27 Search Results for "Tennenholtz, Moshe"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.15
Incentivizing High-Quality Content in Online Recommender Systems

Authors: Xinyan Hu, Meena Jagadeesan, Michael I. Jordan, and Jacob Steinhardt

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 368, 7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026)

Abstract
In content recommender systems such as TikTok and YouTube, the platform’s recommendation algorithm shapes content producer incentives. Many platforms employ online learning, which generates intertemporal incentives, since content produced today affects recommendations of future content. We study the game between producers and analyze the content created at equilibrium. We prove that standard online learning algorithms, such as Hedge and EXP3, unfortunately incentivize producers to create low-quality content, where producers' effort approaches zero in the long run for typical learning rate schedules. Motivated by this negative result, we design learning algorithms that incentivize producers to invest high effort and achieve high user welfare. At a conceptual level, our work illustrates the unintended impact that a platform’s learning algorithm can have on content quality and introduces algorithmic approaches to mitigating these effects.
Cite as

Xinyan Hu, Meena Jagadeesan, Michael I. Jordan, and Jacob Steinhardt. Incentivizing High-Quality Content in Online Recommender Systems. In 7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 368, pp. 15:1-15:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{hu_et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2026.15,
  author =	{Hu, Xinyan and Jagadeesan, Meena and Jordan, Michael I. and Steinhardt, Jacob},
  title =	{{Incentivizing High-Quality Content in Online Recommender Systems}},
  booktitle =	{7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026)},
  pages =	{15:1--15:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-419-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{368},
  editor =	{Lin, Huijia (Rachel)},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-259887},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: recommender systems, content quality, producer incentives, online learning, algorithmic game theory, Stackelberg games}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.27
The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions in Graphs

Authors: George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamária Kovács, and Ioannis Vlachos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 364, 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)

Abstract
We study truthful and non-truthful protocols for combinatorial auctions in which every item can be allocated to one of two agents (multigraphs), or more generally to a fixed number of agents (hypergraphs). We show some tight - both positive and impossibility - results for the communication complexity of approximating the optimal social welfare for general monotone, subadditive, or XOS valuations.
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George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamária Kovács, and Ioannis Vlachos. The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions in Graphs. In 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 364, pp. 27:1-27:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{christodoulou_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2026.27,
  author =	{Christodoulou, George and Koutsoupias, Elias and Kov\'{a}cs, Annam\'{a}ria and Vlachos, Ioannis},
  title =	{{The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions in Graphs}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)},
  pages =	{27:1--27:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-412-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{364},
  editor =	{Mahajan, Meena and Manea, Florin and McIver, Annabelle and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.27},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-255163},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.27},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Communication Complexity, Mechanism Design, Graphs}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.13
Optimal Online Bipartite Matching in Degree-2 Graphs

Authors: Amey Bhangale, Arghya Chakraborty, and Prahladh Harsha

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 359, 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)

Abstract
Online bipartite matching is a classical problem in online algorithms and we know that both the deterministic fractional and randomized integral online matchings achieve the same competitive ratio of 1-1/e. In this work, we study classes of graphs where the online degree is restricted to 2. As expected, one can achieve a competitive ratio of better than 1-1/e in both the deterministic fractional and randomized integral cases, but surprisingly, these ratios are not the same. It was already known that for fractional matching, a 0.75 competitive ratio algorithm is optimal. We show that the folklore Half-Half algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of η ≈ 0.717772… and more surprisingly, show that this is optimal by giving a matching lower-bound. This yields a separation between the two problems: deterministic fractional and randomized integral, showing that it is impossible to obtain a perfect rounding scheme.
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Amey Bhangale, Arghya Chakraborty, and Prahladh Harsha. Optimal Online Bipartite Matching in Degree-2 Graphs. In 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 359, pp. 13:1-13:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bhangale_et_al:LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.13,
  author =	{Bhangale, Amey and Chakraborty, Arghya and Harsha, Prahladh},
  title =	{{Optimal Online Bipartite Matching in Degree-2 Graphs}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-408-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{359},
  editor =	{Chen, Ho-Lin and Hon, Wing-Kai and Tsai, Meng-Tsung},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-249216},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online Algorithm, Bipartite matching}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21
On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, and Giuseppe F. Italiano

