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Documents authored by Gupta, Sushmita


Document
When Far Is Better: The Chamberlin-Courant Approach to Obnoxious Committee Selection

Authors: Sushmita Gupta, Tanmay Inamdar, Pallavi Jain, Daniel Lokshtanov, Fahad Panolan, and Saket Saurabh

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 323, 44th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2024)


Abstract
Classical work on metric space based committee selection problem interprets distance as "near is better". In this work, motivated by real-life situations, we interpret distance as "far is better". Formally stated, we initiate the study of "obnoxious" committee scoring rules when the voters' preferences are expressed via a metric space. To accomplish this, we propose a model where large distances imply high satisfaction (in contrast to the classical setting where shorter distances imply high satisfaction) and study the egalitarian avatar of the well-known Chamberlin-Courant voting rule and some of its generalizations. For a given integer value λ between 1 and k, the committee size, a voter derives satisfaction from only the λth favorite committee member; the goal is to maximize the satisfaction of the least satisfied voter. For the special case of λ = 1, this yields the egalitarian Chamberlin-Courant rule. In this paper, we consider general metric space and the special case of a d-dimensional Euclidean space. We show that when λ is 1 and k, the problem is polynomial-time solvable in ℝ² and general metric space, respectively. However, for λ = k-1, it is NP-hard even in ℝ². Thus, we have "double-dichotomy" in ℝ² with respect to the value of λ, where the extreme cases are solvable in polynomial time but an intermediate case is NP-hard. Furthermore, this phenomenon appears to be "tight" for ℝ² because the problem is NP-hard for general metric space, even for λ = 1. Consequently, we are motivated to explore the problem in the realm of (parameterized) approximation algorithms and obtain positive results. Interestingly, we note that this generalization of Chamberlin-Courant rules encodes practical constraints that are relevant to solutions for certain facility locations.

Cite as

Sushmita Gupta, Tanmay Inamdar, Pallavi Jain, Daniel Lokshtanov, Fahad Panolan, and Saket Saurabh. When Far Is Better: The Chamberlin-Courant Approach to Obnoxious Committee Selection. In 44th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 323, pp. 24:1-24:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{gupta_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2024.24,
  author =	{Gupta, Sushmita and Inamdar, Tanmay and Jain, Pallavi and Lokshtanov, Daniel and Panolan, Fahad and Saurabh, Saket},
  title =	{{When Far Is Better: The Chamberlin-Courant Approach to Obnoxious Committee Selection}},
  booktitle =	{44th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2024)},
  pages =	{24:1--24:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-355-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{323},
  editor =	{Barman, Siddharth and Lasota, S{\l}awomir},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2024.24},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-222135},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2024.24},
  annote =	{Keywords: Metric Space, Parameterized Complexity, Approximation, Obnoxious Facility Location}
}
Document
On Controlling Knockout Tournaments Without Perfect Information

Authors: Václav Blažej, Sushmita Gupta, M. S. Ramanujan, and Peter Strulo

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 321, 19th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2024)


Abstract
Over the last decade, extensive research has been conducted on the algorithmic aspects of designing single-elimination (SE) tournaments. Addressing natural questions of algorithmic tractability, we identify key properties of input instances that enable the tournament designer to efficiently schedule the tournament in a way that maximizes the chances of a preferred player winning. Much of the prior algorithmic work on this topic focuses on the perfect (complete and deterministic) information scenario, especially in the context of fixed-parameter algorithm design. Our contributions constitute the first fixed-parameter tractability results applicable to more general settings of SE tournament design with potential imperfect information.

Cite as

Václav Blažej, Sushmita Gupta, M. S. Ramanujan, and Peter Strulo. On Controlling Knockout Tournaments Without Perfect Information. In 19th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 321, pp. 7:1-7:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{blazej_et_al:LIPIcs.IPEC.2024.7,
  author =	{Bla\v{z}ej, V\'{a}clav and Gupta, Sushmita and Ramanujan, M. S. and Strulo, Peter},
  title =	{{On Controlling Knockout Tournaments Without Perfect Information}},
  booktitle =	{19th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2024)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-353-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{321},
  editor =	{Bonnet, \'{E}douard and Rz\k{a}\.{z}ewski, Pawe{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2024.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-222337},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2024.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Parameterized algorithms, Tournament design, Imperfect information}
}
Document
On the (Parameterized) Complexity of Almost Stable Marriage

Authors: Sushmita Gupta, Pallavi Jain, Sanjukta Roy, Saket Saurabh, and Meirav Zehavi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 182, 40th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2020)


Abstract
In the Stable Marriage problem, when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents participate in the matching market voluntarily and submit their preferences, it is natural to assume that each agent wants to be matched to someone in his/her preference list as opposed to being unmatched. In light of the Rural Hospital Theorem, we have to relax the "no blocking pair" condition for stable matchings in order to match more agents. In this paper, we study the question of matching more agents with fewest possible blocking edges. In particular, the goal is to find a matching whose size exceeds that of a stable matching in the graph by at least t and has at most k blocking edges. We study this question in the realm of parameterized complexity with respect to several natural parameters, k,t,d, where d is the maximum length of a preference list. Unfortunately, the problem remains intractable even for the combined parameter k+t+d. Thus, we extend our study to the local search variant of this problem, in which we search for a matching that not only fulfills each of the above conditions but is "closest", in terms of its symmetric difference to the given stable matching, and obtain an FPT algorithm.

