9 Search Results for "Endriss, Ulle"

Document
Invited Paper
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.RW.2024/2025.6
Explaining Reasoning Results for Description Logic Ontologies (Invited Paper)

Authors: Patrick Koopmann

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 138, Joint Proceedings of the 20th and 21st Reasoning Web Summer Schools (RW 2024 & RW 2025)

Abstract
The Web Ontology Language (OWL), grounded in description logics, enables reasoning systems to infer implicit knowledge in a transparent manner. However, the expressivity of description logics and the complexity of large ontologies often results in reasoning outcomes that are hard to understand without additional tool support. Explanations of these outcomes are essential for users to understand ontology content, communicate its structure and behavior effectively, and debug undesired or missing inferences. This chapter provides an overview of the central explanation techniques that have been developed for explaining reasoning with description logic ontologies. Here, we consider both explanations for positive entailments (explaining why something can be deduced), as well as negative entailments (why something cannot be deduced). More specifically, we discuss justifications, proofs and interpolation as a means to explain positive entailments, and abduction for explaining negative entailments, where we also have a closer look at practical algorithms as well as practical and theoretical challenges.
Cite as

Patrick Koopmann. Explaining Reasoning Results for Description Logic Ontologies (Invited Paper). In Joint Proceedings of the 20th and 21st Reasoning Web Summer Schools (RW 2024 & RW 2025). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 138, pp. 6:1-6:29, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{koopmann:OASIcs.RW.2024/2025.6,
  author =	{Koopmann, Patrick},
  title =	{{Explaining Reasoning Results for Description Logic Ontologies}},
  booktitle =	{Joint Proceedings of the 20th and 21st Reasoning Web Summer Schools (RW 2024 \& RW 2025)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:29},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-405-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{138},
  editor =	{Artale, Alessandro and Bienvenu, Meghyn and Garc{\'\i}a, Yazm{\'\i}n Ib\'{a}\~{n}ez and Murlak, Filip},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.RW.2024/2025.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-250514},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.RW.2024/2025.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Explanations, Justifications, Proofs, Craig Interpolation, Contrastive Explanations}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54
Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods

Authors: Sheung Man Yuen, Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama, and Warut Suksompong

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 359, 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)

Abstract
Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequence of exchanges to attain fairness in the form of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). We present a vast array of results on the complexity of determining whether it is possible to reach an EF1 allocation from the initial allocation and, if so, the minimum number of exchanges required. In particular, we uncover several distinctions based on the number of agents involved and their utility functions. Furthermore, we derive essentially tight bounds on the worst-case number of exchanges needed to achieve EF1.
Cite as

Sheung Man Yuen, Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama, and Warut Suksompong. Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods. In 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 359, pp. 54:1-54:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{yuen_et_al:LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54,
  author =	{Yuen, Sheung Man and Igarashi, Ayumi and Kamiyama, Naoyuki and Suksompong, Warut},
  title =	{{Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)},
  pages =	{54:1--54:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-408-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{359},
  editor =	{Chen, Ho-Lin and Hon, Wing-Kai and Tsai, Meng-Tsung},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-249626},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54},
  annote =	{Keywords: fair division, indivisible goods, envy-freeness, exchanges}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21
Pool Formation in Oceanic Games: Shapley Value and Proportional Sharing

Authors: Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Evangelos Markakis, and Panagiotis Tsamopoulos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
We study a game-theoretic model for pool formation in Proof of Stake blockchain protocols. In such systems, stakeholders can form pools as a means of obtaining regular rewards from participation in ledger maintenance, with the power of each pool being dependent on its collective stake. The question we are interested in is the design of mechanisms, i.e., "reward sharing schemes," that suitably split rewards among pool members and achieve favorable properties in the resulting pool configuration. With this in mind, we initiate a non-cooperative game-theoretic analysis of the well known Shapley value scheme from cooperative game theory into the context of blockchains. In particular, we focus on the oceanic model of games, proposed by Milnor and Shapley (1978), which is suitable for populations where a small set of large players coexists with a big mass of rather small, negligible players. This provides an appropriate level of abstraction for pool formation processes that occur among the stakeholders of a blockchain. We provide comparisons between the Shapley mechanism and the more standard proportional scheme, in terms of attained decentralization, via a Price of Stability analysis and in terms of susceptibility to Sybil attacks, i.e., the strategic splitting of a players' stake with the intention of participating in multiple pools for increased profit. Interestingly, while the widely deployed proportional scheme appears to have certain advantages, the Shapley value scheme, which rewards higher the most pivotal players, emerges as a competitive alternative, by being able to bypass some of the downsides of proportional sharing in terms of Sybil attack susceptibility, while also not being far from optimal guarantees w.r.t. decentralization. Finally, we also complement our study with some variations of proportional sharing, where the profit is split in proportion to a superadditive or a subadditive function of the stake, showing that our results for the Shapley value scheme are maintained in comparison to these functions as well.
Cite as

Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Evangelos Markakis, and Panagiotis Tsamopoulos. Pool Formation in Oceanic Games: Shapley Value and Proportional Sharing. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 21:1-21:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{kiayias_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21,
  author =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Markakis, Evangelos and Tsamopoulos, Panagiotis},
  title =	{{Pool Formation in Oceanic Games: Shapley Value and Proportional Sharing}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247409},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Shapley value, Nash equilibria, Price of Stability, Reward sharing schemes, Proof of Stake blockchains}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.111
Hardness of Median and Center in the Ulam Metric

Authors: Nick Fischer, Elazar Goldenberg, Mursalin Habib, and Karthik C. S.

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 351, 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)

Abstract
The classical rank aggregation problem seeks to combine a set X of n permutations into a single representative "consensus" permutation. In this paper, we investigate two fundamental rank aggregation tasks under the well-studied Ulam metric: computing a median permutation (which minimizes the sum of Ulam distances to X) and computing a center permutation (which minimizes the maximum Ulam distance to X) in two settings. - Continuous Setting: In the continuous setting, the median/center is allowed to be any permutation. It is known that computing a center in the Ulam metric is NP-hard and we add to this by showing that computing a median is NP-hard as well via a simple reduction from the Max-Cut problem. While this result may not be unexpected, it had remained elusive until now and confirms a speculation by Chakraborty, Das, and Krauthgamer [SODA '21]. - Discrete Setting: In the discrete setting, the median/center must be a permutation from the input set. We fully resolve the fine-grained complexity of the discrete median and discrete center problems under the Ulam metric, proving that the naive Õ(n² L)-time algorithm (where L is the length of the permutation) is conditionally optimal. This resolves an open problem raised by Abboud, Bateni, Cohen-Addad, Karthik C. S., and Seddighin [APPROX '23]. Our reductions are inspired by the known fine-grained lower bounds for similarity measures, but we face and overcome several new highly technical challenges.
Cite as

Nick Fischer, Elazar Goldenberg, Mursalin Habib, and Karthik C. S.. Hardness of Median and Center in the Ulam Metric. In 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 351, pp. 111:1-111:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{fischer_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2025.111,
  author =	{Fischer, Nick and Goldenberg, Elazar and Habib, Mursalin and Karthik C. S.},
  title =	{{Hardness of Median and Center in the Ulam Metric}},
  booktitle =	{33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)},
  pages =	{111:1--111:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-395-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{351},
  editor =	{Benoit, Anne and Kaplan, Haim and Wild, Sebastian and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.111},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-245809},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.111},
  annote =	{Keywords: Ulam distance, median, center, rank aggregation, fine-grained complexity}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.5
Transition Dominance in Domain-Independent Dynamic Programming

Authors: J. Christopher Beck, Ryo Kuroiwa, Jimmy H. M. Lee, Peter J. Stuckey, and Allen Z. Zhong

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 340, 31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025)

Abstract
Domain-independent dynamic programming (DIDP) is a model-based paradigm for dynamic programming (DP) that enables users to define DP models based on a state transition system. Heuristic search-based solvers have demonstrated strong performance in solving combinatorial optimization problems. In this paper, we formally define transition dominance in DIDP, where one transition consistently leads to better solutions than another, allowing the search process to safely ignore dominated transitions. To facilitate the efficient use of transition dominance, we introduce an interface for defining transition dominance and propose the use of state functions to cache values, thereby avoiding redundant computations when verifying transition dominance. Experimental results on DP models across multiple problem classes indicate that incorporating transition dominance and state functions yields a 5 to 10 times speed-up on average for different search algorithms within the DIDP framework compared to the baseline.
Cite as

