5 Search Results for "Li, Ziqi"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.64
A Dynamic Piecewise-Linear Geometric Index with Worst-Case Guarantees

Authors: Emil Toftegaard Gæde, Ivor van der Hoog, Eva Rotenberg, and Tord Stordalen

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 351, 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)

Abstract
Indexing data is a fundamental problem in computer science. The input is a set S of n distinct integers from a universe 𝒰. Indexing queries take a value q ∈ 𝒰 and return the membership, predecessor or rank of q in S. A range query takes two values q, r ∈ 𝒰 and returns the set S ∩ [q,r]. Recently, various papers study a special case where the the input data behaves in an approximately piece-wise linear way. Given the sorted (rank,value) pairs, and given some constant ε, one wants to maintain a small number of axis-disjoint line-segments such that, for each rank, the value is within ± ε of the corresponding line-segment. Ferragina and Vinciguerra (VLDB 2020) observe that this geometric problem is useful for solving indexing problems, particularly when the number of line-segments is small compared to the size of the dataset. We study the dynamic version of this geometric problem. In the dynamic setting, inserting or deleting just one data point may cause up to three line-segments to be merged, or one line-segment to be split at most three-way. To determine and compute this, we use techniques from dynamic maintenance of convex hulls, and provide new algorithms with worst-case guarantees, including an O(log n) algorithm to compute a separating line between two non-intersecting convex hulls - an operation previously missing from the literature. We then use our fully-dynamic geometry-based subroutine in an indexing data structure, combining it with a natural hashing technique. The resulting indexing data structure has theoretically efficient worst-case guarantees in expectation. We compare its practical performance to the solution of Ferragina and Vinciguerra, which was shown to perform better in certain structured settings [Sun, Zhou, Li VLDB 2023]. Our empirical analysis shows that our solution supports more efficient range queries in the special case where the update sequence contains many deletions.
Cite as

Emil Toftegaard Gæde, Ivor van der Hoog, Eva Rotenberg, and Tord Stordalen. A Dynamic Piecewise-Linear Geometric Index with Worst-Case Guarantees. In 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 351, pp. 64:1-64:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{gaede_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2025.64,
  author =	{G{\ae}de, Emil Toftegaard and van der Hoog, Ivor and Rotenberg, Eva and Stordalen, Tord},
  title =	{{A Dynamic Piecewise-Linear Geometric Index with Worst-Case Guarantees}},
  booktitle =	{33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)},
  pages =	{64:1--64:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-395-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{351},
  editor =	{Benoit, Anne and Kaplan, Haim and Wild, Sebastian and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.64},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-245323},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.64},
  annote =	{Keywords: Algorithms Engineering, Data Structures, Indexing, Convex Hulls}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.6
Detecting Functionality-Specific Vulnerabilities via Retrieving Individual Functionality-Equivalent APIs in Open-Source Repositories

Authors: Tianyu Chen, Zeyu Wang, Lin Li, Ding Li, Zongyang Li, Xiaoning Chang, Pan Bian, Guangtai Liang, Qianxiang Wang, and Tao Xie

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 333, 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)

Abstract
Functionality-specific vulnerabilities, which mainly occur in Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) with specific functionalities, are crucial for software developers to detect and avoid. When detecting individual functionality-specific vulnerabilities, the existing two categories of approaches are ineffective because they consider only the API bodies and are unable to handle diverse implementations of functionality-equivalent APIs. To effectively detect functionality-specific vulnerabilities, we propose APISS, the first approach to utilize API doc strings and signatures instead of API bodies. APISS first retrieves functionality-equivalent APIs for APIs with existing vulnerabilities and then migrates Proof-of-Concepts (PoCs) of the existing vulnerabilities for newly detected vulnerable APIs. To retrieve functionality-equivalent APIs, we leverage a Large Language Model for API embedding to improve the accuracy and address the effectiveness and scalability issues suffered by the existing approaches. To migrate PoCs of the existing vulnerabilities for newly detected vulnerable APIs, we design a semi-automatic schema to substantially reduce manual costs. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation to empirically compare APISS with four state-of-the-art approaches of detecting vulnerabilities and two state-of-the-art approaches of retrieving functionality-equivalent APIs. The evaluation subjects include 180 widely used Java repositories using 10 existing vulnerabilities, along with their PoCs. The results show that APISS effectively retrieves functionality-equivalent APIs, achieving a Top-1 Accuracy of 0.81 while the best of the baselines under comparison achieves only 0.55. APISS is highly efficient: the manual costs are within 10 minutes per vulnerability and the end-to-end runtime overhead of testing one candidate API is less than 2 hours. APISS detects 179 new vulnerabilities and receives 60 new CVE IDs, bringing high value to security practice.
Cite as

