6 Search Results for "Avarikioti, Georgia"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.23
Boosting Payment Channel Network Liquidity with Topology Optimization and Transaction Selection

Authors: Krishnendu Chatterjee, Jan Matyáš Křišťan, Stefan Schmid, Jakub Svoboda, and Michelle Yeo

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 356, 39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025)

Abstract
Payment channel networks (PCNs) are a promising technology that alleviates blockchain scalability by shifting the transaction load from the blockchain to the PCN. Nevertheless, the network topology has to be carefully designed to maximise the transaction throughput in PCNs. Additionally, users in PCNs also have to make optimal decisions on which transactions to forward and which to reject to prolong the lifetime of their channels. In this work, we consider an input sequence of transactions over p parties. Each transaction consists of a transaction size, source, and target, and can be either accepted or rejected (entailing a cost). The goal is to design a PCN topology among the p cooperating parties, along with the channel capacities, and then output a decision for each transaction in the sequence to minimise the cost of creating and augmenting channels, as well as the cost of rejecting transactions. Our main contribution is an 𝒪(p) approximation algorithm for the problem with p parties. We further show that with some assumptions on the distribution of transactions, we can reduce the approximation ratio to 𝒪(√p). We complement our theoretical analysis with an empirical study of our assumptions and approach in the context of the Lightning Network.
Cite as

Krishnendu Chatterjee, Jan Matyáš Křišťan, Stefan Schmid, Jakub Svoboda, and Michelle Yeo. Boosting Payment Channel Network Liquidity with Topology Optimization and Transaction Selection. In 39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 356, pp. 23:1-23:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{chatterjee_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2025.23,
  author =	{Chatterjee, Krishnendu and K\v{r}i\v{s}\v{t}an, Jan Maty\'{a}\v{s} and Schmid, Stefan and Svoboda, Jakub and Yeo, Michelle},
  title =	{{Boosting Payment Channel Network Liquidity with Topology Optimization and Transaction Selection}},
  booktitle =	{39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-402-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{356},
  editor =	{Kowalski, Dariusz R.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-248402},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchains, Cryptocurrencies, Payment Channel Networks, Throughput, Optimisation, Graph Algorithms, Approximation Algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.5
Blockchain Governance via Sharp Anonymous Multisignatures

Authors: Wonseok Choi, Xiangyu Liu, and Vassilis Zikas

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
Electronic voting has occupied a large part of the cryptographic protocols literature. The recent reality of blockchains - in particular, their need for online governance mechanisms - has brought new parameters and requirements to the problem. We identify the key requirements of a blockchain governance mechanism, namely correctness (including eliminative double votes), voter anonymity, and traceability, and investigate mechanisms that can achieve them with minimal interaction and under assumptions that fit the blockchain setting. First, we define a signature-like primitive, which we term sharp anonymous multisignatures (in short, ♯AMS) that tightly meets the needs of blockchain governance. In a nutshell, ♯AMSs allow any set of parties to generate a signature, e.g., on a proposal to be voted upon, which, if posted on the blockchain, hides the identities of the signers/voters but reveals their number. This can be seen as a (strict) generalization of threshold ring signatures (TRS). We next turn to constructing such ♯AMSs and using them in various governance scenarios - e.g., single vote vs. multiple votes per voter. In this direction, although the definition of TRS does not imply ♯AMS, one can compile some existing TRS constructions into ♯AMS. This raises the question: What is the TRS structure that allows such a compilation? To answer the above, we devise templates for TRSs. Our templates encapsulate and abstract the structure that allows for the above compilation - most of the TRS schemes that can be compiled into ♯AMS are, in fact, instantiations of our template. This abstraction makes our template generic for instantiating TRSs and ♯AMSs from different cryptographic assumptions (e.g., DDH, LWE, etc.). One of our templates is based on chameleon hashes, and we explore a framework of lossy chameleon hashes to understand their nature fully. Finally, we turn to how ♯AMS schemes can be used in our applications. We provide fast (in some cases non-interactive) ♯AMS-based blockchain governance mechanisms for a wide spectrum of assumptions on the honesty (semi-honest vs malicious) and availability of voters and proposers.
Cite as

