9 Search Results for "Paes Leme, Renato"

Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2026.69
Online Matroid Embeddings

Authors: Andrés Cristi, Paul Dütting, Robert Kleinberg, Renato Paes Leme, and Neel Patel

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 374, 53rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2026)

Abstract
We introduce the notion of an online matroid embedding, which is an algorithm for mapping an unknown matroid that is revealed in an online fashion to a larger-but-known matroid. The existence of such embedding enables a reduction from the version of the matroid secretary problem where the matroid is unknown to the version where the matroid is known in advance. We establish the existence of such an embedding for binary matroids, and use it to relate variants of the binary matroid secretary problem to each other, showing that seemingly simpler problems are in fact equivalent to seemingly harder ones (up to constant-factors). Specifically, we show this to be the case for the version of the matroid secretary problem in which the binary matroid is not known in advance, and where it is known in advance. We also show that the version with known matroid structure is equivalent to the problem where weights are not fully adversarial but drawn from a known pairwise-independent distribution.
Cite as

Andrés Cristi, Paul Dütting, Robert Kleinberg, Renato Paes Leme, and Neel Patel. Online Matroid Embeddings. In 53rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 374, pp. 69:1-69:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{cristi_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2026.69,
  author =	{Cristi, Andr\'{e}s and D\"{u}tting, Paul and Kleinberg, Robert and Paes Leme, Renato and Patel, Neel},
  title =	{{Online Matroid Embeddings}},
  booktitle =	{53rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2026)},
  pages =	{69:1--69:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-428-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{374},
  editor =	{Bhattacharya, Sayan and Nanongkai, Danupon and Benedikt, Michael and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2026.69},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-264585},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2026.69},
  annote =	{Keywords: Matroids, Secretary Problem, Online Algorithm}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.21
The Importance of Being Smoothly Calibrated

Authors: Parikshit Gopalan, Konstantinos Stavropoulos, Kunal Talwar, and Pranay Tankala

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 368, 7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026)

Abstract
Recent work has highlighted the centrality of smooth calibration [Sham Kakade and Dean Foster, 2008] as a robust measure of calibration error. We generalize, unify, and extend previous results on smooth calibration, both as a robust calibration measure, and as a step towards omniprediction, which enables predictions with low regret for downstream decision makers seeking to optimize some proper loss unknown to the predictor. - We present a new omniprediction guarantee for smoothly calibrated predictors, for the class of all bounded proper losses. We smooth the predictor by adding some noise to it, and compete against smoothed versions of any benchmark predictor on the space, where we add some noise to the predictor and then post-process it arbitrarily. The omniprediction error is bounded by the smooth calibration error of the predictor and the earth mover’s distance from the benchmark. We exhibit instances showing that this dependence cannot, in general, be improved. We show how this unifies and extends prior results [Dean P. Foster and Rakesh V. Vohra, 1998; Jason D. Hartline et al., 2025] on omniprediction from smooth calibration. - We present a crisp new characterization of smooth calibration in terms of the earth mover’s distance to the closest perfectly calibrated joint distribution of predictions and labels. This also yields a simpler proof of the relation to the lower distance to calibration from [Jaroslaw Blasiok et al., 2023]. - We use this to show that the upper distance to calibration cannot be estimated within a quadratic factor with sample complexity independent of the support size of the predictions. This is in contrast to the distance to calibration, where the corresponding problem was known to be information-theoretically impossible: no finite number of samples suffice [Jaroslaw Blasiok et al., 2023].
Cite as

Parikshit Gopalan, Konstantinos Stavropoulos, Kunal Talwar, and Pranay Tankala. The Importance of Being Smoothly Calibrated. In 7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 368, pp. 21:1-21:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{gopalan_et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2026.21,
  author =	{Gopalan, Parikshit and Stavropoulos, Konstantinos and Talwar, Kunal and Tankala, Pranay},
  title =	{{The Importance of Being Smoothly Calibrated}},
  booktitle =	{7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-419-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{368},
  editor =	{Lin, Huijia (Rachel)},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-259945},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Smooth Calibration, Omniprediction, Distance to Calibration}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.58
One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts

Authors: Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, and Maya Schlesinger

