11 Search Results for "Manlove, David"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.21
Practically Feasible Proof Logging for Pseudo-Boolean Optimization

Authors: Wietze Koops, Daniel Le Berre, Magnus O. Myreen, Jakob Nordström, Andy Oertel, Yong Kiam Tan, and Marc Vinyals

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 340, 31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025)

Abstract
Certifying solvers have long been standard for decision problems in Boolean satisfiability (SAT), allowing for proof logging and checking with very limited overhead, but developing similar tools for combinatorial optimization has remained a challenge. A recent promising approach covering a wide range of solving paradigms is pseudo-Boolean proof logging, but this has mostly consisted of proof-of-concept works far from delivering the performance required for real-world deployment. In this work, we present an efficient toolchain based on VeriPB and CakePB for formally verified pseudo-Boolean optimization. We implement proof logging for the full range of techniques in the state-of-the-art solvers RoundingSat and Sat4j, including core-guided search and linear programming integration with Farkas certificates and cut generation. Our experimental evaluation shows that proof logging and checking performance in this much more expressive paradigm is now quite close to the level of SAT solving, and hence is clearly practically feasible.
Cite as

Wietze Koops, Daniel Le Berre, Magnus O. Myreen, Jakob Nordström, Andy Oertel, Yong Kiam Tan, and Marc Vinyals. Practically Feasible Proof Logging for Pseudo-Boolean Optimization. In 31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 340, pp. 21:1-21:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{koops_et_al:LIPIcs.CP.2025.21,
  author =	{Koops, Wietze and Le Berre, Daniel and Myreen, Magnus O. and Nordstr\"{o}m, Jakob and Oertel, Andy and Tan, Yong Kiam and Vinyals, Marc},
  title =	{{Practically Feasible Proof Logging for Pseudo-Boolean Optimization}},
  booktitle =	{31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-380-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{340},
  editor =	{de la Banda, Maria Garcia},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-238825},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: proof logging, certifying algorithms, combinatorial optimization, certification, pseudo-Boolean solving, 0-1 integer linear programming}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.45
Scarf’s Algorithm on Arborescence Hypergraphs

Authors: Karthekeyan Chandrasekaran, Yuri Faenza, Chengyue He, and Jay Sethuraman

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
Scarf’s algorithm - a pivoting procedure that finds a dominating extreme point in a down-monotone polytope - can be used to show the existence of a fractional stable matching in hypergraphs. The problem of finding a fractional stable matching in hypergraphs, however, is PPAD-complete. In this work, we study the behavior of Scarf’s algorithm on arborescence hypergraphs, the family of hypergraphs in which hyperedges correspond to the paths of an arborescence. For arborescence hypergraphs, we prove that Scarf’s algorithm can be implemented to find an integral stable matching in polynomial time. En route to our result, we uncover novel structural properties of bases and pivots for the more general family of network hypergraphs. Our work provides the first proof of polynomial-time convergence of Scarf’s algorithm on hypergraphic stable matching problems, giving hope to the possibility of polynomial-time convergence of Scarf’s algorithm for other families of polytopes.
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Karthekeyan Chandrasekaran, Yuri Faenza, Chengyue He, and Jay Sethuraman. Scarf’s Algorithm on Arborescence Hypergraphs. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 45:1-45:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{chandrasekaran_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.45,
  author =	{Chandrasekaran, Karthekeyan and Faenza, Yuri and He, Chengyue and Sethuraman, Jay},
  title =	{{Scarf’s Algorithm on Arborescence Hypergraphs}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{45:1--45:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.45},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234220},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.45},
  annote =	{Keywords: Scarf’s algorithm, Arborescence Hypergraphs, Stable Matchings}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.31
Stable Hypergraph Matching in Unimodular Hypergraphs

