6 Search Results for "Zindros, Dionysis"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.16
CrudiTEE: A Stick-And-Carrot Approach to Building Trustworthy Cryptocurrency Wallets with TEEs

Authors: Lulu Zhou, Zeyu Liu, Fan Zhang, and Michael K. Reiter

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
Cryptocurrency introduces usability challenges by requiring users to manage signing keys. Popular signing key management services (e.g., custodial wallets), however, either introduce a trusted party or burden users with managing signing key shares, posing the same usability challenges. TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) is a promising technology to avoid both, but practical implementations of TEEs suffer from various side-channel attacks that have proven hard to eliminate. This paper explores a new approach to side-channel mitigation through economic incentives for TEE-based cryptocurrency wallet solutions. By taking the cost and profit of side-channel attacks into consideration, we designed a Stick-and-Carrot-based cryptocurrency wallet, CrudiTEE, that leverages penalties (the stick) and rewards (the carrot) to disincentivize attackers from exfiltrating signing keys in the first place. We model the attacker’s behavior using a Markov Decision Process (MDP) to evaluate the effectiveness of the bounty and enable the service provider to adjust the parameters of the bounty’s reward function accordingly.
Cite as

Lulu Zhou, Zeyu Liu, Fan Zhang, and Michael K. Reiter. CrudiTEE: A Stick-And-Carrot Approach to Building Trustworthy Cryptocurrency Wallets with TEEs. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 16:1-16:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{zhou_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.16,
  author =	{Zhou, Lulu and Liu, Zeyu and Zhang, Fan and Reiter, Michael K.},
  title =	{{CrudiTEE: A Stick-And-Carrot Approach to Building Trustworthy Cryptocurrency Wallets with TEEs}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{16:1--16:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209525},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cryptocurrency wallet, blockchain}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.8
A Circuit Approach to Constructing Blockchains on Blockchains

Authors: Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse, and Yifei Wang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
Recent years have witnessed an explosion of blockchains, each with an open ledger that anyone can read from and write to. In this multi-chain world, an important question emerges: how can we build a more secure overlay blockchain by reading from and writing to a given set of blockchains? Drawing an analogy with switching circuits, we approach the problem by defining two basic compositional operations between blockchains, serial and triangular compositions, and use these operations as building blocks to construct general overlay blockchains. Under the partially synchronous setting, we have the following results: 1) the serial composition, between two certificate-producing blockchains, yields an overlay blockchain that is safe if at least one of the two underlay blockchains is safe and that is live if both of them are live; 2) the triangular composition between three blockchains, akin to parallel composition of switching circuits, yields an overlay blockchain that is safe if all underlay blockchains are safe and that is live if over half of them are live; 3) repeated composition of these two basic operations can yield all possible tradeoffs of safety and liveness for an overlay blockchain built on an arbitrary number of underlay chains. The results are also extended to the synchronous setting.
Cite as

Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse, and Yifei Wang. A Circuit Approach to Constructing Blockchains on Blockchains. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 8:1-8:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{tas_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.8,
  author =	{Tas, Ertem Nusret and Tse, David and Wang, Yifei},
  title =	{{A Circuit Approach to Constructing Blockchains on Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209442},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: interchain consensus protocols, serial composition, triangular composition, circuits}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.11
Bribe & Fork: Cheap PCN Bribing Attacks via Forking Threat

Authors: Zeta Avarikioti, Paweł Kędzior, Tomasz Lizurej, and Tomasz Michalak

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
In this work, we reexamine the vulnerability of Payment Channel Networks (PCNs) to bribing attacks, where an adversary incentivizes blockchain miners to deliberately ignore a specific transaction to undermine the punishment mechanism of PCNs. While previous studies have posited a prohibitive cost for such attacks, we show that this cost can be dramatically reduced (to approximately $125), thereby increasing the likelihood of these attacks. To this end, we introduce Bribe & Fork, a modified bribing attack that leverages the threat of a so-called feather fork which we analyze with a novel formal model for the mining game with forking. We empirically analyze historical data of some real-world blockchain implementations to evaluate the scale of this cost reduction. Our findings shed more light on the potential vulnerability of PCNs and highlight the need for robust solutions.
Cite as

Zeta Avarikioti, Paweł Kędzior, Tomasz Lizurej, and Tomasz Michalak. Bribe & Fork: Cheap PCN Bribing Attacks via Forking Threat. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 11:1-11:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{avarikioti_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.11,
  author =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and K\k{e}dzior, Pawe{\l} and Lizurej, Tomasz and Michalak, Tomasz},
  title =	{{Bribe \& Fork: Cheap PCN Bribing Attacks via Forking Threat}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{11:1--11:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209473},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Payment Channels Networks, Timelock Bribing, Feather Forking}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.13
Musketeer: Incentive-Compatible Rebalancing for Payment Channel Networks