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
We study multi-agent contract design with combinatorial actions, under budget constraints, and for a broad class of objective functions, including profit (principal’s utility), reward, and welfare. Our first result is a strong impossibility: For submodular reward functions, no randomized poly-time algorithm can approximate the optimal budget-feasible value within any finite factor, even with demand-oracle access. This result rules out extending known constant-factor guarantees from either (i) unbudgeted settings with combinatorial actions or (ii) budgeted settings with binary actions, to their combination. The hardness is tight: It holds even when all but one agent have binary actions and the remaining agent has just one additional action. On the positive side, we show that gross substitutes rewards (a well-studied strict subclass of submodular functions) admit a deterministic poly-time O(1)-approximation, using only value queries. Our results thus draw the first sharp separation between budgeted and unbudgeted settings in combinatorial contracts, and identifies gross substitutes as a tractable frontier for budgeted combinatorial contracts. Finally, we present an FPTAS for additive rewards, demonstrating that arbitrary approximation is tractable under any budget. This constitutes the first FPTAS for the multi-agent combinatorial-actions setting, even in the absence of budget constraints.
Cite as

Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, and Maya Schlesinger. One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 58:1-58:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{feldman_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.58,
  author =	{Feldman, Michal and Gal-Tzur, Yoav and Ponitka, Tomasz and Schlesinger, Maya},
  title =	{{One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{58:1--58:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.58},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253459},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.58},
  annote =	{Keywords: Combinatorial Contracts, Algorithmic Contract Design, Budget-Feasible Contracts}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86
The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order

Authors: Helia Karisani, Mohammadreza Daneshvaramoli, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Mohammad Hajiesmaili, and Cameron Musco

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
We study a learning-augmented variant of the secretary problem, recently introduced by Fujii and Yoshida (2023). In this variant, the decision-maker has access to machine-learned predictions of candidate values in advance. The key challenge is to balance consistency and robustness: when the predictions are accurate, the algorithm should hire a near-best secretary; however, if they are inaccurate, the algorithm should still achieve a bounded competitive ratio. We consider both the standard Random Order Secretary Problem (ROSP), where candidates arrive in a uniform random order, and a more natural model in the learning-augmented setting, where the decision-maker can choose the arrival order based on the predicted candidate values. This model, which we call the Chosen Order Secretary Problem (COSP), can capture scenarios such as an interview schedule that is set by the decision-maker. We propose a novel algorithm that applies to both ROSP and COSP. Building on the approach of Fujii and Yoshida, our method switches from fully trusting predictions to a threshold-based rule when a large deviation of a prediction is observed. Importantly, unlike the algorithm of Fujii and Yoshida, our algorithm uses randomization as part of its decision logic. We show that if ε ∈ [0,1] denotes the maximum multiplicative prediction error, then for ROSP our algorithm achieves competitive ratio max {0.221, (1-ε)/(1+ε)}, improving on a previous bound of max {0.215, (1-ε)/(1+ε)} due to Fujii and Yoshida [Fujii and Yoshida, 2023]. For COSP, our algorithm achieves max {0.262, (1-ε)/(1+ε)}. This surpasses a 0.25 upper bound on the worst-case competitive ratio that applies to the approach of Fujii and Yoshida, and gets closer to the classical secretary benchmark of 1/e ≈ 0.368, which is an upper bound for any algorithm. Our result for COSP highlights the benefit of integrating predictions with arrival-order control in online decision-making.
Cite as

Helia Karisani, Mohammadreza Daneshvaramoli, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Mohammad Hajiesmaili, and Cameron Musco. The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 86:1-86:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{karisani_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86,
  author =	{Karisani, Helia and Daneshvaramoli, Mohammadreza and Beyhaghi, Hedyeh and Hajiesmaili, Mohammad and Musco, Cameron},
  title =	{{The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{86:1--86:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253734},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secretary problem, learning-augmented algorithms, online algorithms}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.137
Universal Online Contention Resolution with Preselected Order