Authors: Péter Biró, Gergely Csáji, and Ildikó Schlotter

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
We study the NP-hard Stable Hypergraph Matching (SHM) problem and its generalization allowing capacities, the Stable Hypergraph b-Matching (SHbM) problem, and investigate their computational properties under various structural constraints. Our study is motivated by the fact that Scarf’s Lemma [Scarf, 1967] together with a result of Lovász [Lovász, 1972] guarantees the existence of a stable matching whenever the underlying hypergraph is normal. Furthermore, if the hypergraph is unimodular (i.e., its incidence matrix is totally unimodular), then even a stable b-matching is guaranteed to exist. However, no polynomial-time algorithm is known for finding a stable matching or b-matching in unimodular hypergraphs. We identify subclasses of unimodular hypergraphs where SHM and SHbM are tractable such as laminar hypergraphs or so-called subpath hypergraphs with bounded-size hyperedges; for the latter case, even a maximum-weight stable b-matching can be found efficiently. We complement our algorithms by showing that optimizing over stable matchings is NP-hard even in laminar hypergraphs. As a practically important special case of SHbM for unimodular hypergraphs, we investigate a tripartite stable matching problem with students, schools, and companies as agents, called the University Dual Admission problem, which models real-world scenarios in higher education admissions. Finally, we examine a superclass of subpath hypergraphs that are normal but not necessarily unimodular, namely subtree hypergraphs where hyperedges correspond to subtrees of a tree. We establish that for such hypergraphs, stable matchings can be found in polynomial time but, in the setting with capacities, finding a stable b-matching is NP-hard.
Cite as

Péter Biró, Gergely Csáji, and Ildikó Schlotter. Stable Hypergraph Matching in Unimodular Hypergraphs. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 31:1-31:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{biro_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.31,
  author =	{Bir\'{o}, P\'{e}ter and Cs\'{a}ji, Gergely and Schlotter, Ildik\'{o}},
  title =	{{Stable Hypergraph Matching in Unimodular Hypergraphs}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{31:1--31:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.31},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234086},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.31},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable hypergraph matching, Scarf’s Lemma, unimodular hypergraphs, university dual admission}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125
Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences

Authors: Aditya Potukuchi and Shikha Singh

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
Properties of stable matchings in the popular random-matching-market model have been studied for over 50 years. In a random matching market, each agent has complete preferences drawn uniformly and independently at random. Wilson (1972), Knuth (1976) and Pittel (1989) proved that in balanced random matching markets, the proposers are matched to their ln nth choice on average. In this paper, we consider competitive markets with n jobs and n+k candidates, and partial lists where each agent only ranks their top d choices. Despite the long history of the problem, the following fundamental question remains unanswered for these generalized markets: what is the tight threshold on list length d that results in a perfect stable matching with high probability? In this paper, we answer this question exactly - we prove a sharp threshold d₀ = ln n ⋅ ln (n+k)/(k+1) on the existence of perfect stable matchings when k = o(n). That is, we show that if d < (1-ε) d₀, then no stable matching matches all jobs; moreover, if d > (1+ ε) d₀, then all jobs are matched in every stable matching with high probability. This bound improves and generalizes recent results by Kanoria, Min and Qian (2021). Furthermore, we extend the line of work studying the effect of imbalance on the expected rank of the proposers (termed the "stark effect of competition"). We establish the regime in unbalanced markets that forces this stark effect to take shape in markets with partial preferences.
Cite as

Aditya Potukuchi and Shikha Singh. Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 125:1-125:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{potukuchi_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125,
  author =	{Potukuchi, Aditya and Singh, Shikha},
  title =	{{Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{125:1--125:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-235025},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matching, probabilistic method, Gale-Shapley algorithm}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.36
MaxMin Separation Problems: FPT Algorithms for st-Separator and Odd Cycle Transversal

Authors: Ajinkya Gaikwad, Hitendra Kumar, Soumen Maity, Saket Saurabh, and Roohani Sharma

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 327, 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)

