17 Search Results for "Ferreira, Francisco"


Document
Hardness Results on Characteristics for Elastic-Degenerate Strings

Authors: Dominik Köppl and Jannik Olbrich

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 369, 37th Annual Symposium on Combinatorial Pattern Matching (CPM 2026)


Abstract
Generalizations of plain strings have been proposed as a compact way to represent a collection of nearly identical sequences or to express uncertainty at specific text positions by enumerating all possibilities. While a plain string stores a character at each of its positions, generalizations consider a set of characters (indeterminate strings), a set of strings of equal length (generalized degenerate strings, or shortly GD strings), or a set of strings of arbitrary lengths (elastic-degenerate strings, or shortly ED strings). These generalizations are of importance to compactly represent such type of data, and find applications in bioinformatics for representing and maintaining a set of genetic sequences of the same taxonomy or a multiple sequence alignment. To be of use, attention has been drawn to answering various query types such as pattern matching or measuring similarity of ED strings by generalizing techniques known to plain strings. However, for some types of queries, it has been shown that a generalization of a polynomial-time solvable query on classic strings becomes NP-hard on ED strings, e.g. [Russo et al., 2022]. In that light, we wonder about other types of queries that are of particular interest to bioinformatics: unique substrings, absent words, anti-powers, longest previous factors, and Lempel-Ziv-like compression schemes. While we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for a variation of longest previous factors, we show that all other problems are NP-hard to compute, some of them even under the restriction that the input can be modeled as an indeterminate or GD string.

Cite as

Dominik Köppl and Jannik Olbrich. Hardness Results on Characteristics for Elastic-Degenerate Strings. In 37th Annual Symposium on Combinatorial Pattern Matching (CPM 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 369, pp. 14:1-14:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)


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@InProceedings{koppl_et_al:LIPIcs.CPM.2026.14,
  author =	{K\"{o}ppl, Dominik and Olbrich, Jannik},
  title =	{{Hardness Results on Characteristics for Elastic-Degenerate Strings}},
  booktitle =	{37th Annual Symposium on Combinatorial Pattern Matching (CPM 2026)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-420-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{369},
  editor =	{Bille, Philip and Prezza, Nicola},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CPM.2026.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-259409},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CPM.2026.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Elastic-degenerate strings, NP-hardness, longest common factor, minimal unique substring, minimal absent word, anti-power, longest previous factor}
}
Document
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms

Authors: Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, and S. Matthew Weinberg

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)


Abstract
Roughgarden [Roughgarden, 2020] initiates the study of Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs), and posits that the on-chain game of a "good" TFM should be on-chain simple (OnC-S), i.e., incentive compatible for both the users and the miner. Recent work of Ganesh, Thomas an Weinberg [Ganesh et al., 2024] posit that they should additionally be Off-Chain Influence-Proof (OffC-IP), which means that the miner cannot achieve any additional revenue by separately conducting an off-chain auction to determine on-chain inclusion. They observe that a cryptographic second-price auction satisfies both properties, but leave open the question of whether other mechanisms (such as those not dependent on cryptography) satisfy these properties. In this paper, we characterize OffC-IP TFMs: They are those satisfying a burn identity relating the burn rule to the allocation rule. In particular, we show that auction is OffC-IP if and only if its (induced direct-revelation) allocation rule X̄(⋅) and burn rule B̅(⋅) (both of which take as input users' values v₁, … , v_n) are truthful when viewing (X̄(⋅), B̅(⋅)) as the allocation and pricing rule of a multi-item auction for a single additive buyer with values (φ(v₁),…, φ(v_n)) equal to the users' virtual values. Building on this burn identity, we characterize OffC-IP and OnC-S TFMs that are deterministic and do not use cryptography: They are posted-price mechanisms with specially-tuned burns. As a corollary, we show that such TFMs can only exist with infinite supply and prior-dependence. However, we show that for randomized TFMs, there are additional OnC-S and OffC-IP auctions that do not use cryptography (even when there is {finite} supply, under prior-dependence with a bounded prior distribution). Holistically, our results show that while OffC-IP is a fairly stringent requirement, families of OffC-IP mechanisms can be found for a variety of settings.

