11 Search Results for "Flammini, Michele"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.21
Solving Tasks with Fewer Registers Than Processes

Authors: Eli Gafni, Giuliano Losa, Michel Raynal, and Gadi Taubenfeld

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 361, 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)

Abstract
This paper studies distributed-computing tasks through the lens of space complexity in the read/write wait-free model, defined as the number of multi-reader-multi-writer atomic read/write registers needed to solve a task using a wait-free algorithm. Surprisingly, even though the read/write wait-free model is at the foundation of distributed computing, previous work on space complexity has focused on synchronization primitives stronger than read/write registers or on weaker progress conditions. The paper reveals that the read/write wait-free model offers a rich space-complexity landscape: (1) assuming non-anonymous processes, it shows that there is an infinite hierarchy of tasks of increasing space complexity; (2) it shows that space complexity separates anonymous from non-anonymous memory; (3) regardless of process or register anonymity, it exhibits a task of space complexity two, which is the minimal non-trivial space complexity; (4) finally, it shows that subcases of the adopt-commit task have different space complexity in non-anonymous memory under bounded wait-freedom.
Cite as

Eli Gafni, Giuliano Losa, Michel Raynal, and Gadi Taubenfeld. Solving Tasks with Fewer Registers Than Processes. In 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 361, pp. 21:1-21:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{gafni_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.21,
  author =	{Gafni, Eli and Losa, Giuliano and Raynal, Michel and Taubenfeld, Gadi},
  title =	{{Solving Tasks with Fewer Registers Than Processes}},
  booktitle =	{29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-409-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{361},
  editor =	{Arusoaie, Andrei and Onica, Emanuel and Spear, Michael and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251947},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Asynchrony, Read/write registers, Wait-freedom, Tasks, Covering argument, Lower bound, Space complexity, Anonymous Processes, Anonymous Memory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29
Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division

Authors: Ajaykrishnan E S and Daniel Lokshtanov

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the problem of Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, where exactly p vertices of an undirected graph must be allocated to agents such that each agent receives a connected share and does not envy another agent’s share. Focusing on agents with additive valuations, we show that the problem remains computationally hard when parameterized by p and the number of agents. This result holds even for star graphs and with the input numbers given in unary representation, thereby resolving an open problem posed by Gahlawat and Zehavi (FSTTCS 2023). In stark contrast, we show that if one is willing to tolerate even the slightest amount of envy, then the problem becomes efficient with respect to the natural parameters. Specifically, we design an Efficient Parameterized Approximation Scheme parameterized by p and the number of agent types. Our algorithm works on general graphs and remains efficient even when the input numbers are provided in binary representation.
Cite as

Ajaykrishnan E S and Daniel Lokshtanov. Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 29:1-29:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{es_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29,
  author =	{E S, Ajaykrishnan and Lokshtanov, Daniel},
  title =	{{Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{29:1--29:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251101},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29},
  annote =	{Keywords: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, Efficient Parameterized Approximation Scheme, W\lbrack1\rbrack-hardness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.41
Simultaneously Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Across Multiple Dimensions

Authors: Yasushi Kawase, Bodhayan Roy, and Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
This paper explores the fair allocation of indivisible items in a multidimensional setting, motivated by the need to address fairness in complex environments where agents assess bundles according to multiple criteria. Such multidimensional settings are not merely of theoretical interest but are central to many real-world applications. For example, cloud computing resources are evaluated based on multiple criteria such as CPU cores, memory, and network bandwidth. In such cases, traditional one-dimensional fairness notions fail to capture fairness across multiple attributes. To address these challenges, we study two relaxed variants of envy-freeness: weak simultaneously envy-free up to c goods (weak sEFc) and strong simultaneously envy-free up to c goods (strong sEFc), which accommodate the multidimensionality of agents’ preferences. Under the weak notion, for every pair of agents and for each dimension, any perceived envy can be eliminated by removing, if necessary, a different set of goods from the envied agent’s allocation. In contrast, the strong version requires selecting a single set of goods whose removal from the envied bundle simultaneously eliminates envy in every dimension. We provide upper and lower bounds on the relaxation parameter c that guarantee the existence of weak or strong sEFc allocations, where these bounds are independent of the total number of items. In addition, we present algorithms for checking whether a weak or strong sEFc allocation exists. Moreover, we establish NP-hardness results for checking the existence of weak sEF1 and strong sEF1 allocations.
Cite as