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the performance of mildly greedy players in k-coloring games, a relevant subclass of anti-coordination games. A mildly greedy player is a selfish agent who is willing to deviate from a certain strategy profile only if her payoff improves by a factor of more than ε, for some given ε ≥ 0. In presence of mildly greedy players, stability is captured by the concept of (1+ε)-approximate Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we first show that, for any k-coloring game, the (1+ε)-approximate price of anarchy, i.e., the price of anarchy of (1+ε)-approximate pure Nash equilibria, is at least (k-1)/((k-1)ε +k), and that this bound is tight for any ε ≥ 0. Then, we evaluate the approximation ratio of the solutions achieved after a (1 + ϵ)-approximate one-round walk starting from any initial strategy profile, where a (1 + ϵ)-approximate one-round walk is a sequence of (1 + ε)-approximate best-responses, one for each player. We provide a lower bound of min{(k-2)/k, (k-1)/((k-1)ε+k)} on this ratio, for any ε ≥ 0 and k ≥ 5; for the cases of k = 3 and k = 4, we give finer bounds depending on ε. Our work generalizes the results known for cut games, the special case of k-coloring games restricted to k = 2.
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Vittorio Bilò, Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, and Giuseppe F. Italiano. On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 21:1-21:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and D'Ascenzo, Andrea and D'Emidio, Mattia and Italiano, Giuseppe F.},
  title =	{{On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241287},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Coloring games, (Approximate) Nash Equilibria, Price of Anarchy}
}
Document
Position
DOI: 10.4230/TGDK.1.1.2
Large Language Models and Knowledge Graphs: Opportunities and Challenges

Authors: Jeff Z. Pan, Simon Razniewski, Jan-Christoph Kalo, Sneha Singhania, Jiaoyan Chen, Stefan Dietze, Hajira Jabeen, Janna Omeliyanenko, Wen Zhang, Matteo Lissandrini, Russa Biswas, Gerard de Melo, Angela Bonifati, Edlira Vakaj, Mauro Dragoni, and Damien Graux

Published in: TGDK, Volume 1, Issue 1 (2023): Special Issue on Trends in Graph Data and Knowledge. Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge, Volume 1, Issue 1

Abstract
Large Language Models (LLMs) have taken Knowledge Representation - and the world - by storm. This inflection point marks a shift from explicit knowledge representation to a renewed focus on the hybrid representation of both explicit knowledge and parametric knowledge. In this position paper, we will discuss some of the common debate points within the community on LLMs (parametric knowledge) and Knowledge Graphs (explicit knowledge) and speculate on opportunities and visions that the renewed focus brings, as well as related research topics and challenges.
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Jeff Z. Pan, Simon Razniewski, Jan-Christoph Kalo, Sneha Singhania, Jiaoyan Chen, Stefan Dietze, Hajira Jabeen, Janna Omeliyanenko, Wen Zhang, Matteo Lissandrini, Russa Biswas, Gerard de Melo, Angela Bonifati, Edlira Vakaj, Mauro Dragoni, and Damien Graux. Large Language Models and Knowledge Graphs: Opportunities and Challenges. In Special Issue on Trends in Graph Data and Knowledge. Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge (TGDK), Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 2:1-2:38, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@Article{pan_et_al:TGDK.1.1.2,
  author =	{Pan, Jeff Z. and Razniewski, Simon and Kalo, Jan-Christoph and Singhania, Sneha and Chen, Jiaoyan and Dietze, Stefan and Jabeen, Hajira and Omeliyanenko, Janna and Zhang, Wen and Lissandrini, Matteo and Biswas, Russa and de Melo, Gerard and Bonifati, Angela and Vakaj, Edlira and Dragoni, Mauro and Graux, Damien},
  title =	{{Large Language Models and Knowledge Graphs: Opportunities and Challenges}},
  journal =	{Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge},
  pages =	{2:1--2:38},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{1},
  number =	{1},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/TGDK.1.1.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-194766},
  doi =		{10.4230/TGDK.1.1.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Large Language Models, Pre-trained Language Models, Knowledge Graphs, Ontology, Retrieval Augmented Language Models}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2016.41
Distributed Signaling Games

Authors: Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz, and Omri Weinstein

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 57, 24th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2016)