Cite as

Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 65:1-65:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)


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@InProceedings{ganesh_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.65,
  author =	{Ganesh, Aadityan and Thomas, Clayton and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  title =	{{Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{65:1--65:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.65},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253527},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.65},
  annote =	{Keywords: Transaction Fee Mechanism Design, Off-Chain Influence Proofness, Blockchain, Decentralized Finance, Simple Auctions}
}
Document
Where to Place Your TEE? In Search of a Censorship-Resilient Design for Rollup Sequencers

Authors: Andrei Arusoaie, Claudiu-Nicu Bărbieru, Oana-Otilia Captarencu, Pascal Felber, Corentin Libert, Emanuel Onica, Etienne Rivière, Valerio Schiavoni, and Peterson Yuhala

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 361, 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)


Abstract
Ethereum is the dominant blockchain ecosystem capable of executing Turing-complete smart contracts. Rollups gained significant traction as the primary layer 2 (L2) solution meant to bring horizontal scalability to the main Ethereum network (L1). A core component of any rollup is the sequencer, which creates new L2 blocks to be submitted in rollup batches to L1. In most of the current rollup architectures, this component is centralised. As a result, these designs are prone to inconspicuous censorship practices by the sequencer. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) can guarantee the integrity of various sequencer components, which is instrumental in addressing censorship. However, the reaction of the system design to censorship attempts depends on where a TEE is integrated and which components it protects. In particular, this reaction is limited in the case of a monolithic TEE-protected sequencer design. Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is a non-monolithic paradigm adopted on L1, which separates the production of blocks from proposing them for inclusion in the blockchain. Recently, PBS has been considered for integration with L2 sequencers, with an impact on alleviating censorship. In this paper, we explore the design space of TEE-integrating PBS and non-PBS sequencer variants. First, we introduce a formal framework for the censorship actions that captures the specificity of the L2 sequencer. Then, we analyse to what extent the different designs address these censorship actions. Our main contribution is a novel design variation that allows for a precise observation of censored transactions. In the presence of TEEs, in a PBS setting, we demonstrate this precise observability, which is necessary to enable resilience to censorship.

Cite as

Andrei Arusoaie, Claudiu-Nicu Bărbieru, Oana-Otilia Captarencu, Pascal Felber, Corentin Libert, Emanuel Onica, Etienne Rivière, Valerio Schiavoni, and Peterson Yuhala. Where to Place Your TEE? In Search of a Censorship-Resilient Design for Rollup Sequencers. In 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 361, pp. 27:1-27:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


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@InProceedings{arusoaie_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.27,
  author =	{Arusoaie, Andrei and B\u{a}rbieru, Claudiu-Nicu and Captarencu, Oana-Otilia and Felber, Pascal and Libert, Corentin and Onica, Emanuel and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio and Yuhala, Peterson},
  title =	{{Where to Place Your TEE? In Search of a Censorship-Resilient Design for Rollup Sequencers}},
  booktitle =	{29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)},
  pages =	{27:1--27:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-409-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{361},
  editor =	{Arusoaie, Andrei and Onica, Emanuel and Spear, Michael and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.27},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-252000},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.27},
  annote =	{Keywords: Rollups, Trusted Execution Environments, Censorship}
}
Document
Optimistic MEV in Ethereum Layer 2s: Why Blockspace Is Always in Demand

Authors: Ozan Solmaz, Lioba Heimbach, Yann Vonlanthen, and Roger Wattenhofer

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)