Authors: Junyao Zhao

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
Online contention resolution scheme (OCRS) is a powerful technique for online decision making, which - in the case of matroids - given a matroid and a prior distribution of active elements, selects a subset of active elements that satisfies the matroid constraint in an online fashion. OCRS has been studied mostly for product distributions in the literature. Recently, universal OCRS, that works even for correlated distributions, has gained interest, because it naturally generalizes the classic notion, and its existence in the random-order arrival model turns out to be equivalent to the matroid secretary conjecture. However, currently very little is known about how to design universal OCRSs for any arrival model. In this work, we consider a natural and relatively flexible arrival model, where the OCRS is allowed to preselect (i.e., non-adaptively select) the arrival order of the elements, and within this model, we design simple and optimal universal OCRSs that are computationally efficient. In the course of deriving our OCRSs, we also discover an efficient reduction from universal online contention resolution to the matroid secretary problem for any arrival model, answering a question posed in [Dughmi, 2020].
Cite as

Junyao Zhao. Universal Online Contention Resolution with Preselected Order. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 137:1-137:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{zhao:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.137,
  author =	{Zhao, Junyao},
  title =	{{Universal Online Contention Resolution with Preselected Order}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{137:1--137:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.137},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-235147},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.137},
  annote =	{Keywords: Matroids, online contention resolution schemes, secretary problems}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.16
Smooth Calibration and Decision Making

Authors: Jason Hartline, Yifan Wu, and Yunran Yang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 329, 6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025)

Abstract
Calibration requires predictor outputs to be consistent with their Bayesian posteriors. For machine learning predictors that do not distinguish between small perturbations, calibration errors are continuous in predictions, e.g. smooth calibration error [Foster and Hart, 2018], distance to calibration [Błasiok et al., 2023]. On the contrary, decision-makers who use predictions make optimal decisions discontinuously in probabilistic space, experiencing loss from miscalibration discontinuously. Calibration errors for decision-making are thus discontinuous, e.g., Expected Calibration Error [Foster and Vohra, 1997], and Calibration Decision Loss [Hu and Wu, 2024]. Thus, predictors with a low calibration error for machine learning may suffer a high calibration error for decision-making, i.e. they may not be trustworthy for decision-makers optimizing assuming their predictions are correct. It is natural to ask if post-processing a predictor with a low calibration error for machine learning is without loss to achieve a low calibration error for decision-making. In our paper, we show post-processing an online predictor with ε distance to calibration achieves O(√{ε}) ECE and CDL, which is asymptotically optimal. The post-processing algorithm adds noise to make predictions differentially private. The optimal bound from low distance to calibration predictors from post-processing is non-optimal compared with existing online calibration algorithms that directly optimize for ECE and CDL.
Cite as

Jason Hartline, Yifan Wu, and Yunran Yang. Smooth Calibration and Decision Making. In 6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 329, pp. 16:1-16:26, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{hartline_et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2025.16,
  author =	{Hartline, Jason and Wu, Yifan and Yang, Yunran},
  title =	{{Smooth Calibration and Decision Making}},
  booktitle =	{6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025)},
  pages =	{16:1--16:26},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-367-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{329},
  editor =	{Bun, Mark},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-231438},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Calibration, calibration errors, decision making, differential privacy}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.22
When Does a Predictor Know Its Own Loss?

Authors: Aravind Gollakota, Parikshit Gopalan, Aayush Karan, Charlotte Peale, and Udi Wieder

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 329, 6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025)

Abstract
Given a predictor and a loss function, how well can we predict the loss that the predictor will incur on an input? This is the problem of loss prediction, a key computational task associated with uncertainty estimation for a predictor. In a classification setting, a predictor will typically predict a distribution over labels and hence have its own estimate of the loss that it will incur, given by the entropy of the predicted distribution. Should we trust this estimate? In other words, when does the predictor know what it knows and what it does not know? In this work we study the theoretical foundations of loss prediction. Our main contribution is to establish tight connections between nontrivial loss prediction and certain forms of multicalibration [Ursula Hébert-Johnson et al., 2018], a multigroup fairness notion that asks for calibrated predictions across computationally identifiable subgroups. Formally, we show that a loss predictor that is able to improve on the self-estimate of a predictor yields a witness to a failure of multicalibration, and vice versa. This has the implication that nontrivial loss prediction is in effect no easier or harder than auditing for multicalibration. We support our theoretical results with experiments that show a robust positive correlation between the multicalibration error of a predictor and the efficacy of training a loss predictor.
Cite as

