7 Search Results for "Lazos, Philip"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94
Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion

Authors: Yingxi Li, Ellen Vitercik, and Mingwei Yang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
In the online metric matching problem, n servers and n requests lie in a metric space. Servers are available upfront, and requests arrive sequentially. An arriving request must be matched immediately and irrevocably to an available server, incurring a cost equal to their distance. The goal is to minimize the total matching cost. We study this problem in [0, 1]^d with the Euclidean metric, when servers are adversarial and requests are independently drawn from distinct distributions that satisfy a mild smoothness condition. Our main result is an O(1)-competitive algorithm for d ≠ 2 that requires no distributional knowledge, relying only on a single sample from each request distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first algorithm to achieve an o(log n) competitive ratio for non-trivial metrics beyond the i.i.d. setting. Our approach bypasses the Ω(log n) barrier introduced by probabilistic metric embeddings: instead of analyzing the embedding distortion and the algorithm separately, we directly bound the cost of the algorithm on the target metric space of a simple deterministic embedding. We then combine this analysis with lower bounds on the offline optimum for Euclidean metrics, derived via majorization arguments, to obtain our guarantees.
Cite as

Yingxi Li, Ellen Vitercik, and Mingwei Yang. Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 94:1-94:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{li_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94,
  author =	{Li, Yingxi and Vitercik, Ellen and Yang, Mingwei},
  title =	{{Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{94:1--94:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253815},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online algorithm, Metric matching, Competitive analysis, Smoothed analysis}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.5
Blockchain Governance via Sharp Anonymous Multisignatures

Authors: Wonseok Choi, Xiangyu Liu, and Vassilis Zikas

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
Electronic voting has occupied a large part of the cryptographic protocols literature. The recent reality of blockchains - in particular, their need for online governance mechanisms - has brought new parameters and requirements to the problem. We identify the key requirements of a blockchain governance mechanism, namely correctness (including eliminative double votes), voter anonymity, and traceability, and investigate mechanisms that can achieve them with minimal interaction and under assumptions that fit the blockchain setting. First, we define a signature-like primitive, which we term sharp anonymous multisignatures (in short, ♯AMS) that tightly meets the needs of blockchain governance. In a nutshell, ♯AMSs allow any set of parties to generate a signature, e.g., on a proposal to be voted upon, which, if posted on the blockchain, hides the identities of the signers/voters but reveals their number. This can be seen as a (strict) generalization of threshold ring signatures (TRS). We next turn to constructing such ♯AMSs and using them in various governance scenarios - e.g., single vote vs. multiple votes per voter. In this direction, although the definition of TRS does not imply ♯AMS, one can compile some existing TRS constructions into ♯AMS. This raises the question: What is the TRS structure that allows such a compilation? To answer the above, we devise templates for TRSs. Our templates encapsulate and abstract the structure that allows for the above compilation - most of the TRS schemes that can be compiled into ♯AMS are, in fact, instantiations of our template. This abstraction makes our template generic for instantiating TRSs and ♯AMSs from different cryptographic assumptions (e.g., DDH, LWE, etc.). One of our templates is based on chameleon hashes, and we explore a framework of lossy chameleon hashes to understand their nature fully. Finally, we turn to how ♯AMS schemes can be used in our applications. We provide fast (in some cases non-interactive) ♯AMS-based blockchain governance mechanisms for a wide spectrum of assumptions on the honesty (semi-honest vs malicious) and availability of voters and proposers.
Cite as

Wonseok Choi, Xiangyu Liu, and Vassilis Zikas. Blockchain Governance via Sharp Anonymous Multisignatures. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 5:1-5:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{choi_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.5,
  author =	{Choi, Wonseok and Liu, Xiangyu and Zikas, Vassilis},
  title =	{{Blockchain Governance via Sharp Anonymous Multisignatures}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247242},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, E-voting, Threshold Ring Signatures, Threshold Cryptography}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.22
Single-Token vs Two-Token Blockchain Tokenomics