Wonseok Choi, Xiangyu Liu, and Vassilis Zikas. Blockchain Governance via Sharp Anonymous Multisignatures. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 5:1-5:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{choi_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.5,
  author =	{Choi, Wonseok and Liu, Xiangyu and Zikas, Vassilis},
  title =	{{Blockchain Governance via Sharp Anonymous Multisignatures}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247242},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, E-voting, Threshold Ring Signatures, Threshold Cryptography}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.3
Fast, Private and Regulated Payments in Asynchronous Networks

Authors: Maxence Brugeres, Victor Languille, Petr Kuznetsov, and Hamza Zarfaoui

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
We propose a decentralized asset-transfer system that enjoys full privacy: no party can learn the details of a transaction, except for its issuer and its recipient. Furthermore, the recipient is not aware of the sender’s identity. Our system does not rely on consensus or synchrony assumptions, and therefore, it is responsive, since it runs at the actual network speed. Under the hood, every transaction creates a consumable coin equipped with a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) that confirms that the issuer has sufficient funds without revealing any information about her identity, the recipient’s identity, or the payment amount. Moreover, we equip our system with a regulatory enforcement mechanism that can be used to regulate transfer limits or restrict specific addresses from sending or receiving funds, while preserving the system’s privacy guarantees. Finally, we report on PaxPay, our implementation of Fully Private Asset Transfer (FPAT) that uses the Gnark library for the NIZKs. In our benchmark, PaxPay exhibits better performance than earlier proposals that either ensure only partial privacy, require some kind of network synchrony or do not implement regulation features. Our system thus reconciles privacy, responsiveness, regulation enforcement and performance.
Cite as

Maxence Brugeres, Victor Languille, Petr Kuznetsov, and Hamza Zarfaoui. Fast, Private and Regulated Payments in Asynchronous Networks. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 3:1-3:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{brugeres_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.3,
  author =	{Brugeres, Maxence and Languille, Victor and Kuznetsov, Petr and Zarfaoui, Hamza},
  title =	{{Fast, Private and Regulated Payments in Asynchronous Networks}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247227},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Anonymous, Asset Transfer, Asynchronous System, BFT, CBDC, NIZK, Payment System, Privacy, Regulation, Scalability, zk-SNARK}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.19
Two-Tier Black-Box Blockchains and Application to Instant Layer-1 Payments

Authors: Michele Ciampi, Yun Lu, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Vassilis Zikas

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
Common blockchain protocols are monolithic, i.e., their security relies on a single assumption, e.g., honest majority of hashing power (Bitcoin) or stake (Cardano, Algorand, Ethereum). In contrast, so-called optimistic approaches (Thunderella, Meshcash) rely on a combination of assumptions to achieve faster transaction liveness. We revisit, redesign, and augment the optimistic paradigm to a tiered approach. Our design assumes a primary (Tier 1) and a secondary (Tier 2, also referred to as fallback) blockchain, and achieves full security also in a tiered fashion: If the assumption underpinning the primary chain holds, then we guarantee safety, liveness and censorship resistance, irrespectively of the status of the fallback chain. And even if the primary assumption fails, all security properties are still satisfied (albeit with a temporary slow down) provided the fallback assumption holds. To our knowledge, no existing optimistic or tiered approach preserves both safety and liveness when any one of its underlying blockchain (assumptions) fails. The above is achieved by a new detection-and-recovery mechanism that links the two blockchains, so that any violation of safety, liveness, or censorship resistance on the (faster) primary blockchain is temporary - it is swiftly detected and recovered on the secondary chain - and thus cannot result in a persistent fork or halt of the blockchain ledger. We instantiate the above paradigm using a primary chain based on proof of reputation (PoR) and a fallback chain based on proof of stake (PoS). Our construction uses the PoR and PoS blockchains in a mostly black-box manner - where rather than assuming a concrete construction we distil abstract properties on the two blockchains that are sufficient for applying our tiered methodology. In fact, choosing reputation as the resource of the primary chain opens the door to an incentive mechanism - which we devise and analyze - that tokenizes reputation in order to deter cheating and boost participation (on both the primary/PoR and the fallback/PoS blockchain). As we demonstrate, such tokenization in combination with interpreting reputation as a built-in system-wide credit score, allows for embedding in our two-tiered methodology a novel mechanism which provides collateral-free, multi-use payment-channel-like functionality where payments can be instantly confirmed.
Cite as