Abstract
Layer 2 rollups are rapidly absorbing DeFi activity, securing over $40 billion and accounting for nearly half of Ethereum’s DEX volume by Q1 2025, yet their MEV dynamics remain understudied. We address this gap by defining and quantifying optimistic MEV, a form of speculative, on-chain MEV whose detection and execution logic reside largely on-chain in smart contracts. As a result of their speculative nature and lack of off-chain opportunity verification, optimistic MEV transactions frequently decide not to execute any trades. In this work, we focus on cyclic arbitrage, which we find is predominantly executed as optimistic MEV on Layer 2s. Using our multi-stage identification pipeline on Arbitrum, Base, and Optimism, we show that in Q1 2025, transactions from cyclic arbitrage contracts account for over 50% of on-chain gas on Base and Optimism and 7% on Arbitrum, driven mainly by "interaction" probes (on-chain computations searching for arbitrage). This speculative probing indicates that cyclic arbitrage on Layer 2s is predominantly executed as optimistic MEV and contributes to generally keeping blocks on Base and Optimism persistently full. Despite consuming over half of on-chain gas, these optimistic MEV transactions pay less than one quarter of total gas fees. Cross-network comparison reveals divergent success rates, differing patterns of code reuse, and sensitivity to varying sequencer ordering and block production times. Finally, OLS regressions link optimistic MEV trade count to ETH volatility, retail trading activity, and DEX aggregator usage. Together, these findings show that optimistic MEV has become a major source of persistent spam-like transaction activity on Layer 2s, dominating blockspace with low-value probes and reshaping the composition of on-chain activity.

Cite as

Ozan Solmaz, Lioba Heimbach, Yann Vonlanthen, and Roger Wattenhofer. Optimistic MEV in Ethereum Layer 2s: Why Blockspace Is Always in Demand. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 28:1-28:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


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@InProceedings{solmaz_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.28,
  author =	{Solmaz, Ozan and Heimbach, Lioba and Vonlanthen, Yann and Wattenhofer, Roger},
  title =	{{Optimistic MEV in Ethereum Layer 2s: Why Blockspace Is Always in Demand}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{28:1--28:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.28},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247479},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.28},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, MEV, Layer 2, Ethereum}
}
Document
Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest

Authors: Fei Wu, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Mallesh Pai

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)


Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics and dynamics behind arbitrages between centralized and decentralized exchanges (CEX-DEX) on Ethereum. We refine heuristics to identify arbitrage transactions from on-chain data and introduce a robust empirical framework to estimate arbitrage revenue without knowing traders' actual behaviors on CEX. Leveraging an extensive dataset spanning 19 months from August 2023 to March 2025, we estimate a total of 233.8M USD extracted by 19 major CEX-DEX searchers from 7,203,560 identified CEX-DEX arbitrages. Our analysis reveals increasing centralization trends as three searchers captured three-quarters of both volume and extracted value. We also demonstrate that searchers' profitability is tied to their integration level with block builders and uncover exclusive searcher-builder relationships and their market impact. Finally, we correct the previously underestimated profitability of block builders who vertically integrate with a searcher. These insights illuminate the darkest corner of the MEV landscape and highlight the critical implications for Ethereum’s decentralization.

Cite as

Fei Wu, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Mallesh Pai. Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 26:1-26:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


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@InProceedings{wu_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26,
  author =	{Wu, Fei and Sui, Danning and Thiery, Thomas and Pai, Mallesh},
  title =	{{Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{26:1--26:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247450},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26},
  annote =	{Keywords: Decentralized Finance, Maximal Extractable Value, CEX-DEX arbitrages}
}
Document
Selfish Mining Under General Stochastic Rewards

Authors: Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, and S. Matthew Weinberg

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)