Cite as

Sushmita Gupta, Pallavi Jain, Sanjukta Roy, Saket Saurabh, and Meirav Zehavi. On the (Parameterized) Complexity of Almost Stable Marriage. In 40th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 182, pp. 24:1-24:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)


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@InProceedings{gupta_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2020.24,
  author =	{Gupta, Sushmita and Jain, Pallavi and Roy, Sanjukta and Saurabh, Saket and Zehavi, Meirav},
  title =	{{On the (Parameterized) Complexity of Almost Stable Marriage}},
  booktitle =	{40th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2020)},
  pages =	{24:1--24:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-174-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{182},
  editor =	{Saxena, Nitin and Simon, Sunil},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2020.24},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-132655},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2020.24},
  annote =	{Keywords: Stable Matching, Parameterized Complexity, Local Search}
}
Document
Parameterized Algorithms and Kernels for Rainbow Matching

Authors: Sushmita Gupta, Sanjukta Roy, Saket Saurabh, and Meirav Zehavi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 83, 42nd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2017)


Abstract
In this paper, we study the NP-complete colorful variant of the classical Matching problem, namely, the Rainbow Matching problem. Given an edge-colored graph G and a positive integer k, this problem asks whether there exists a matching of size at least k such that all the edges in the matching have distinct colors. We first develop a deterministic algorithm that solves Rainbow Matching on paths in time O*(((1+\sqrt{5})/2)^k) and polynomial space. This algorithm is based on a curious combination of the method of bounded search trees and a "divide-and-conquer-like" approach, where the branching process is guided by the maintenance of an auxiliary bipartite graph where one side captures "divided-and-conquered" pieces of the path. Our second result is a randomized algorithm that solves Rainbow Matching on general graphs in time O*(2^k) and polynomial space. Here, we show how a result by Björklund et al. [JCSS, 2017] can be invoked as a black box, wrapped by a probability-based analysis tailored to our problem. We also complement our two main results by designing kernels for Rainbow Matching on general and bounded-degree graphs.

Cite as

Sushmita Gupta, Sanjukta Roy, Saket Saurabh, and Meirav Zehavi. Parameterized Algorithms and Kernels for Rainbow Matching. In 42nd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 83, pp. 71:1-71:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)


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@InProceedings{gupta_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.71,
  author =	{Gupta, Sushmita and Roy, Sanjukta and Saurabh, Saket and Zehavi, Meirav},
  title =	{{Parameterized Algorithms and Kernels for Rainbow Matching}},
  booktitle =	{42nd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2017)},
  pages =	{71:1--71:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-046-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{83},
  editor =	{Larsen, Kim G. and Bodlaender, Hans L. and Raskin, Jean-Francois},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.71},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-81245},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2017.71},
  annote =	{Keywords: Rainbow Matching, Parameterized Algorithm, Bounded Search Trees, Divide-and-Conquer, 3-Set Packing, 3-Dimensional Matching}
}
Document
Improved Algorithms and Combinatorial Bounds for Independent Feedback Vertex Set

Authors: Akanksha Agrawal, Sushmita Gupta, Saket Saurabh, and Roohani Sharma

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 63, 11th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2016)


Abstract
In this paper we study the "independent" version of the classic Feedback Vertex Set problem in the realm of parameterized algorithms and moderately exponential time algorithms. More precisely, we study the Independent Feedback Vertex Set problem, where we are given an undirected graph G on n vertices and a positive integer k, and the objective is to check if there is an independent feedback vertex set of size at most k. A set S subseteq V(G) is called an independent feedback vertex set (ifvs) if S is an independent set and G\S is a forest. In this paper we design two deterministic exact algorithms for Independent Feedback Vertex Set with running times O*(4.1481^k) and O*(1.5981^n). In fact, the algorithm with O*(1.5981^n) running time finds the smallest sized ifvs, if an ifvs exists. Both the algorithms are based on interesting measures and improve the best known algorithms for the problem in their respective domains. In particular, the algorithm with running time O*(4.1481^k) is an improvement over the previous algorithm that ran in time O*(5^k). On the other hand, the algorithm with running time O*(1.5981^n) is the first moderately exponential time algorithm that improves over the naive algorithm that enumerates all the subsets of V(G). Additionally, we show that the number of minimal ifvses in any graph on n vertices is upper bounded by 1.7485^n.