Yasushi Kawase, Bodhayan Roy, and Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui. Simultaneously Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Across Multiple Dimensions. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 41:1-41:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{kawase_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.41,
  author =	{Kawase, Yasushi and Roy, Bodhayan and Sanpui, Mohammad Azharuddin},
  title =	{{Simultaneously Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Across Multiple Dimensions}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{41:1--41:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.41},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251210},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.41},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair allocation, Envy-free up to one good, Multi-dimensional criteria, Linear programming, NP-hardness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.34
New Distributed Interactive Proofs for Planarity: A Matter of Left and Right

Authors: Yuval Gil and Merav Parter

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 356, 39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025)

Abstract
We provide new distributed interactive proofs (DIP) for planarity and related graph families. The notion of a distributed interactive proof (DIP) was introduced by Kol, Oshman, and Saxena (PODC 2018). In this setting, the verifier consists of n nodes connected by a communication graph G. The prover is a single entity that communicates with all nodes by short messages. The goal is to verify that the graph G satisfies a certain property (e.g., planarity) in a small number of rounds, and with a small communication bound, denoted as the proof size. Prior work by Naor, Parter and Yogev (SODA 2020) presented a DIP for planarity that uses three interaction rounds and a proof size of O(log n). Feuilloley et al. (PODC 2020) showed that the same can be achieved with a single interaction round and without randomization, by providing a proof labeling scheme with a proof size of O(log n). In a subsequent work, Bousquet, Feuilloley, and Pierron (OPODIS 2021) achieved the same bound for related graph families such as outerplanarity, series-parallel graphs, and graphs of treewidth at most 2. In this work, we design new DIPs that use exponentially shorter proofs compared to the state-of-the-art bounds. Our main results are: - There is a 5-round protocol with O(log log n) proof size for outerplanarity. - There is a 5-round protocol with O(log log n) proof size for verifying embedded planarity and O(log log n+log Δ) proof size for general planar graphs, where Δ is the maximum degree in the graph. In the former setting, it is assumed that an embedding of the graph is given (e.g., each node holds a clockwise orientation of its neighbors) and the goal is to verify that it is a valid planar embedding. The latter result should be compared with the non-interactive setting for which there is lower bound of Ω(log n) bits for graphs with Δ = O(1) by Feuilloley et al. (PODC 2020). - The non-interactive deterministic lower bound of Ω(log n) bits by Feuilloley et al. (PODC 2020) can be extended to hold even if the verifier is randomized. Moreover, the lower bound holds even with the assumption that the verifier’s randomness comes in the form of an unbounded random string shared among the nodes. We also show that our DIPs can be extended to protocols with similar bounds for verifying series-parallel graphs and graphs with tree-width at most 2. Perhaps surprisingly, our results demonstrate that the key technical barrier for obtaining o(log log n) labels for all our problems is a basic sorting verification task in which all nodes are embedded on an oriented path P ⊆ G and it is desired for each node to distinguish between its left and right G-neighbors.
Cite as

Yuval Gil and Merav Parter. New Distributed Interactive Proofs for Planarity: A Matter of Left and Right. In 39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 356, pp. 34:1-34:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{gil_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2025.34,
  author =	{Gil, Yuval and Parter, Merav},
  title =	{{New Distributed Interactive Proofs for Planarity: A Matter of Left and Right}},
  booktitle =	{39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025)},
  pages =	{34:1--34:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-402-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{356},
  editor =	{Kowalski, Dariusz R.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.34},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-248515},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.34},
  annote =	{Keywords: Distributed interactive proofs, Planar graphs}
}
Document
APPROX
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.9
Optimal Competitive Ratio for Optimization Problems with Congestion Effects

Authors: Miriam Fischer, Dario Paccagnan, and Cosimo Vinci

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 353, Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2025)