Abstract
Selfish miners selectively withhold blocks to earn disproportionately high revenue. The vast majority of the selfish mining literature focuses exclusively on block rewards. [Carlsten et al., 2016] is a notable exception, observing that similar strategic behavior is profitable in a zero-block-reward regime (the endgame for Bitcoin’s quadrennial halving schedule) if miners are compensated with transaction fees alone. Neither model fully captures miner incentives today. The block reward remains 3.125 BTC, yet some blocks yield significantly higher revenue. For example, congestion during the launch of the Babylon protocol in August 2024 caused transaction fees to spike from 0.14 BTC to 9.52 BTC, a 68× increase in fees within two blocks. Our results are both practical and theoretical. Of practical interest, we study selfish mining profitability under a combined reward function that more accurately models miner incentives. This analysis enables us to make quantitative claims about protocol risk (e.g., the mining power at which a selfish strategy becomes profitable is reduced by 22% when optimizing over the combined reward function versus block rewards alone) and qualitative observations (e.g., a miner considering both block rewards and transaction fees will mine more or less aggressively respectively than if they cared about either alone). These practical results follow from our novel model and methodology, which constitute our theoretical contributions. We model general, time-accruing stochastic rewards in the Nakamoto Consensus Game, which requires explicit treatment of difficult adjustment and randomness; we characterize reward function structure through a set of properties (e.g., that rewards accrue only as a function of time since the parent block). We present a new methodology to analytically calculate expected selfish miner rewards under a broad class of stochastic reward functions and validate our method numerically by comparing it with the existing literature and simulating the combined reward sources directly.

Cite as

Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Selfish Mining Under General Stochastic Rewards. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 20:1-20:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


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@InProceedings{bahrani_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.20,
  author =	{Bahrani, Maryam and Neuder, Michael and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  title =	{{Selfish Mining Under General Stochastic Rewards}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{20:1--20:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247396},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: Proof-of-Work, Selfish Mining, MEV}
}
Document
Barendregt’s Theory of the λ-Calculus, Refreshed and Formalized

Authors: Adrienne Lancelot, Beniamino Accattoli, and Maxime Vemclefs

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 352, 16th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2025)


Abstract
Barendregt’s book on the untyped λ-calculus refines the inconsistent view of β-divergence as representation of the undefined via the key concept of head reduction. In this paper, we put together recent revisitations of some key theorems laid out in Barendregt’s book, and we formalize them in the Abella proof assistant. Our work provides a compact and refreshed presentation of the core of the book. The formalization faithfully mimics pen-and-paper proofs. Two interesting aspects are the manipulation of contexts for the study of contextual equivalence and a formal alternative to the informal trick at work in Takahashi’s proof of the genericity lemma. As a by-product, we obtain an alternative definition of contextual equivalence that does not mention contexts.

Cite as

Adrienne Lancelot, Beniamino Accattoli, and Maxime Vemclefs. Barendregt’s Theory of the λ-Calculus, Refreshed and Formalized. In 16th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 352, pp. 13:1-13:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


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@InProceedings{lancelot_et_al:LIPIcs.ITP.2025.13,
  author =	{Lancelot, Adrienne and Accattoli, Beniamino and Vemclefs, Maxime},
  title =	{{Barendregt’s Theory of the \lambda-Calculus, Refreshed and Formalized}},
  booktitle =	{16th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2025)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-396-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{352},
  editor =	{Forster, Yannick and Keller, Chantal},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2025.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-246114},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2025.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: lambda-calculus, head reduction, equational theory}
}
Document
Certified Implementability of Global Multiparty Protocols

Authors: Elaine Li and Thomas Wies

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 352, 16th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2025)


Abstract
Implementability is the decision problem at the heart of top-down approaches to protocol verification. In this paper, we present a mechanization of a recently proposed precise implementability characterization by Li et al. for a large class of protocols that subsumes many existing formalisms in the literature. Our protocols and implementations model asynchronous commmunication, and can exhibit infinite behavior. We improve upon their pen-and-paper results by unifying distinct formalisms, simplifying existing proof arguments, elaborating on the construction of canonical implementations, and even uncovering a subtle bug in the semantics for infinite words. As a corollary of our mechanization, we show that the original characterization of implementability applies even to protocols with infinitely many participants. We also contribute a reusable library for reasoning about generic communicating state machines. Our mechanization consists of about 15k lines of Rocq code. We believe that our mechanization can provide the foundation for deductively proving the implementability of protocols beyond the reach of prior work, extracting certified implementations for finite protocols, and investigating implementability under alternative asynchronous communication models.