Abstract
The study of the algorithmic and computational complexity of designing efficient signaling schemes for mechanisms aiming to optimize social welfare or revenue is a recurring theme in recent computer science literature. In reality, however, information is typically not held by a central authority, but is distributed among multiple sources (third-party "mediators"), a fact that dramatically changes the strategic and combinatorial nature of the signaling problem. In this paper we introduce distributed signaling games, while using display advertising as a canonical example for introducing this foundational framework. A distributed signaling game may be a pure coordination game (i.e., a distributed optimization task), or a non-cooperative game. In the context of pure coordination games, we show a wide gap between the computational complexity of the centralized and distributed signaling problems, proving that distributed coordination on revenue-optimal signaling is a much harder problem than its "centralized" counterpart. In the context of non-cooperative games, the outcome generated by the mediators' signals may have different value to each. The reason for that is typically the desire of the auctioneer to align the incentives of the mediators with his own by a compensation relative to the marginal benefit from their signals. We design a mechanism for this problem via a novel application of Shapley's value, and show that it possesses a few interesting economical properties.
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Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz, and Omri Weinstein. Distributed Signaling Games. In 24th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 57, pp. 41:1-41:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016)

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@InProceedings{feldman_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2016.41,
  author =	{Feldman, Moran and Tennenholtz, Moshe and Weinstein, Omri},
  title =	{{Distributed Signaling Games}},
  booktitle =	{24th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2016)},
  pages =	{41:1--41:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-015-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2016},
  volume =	{57},
  editor =	{Sankowski, Piotr and Zaroliagis, Christos},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2016.41},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-63536},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2016.41},
  annote =	{Keywords: Signaling, display advertising, mechanism design, shapley value}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.5
Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament

Authors: Alon Altman, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, Computational Foundations of Social Choice (2010)

Abstract
A tournament is a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. Tournaments arise in many contexts that are relevant to AI, most notably in voting (as a method to aggregate the preferences of agents). There are many works that deal with choice rules that select a desirable alternative from a tournament, but very few of them deal directly with incentive issues, despite the fact that game-theoretic considerations are crucial with respect to systems populated by selfish agents. We deal with the problem of the manipulation of choice rules by considering two types of manipulation. We say that a choice rule is emph{monotonic} if an alternative cannot get itself selected by losing on purpose, and emph{pairwise nonmanipulable} if a pair of alternatives cannot make one of them the winner by reversing the outcome of the match between them. Our main result is a combinatorial construction of a choice rule that is monotonic, pairwise nonmanipulable, and onto the set of alternatives, for any number of alternatives besides three.
Cite as

Alon Altman, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Moshe Tennenholtz. Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-6, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)

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@InProceedings{altman_et_al:DagSemProc.10101.5,
  author =	{Altman, Alon and Procaccia, Ariel D. and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Foundations of Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--6},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2010},
  volume =	{10101},
  editor =	{Felix Brandt and Vincent Conitzer and Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Jean-Francois Laslier and William S. Zwicker},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-25607},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Tournament, manipulation}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.1
07271 Abstracts Collection – Computational Social Systems and the Internet

Authors: Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
From 01.07. to 06.07.2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07271 ``Computational Social Systems and the Internet'' was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
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Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz. 07271 Abstracts Collection – Computational Social Systems and the Internet. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{cramton_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.1,
  author =	{Cramton, Peter and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Tardos, Eva and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{07271 Abstracts Collection – Computational Social Systems and the Internet }},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--25},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11666},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design, Combinatorial Auctions, Social Choice Theory, Behavioral Economics, Computational Game Theory, Social Networks}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.2
07271 Summary – Computational Social Systems and the Internet

Authors: Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
The seminar "Computational Social Systems and the Internet" facilitated a very fruitful interaction between economists and computer scientists, which intensified the understanding of the other disciplines' tool sets. The seminar helped to pave the way to a unified theory of social systems on the Internet that takes into account both the economic and the computational issues---and their deep interaction.
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Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz. 07271 Summary – Computational Social Systems and the Internet. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{cramton_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.2,
  author =	{Cramton, Peter and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Tardos, Eva and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{07271 Summary – Computational Social Systems and the Internet }},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11642},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design, Combinatorial Auctions, Social Choice Theory, Behavioral Economics, Computational Game Theory, Social Networks}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3
An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems

Authors: Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
Personalized ranking systems and trust systems are an essential tool for collaboration in a multi-agent environment. In these systems, trust relations between many agents are aggregated to produce a personalized trust rating of the agents. In this paper we introduce the first extensive axiomatic study of this setting, and explore a wide array of well-known and new personalized ranking systems. We adapt several axioms (basic criteria) from the literature on global ranking systems to the context of personalized ranking systems, and fully classify the set of systems that satisfy all of these axioms. We further show that all these axioms are necessary for this result.
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Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz. An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{altman_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.3,
  author =	{Altman, Alon and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--25},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11527},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Ranking systems, trust, axiomatization, incentives, mechanism design, game theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.4
Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules

Authors: Vincent Conitzer

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
A (randomized, anonymous) voting rule maps any multiset of total orders of (aka. votes over) a fixed set of alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. A voting rule f is neutral if it treats all alternatives symmetrically. It satisfies participation if no voter ever benefits from not casting her vote. It is falsename-proof if no voter ever benefits from casting additional (potentially different) votes. It is anonymity-proof if it satisfies participation and it is false-name-proof. We show that the class of anonymity-proof neutral voting rules consists exactly of the rules of the following form. With some probability kf in [0, 1], the rule chooses an alternative at random. With probability 1-kf , the rule first draws a pair of alternatives at random. If every vote prefers the same alternative between the two (and there is at least one vote), then the rule chooses that alternative. Otherwise, the rule flips a fair coin to decide between the two alternatives.
Cite as

Vincent Conitzer. Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{conitzer:DagSemProc.07271.4,
  author =	{Conitzer, Vincent},
  title =	{{Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--15},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11658},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism design, social choice, false-name-proofness, verifying identities, combinatorial auctions}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5
Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach

Authors: Wedad Elmaghraby and Nathan Larson

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
Advances in information technology and computational power have opened the doors for auctioneers to explore a range of auction formats by considering varying degrees of bid expressivity and different payment rule, e.g., single price vs. discriminatory prices. While it is clear that one can design more complicated auctions, it is still not clear if should do so and which auction parameters have the greatest impact on the performance on cost and efficiency. The purpose of this paper is to gain some insight into this question, via analytical and experimental methods.
Cite as

Wedad Elmaghraby and Nathan Larson. Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{elmaghraby_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.5,
  author =	{Elmaghraby, Wedad and Larson, Nathan},
  title =	{{Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11579},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Experimental, Procurement, Synergies, Asymmetric Bidders}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.6
Incentive Compatible Regression Learning

Authors: Ofer Dekel, Felix Fischer, and Ariel D. Procaccia

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
We initiate the study of incentives in a general machine learning framework. We focus on a game theoretic regression learning setting where private information is elicited from multiple agents, which are interested in different distributions over the sample space. This conflict potentially gives rise to untruthfulness on the part of the agents. In the restricted but important case when distributions are degenerate, and under mild assumptions, we show that agents are motivated to tell the truth. In a more general setting, we study the power and limitations of mechanisms without payments. We finally establish that, in the general setting, the VCG mechanism goes a long way in guaranteeing truthfulness and efficiency.
Cite as

Ofer Dekel, Felix Fischer, and Ariel D. Procaccia. Incentive Compatible Regression Learning. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{dekel_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.6,
  author =	{Dekel, Ofer and Fischer, Felix and Procaccia, Ariel D.},
  title =	{{Incentive Compatible Regression Learning}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11622},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Machine learning, regression, mechanism design}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7
Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations

Authors: Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller, and Dries Vermeulen

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running time of the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. In contrast we show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate efficiency in equilibrium, while additionally the running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for all realizations of valuations.
Cite as

Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller, and Dries Vermeulen. Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-9, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{grigorieva_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.7,
  author =	{Grigorieva, Elena and Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Vermeulen, Dries},
  title =	{{Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--9},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11616},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Query auctions, ex post equilibrium, efficiency}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.8
Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions

Authors: Maria-Florina Balcan

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
Consider the problem of a retailer with various goods for sale, attempting to set prices to maximize revenue. If customers have separate valuations over the different goods, and these are known to the retailer, then the goods can be priced separately and the problem is not so difficult. However, when customers have valuations over sets of items, this becomes a combinatorial auction problem, and the problem becomes computationally hard even when valuations are fully known in advance. In this talk we present some simple randomized algorithms and mechanisms for a number of interesting cases of this problem, both in the limited and unlimited supply setting. This talk is based on joint work with Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour.
Cite as

Maria-Florina Balcan. Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{balcan:DagSemProc.07271.8,
  author =	{Balcan, Maria-Florina},
  title =	{{Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11534},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Item Pricing, Revenue Maximizing, Combinatorial Auctions}
}
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