Tianyu Chen, Zeyu Wang, Lin Li, Ding Li, Zongyang Li, Xiaoning Chang, Pan Bian, Guangtai Liang, Qianxiang Wang, and Tao Xie. Detecting Functionality-Specific Vulnerabilities via Retrieving Individual Functionality-Equivalent APIs in Open-Source Repositories. In 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 333, pp. 6:1-6:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{chen_et_al:LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.6,
  author =	{Chen, Tianyu and Wang, Zeyu and Li, Lin and Li, Ding and Li, Zongyang and Chang, Xiaoning and Bian, Pan and Liang, Guangtai and Wang, Qianxiang and Xie, Tao},
  title =	{{Detecting Functionality-Specific Vulnerabilities via Retrieving Individual Functionality-Equivalent APIs in Open-Source Repositories}},
  booktitle =	{39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-373-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{333},
  editor =	{Aldrich, Jonathan and Silva, Alexandra},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-232999},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Application Security, Vulnerability Detection, Large Language Model}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.39
Data Reconstruction: When You See It and When You Don't

Authors: Edith Cohen, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Shay Moran, Kobbi Nissim, Uri Stemmer, and Eliad Tsfadia

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
We revisit the fundamental question of formally defining what constitutes a reconstruction attack. While often clear from the context, our exploration reveals that a precise definition is much more nuanced than it appears, to the extent that a single all-encompassing definition may not exist. Thus, we employ a different strategy and aim to "sandwich" the concept of reconstruction attacks by addressing two complementing questions: (i) What conditions guarantee that a given system is protected against such attacks? (ii) Under what circumstances does a given attack clearly indicate that a system is not protected? More specifically, - We introduce a new definitional paradigm - Narcissus Resiliency - to formulate a security definition for protection against reconstruction attacks. This paradigm has a self-referential nature that enables it to circumvent shortcomings of previously studied notions of security. Furthermore, as a side-effect, we demonstrate that Narcissus resiliency captures as special cases multiple well-studied concepts including differential privacy and other security notions of one-way functions and encryption schemes. - We formulate a link between reconstruction attacks and Kolmogorov complexity. This allows us to put forward a criterion for evaluating when such attacks are convincingly successful.
Cite as

Edith Cohen, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Shay Moran, Kobbi Nissim, Uri Stemmer, and Eliad Tsfadia. Data Reconstruction: When You See It and When You Don't. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 39:1-39:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{cohen_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.39,
  author =	{Cohen, Edith and Kaplan, Haim and Mansour, Yishay and Moran, Shay and Nissim, Kobbi and Stemmer, Uri and Tsfadia, Eliad},
  title =	{{Data Reconstruction: When You See It and When You Don't}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{39:1--39:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.39},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-226674},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.39},
  annote =	{Keywords: differential privacy, reconstruction}
}
Document
Academic Track
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.SAIA.2024.12
A View on Vulnerabilites: The Security Challenges of XAI (Academic Track)

Authors: Elisabeth Pachl, Fabian Langer, Thora Markert, and Jeanette Miriam Lorenz

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 126, Symposium on Scaling AI Assessments (SAIA 2024)