Cite as

Elaine Li and Thomas Wies. Certified Implementability of Global Multiparty Protocols. In 16th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 352, pp. 15:1-15:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


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@InProceedings{li_et_al:LIPIcs.ITP.2025.15,
  author =	{Li, Elaine and Wies, Thomas},
  title =	{{Certified Implementability of Global Multiparty Protocols}},
  booktitle =	{16th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2025)},
  pages =	{15:1--15:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-396-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{352},
  editor =	{Forster, Yannick and Keller, Chantal},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2025.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-246139},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2025.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Asynchronous protocols, communicating state machines, labeled transition systems, infinite semantics, realizability, multiparty session types, choreographies, deadlock freedom}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
Improved Approximation Algorithms for Three-Dimensional Bin Packing

Authors: Debajyoti Kar, Arindam Khan, and Malin Rau

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)


Abstract
We study three fundamental three-dimensional (3D) geometric packing problems: 3D (Geometric) Bin Packing (3D-BP), 3D Strip Packing (3D-SP), and Minimum Volume Bounding Box (3D-MVBB), where given a set of 3D (rectangular) cuboids, the goal is to find an axis-aligned nonoverlapping packing of all cuboids. In 3D-BP, we need to pack the given cuboids into the minimum number of unit cube bins. In 3D-SP, we need to pack them into a 3D cuboid with a unit square base and minimum height. Finally, in 3D-MVBB, the goal is to pack into a cuboid box of minimum volume. It is NP-hard to even decide whether a set of rectangles can be packed into a unit square bin - giving an (absolute) approximation hardness of 2 for 3D-BP and 3D-SP. The previous best (absolute) approximation for all three problems is by Li and Cheng (SICOMP, 1990), who gave algorithms with approximation ratios of 13, 46/7, and 46/7+ε, respectively, for 3D-BP, 3D-SP, and 3D-MVBB. We provide improved approximation ratios of 6, 6, and 3+ε, respectively, for the three problems, for any constant ε > 0. For 3D-BP, in the asymptotic regime, Bansal, Correa, Kenyon, and Sviridenko (Math. Oper. Res., 2006) showed that there is no asymptotic polynomial-time approximation scheme (APTAS) even when all items have the same height. Caprara (Math. Oper. Res., 2008) gave an asymptotic approximation ratio of T_{∞}² + ε ≈ 2.86, where T_{∞} is the well-known Harmonic constant in Bin Packing. We provide an algorithm with an improved asymptotic approximation ratio of 3 T_{∞}/2 + ε ≈ 2.54. Further, we show that unlike 3D-BP (and 3D-SP), 3D-MVBB admits an APTAS.

Cite as

Debajyoti Kar, Arindam Khan, and Malin Rau. Improved Approximation Algorithms for Three-Dimensional Bin Packing. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 104:1-104:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


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@InProceedings{kar_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.104,
  author =	{Kar, Debajyoti and Khan, Arindam and Rau, Malin},
  title =	{{Improved Approximation Algorithms for Three-Dimensional Bin Packing}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{104:1--104:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.104},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234814},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.104},
  annote =	{Keywords: Approximation Algorithms, Geometric Packing, Multidimensional Packing}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
Algorithms for the Diverse-k-SAT Problem: The Geometry of Satisfying Assignments

Authors: Per Austrin, Ioana O. Bercea, Mayank Goswami, Nutan Limaye, and Adarsh Srinivasan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)