J. Christopher Beck, Ryo Kuroiwa, Jimmy H. M. Lee, Peter J. Stuckey, and Allen Z. Zhong. Transition Dominance in Domain-Independent Dynamic Programming. In 31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 340, pp. 5:1-5:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{beck_et_al:LIPIcs.CP.2025.5,
  author =	{Beck, J. Christopher and Kuroiwa, Ryo and Lee, Jimmy H. M. and Stuckey, Peter J. and Zhong, Allen Z.},
  title =	{{Transition Dominance in Domain-Independent Dynamic Programming}},
  booktitle =	{31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-380-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{340},
  editor =	{de la Banda, Maria Garcia},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-238661},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Dominance, Dynamic Programming, Combinatorial Optimization}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.8
Breaking Symmetries with Involutions

Authors: Michael Codish and Mikoláš Janota

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 340, 31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025)

Abstract
Symmetry breaking for graphs and other combinatorial objects is notoriously hard. On the one hand, complete symmetry breaks are exponential in size. On the other hand, current, state-of-the-art, partial symmetry breaks are often considered too weak to be of practical use. Recently, the concept of graph patterns has been introduced and provides a concise representation for (large) sets of non-canonical graphs, i.e. graphs that are not lex-leaders and can be excluded from search. In particular, four (specific) graph patterns apply to identify about 3/4 of the set of all non-canonical graphs. Taking this approach further, we discover that graph patterns that derive from permutations that are involutions play an important role in the construction of symmetry breaks for graphs. We take advantage of this to guide the construction of partial and complete symmetry-breaking constraints based on graph patterns. The resulting constraints are small in size and strong in the number of symmetries they break.
Cite as

Michael Codish and Mikoláš Janota. Breaking Symmetries with Involutions. In 31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 340, pp. 8:1-8:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{codish_et_al:LIPIcs.CP.2025.8,
  author =	{Codish, Michael and Janota, Mikol\'{a}\v{s}},
  title =	{{Breaking Symmetries with Involutions}},
  booktitle =	{31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-380-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{340},
  editor =	{de la Banda, Maria Garcia},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-238699},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: graph symmetry, patterns, permutation, Ramsey graphs, greedy, CEGAR}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagRep.4.5.27
JA4AI – Judgment Aggregation for Artificial Intelligence (Dagstuhl Seminar 14202)

Authors: Franz Dietrich, Ulle Endriss, Davide Grossi, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Marija Slavkovik

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 4, Issue 5 (2014)

Abstract
This report documents the programme and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 14202 on "Judgment Aggregation for Artificial Intelligence". Judgment aggregation is a new group decision-making theory that lies in the intersection of logic and social choice; it studies how to reach group decisions on several logically interconnected issues by aggregation of individual judgments. Until recently research in judgment aggregation was dominated by its originating context of philosophy, political science and law. Presently, however we are witnessing increasing work in judgment aggregation from researchers in computer science. Since researchers from such diverse disciplinary backgrounds working on judgment aggregation each publish within their own discipline with virtually no cross-discipline cooperation on concrete projects, it is essential that they are given an opportunity to connect to each other and become aware of the workings of the other side. This seminar has provided such an opportunity.
Cite as

Franz Dietrich, Ulle Endriss, Davide Grossi, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Marija Slavkovik. JA4AI – Judgment Aggregation for Artificial Intelligence (Dagstuhl Seminar 14202). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 4, Issue 5, pp. 27-39, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2014)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@Article{dietrich_et_al:DagRep.4.5.27,
  author =	{Dietrich, Franz and Endriss, Ulle and Grossi, Davide and Pigozzi, Gabriella and Slavkovik, Marija},
  title =	{{JA4AI – Judgment Aggregation for Artificial Intelligence (Dagstuhl Seminar 14202)}},
  pages =	{27--39},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2014},
  volume =	{4},
  number =	{5},
  editor =	{Dietrich, Franz and Endriss, Ulle and Grossi, Davide and Pigozzi, Gabriella and Slavkovik, Marija},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.4.5.27},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-46791},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.4.5.27},
  annote =	{Keywords: Judgment Aggregation, Artificial Intelligence, Computational Social Choice, Collective Decision-making}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07431.1
07431 Abstracts Collection – Computational Issues in Social Choice