Abstract
In this work we study online optimization problems with congestion effects. These are problems where tasks arrive online and a decision maker is required to allocate them on the fly to available resources in order to minimize the cost suffered, which grows with the amount of resources used. This class of problems corresponds to the online counterpart of well-known studied problems, including optimization problems with diseconomies of scale [Konstantin Makarychev and Maxim Sviridenko, 2018], minimum cost in congestion games [Gairing and Paccagnan, 2023], and load balancing problems [Baruch Awerbuch et al., 1995]. Within this setting, our work settles the problem of designing online algorithms with optimal competitive ratio, i.e., algorithms whose incurred cost is as close as possible to that of an oracle with complete knowledge of the future instance ahead of time. We provide three contributions underpinning this result. First, we show that no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio below a given factor depending solely on the resource costs. Second, we show that, when guided by carefully modified cost functions, the greedy algorithm achieves a competitive ratio matching this lower bound and thus is optimal. Finally, we show how to compute such modified cost functions in polynomial time.
Cite as

Miriam Fischer, Dario Paccagnan, and Cosimo Vinci. Optimal Competitive Ratio for Optimization Problems with Congestion Effects. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 353, pp. 9:1-9:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{fischer_et_al:LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.9,
  author =	{Fischer, Miriam and Paccagnan, Dario and Vinci, Cosimo},
  title =	{{Optimal Competitive Ratio for Optimization Problems with Congestion Effects}},
  booktitle =	{Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2025)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-397-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{353},
  editor =	{Ene, Alina and Chattopadhyay, Eshan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-243754},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX/RANDOM.2025.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online Algorithms, Competitive Ratio, Algorithmic Game Theory, Greedy Algorithms, Congestion Games}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21
On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, and Giuseppe F. Italiano

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the performance of mildly greedy players in k-coloring games, a relevant subclass of anti-coordination games. A mildly greedy player is a selfish agent who is willing to deviate from a certain strategy profile only if her payoff improves by a factor of more than ε, for some given ε ≥ 0. In presence of mildly greedy players, stability is captured by the concept of (1+ε)-approximate Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we first show that, for any k-coloring game, the (1+ε)-approximate price of anarchy, i.e., the price of anarchy of (1+ε)-approximate pure Nash equilibria, is at least (k-1)/((k-1)ε +k), and that this bound is tight for any ε ≥ 0. Then, we evaluate the approximation ratio of the solutions achieved after a (1 + ϵ)-approximate one-round walk starting from any initial strategy profile, where a (1 + ϵ)-approximate one-round walk is a sequence of (1 + ε)-approximate best-responses, one for each player. We provide a lower bound of min{(k-2)/k, (k-1)/((k-1)ε+k)} on this ratio, for any ε ≥ 0 and k ≥ 5; for the cases of k = 3 and k = 4, we give finer bounds depending on ε. Our work generalizes the results known for cut games, the special case of k-coloring games restricted to k = 2.
Cite as

Vittorio Bilò, Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, and Giuseppe F. Italiano. On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 21:1-21:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and D'Ascenzo, Andrea and D'Emidio, Mattia and Italiano, Giuseppe F.},
  title =	{{On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241287},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Coloring games, (Approximate) Nash Equilibria, Price of Anarchy}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LITES.8.2.2
Swarms of Mobile Robots: Towards Versatility with Safety

Authors: Pierre Courtieu, Lionel Rieg, Sébastien Tixeuil, and Xavier Urbain

Published in: LITES, Volume 8, Issue 2 (2022): Special Issue on Distributed Hybrid Systems. Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems, Volume 8, Issue 2

Abstract
We present Pactole, a formal framework to design and prove the correctness of protocols (or the impossibility of their existence) that target mobile robotic swarms. Unlike previous approaches, our methodology unifies in a single formalism the execution model, the problem specification, the protocol, and its proof of correctness. The Pactole framework makes use of the Coq proof assistant, and is specially targeted at protocol designers and problem specifiers, so that a common unambiguous language is used from the very early stages of protocol development. We stress the underlying framework design principles to enable high expressivity and modularity, and provide concrete examples about how the Pactole framework can be used to tackle actual problems, some previously addressed by the Distributed Computing community, but also new problems, while being certified correct.
Cite as