Michele Ciampi, Yun Lu, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Vassilis Zikas. Two-Tier Black-Box Blockchains and Application to Instant Layer-1 Payments. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 19:1-19:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{ciampi_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.19,
  author =	{Ciampi, Michele and Lu, Yun and Ostrovsky, Rafail and Zikas, Vassilis},
  title =	{{Two-Tier Black-Box Blockchains and Application to Instant Layer-1 Payments}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{19:1--19:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247380},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fault tolerant blockchain, instantly confirmed payments}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.15
Beyond Optimal Fault-Tolerance

Authors: Andrew Lewis-Pye and Tim Roughgarden

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
One of the most basic properties of a consensus protocol is its fault-tolerance - the maximum fraction of faulty participants that the protocol can tolerate without losing fundamental guarantees such as safety and liveness. Because of its importance, the optimal fault-tolerance achievable by any protocol has been characterized in a wide range of settings. For example, for state machine replication (SMR) protocols operating in the partially synchronous setting, it is possible to simultaneously guarantee consistency against α-bounded adversaries (i.e., adversaries that control less than an α fraction of the participants) and liveness against β-bounded adversaries if and only if α + 2β ≤ 1. This paper characterizes to what extent "better-than-optimal" fault-tolerance guarantees are possible for SMR protocols when the standard consistency requirement is relaxed to allow a bounded number r of consistency violations, each potentially leading to the rollback of recently finalized transactions. We prove that bounded rollback is impossible without additional timing assumptions and investigate protocols that tolerate and recover from consistency violations whenever message delays around the time of an attack are bounded by a parameter Δ^* (which may be arbitrarily larger than the parameter Δ that bounds post-GST message delays in the partially synchronous model). Here, a protocol’s fault-tolerance can be a non-constant function of r, and we prove, for each r, matching upper and lower bounds on the optimal "recoverable fault-tolerance" achievable by any SMR protocol. For example, for protocols that guarantee liveness against 1/3-bounded adversaries in the partially synchronous setting, a 5/9-bounded adversary can always cause one consistency violation but not two, and a 2/3-bounded adversary can always cause two consistency violations but not three. Our positive results are achieved through a generic "recovery procedure" that can be grafted on to any accountable SMR protocol and restores consistency following a violation while rolling back only transactions that were finalized in the previous 2Δ^* timesteps.
Cite as

Andrew Lewis-Pye and Tim Roughgarden. Beyond Optimal Fault-Tolerance. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 15:1-15:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{lewispye_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.15,
  author =	{Lewis-Pye, Andrew and Roughgarden, Tim},
  title =	{{Beyond Optimal Fault-Tolerance}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{15:1--15:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247341},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Distributed computing, consensus, recovery}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2018.16
Algorithmic Channel Design

Authors: Georgia Avarikioti, Yuyi Wang, and Roger Wattenhofer

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 123, 29th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2018)

Abstract
Payment networks, also known as channels, are a most promising solution to the throughput problem of cryptocurrencies. In this paper we study the design of capital-efficient payment networks, offline as well as online variants. We want to know how to compute an efficient payment network topology, how capital should be assigned to the individual edges, and how to decide which transactions to accept. Towards this end, we present a flurry of interesting results, basic but generally applicable insights on the one hand, and hardness results and approximation algorithms on the other hand.
Cite as

Georgia Avarikioti, Yuyi Wang, and Roger Wattenhofer. Algorithmic Channel Design. In 29th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 123, pp. 16:1-16:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{avarikioti_et_al:LIPIcs.ISAAC.2018.16,
  author =	{Avarikioti, Georgia and Wang, Yuyi and Wattenhofer, Roger},
  title =	{{Algorithmic Channel Design}},
  booktitle =	{29th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2018)},
  pages =	{16:1--16:12},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-094-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{123},
  editor =	{Hsu, Wen-Lian and Lee, Der-Tsai and Liao, Chung-Shou},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2018.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-99648},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2018.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, payment channels, layer 2 solution, network design, payment hubs, routing}
}
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