Authors: Zeta Avarikioti, Stefan Schmid, and Samarth Tiwari

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
In this work, we revisit the severely limited throughput problem of cryptocurrencies and propose a novel rebalancing approach for Payment Channel Networks (PCNs). PCNs are a popular solution for increasing the blockchain throughput, however, their benefit depends on the overall users' liquidity. Rebalancing mechanisms are the state-of-the-art approach to maintaining high liquidity in PCNs. However, existing opt-in rebalancing mechanisms exclude users that may assist in rebalancing for small service fees, leading to suboptimal solutions and under-utilization of the PCNs' bounded liquidity. We introduce the first rebalancing approach for PCNs that includes all users, following a "all for one and one for all" design philosophy that yields optimal throughput. The proposed approach introduces a double-auction rebalancing problem, which we term Musketeer, where users can participate as buyers (paying fees to rebalance) or sellers (charging fees to route transactions). The desired properties tailored to the unique characteristics of PCNs are formally defined, including the novel game-theoretic property of cyclic budget balance that is a stronger variation of strong budget balance. Basic results derived from auction theory, including an impossibility and multiple mechanisms that either achieve all desiderata under a relaxed model or sacrifice one of the properties, are presented. We also propose a novel mechanism that leverages time delays as an additional cost to users. This mechanism is provably truthful, cyclic budget balanced, individually rational and economic efficient but only with respect to liquidity.
Cite as

Zeta Avarikioti, Stefan Schmid, and Samarth Tiwari. Musketeer: Incentive-Compatible Rebalancing for Payment Channel Networks. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 13:1-13:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{avarikioti_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.13,
  author =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Schmid, Stefan and Tiwari, Samarth},
  title =	{{Musketeer: Incentive-Compatible Rebalancing for Payment Channel Networks}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209494},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchains, Payment Channel Networks, Rebalancing, Game Theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.14
Proofs of Proof-Of-Stake with Sublinear Complexity

Authors: Shresth Agrawal, Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, and Dionysis Zindros

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 282, 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)

Abstract
Popular Ethereum wallets (like MetaMask) entrust centralized infrastructure providers (e.g., Infura) to run the consensus client logic on their behalf. As a result, these wallets are light-weight and high-performant, but come with security risks. A malicious provider can mislead the wallet by faking payments and balances, or censoring transactions. On the other hand, light clients, which are not in popular use today, allow decentralization, but are concretely inefficient, often with asymptotically linear bootstrapping complexity. This poses a dilemma between decentralization and performance. We design, implement, and evaluate a new proof-of-stake (PoS) superlight client with concretely efficient and asymptotically logarithmic bootstrapping complexity. Our proofs of proof-of-stake (PoPoS) take the form of a Merkle tree of PoS epochs. The verifier enrolls the provers in a bisection game, in which honest provers are destined to win once an adversarial Merkle tree is challenged at sufficient depth. We provide an implementation for mainnet Ethereum: compared to the state-of-the-art light client construction of Ethereum, our client improves time-to-completion by 9×, communication by 180×, and energy usage by 30× (when bootstrapping after 10 years of consensus execution). As an important additional application, our construction can be used to realize trustless cross-chain bridges, in which the superlight client runs within a smart contract and takes the role of an on-chain verifier. We prove our construction is secure and show how to employ it for other PoS systems such as Cardano (with fully adaptive adversary), Algorand, and Snow White.
Cite as

Shresth Agrawal, Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, and Dionysis Zindros. Proofs of Proof-Of-Stake with Sublinear Complexity. In 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 282, pp. 14:1-14:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{agrawal_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2023.14,
  author =	{Agrawal, Shresth and Neu, Joachim and Tas, Ertem Nusret and Zindros, Dionysis},
  title =	{{Proofs of Proof-Of-Stake with Sublinear Complexity}},
  booktitle =	{5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-303-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{282},
  editor =	{Bonneau, Joseph and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-192037},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Proof-of-stake, blockchain, light client, superlight, bridge, Ethereum}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7
Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach

Authors: Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, and Dionysis Zindros

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 71, International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)

Abstract
Since the invention of Bitcoin one decade ago, numerous cryptocurrencies have sprung into existence. Among these, proof-of-work is the most common mechanism for achieving consensus, whilst a number of coins have adopted "ASIC-resistance" as a desirable property, claiming to be more "egalitarian," where egalitarianism refers to the power of each coin to participate in the creation of new coins. While proof-of-work consensus dominates the space, several new cryptocurrencies employ alternative consensus, such as proof-of-stake in which block minting opportunities are based on monetary ownership. A core criticism of proof-of-stake revolves around it being less egalitarian by making the rich richer, as opposed to proof-of-work in which everyone can contribute equally according to their computational power. In this paper, we give the first quantitative definition of a cryptocurrency’s egalitarianism. Based on our definition, we measure the egalitarianism of popular cryptocurrencies that (may or may not) employ ASIC-resistance, among them Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Monero. Our simulations show, as expected, that ASIC-resistance increases a cryptocurrency’s egalitarianism. We also measure the egalitarianism of a stake-based protocol, Ouroboros, and a hybrid proof-of-stake/proof-of-work cryptocurrency, Decred. We show that stake-based cryptocurrencies, under correctly selected parameters, can be perfectly egalitarian, perhaps contradicting folklore belief.
Cite as

Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, and Dionysis Zindros. Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach. In International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 71, pp. 7:1-7:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{karakostas_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7,
  author =	{Karakostas, Dimitris and Kiayias, Aggelos and Nasikas, Christos and Zindros, Dionysis},
  title =	{{Cryptocurrency Egalitarianism: A Quantitative Approach}},
  booktitle =	{International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2019)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:21},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-108-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{71},
  editor =	{Danos, Vincent and Herlihy, Maurice and Potop-Butucaru, Maria and Prat, Julien and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-119715},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2019.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, egalitarianism, cryptocurrency, economics, proof-of-work, proof-of-stake}
}
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