Abstract
In this paper, we study the parameterized complexity of the MaxMin versions of two fundamental separation problems: Maximum Minimal st-Separator and Maximum Minimal Odd Cycle Transversal (OCT), both parameterized by the solution size. In the Maximum Minimal st-Separator problem, given a graph G, two distinct vertices s and t and a positive integer k, the goal is to determine whether there exists a minimal st-separator in G of size at least k. Similarly, the Maximum Minimal OCT problem seeks to determine if there exists a minimal set of vertices whose deletion results in a bipartite graph, and whose size is at least k. We demonstrate that both problems are fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by k. Our FPT algorithm for Maximum Minimal st-Separator answers the open question by Hanaka, Bodlaender, van der Zanden & Ono [TCS 2019]. One unique insight from this work is the following. We use the meta-result of Lokshtanov, Ramanujan, Saurabh & Zehavi [ICALP 2018] that enables us to reduce our problems to highly unbreakable graphs. This is interesting, as an explicit use of the recursive understanding and randomized contractions framework of Chitnis, Cygan, Hajiaghayi, Pilipczuk & Pilipczuk [SICOMP 2016] to reduce to the highly unbreakable graphs setting (which is the result that Lokshtanov et al. tries to abstract out in their meta-theorem) does not seem obvious because certain "extension" variants of our problems are W[1]-hard.
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Ajinkya Gaikwad, Hitendra Kumar, Soumen Maity, Saket Saurabh, and Roohani Sharma. MaxMin Separation Problems: FPT Algorithms for st-Separator and Odd Cycle Transversal. In 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 327, pp. 36:1-36:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{gaikwad_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2025.36,
  author =	{Gaikwad, Ajinkya and Kumar, Hitendra and Maity, Soumen and Saurabh, Saket and Sharma, Roohani},
  title =	{{MaxMin Separation Problems: FPT Algorithms for st-Separator and Odd Cycle Transversal}},
  booktitle =	{42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)},
  pages =	{36:1--36:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-365-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{327},
  editor =	{Beyersdorff, Olaf and Pilipczuk, Micha{\l} and Pimentel, Elaine and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.36},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-228622},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.36},
  annote =	{Keywords: Parameterized Complexity, FPT, MaxMin problems, Maximum Minimal st-separator, Maximum Minimal Odd Cycle Transversal, Unbreakable Graphs, CMSO, Long Induced Odd Cycles, Sunflower Lemma}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30
Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences

Authors: Juho Hirvonen and Sara Ranjbaran

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 324, 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)

Abstract
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair of agents prefer each other over their current matches. The deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley solves this problem in polynomial time. Further, it is a mechanism: the proposing side in the algorithm is always incentivised to report their preferences truthfully. The deferred acceptance algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm (and thus a distributed mechanism). However, the algorithm is slow in the worst case and it is known that the stable matching problem cannot be solved efficiently in the distributed setting. In this work we study a natural special case of the stable matching problem where all agents on one of the two sides share common preferences. We show that in this case the deferred acceptance algorithm does yield a fast and truthful distributed mechanism for finding a stable matching. We show how algorithms for sampling random colorings can be used to break ties fairly and extend the results to fractional stable matching.
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Juho Hirvonen and Sara Ranjbaran. Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences. In 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 324, pp. 30:1-30:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{hirvonen_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30,
  author =	{Hirvonen, Juho and Ranjbaran, Sara},
  title =	{{Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)},
  pages =	{30:1--30:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-360-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{324},
  editor =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-225666},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matching, deferred acceptance, local algorithm, mechanism design}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2022.36
Multi-Dimensional Stable Roommates in 2-Dimensional Euclidean Space

Authors: Jiehua Chen and Sanjukta Roy

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 244, 30th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2022)