Abstract
Given a k-CNF formula and an integer s ≥ 2, we study algorithms that obtain s solutions to the formula that are as dispersed as possible. For s = 2, this problem of computing the diameter of a k-CNF formula was initiated by Creszenzi and Rossi, who showed strong hardness results even for k = 2. The current best upper bound [Angelsmark and Thapper '04] goes to 4ⁿ as k → ∞. As our first result, we show that this quadratic blow up is not necessary by utilizing the Fast-Fourier transform (FFT) to give a O^*(2ⁿ) time exact algorithm for computing the diameter of any k-CNF formula. For s > 2, the problem was raised in the SAT community (Nadel '11) and several heuristics have been proposed for it, but no algorithms with theoretical guarantees are known. We give exact algorithms using FFT and clique-finding that run in O^*(2^{(s-1)n}) and O^*(s² |Ω_{𝐅}|^{ω ⌈ s/3 ⌉}) respectively, where |Ω_{𝐅}| is the size of the solutions space of the formula 𝐅 and ω is the matrix multiplication exponent. However, current SAT algorithms for finding one solution run in time O^*(2^{ε_{k}n}) for ε_{k} ≈ 1-Θ(1/k), which is much faster than all above run times. As our main result, we analyze two popular SAT algorithms - PPZ (Paturi, Pudlák, Zane '97) and Schöning’s ('02) algorithms, and show that in time poly(s)O^*(2^{ε_{k}n}), they can be used to approximate diameter as well as the dispersion (s > 2) problem. While we need to modify Schöning’s original algorithm for technical reasons, we show that the PPZ algorithm, without any modification, samples solutions in a geometric sense. We believe this geometric sampling property of PPZ may be of independent interest. Finally, we focus on diverse solutions to NP-complete optimization problems, and give bi-approximations running in time poly(s)O^*(2^{ε n}) with ε < 1 for several problems such as Maximum Independent Set, Minimum Vertex Cover, Minimum Hitting Set, Feedback Vertex Set, Multicut on Trees and Interval Vertex Deletion. For all of these problems, all existing exact methods for finding optimal diverse solutions have a runtime with at least an exponential dependence on the number of solutions s. Our methods show that by relaxing to bi-approximations, this dependence on s can be made polynomial.

Cite as

Per Austrin, Ioana O. Bercea, Mayank Goswami, Nutan Limaye, and Adarsh Srinivasan. Algorithms for the Diverse-k-SAT Problem: The Geometry of Satisfying Assignments. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 14:1-14:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


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@InProceedings{austrin_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.14,
  author =	{Austrin, Per and Bercea, Ioana O. and Goswami, Mayank and Limaye, Nutan and Srinivasan, Adarsh},
  title =	{{Algorithms for the Diverse-k-SAT Problem: The Geometry of Satisfying Assignments}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-233916},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Exponential time algorithms, Satisfiability, k-SAT, PPZ, Sch\"{o}ning, Dispersion, Diversity}
}
Document
Ensuring Convergence and Invariants Without Coordination

Authors: Dina Borrego, Nuno Preguiça, Elisa Gonzalez Boix, and Carla Ferreira

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 333, 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)


Abstract
The CAP theorem demonstrates a trade-off between consistency and availability (and, by extension, latency) in systems where network partitions are unavoidable, such as in cloud computing and local-first software. While adopting weak consistency can preserve availability, it may result in inconsistencies that compromise application correctness. Replicated data types provide a principled, coordination-free approach to guarantee convergence but do not consider application invariants. Existing methods for maintaining invariants in replicated systems either rely on coordination - undermining the benefits of weak consistency - or suffer from limited applicability. This paper introduces the No-Op framework, a generic approach for enforcing consistency without coordination while guaranteeing both convergence and invariant preservation. The core idea of the No-Op approach is to resolve conflicts among concurrent operations by prioritising one operation over the other according to programmer-defined conflict resolution policies. This prioritisation transforms the less-preferred operation into a no-side-effect operation, ensuring conflict-free execution. We formalise the model underlying the No-Op framework and introduce a replication protocol built upon it, accompanied by a formal proof of correctness for both the framework and the protocol. Furthermore, we demonstrate the framework’s applicability by showcasing the design of widely used replicated data types and the preservation of a wide range of application invariants.