Pierre Courtieu, Lionel Rieg, Sébastien Tixeuil, and Xavier Urbain. Swarms of Mobile Robots: Towards Versatility with Safety. In LITES, Volume 8, Issue 2 (2022): Special Issue on Distributed Hybrid Systems. Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems, Volume 8, Issue 2, pp. 02:1-02:36, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@Article{courtieu_et_al:LITES.8.2.2,
  author =	{Courtieu, Pierre and Rieg, Lionel and Tixeuil, S\'{e}bastien and Urbain, Xavier},
  title =	{{Swarms of Mobile Robots: Towards Versatility with Safety}},
  journal =	{Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems},
  pages =	{02:1--02:36},
  ISSN =	{2199-2002},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{8},
  number =	{2},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LITES.8.2.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-192942},
  doi =		{10.4230/LITES.8.2.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: distributed algorithm, mobile autonomous robots, formal proof}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2022.20
Digraph k-Coloring Games: From Theory to Practice

Authors: Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, Michele Flammini, and Gianpiero Monaco

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 233, 20th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2022)

Abstract
We study digraph k-coloring games where agents are vertices of a directed unweighted graph and arcs represent agents' mutual unidirectional idiosyncrasies or conflicts. Each agent can select one of k different colors, and her payoff in a given state is given by the number of outgoing neighbors with a different color. Such games model lots of strategic real-world scenarios and are related to several fundamental classes of anti-coordination games. Unfortunately, the problem of understanding whether an instance of the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete [Jeremy Kun et al., 2013]. Therefore, in the last few years a relevant research focus has been that of designing polynomial time algorithms able to compute approximate Nash equilibria, i.e., states in which no agent, changing her strategy, can improve her payoff by some bounded multiplicative factor. The only two known algorithms in this respect are those in [Raffaello Carosi et al., 2017]. While they provide theoretical guarantees, their practical performance over real-world instances so far has not been investigated. In this paper, under the further motivation of the lack of practical approximation algorithms for the problem, we experimentally evaluate the above algorithms with the conclusion that, while they were suitably designed for achieving a bounded worst case behavior, they generally have a poor performance. Therefore, we next focus on classical best-response dynamics, and show that, despite of the fact that they might not always converge, they are very effective in practice. In particular, we provide a strong empirical evidence that they outperform existing methods, since surprisingly they quickly converge to exact Nash equilibria in almost all instances arising in practice. This also shows that, while this class of games is known to not always possess pure Nash equilibria, in almost all cases such equilibria exist and can be efficiently computed, even in a distributed uncoordinated way by a decentralized interaction of the agents.
Cite as

Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, Michele Flammini, and Gianpiero Monaco. Digraph k-Coloring Games: From Theory to Practice. In 20th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 233, pp. 20:1-20:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{dascenzo_et_al:LIPIcs.SEA.2022.20,
  author =	{D'Ascenzo, Andrea and D'Emidio, Mattia and Flammini, Michele and Monaco, Gianpiero},
  title =	{{Digraph k-Coloring Games: From Theory to Practice}},
  booktitle =	{20th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2022)},
  pages =	{20:1--20:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-251-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{233},
  editor =	{Schulz, Christian and U\c{c}ar, Bora},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2022.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-165540},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2022.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: Algorithmic Game Theory, Coloring Games, Experimental Algorithmics, Exact vs Approximate Nash Equilibria, Decentralized Dynamics}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.14
Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini, Ayumi Igarashi, Gianpiero Monaco, Dominik Peters, Cosimo Vinci, and William S. Zwicker

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 124, 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019)

Abstract
We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph G. When the items are arranged in a path, we show that EF1 allocations are guaranteed to exist for arbitrary monotonic utility functions over bundles, provided that either there are at most four agents, or there are any number of agents but they all have identical utility functions. Our existence proofs are based on classical arguments from the divisible cake-cutting setting, and involve discrete analogues of cut-and-choose, of Stromquist's moving-knife protocol, and of the Su-Simmons argument based on Sperner's lemma. Sperner's lemma can also be used to show that on a path, an EF2 allocation exists for any number of agents. Except for the results using Sperner's lemma, all of our procedures can be implemented by efficient algorithms. Our positive results for paths imply the existence of connected EF1 or EF2 allocations whenever G is traceable, i.e., contains a Hamiltonian path. For the case of two agents, we completely characterize the class of graphs G that guarantee the existence of EF1 allocations as the class of graphs whose biconnected components are arranged in a path. This class is strictly larger than the class of traceable graphs; one can check in linear time whether a graph belongs to this class, and if so return an EF1 allocation.
Cite as

Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini, Ayumi Igarashi, Gianpiero Monaco, Dominik Peters, Cosimo Vinci, and William S. Zwicker. Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles. In 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 124, pp. 14:1-14:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.14,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and Caragiannis, Ioannis and Flammini, Michele and Igarashi, Ayumi and Monaco, Gianpiero and Peters, Dominik and Vinci, Cosimo and Zwicker, William S.},
  title =	{{Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles}},
  booktitle =	{10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2019)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-095-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{124},
  editor =	{Blum, Avrim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-101078},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Envy-free Division, Cake-cutting, Resource Allocation, Algorithmic Game Theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.47
Pricing Problems with Buyer Preselection

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, and Luca Moscardelli

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 117, 43rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2018)

Abstract
We investigate the problem of preselecting a subset of buyers participating in a market so as to optimize the performance of stable outcomes. We consider four scenarios arising from the combination of two stability notions, item and bundle envy-freeness, with the two classical objective functions, i.e., the social welfare and the seller's revenue. When adopting the notion of item envy-freeness, we prove that, for both the two objective functions, the problem cannot be approximated within n^(1-epsilon) for any epsilon >0, and provide tight or nearly tight approximation algorithms. We also prove that maximizing the seller's revenue is NP-hard even for a single buyer, thus closing an open question. Under bundle envy-freeness, instead, we show how to transform in polynomial time any stable outcome for a market involving only a subset of buyers to a stable one for the whole market without worsening its performance, both for the social welfare and the seller's revenue. Finally, we consider multi-unit markets, where all items are of the same type and are assigned the same price. For this specific case, we show that buyer preselection can improve the performance of stable outcomes in all of the four considered scenarios, and we design corresponding approximation algorithms.
Cite as

Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, and Luca Moscardelli. Pricing Problems with Buyer Preselection. In 43rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 117, pp. 47:1-47:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.47,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and Flammini, Michele and Monaco, Gianpiero and Moscardelli, Luca},
  title =	{{Pricing Problems with Buyer Preselection}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2018)},
  pages =	{47:1--47:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-086-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{117},
  editor =	{Potapov, Igor and Spirakis, Paul and Worrell, James},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.47},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-96292},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2018.47},
  annote =	{Keywords: Pricing problems, Envy-freeness, Revenue maximization, Social Welfare maximization}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.125
Simple Greedy Algorithms for Fundamental Multidimensional Graph Problems

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, and Gianpiero Monaco

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 80, 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)

Abstract
We revisit fundamental problems in undirected and directed graphs, such as the problems of computing spanning trees, shortest paths, steiner trees, and spanning arborescences of minimum cost. We assume that there are d different cost functions associated with the edges of the input graph and seek for solutions to the resulting multidimensional graph problems so that the p-norm of the different costs of the solution is minimized. We present combinatorial algorithms that achieve very good approximations for this objective. The main advantage of our algorithms is their simplicity: they are as simple as classical combinatorial graph algorithms of Dijkstra and Kruskal, or the greedy algorithm for matroids.
Cite as

Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, and Gianpiero Monaco. Simple Greedy Algorithms for Fundamental Multidimensional Graph Problems. In 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 80, pp. 125:1-125:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.125,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and Caragiannis, Ioannis and Fanelli, Angelo and Flammini, Michele and Monaco, Gianpiero},
  title =	{{Simple Greedy Algorithms for Fundamental Multidimensional Graph Problems}},
  booktitle =	{44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)},
  pages =	{125:1--125:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-041-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{80},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Indyk, Piotr and Kuhn, Fabian and Muscholl, Anca},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.125},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-74669},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.125},
  annote =	{Keywords: multidimensional graph problems, matroids, shortest paths, Steiner trees, arborescences}
}
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