Abstract
We investigate the Euclidean 𝖽-Dimensional Stable Roommates problem, which asks whether a given set V of 𝖽⋅ n points from the 2-dimensional Euclidean space can be partitioned into n disjoint (unordered) subsets Π = {V₁,…,V_{n}} with |V_i| = 𝖽 for each V_i ∈ Π such that Π is {stable}. Here, {stability} means that no point subset W ⊆ V is blocking Π, and W is said to be {blocking} Π if |W| = 𝖽 such that ∑_{w' ∈ W}δ(w,w') < ∑_{v ∈ Π(w)}δ(w,v) holds for each point w ∈ W, where Π(w) denotes the subset V_i ∈ Π which contains w and δ(a,b) denotes the Euclidean distance between points a and b. Complementing the existing known polynomial-time result for 𝖽 = 2, we show that such polynomial-time algorithms cannot exist for any fixed number 𝖽 ≥ 3 unless P=NP. Our result for 𝖽 = 3 answers a decade-long open question in the theory of Stable Matching and Hedonic Games [Iwama et al., 2007; Arkin et al., 2009; Vladimir G. Deineko and Gerhard J. Woeginger, 2013; Vladimir G. Deineko and Gerhard J. Woeginger, 2013; David F. Manlove, 2013].
Cite as

Jiehua Chen and Sanjukta Roy. Multi-Dimensional Stable Roommates in 2-Dimensional Euclidean Space. In 30th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 244, pp. 36:1-36:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{chen_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2022.36,
  author =	{Chen, Jiehua and Roy, Sanjukta},
  title =	{{Multi-Dimensional Stable Roommates in 2-Dimensional Euclidean Space}},
  booktitle =	{30th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2022)},
  pages =	{36:1--36:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-247-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{244},
  editor =	{Chechik, Shiri and Navarro, Gonzalo and Rotenberg, Eva and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2022.36},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-169741},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2022.36},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matchings, multidimensional stable roommates, Euclidean preferences, coalition formation games, stable cores, NP-hardness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2020.19
An Algorithm for the Exact Treedepth Problem

Authors: James Trimble

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 160, 18th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2020)

Abstract
We present a novel algorithm for the minimum-depth elimination tree problem, which is equivalent to the optimal treedepth decomposition problem. Our algorithm makes use of two cheaply-computed lower bound functions to prune the search tree, along with symmetry-breaking and domination rules. We present an empirical study showing that the algorithm outperforms the current state-of-the-art solver (which is based on a SAT encoding) by orders of magnitude on a range of graph classes.
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James Trimble. An Algorithm for the Exact Treedepth Problem. In 18th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 160, pp. 19:1-19:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{trimble:LIPIcs.SEA.2020.19,
  author =	{Trimble, James},
  title =	{{An Algorithm for the Exact Treedepth Problem}},
  booktitle =	{18th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2020)},
  pages =	{19:1--19:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-148-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{160},
  editor =	{Faro, Simone and Cantone, Domenico},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2020.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-120938},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2020.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: Treedepth, Elimination Tree, Graph Algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2020.20
Algorithms for New Types of Fair Stable Matchings

Authors: Frances Cooper and David Manlove

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 160, 18th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2020)

Abstract
We study the problem of finding "fair" stable matchings in the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI). For an instance I of SMI there may be many stable matchings, providing significantly different outcomes for the sets of men and women. We introduce two new notions of fairness in SMI. Firstly, a regret-equal stable matching minimises the difference in ranks of a worst-off man and a worst-off woman, among all stable matchings. Secondly, a min-regret sum stable matching minimises the sum of ranks of a worst-off man and a worst-off woman, among all stable matchings. We present two new efficient algorithms to find stable matchings of these types. Firstly, the Regret-Equal Degree Iteration Algorithm finds a regret-equal stable matching in O(d₀ nm) time, where d₀ is the absolute difference in ranks between a worst-off man and a worst-off woman in the man-optimal stable matching, n is the number of men or women, and m is the total length of all preference lists. Secondly, the Min-Regret Sum Algorithm finds a min-regret sum stable matching in O(d_s m) time, where d_s is the difference in the ranks between a worst-off man in each of the woman-optimal and man-optimal stable matchings. Experiments to compare several types of fair optimal stable matchings were conducted and show that the Regret-Equal Degree Iteration Algorithm produces matchings that are competitive with respect to other fairness objectives. On the other hand, existing types of "fair" stable matchings did not provide as close an approximation to regret-equal stable matchings.
Cite as