Cite as

Dina Borrego, Nuno Preguiça, Elisa Gonzalez Boix, and Carla Ferreira. Ensuring Convergence and Invariants Without Coordination. In 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 333, pp. 4:1-4:29, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


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@InProceedings{borrego_et_al:LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.4,
  author =	{Borrego, Dina and Pregui\c{c}a, Nuno and Gonzalez Boix, Elisa and Ferreira, Carla},
  title =	{{Ensuring Convergence and Invariants Without Coordination}},
  booktitle =	{39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:29},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-373-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{333},
  editor =	{Aldrich, Jonathan and Silva, Alexandra},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-232978},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: distributed systems, conflict resolution, RDTs, invariant preservation}
}
Document
Automatic Goal Clone Detection in Rocq

Authors: Ali Ghanbari

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 333, 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)


Abstract
Proof engineering in Rocq is a labor-intensive process, and as proof developments grow in size, redundancy and maintainability become challenges. One such redundancy is goal cloning, i.e., proving α-equivalent goals multiple times, leading to wasted effort and bloated proof scripts. In this paper, we introduce clone-finder, a novel technique for detecting goal clones in Rocq proofs. By leveraging the formal notion of α-equivalence for Gallina terms, clone-finder systematically identifies duplicated proof goals across large Rocq codebases. We evaluate clone-finder on 40 real-world Rocq projects from the CoqGym dataset. Our results reveal that each project contains an average of 27.73 instances of goal clone. We observed that the clones can be categorized as either exact goal duplication, generalization, or α-equivalent goals with different proofs, each signifying varying levels duplicate effort. Our findings highlight significant untapped potential for proof reuse in Rocq-based formal verification projects, paving the way for future improvements in automated proof engineering.

Cite as

Ali Ghanbari. Automatic Goal Clone Detection in Rocq. In 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 333, pp. 12:1-12:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)


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@InProceedings{ghanbari:LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.12,
  author =	{Ghanbari, Ali},
  title =	{{Automatic Goal Clone Detection in Rocq}},
  booktitle =	{39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-373-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{333},
  editor =	{Aldrich, Jonathan and Silva, Alexandra},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-233055},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Clone Detection, Goal, Proof, Rocq, Gallina}
}
Document
Unified Multimedia Segmentation - A Comprehensive Model for URI-based Media Segment Representation

Authors: Jan Willi, Abraham Bernstein, and Luca Rossetto

Published in: TGDK, Volume 2, Issue 3 (2024). Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge, Volume 2, Issue 3


Abstract
In multimedia annotation, referencing specific segments of a document is often desired due to its richness and multimodality, but no universal representation for such references exists. This significantly hampers the usage of multimedia content in knowledge graphs, as it is modeled as one large atomic information container. Unstructured data - such as text, audio, images, and video - can commonly be decomposed into its constituent parts, as such documents rarely contain only one semantic concept. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that these advances will make it possible to decompose these previous atomic components into logical segments. To be processable by the knowledge graph stack, however, one needs to break the atomic nature of multimedia content, providing a mechanism to address media segments. This paper proposes a Unified Segmentation Model capable of depicting arbitrary segmentations on any media document type. The work begins with a formal analysis of multimedia and segmentation, exploring segmentation operations and how to describe them. Building on this analysis, it then develops a practical scheme for expressing segmentation in Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs). Given that this approach makes segments of multimedia content referencable, it breaks their atomic nature and makes them first-class citizens within knowledge graphs. The proposed model is implemented as a proof of concept in the MediaGraph Store, a multimedia knowledge graph storage and querying engine.