Abstract
Modern deep learning methods have long been considered as black-boxes due to their opaque decision-making processes. Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), however, has turned the tables: it provides insight into how these models work, promoting transparency that is crucial for accountability. Yet, recent developments in adversarial machine learning have highlighted vulnerabilities in XAI methods, raising concerns about security, reliability and trustworthiness, particularly in sensitive areas like healthcare and autonomous systems. Awareness of the potential risks associated with XAI is needed as its adoption increases, driven in part by the need to enhance compliance to regulations. This survey provides a holistic perspective on the security and safety landscape surrounding XAI, categorizing research on adversarial attacks against XAI and the misuse of explainability to enhance attacks on AI systems, such as evasion and privacy breaches. Our contribution includes identifying current insecurities in XAI and outlining future research directions in adversarial XAI. This work serves as an accessible foundation and outlook to recognize potential research gaps and define future directions. It identifies data modalities, such as time-series or graph data, and XAI methods that have not been extensively investigated for vulnerabilities in current research.
Cite as

Elisabeth Pachl, Fabian Langer, Thora Markert, and Jeanette Miriam Lorenz. A View on Vulnerabilites: The Security Challenges of XAI (Academic Track). In Symposium on Scaling AI Assessments (SAIA 2024). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 126, pp. 12:1-12:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{pachl_et_al:OASIcs.SAIA.2024.12,
  author =	{Pachl, Elisabeth and Langer, Fabian and Markert, Thora and Lorenz, Jeanette Miriam},
  title =	{{A View on Vulnerabilites: The Security Challenges of XAI}},
  booktitle =	{Symposium on Scaling AI Assessments (SAIA 2024)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:23},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-357-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{126},
  editor =	{G\"{o}rge, Rebekka and Haedecke, Elena and Poretschkin, Maximilian and Schmitz, Anna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.SAIA.2024.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-227523},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.SAIA.2024.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Explainability, XAI, Transparency, Adversarial Machine Learning, Security, Vulnerabilities}
}
Document
Short Paper
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.GIScience.2023.86
A Comparison of Global and Local Statistical and Machine Learning Techniques in Estimating Flash Flood Susceptibility (Short Paper)

Authors: Jing Yao, Ziqi Li, Xiaoxiang Zhang, Changjun Liu, and Liliang Ren

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 277, 12th International Conference on Geographic Information Science (GIScience 2023)

Abstract
Flash floods, as a type of devastating natural disasters, can cause significant damage to infrastructure, agriculture, and people’s livelihoods. Mapping flash flood susceptibility has long been an effective measure to help with the development of flash flood risk reduction and management strategies. Recent studies have shown that machine learning (ML) techniques perform better than traditional statistical and process-based models in estimating flash flood susceptibility. However, a major limitation of standard ML models is that they ignore the local geographic context where flash floods occur. To address this limitation, we developed a local Geographically Weighted Random Forest (GWRF) model and compared its performance against other global and local statistical and ML alternatives using an empirical flash floods model of Jiangxi Province, China.
Cite as

Jing Yao, Ziqi Li, Xiaoxiang Zhang, Changjun Liu, and Liliang Ren. A Comparison of Global and Local Statistical and Machine Learning Techniques in Estimating Flash Flood Susceptibility (Short Paper). In 12th International Conference on Geographic Information Science (GIScience 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 277, pp. 86:1-86:6, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{yao_et_al:LIPIcs.GIScience.2023.86,
  author =	{Yao, Jing and Li, Ziqi and Zhang, Xiaoxiang and Liu, Changjun and Ren, Liliang},
  title =	{{A Comparison of Global and Local Statistical and Machine Learning Techniques in Estimating Flash Flood Susceptibility}},
  booktitle =	{12th International Conference on Geographic Information Science (GIScience 2023)},
  pages =	{86:1--86:6},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-288-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{277},
  editor =	{Beecham, Roger and Long, Jed A. and Smith, Dianna and Zhao, Qunshan and Wise, Sarah},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.GIScience.2023.86},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-189815},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.GIScience.2023.86},
  annote =	{Keywords: Machine Learning, Spatial Statistics, Flash floods, Susceptibility}
}
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