Frances Cooper and David Manlove. Algorithms for New Types of Fair Stable Matchings. In 18th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 160, pp. 20:1-20:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{cooper_et_al:LIPIcs.SEA.2020.20,
  author =	{Cooper, Frances and Manlove, David},
  title =	{{Algorithms for New Types of Fair Stable Matchings}},
  booktitle =	{18th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2020)},
  pages =	{20:1--20:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-148-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{160},
  editor =	{Faro, Simone and Cantone, Domenico},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2020.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-120945},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2020.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: Stable marriage, Algorithms, Optimality, Fair stable matchings, Regret-equality, Min-regret sum}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2019.21
Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem

Authors: Ágnes Cseh and Attila Juhos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 126, 36th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2019)

Abstract
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to declare a draw or even withdraw from such a comparison. This freedom is then gradually restricted as we specify six stages of orderedness in the preferences, ending with the classical case of strictly ordered lists. We study all cases occurring when combining the three known notions of stability - weak, strong and super-stability - under the assumption that each side of the bipartite market obtains one of the six degrees of orderedness. By designing three polynomial algorithms and two NP-completeness proofs we determine the complexity of all cases not yet known, and thus give an exact boundary in terms of preference structure between tractable and intractable cases.
Cite as

Ágnes Cseh and Attila Juhos. Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem. In 36th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 126, pp. 21:1-21:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{cseh_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2019.21,
  author =	{Cseh, \'{A}gnes and Juhos, Attila},
  title =	{{Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2019)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-100-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{126},
  editor =	{Niedermeier, Rolf and Paul, Christophe},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2019.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-102603},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2019.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable marriage, intransitivity, acyclic preferences, poset, weakly stable matching, strongly stable matching, super stable matching}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2018.8
A 3/2-Approximation Algorithm for the Student-Project Allocation Problem

Authors: Frances Cooper and David Manlove

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 103, 17th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2018)

Abstract
The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S) comprises three sets of agents, namely students, projects and lecturers, where students have preferences over projects and lecturers have preferences over students. In this scenario we seek a stable matching, that is, an assignment of students to projects such that there is no student and lecturer who have an incentive to deviate from their assignee/s. We study SPA-ST, the extension of SPA-S in which the preference lists of students and lecturers need not be strictly ordered, and may contain ties. In this scenario, stable matchings may be of different sizes, and it is known that MAX SPA-ST, the problem of finding a maximum stable matching in SPA-ST, is NP-hard. We present a linear-time 3/2-approximation algorithm for MAX SPA-ST and an Integer Programming (IP) model to solve MAX SPA-ST optimally. We compare the approximation algorithm with the IP model experimentally using randomly-generated data. We find that the performance of the approximation algorithm easily surpassed the 3/2 bound, constructing a stable matching within 92% of optimal in all cases, with the percentage being far higher for many instances.
Cite as

Frances Cooper and David Manlove. A 3/2-Approximation Algorithm for the Student-Project Allocation Problem. In 17th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 103, pp. 8:1-8:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{cooper_et_al:LIPIcs.SEA.2018.8,
  author =	{Cooper, Frances and Manlove, David},
  title =	{{A 3/2-Approximation Algorithm for the Student-Project Allocation Problem}},
  booktitle =	{17th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2018)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-070-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{103},
  editor =	{D'Angelo, Gianlorenzo},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2018.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-89439},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2018.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Matching problems, Approximation, Algorithms, Stability}
}
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