Cite as

Jan Willi, Abraham Bernstein, and Luca Rossetto. Unified Multimedia Segmentation - A Comprehensive Model for URI-based Media Segment Representation. In Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge (TGDK), Volume 2, Issue 3, pp. 1:1-1:34, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@Article{willi_et_al:TGDK.2.3.1,
  author =	{Willi, Jan and Bernstein, Abraham and Rossetto, Luca},
  title =	{{Unified Multimedia Segmentation - A Comprehensive Model for URI-based Media Segment Representation}},
  journal =	{Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge},
  pages =	{1:1--1:34},
  ISSN =	{2942-7517},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{2},
  number =	{3},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/TGDK.2.3.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-225953},
  doi =		{10.4230/TGDK.2.3.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Multimodal Knowledge Graphs, Multimedia Segmentation, Multimedia Representation}
}
Document
Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why?

Authors: Burak Öz, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Florian Matthes

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)


Abstract
The MEV-Boost block auction contributes approximately 90% of all Ethereum blocks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, only three builders produced 80% of them, highlighting the concentration of power within the block builder market. To foster competition and preserve Ethereum’s decentralized ethos and censorship resistance properties, understanding the dominant players' competitive edges is essential. In this paper, we identify features that play a significant role in builders' ability to win blocks and earn profits by conducting a comprehensive empirical analysis of MEV-Boost auctions over a six-month period. We reveal that block market share positively correlates with order flow diversity, while profitability correlates with access to order flow from Exclusive Providers, such as integrated searchers and external providers with exclusivity deals. Additionally, we show a positive correlation between market share and profit margin among the top ten builders, with features such as exclusive signal, non-atomic arbitrages, and Telegram bot flow strongly correlating with both metrics. This highlights a "chicken-and-egg" problem where builders need differentiated order flow to profit, but only receive such flow if they have a significant market share. Overall, this work provides an in-depth analysis of the key features driving the builder market towards centralization and offers valuable insights for designing further iterations of Ethereum block auctions, preserving Ethereum’s censorship resistance properties.

Cite as

Burak Öz, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Florian Matthes. Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why?. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 22:1-22:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{oz_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.22,
  author =	{\"{O}z, Burak and Sui, Danning and Thiery, Thomas and Matthes, Florian},
  title =	{{Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why?}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{22:1--22:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.22},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209589},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.22},
  annote =	{Keywords: Block Building Auction, Proposer-Builder Separation, Maximal Extractable Value}
}
Document
Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets

Authors: Theo Diamandis, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra, and Guillermo Angeris

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 282, 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)


Abstract
Public blockchains implement a fee mechanism to allocate scarce computational resources across competing transactions. Most existing fee market designs utilize a joint, fungible unit of account (e.g., gas in Ethereum) to price otherwise non-fungible resources such as bandwidth, computation, and storage, by hardcoding their relative prices. Fixing the relative price of each resource in this way inhibits granular price discovery, limiting scalability and opening up the possibility of denial-of-service attacks. As a result, many prominent networks such as Ethereum and Solana have proposed multidimensional fee markets. In this paper, we provide a principled way to design fee markets that efficiently price multiple non-fungible resources. Starting from a loss function specified by the network designer, we show how to dynamically compute prices that align the network’s incentives (to minimize the loss) with those of the users and miners (to maximize their welfare), even as demand for these resources changes. We derive an EIP-1559-like mechanism from first principles as an example. Our pricing mechanism follows from a natural decomposition of the network designer’s problem into two parts that are related to each other via the resource prices. These results can be used to efficiently set fees in order to improve network performance.

Cite as

Theo Diamandis, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra, and Guillermo Angeris. Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets. In 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 282, pp. 4:1-4:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)


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@InProceedings{diamandis_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2023.4,
  author =	{Diamandis, Theo and Evans, Alex and Chitra, Tarun and Angeris, Guillermo},
  title =	{{Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets}},
  booktitle =	{5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-303-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{282},
  editor =	{Bonneau, Joseph and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-191933},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchains, transaction fees, convex optimization, mechanism design}
}
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