envy minimization, Pseudo-polynomial time algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.71
Unfairly Splitting Separable Necklaces

Authors: Patrick Schnider, Linus Stalder, and Simon Weber

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 327, 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)

Abstract
The Necklace Splitting problem is a classical problem in combinatorics that has been intensively studied both from a combinatorial and a computational point of view. It is well-known that the Necklace Splitting problem reduces to the discrete Ham Sandwich problem. This reduction was crucial in the proof of PPA-completeness of the Ham Sandwich problem. Recently, Borzechowski, Schnider and Weber [ISAAC'23] introduced a variant of Necklace Splitting that similarly reduces to the α-Ham Sandwich problem, which lies in the complexity class UEOPL but is not known to be complete. To make this reduction work, the input necklace is guaranteed to be n-separable. They showed that these necklaces can be fairly split in polynomial time and thus this subproblem cannot be used to prove UEOPL-hardness for α-Ham Sandwich. We consider the more general unfair necklace splitting problem on n-separable necklaces, i.e., the problem of splitting these necklaces such that each thief gets a desired fraction of each type of jewels. This more general problem is the natural necklace-splitting-type version of α-Ham Sandwich, and its complexity status is one of the main open questions posed by Borzechowski, Schnider and Weber. We show that the unfair splitting problem is also polynomial-time solvable, and can thus also not be used to show UEOPL-hardness for α-Ham Sandwich.
Cite as

Patrick Schnider, Linus Stalder, and Simon Weber. Unfairly Splitting Separable Necklaces. In 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 327, pp. 71:1-71:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{schnider_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2025.71,
  author =	{Schnider, Patrick and Stalder, Linus and Weber, Simon},
  title =	{{Unfairly Splitting Separable Necklaces}},
  booktitle =	{42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)},
  pages =	{71:1--71:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-365-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{327},
  editor =	{Beyersdorff, Olaf and Pilipczuk, Micha{\l} and Pimentel, Elaine and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.71},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-228963},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.71},
  annote =	{Keywords: Necklace splitting, n-separability, well-separation, Ham Sandwich, alpha-Ham Sandwich, unfair splitting, fair division}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30
Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences

Authors: Juho Hirvonen and Sara Ranjbaran

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 324, 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)

Abstract
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair of agents prefer each other over their current matches. The deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley solves this problem in polynomial time. Further, it is a mechanism: the proposing side in the algorithm is always incentivised to report their preferences truthfully. The deferred acceptance algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm (and thus a distributed mechanism). However, the algorithm is slow in the worst case and it is known that the stable matching problem cannot be solved efficiently in the distributed setting. In this work we study a natural special case of the stable matching problem where all agents on one of the two sides share common preferences. We show that in this case the deferred acceptance algorithm does yield a fast and truthful distributed mechanism for finding a stable matching. We show how algorithms for sampling random colorings can be used to break ties fairly and extend the results to fractional stable matching.
Cite as

Juho Hirvonen and Sara Ranjbaran. Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences. In 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 324, pp. 30:1-30:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{hirvonen_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30,
  author =	{Hirvonen, Juho and Ranjbaran, Sara},
  title =	{{Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)},
  pages =	{30:1--30:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-360-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{324},
  editor =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-225666},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matching, deferred acceptance, local algorithm, mechanism design}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.60
The Chromatic Number of Kneser Hypergraphs via Consensus Division

Authors: Ishay Haviv

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 287, 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024)

Abstract
We show that the Consensus Division theorem implies lower bounds on the chromatic number of Kneser hypergraphs, offering a novel proof for a result of Alon, Frankl, and Lovász (Trans. Amer. Math. Soc., 1986) and for its generalization by Kriz (Trans. Amer. Math. Soc., 1992). Our approach is applied to study the computational complexity of the total search problem Kneser^p, which given a succinct representation of a coloring of a p-uniform Kneser hypergraph with fewer colors than its chromatic number, asks to find a monochromatic hyperedge. We prove that for every prime p, the Kneser^p problem with an extended access to the input coloring is efficiently reducible to a quite weak approximation of the Consensus Division problem with p shares. In particular, for p = 2, the problem is efficiently reducible to any non-trivial approximation of the Consensus Halving problem on normalized monotone functions. We further show that for every prime p, the Kneser^p problem lies in the complexity class PPA-p. As an application, we establish limitations on the complexity of the Kneser^p problem, restricted to colorings with a bounded number of colors.
Cite as

Ishay Haviv. The Chromatic Number of Kneser Hypergraphs via Consensus Division. In 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 287, pp. 60:1-60:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{haviv:LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.60,
  author =	{Haviv, Ishay},
  title =	{{The Chromatic Number of Kneser Hypergraphs via Consensus Division}},
  booktitle =	{15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024)},
  pages =	{60:1--60:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-309-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{287},
  editor =	{Guruswami, Venkatesan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.60},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-195883},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.60},
  annote =	{Keywords: Kneser hypergraphs, consensus division, the complexity classes PPA-p}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.4
The Complexity of Finding Fair Independent Sets in Cycles