Authors: Aggelos Kiayias, Philip Lazos, and Paolo Penna

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
We study long-term equilibria that arise in the token monetary policy, or tokenomics, design of proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain systems that engage utility maximizing users and validators. Validators are system maintainers who get rewarded with tokens for performing the work necessary for the system to function properly, while users compete and pay with such tokens for getting a desired portion of the system service. We study how the system service provision and suitable rewards schemes together can lead to equilibria with the following desirable characteristics (1) viability: the system keeps parties engaged, (2) decentralization and skin-in-the-game: multiple sufficiently invested validators are participating, (3) stability: the price path of the underlying token used to transact with the system does not change widely over time, and (4) feasibility: the mechanism is easy to implement as a smart contract, e.g., it does not require a fiat reserve on-chain to perform token buybacks or to perform bookkeeping of exponentially growing token holdings. Our analysis enables us to put forward a novel generic mechanism for blockchain monetary policy that we call quantitative rewarding (QR). We investigate how to implement QR in single-token and two-token proof of stake (PoS) blockchain systems. The latter are systems that utilize one token for the users to pay the transaction fees and a different token for the validators to participate in the PoS protocol and get rewarded. Our approach demonstrates a concrete advantage of the two-token setting in terms of the ability of the QR mechanism to be realized effectively and provide good equilibria. Our analysis also reveals an inherent limitation of the single token setting in terms of implementing an effective blockchain monetary policy - a distinction that is, to the best of our knowledge, highlighted for the first time.
Cite as

Aggelos Kiayias, Philip Lazos, and Paolo Penna. Single-Token vs Two-Token Blockchain Tokenomics. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 22:1-22:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{kiayias_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.22,
  author =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Lazos, Philip and Penna, Paolo},
  title =	{{Single-Token vs Two-Token Blockchain Tokenomics}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{22:1--22:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.22},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247412},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.22},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, tokenomics, buyback, equilibria, price path, stable price, discounted game, dual-token, proof-of-stake, validator}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.50
Designing Exploration Contracts

Authors: Martin Hoefer, Conrad Schecker, and Kevin Schewior

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 327, 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)

Abstract
We study a natural application of contract design in the context of sequential exploration problems. In our principal-agent setting, a search task is delegated to an agent. The agent performs a sequential exploration of n boxes, suffers the exploration cost for each inspected box, and selects the content (called the prize) of one inspected box as outcome. Agent and principal obtain an individual value based on the selected prize. To influence the search, the principal a-priori designs a contract with a non-negative payment to the agent for each potential prize. The goal of the principal is to maximize her expected reward, i.e., value minus payment. Interestingly, this natural contract scenario shares close relations with the Pandora’s Box problem. We show how to compute optimal contracts for the principal in several scenarios. A popular and important subclass is that of linear contracts, and we show how to compute optimal linear contracts in polynomial time. For general contracts, we obtain optimal contracts under the standard assumption that the agent suffers cost but obtains value only from the transfers by the principal. More generally, for general contracts with non-zero agent values for outcomes we show how to compute an optimal contract in two cases: (1) when each box has only one prize with non-zero value for principal and agent, (2) for i.i.d. boxes with a single prize with positive value for the principal.
Cite as

Martin Hoefer, Conrad Schecker, and Kevin Schewior. Designing Exploration Contracts. In 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 327, pp. 50:1-50:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{hoefer_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2025.50,
  author =	{Hoefer, Martin and Schecker, Conrad and Schewior, Kevin},
  title =	{{Designing Exploration Contracts}},
  booktitle =	{42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)},
  pages =	{50:1--50:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-365-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{327},
  editor =	{Beyersdorff, Olaf and Pilipczuk, Micha{\l} and Pimentel, Elaine and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.50},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-228755},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.50},
  annote =	{Keywords: Exploration, Contract Design, Pandora’s Box Problem}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.9
Blockchain Space Tokenization

Authors: Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Philip Lazos, and Giorgos Panagiotakos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
Handling congestion in blockchain systems is a fundamental problem given that the security and decentralization objectives of such systems lead to designs that compromise on (horizontal) scalability (what sometimes is referred to as the "blockchain trilemma"). Motivated by this, we focus on the question whether it is possible to design a transaction inclusion policy for block producers that facilitates fee and delay predictability while being incentive compatible at the same time. Reconciling these three properties is seemingly paradoxical given that the dominant approach to transaction processing is based on first-price auctions (e.g., as in Bitcoin) or dynamic adjustment of the minimum admissible fee (e.g. as in Ethereum EIP-1559) something that breaks fee predictability. At the same time, in fixed fee mechanisms (e.g., as in Cardano), fees are trivially predictable but are subject to relatively inexpensive bribing or denial of service attacks where transactions may be delayed indefinitely by a well funded attacker, hence breaking delay predictability. In this work, we set out to address this problem by putting forward blockchain space tokenization (BST), namely a new capability of a blockchain system to tokenize its capacity for transactions and allocate it to interested users who are willing to pay ahead of time for the ability to post transactions regularly for a period of time. We analyze our system in the face of worst-case transaction-processing attacks by introducing a security game played between the mempool mechanism and an adversary. Leveraging this framework, we prove that BST offers predictable and asymptotically optimal delays, predictable fees, and is incentive compatible, thus answering the question posed in the affirmative.
Cite as

Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Philip Lazos, and Giorgos Panagiotakos. Blockchain Space Tokenization. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 9:1-9:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{kiayias_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.9,
  author =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Lazos, Philip and Panagiotakos, Giorgos},
  title =	{{Blockchain Space Tokenization}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209453},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain protocols, Predictable Service, Transaction Fees}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.14
The Infinite Server Problem

Authors: Christian Coester, Elias Koutsoupias, and Philip Lazos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 80, 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)

Abstract
We study a variant of the k-server problem, the infinite server problem, in which infinitely many servers reside initially at a particular point of the metric space and serve a sequence of requests. In the framework of competitive analysis, we show a surprisingly tight connection between this problem and the (h,k)-server problem, in which an online algorithm with k servers competes against an offline algorithm with h servers. Specifically, we show that the infinite server problem has bounded competitive ratio if and only if the (h,k)-server problem has bounded competitive ratio for some k=O(h). We give a lower bound of 3.146 for the competitive ratio of the infinite server problem, which implies the same lower bound for the (h,k)-server problem even when k>>h and holds also for the line metric; the previous known bounds were 2.4 for general metric spaces and 2 for the line. For weighted trees and layered graphs we obtain upper bounds, although they depend on the depth. Of particular interest is the infinite server problem on the line, which we show to be equivalent to the seemingly easier case in which all requests are in a fixed bounded interval away from the original position of the servers. This is a special case of a more general reduction from arbitrary metric spaces to bounded subspaces. Unfortunately, classical approaches (double coverage and generalizations, work function algorithm, balancing algorithms) fail even for this special case.
Cite as

Christian Coester, Elias Koutsoupias, and Philip Lazos. The Infinite Server Problem. In 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 80, pp. 14:1-14:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)

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@InProceedings{coester_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.14,
  author =	{Coester, Christian and Koutsoupias, Elias and Lazos, Philip},
  title =	{{The Infinite Server Problem}},
  booktitle =	{44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-041-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{80},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Indyk, Piotr and Kuhn, Fabian and Muscholl, Anca},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-74563},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online Algorithms, k-Server, Resource Augmentation}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.47
Online Market Intermediation

Authors: Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Elias Koutsoupias, and Philip Lazos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 80, 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)

Abstract
We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown large sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as the sequence length n, are decided in an adversarial, online way. Each agent is interested in trading a single item, and all items in the market are identical. The intermediary has some prior, incomplete knowledge of the agents' values for the items: all seller values are independently drawn from the same distribution F_S, and all buyer values from F_B. The two distributions may differ, and we make common regularity assumptions, namely that F_B is MHR and F_S is log-concave. We focus on online, posted-price mechanisms, and analyse two objectives: that of maximizing the intermediary's profit and that of maximizing the social welfare, under a competitive analysis benchmark. First, on the negative side, for general agent sequences we prove tight competitive ratios of Theta(\sqrt(n)) and Theta(\ln n), respectively for the two objectives. On the other hand, under the extra assumption that the intermediary knows some bound \alpha on the ratio between the number of sellers and buyers, we design asymptotically optimal online mechanisms with competitive ratios of 1+o(1) and 4, respectively. Additionally, we study the model where the number of items that can be stored in stock throughout the execution is bounded, in which case the competitive ratio for the profit is improved to O(ln n).
Cite as

Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Elias Koutsoupias, and Philip Lazos. Online Market Intermediation. In 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 80, pp. 47:1-47:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2017)

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@InProceedings{giannakopoulos_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.47,
  author =	{Giannakopoulos, Yiannis and Koutsoupias, Elias and Lazos, Philip},
  title =	{{Online Market Intermediation}},
  booktitle =	{44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)},
  pages =	{47:1--47:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-041-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2017},
  volume =	{80},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Indyk, Piotr and Kuhn, Fabian and Muscholl, Anca},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.47},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-74815},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.47},
  annote =	{Keywords: optimal auctions, bilateral trade, sequential auctions, online algorithms, competitive analysis}
}
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