Authors: Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, and Tuomas Sandholm

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7431, Computational Issues in Social Choice (2007)

Abstract
From the 21st to the 26th of October 2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07431 on ``Computational Issues in Social Choice'' was held at the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their recent research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. The abstracts of the talks given during the seminar are collected in this paper. The first section summarises the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to full papers are provided where available.
Cite as

Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, and Tuomas Sandholm. 07431 Abstracts Collection – Computational Issues in Social Choice. In Computational Issues in Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7431, pp. 1-19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{endriss_et_al:DagSemProc.07431.1,
  author =	{Endriss, Ulle and Lang, J\'{e}r\^{o}me and Rossi, Francesca and Sandholm, Tuomas},
  title =	{{07431 Abstracts Collection – Computational Issues in Social Choice}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Issues in Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--19},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7431},
  editor =	{Ulle Endriss and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Francesca Rossi and Tuomas Sandholm},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07431.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12736},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07431.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Computational social choice, voting theory, fair division, mechanism design, coalition formation, complexity theory, preference representation, algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07431.2
07431 Executive Summary – Computational Issues in Social Choice

Authors: Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, and Tuomas Sandholm

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7431, Computational Issues in Social Choice (2007)

Abstract
Computational social choice is an interdisciplinary field of study at the interface of social choice theory and computer science, with knowledge flowing in either direction. On the one hand, computational social choice is concerned with importing concepts and procedures from social choice theory for solving questions that arise in computer science and AI application domains. This is typically the case for managing societies of autonomous agents, which calls for negotiation and voting procedures. On the other hand, computational social choice is concerned with importing notions and methods from computer science for solving questions originally stemming from social choice, for instance by providing new perspectives on the problem of manipulation and control in elections. This Dagstuhl Seminar has been devoted to the presentation of recent results and an exchange of ideas in this growing research field.
Cite as

Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, and Tuomas Sandholm. 07431 Executive Summary – Computational Issues in Social Choice. In Computational Issues in Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7431, pp. 1-3, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{endriss_et_al:DagSemProc.07431.2,
  author =	{Endriss, Ulle and Lang, J\'{e}r\^{o}me and Rossi, Francesca and Sandholm, Tuomas},
  title =	{{07431 Executive Summary – Computational Issues in Social Choice}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Issues in Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--3},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7431},
  editor =	{Ulle Endriss and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Francesca Rossi and Tuomas Sandholm},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07431.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12749},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07431.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Computational social choice, voting theory, fair division, mechanism design, coalition formation, complexity theory, preference representation, algorithms}
}
  • Refine by Type
  • 9 Document/PDF
  • 6 Document/HTML

  • Refine by Publication Year
  • 6 2025
  • 1 2014
  • 2 2007

  • Refine by Author
  • 3 Endriss, Ulle
  • 2 Lang, Jérôme
  • 2 Rossi, Francesca
  • 2 Sandholm, Tuomas
  • 1 Beck, J. Christopher
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Series/Journal
  • 5 LIPIcs
  • 1 OASIcs
  • 1 DagRep
  • 2 DagSemProc

  • Refine by Classification
  • 2 Mathematics of computing → Combinatorial optimization
  • 2 Theory of computation → Problems, reductions and completeness
  • 1 Computing methodologies
  • 1 Computing methodologies → Description logics
  • 1 Mathematics of computing → Permutations and combinations
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Keyword
  • 3 fair division
  • 2 Computational social choice
  • 2 algorithms
  • 2 coalition formation
  • 2 complexity theory
  • Show More...

Any Issues?
X

Feedback on the Current Page

CAPTCHA

Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted to Dagstuhl Publishing

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2026 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH About DROPS Imprint Privacy Contact