Cite as

Akanksha Agrawal, Sushmita Gupta, Saket Saurabh, and Roohani Sharma. Improved Algorithms and Combinatorial Bounds for Independent Feedback Vertex Set. In 11th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 63, pp. 2:1-2:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)


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@InProceedings{agrawal_et_al:LIPIcs.IPEC.2016.2,
  author =	{Agrawal, Akanksha and Gupta, Sushmita and Saurabh, Saket and Sharma, Roohani},
  title =	{{Improved Algorithms and Combinatorial Bounds for Independent Feedback Vertex Set}},
  booktitle =	{11th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2016)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-023-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{63},
  editor =	{Guo, Jiong and Hermelin, Danny},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2016.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-69400},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2016.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: independent feedback vertex set, fixed parameter tractable, exact algorithm, enumeration}
}
Document
Stable Matching Games: Manipulation via Subgraph Isomorphism

Authors: Sushmita Gupta and Sanjukta Roy

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 65, 36th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2016)


Abstract
In this paper we consider a problem that arises from a strategic issue in the stable matching model (with complete preference lists) from the viewpoint of exact-exponential time algorithms. Specifically, we study the Stable Extension of Partial Matching (SEOPM) problem, where the input consists of the complete preference lists of men, and a partial matching. The objective is to find (if one exists) a set of preference lists of women, such that the men-optimal Gale Shapley algorithm outputs a perfect matching that contains the given partial matching. Kobayashi and Matsui [Algorithmica, 2010] proved this problem is NP-complete. In this article, we give an exact-exponential algorithm for SEOPM running in time 2^{O(n)}, where n denotes the number of men/women. We complement our algorithmic finding by showing that unless Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) fails, our algorithm is asymptotically optimal. That is, unless ETH fails, there is no algorithm for SEOPM running in time 2^{o(n)}. Our algorithm is a non-trivial combination of a parameterized algorithm for Subgraph Isomorphism, a relationship between stable matching and finding an out-branching in an appropriate graph and enumerating non-isomorphic out-branchings.

Cite as

Sushmita Gupta and Sanjukta Roy. Stable Matching Games: Manipulation via Subgraph Isomorphism. In 36th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 65, pp. 29:1-29:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)


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@InProceedings{gupta_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2016.29,
  author =	{Gupta, Sushmita and Roy, Sanjukta},
  title =	{{Stable Matching Games: Manipulation via Subgraph Isomorphism}},
  booktitle =	{36th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2016)},
  pages =	{29:1--29:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-027-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{65},
  editor =	{Lal, Akash and Akshay, S. and Saurabh, Saket and Sen, Sandeep},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2016.29},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-68642},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2016.29},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matching, Gale-Shapley algorithm, suitor graph, subgraph iso- morphism, exact-exponential time algorithms}
}
Document
Total Stability in Stable Matching Games

Authors: Sushmita Gupta, Kazuo Iwama, and Shuichi Miyazaki

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 53, 15th Scandinavian Symposium and Workshops on Algorithm Theory (SWAT 2016)


Abstract
The stable marriage problem (SMP) can be seen as a typical game, where each player wants to obtain the best possible partner by manipulating his/her preference list. Thus the set Q of preference lists submitted to the matching agency may differ from P, the set of true preference lists. In this paper, we study the stability of the stated lists in Q. If Q is not Nash equilibrium, i.e., if a player can obtain a strictly better partner (with respect to the preference order in P) by only changing his/her list, then in the view of standard game theory, Q is vulnerable. In the case of SMP, however, we need to consider another factor, namely that all valid matchings should not include any "blocking pairs" with respect to P. Thus, if the above manipulation of a player introduces blocking pairs, it would prevent this manipulation. Consequently, we say Q is totally stable if either Q is a Nash equilibrium or if any attempt at manipulation by a single player causes blocking pairs with respect to P. We study the complexity of testing the total stability of a stated strategy. It is known that this question is answered in polynomial time if the instance (P,Q) always satisfies P=Q. We extend this polynomially solvable class to the general one, where P and Q may be arbitrarily different.

Cite as

Sushmita Gupta, Kazuo Iwama, and Shuichi Miyazaki. Total Stability in Stable Matching Games. In 15th Scandinavian Symposium and Workshops on Algorithm Theory (SWAT 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 53, pp. 23:1-23:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)


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@InProceedings{gupta_et_al:LIPIcs.SWAT.2016.23,
  author =	{Gupta, Sushmita and Iwama, Kazuo and Miyazaki, Shuichi},
  title =	{{Total Stability in Stable Matching Games}},
  booktitle =	{15th Scandinavian Symposium and Workshops on Algorithm Theory (SWAT 2016)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:12},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-011-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{53},
  editor =	{Pagh, Rasmus},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SWAT.2016.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-60450},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SWAT.2016.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matching, Gale-Shapley algorithm, manipulation, stability, Nash equilibrium}
}
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