Aravind Gollakota, Parikshit Gopalan, Aayush Karan, Charlotte Peale, and Udi Wieder. When Does a Predictor Know Its Own Loss?. In 6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 329, pp. 22:1-22:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{gollakota_et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2025.22,
  author =	{Gollakota, Aravind and Gopalan, Parikshit and Karan, Aayush and Peale, Charlotte and Wieder, Udi},
  title =	{{When Does a Predictor Know Its Own Loss?}},
  booktitle =	{6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025)},
  pages =	{22:1--22:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-367-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{329},
  editor =	{Bun, Mark},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.22},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-231490},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.22},
  annote =	{Keywords: loss prediction, multicalibration, active learning, algorithmic fairness, calibration, predictive uncertainty, uncertainty estimation, machine learning theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.105
Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade

Authors: Jieming Mao, Renato Paes Leme, and Kangning Wang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 215, 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)

Abstract
We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define message complexity corresponding to the minimum number of interactive rounds necessary to achieve the best possible outcome. Our main result is that for bilateral trade, agents don't stop talking until they reach an efficient outcome: Either agents achieve an efficient allocation in finitely many rounds of communication; or the optimal communication protocol has infinite number of rounds. We show an important class of bilateral trade settings where efficient allocation is achievable with a small number of rounds of communication.
Cite as

Jieming Mao, Renato Paes Leme, and Kangning Wang. Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade. In 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 215, pp. 105:1-105:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{mao_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.105,
  author =	{Mao, Jieming and Paes Leme, Renato and Wang, Kangning},
  title =	{{Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade}},
  booktitle =	{13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)},
  pages =	{105:1--105:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-217-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{215},
  editor =	{Braverman, Mark},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.105},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-157014},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.105},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, bilateral trade, information design}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.142
Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising

Authors: Gagan Goel, Stefano Leonardi, Vahab Mirrokni, Afshin Nikzad, and Renato Paes-Leme

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 55, 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)

Abstract
Internet display advertising industry follows two main business models. One model is based on direct deals between publishers and advertisers where they sign legal contracts containing terms of fulfillment for a future inventory. The second model is a spot market based on auctioning page views in real-time on advertising exchange (AdX) platforms such as DoubleClick's Ad Exchange, RightMedia, or AppNexus. These exchanges play the role of intermediaries who sell items (e.g. page-views) on behalf of a seller (e.g. a publisher) to buyers (e.g., advertisers) on the opposite side of the market. The computational and economics issues arising in this second model have been extensively investigated in recent times. In this work, we consider a third emerging model called reservation exchange market. A reservation exchange is a two-sided market between buyer orders for blocks of advertisers' impressions and seller orders for blocks of publishers' page views. The goal is to match seller orders to buyer orders while providing the right incentives to both sides. In this work we first describe the important features of mechanisms for efficient reservation exchange markets. We then address the algorithmic problems of designing revenue sharing schemes to provide a fair division between sellers of the revenue collected from buyers. A major conceptual contribution of this work is in showing that even though both clinching ascending auctions and VCG mechanisms achieve the same outcome from a buyer perspective, however, from the perspective of revenue sharing among sellers, clinching ascending auctions are much more informative than VCG auctions.
Cite as

Gagan Goel, Stefano Leonardi, Vahab Mirrokni, Afshin Nikzad, and Renato Paes-Leme. Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising. In 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 55, pp. 142:1-142:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

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@InProceedings{goel_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.142,
  author =	{Goel, Gagan and Leonardi, Stefano and Mirrokni, Vahab and Nikzad, Afshin and Paes-Leme, Renato},
  title =	{{Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016)},
  pages =	{142:1--142:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-013-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{55},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Mitzenmacher, Michael and Rabani, Yuval and Sangiorgi, Davide},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.142},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-62863},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.142},
  annote =	{Keywords: Reservation Markets, Internet Advertising, Two-sided Markets, Clinching Auction, Envy-free allocations}
}
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