Authors: Ishay Haviv

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 185, 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021)

Abstract
Let G be a cycle graph and let V₁,…,V_m be a partition of its vertex set into m sets. An independent set S of G is said to fairly represent the partition if |S ∩ V_i| ≥ 1/2⋅|V_i| - 1 for all i ∈ [m]. It is known that for every cycle and every partition of its vertex set, there exists an independent set that fairly represents the partition (Aharoni et al., A Journey through Discrete Math., 2017). We prove that the problem of finding such an independent set is PPA-complete. As an application, we show that the problem of finding a monochromatic edge in a Schrijver graph, given a succinct representation of a coloring that uses fewer colors than its chromatic number, is PPA-complete as well. The work is motivated by the computational aspects of the "cycle plus triangles" problem and of its extensions.
Cite as

Ishay Haviv. The Complexity of Finding Fair Independent Sets in Cycles. In 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 185, pp. 4:1-4:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{haviv:LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.4,
  author =	{Haviv, Ishay},
  title =	{{The Complexity of Finding Fair Independent Sets in Cycles}},
  booktitle =	{12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-177-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{185},
  editor =	{Lee, James R.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135431},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair independent sets in cycles, the complexity class \{PPA\}, Schrijver graphs}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.24
Hardness Results for Consensus-Halving

Authors: Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Paul W. Goldberg, and Jie Zhang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 117, 43rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2018)

Abstract
The Consensus-halving problem is the problem of dividing an object into two portions, such that each of n agents has equal valuation for the two portions. We study the epsilon-approximate version, which allows each agent to have an epsilon discrepancy on the values of the portions. It was recently proven in [Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg, 2018] that the problem of computing an epsilon-approximate Consensus-halving solution (for n agents and n cuts) is PPA-complete when epsilon is inverse-exponential. In this paper, we prove that when epsilon is constant, the problem is PPAD-hard and the problem remains PPAD-hard when we allow a constant number of additional cuts. Additionally, we prove that deciding whether a solution with n-1 cuts exists for the problem is NP-hard.
Cite as

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Paul W. Goldberg, and Jie Zhang. Hardness Results for Consensus-Halving. In 43rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 117, pp. 24:1-24:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{filosratsikas_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.24,
  author =	{Filos-Ratsikas, Aris and Frederiksen, S{\o}ren Kristoffer Stiil and Goldberg, Paul W. and Zhang, Jie},
  title =	{{Hardness Results for Consensus-Halving}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2018)},
  pages =	{24:1--24:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-086-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{117},
  editor =	{Potapov, Igor and Spirakis, Paul and Worrell, James},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.24},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-96069},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.24},
  annote =	{Keywords: PPAD, PPA, consensus halving, generalized-circuit, reduction}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.80
Walrasian Pricing in Multi-Unit Auctions

Authors: Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen, and Yulong Zeng

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 83, 42nd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2017)

Abstract
Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling relaxations such as Walrasian envy-free pricing do. In this paper we design an optimal envy-free mechanism for multi-unit auctions with budgets. When the market is even mildly competitive, the approximation ratios of this mechanism are small constants for both the revenue and welfare objectives, and in fact for welfare the approximation converges to 1 as the market becomes fully competitive. We also give an impossibility theorem, showing that truthfulness requires discarding resources, and in particular, is incompatible with (Pareto) efficiency.
Cite as

Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen, and Yulong Zeng. Walrasian Pricing in Multi-Unit Auctions. In 42nd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 83, pp. 80:1-80:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{branzei_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.80,
  author =	{Br\^{a}nzei, Simina and Filos-Ratsikas, Aris and Miltersen, Peter Bro and Zeng, Yulong},
  title =	{{Walrasian Pricing in Multi-Unit Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{42nd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2017)},
  pages =	{80:1--80:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-046-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{83},
  editor =	{Larsen, Kim G. and Bodlaender, Hans L. and Raskin, Jean-Francois},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.80},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-81197},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.80},
  annote =	{Keywords: mechanism design, multi-unit auctions, Walrasian pricing, market share}
}
  • Refine by Type
  • 13 Document/PDF
  • 9 Document/HTML

  • Refine by Publication Year
  • 1 2026
  • 8 2025
  • 1 2024
  • 1 2021
  • 1 2018
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Author
  • 2 Filos-Ratsikas, Aris
  • 2 Haviv, Ishay
  • 1 Antonopoulos, Antonis
  • 1 Bhaskar, Umang
  • 1 Brânzei, Simina
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Series/Journal
  • 13 LIPIcs

  • Refine by Classification
  • 3 Theory of computation → Problems, reductions and completeness
  • 2 Mathematics of computing → Graph theory
  • 2 Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory
  • 2 Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
  • 2 Theory of computation → Algorithmic mechanism design
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Keyword
  • 2 Fair Division
  • 2 mechanism design
  • 1 Auctions
  • 1 Communication Complexity
  • 1 EFX
  • Show More...

Any Issues?
X

Feedback on the Current Page

CAPTCHA

Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted to Dagstuhl Publishing

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2025 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH About DROPS Imprint Privacy Contact