12 Search Results for "van den Bogaard, Marie"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31
Games with ω-Automatic Preference Relations

Authors: Véronique Bruyère, Christophe Grandmont, and Jean-François Raskin

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
This paper investigates Nash equilibria (NEs) in multi-player turn-based games on graphs, where player preferences are modeled as ω-automatic relations via deterministic parity automata. Unlike much of the existing literature, which focuses on specific reward functions, our results apply to any preference relation definable by an ω-automatic relation. We analyze the computational complexity of determining the existence of an NE (possibly under some constraints), verifying whether a given strategy profile forms an NE, and checking whether a specific outcome can be realized by an NE. When a (constrained) NE exists, we show that there always exists one with finite-memory strategies. Finally, we explore fundamental properties of ω-automatic relations and their implications in the existence of equilibria.
Cite as

Véronique Bruyère, Christophe Grandmont, and Jean-François Raskin. Games with ω-Automatic Preference Relations. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 31:1-31:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bruyere_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31,
  author =	{Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Grandmont, Christophe and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois},
  title =	{{Games with \omega-Automatic Preference Relations}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{31:1--31:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241381},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31},
  annote =	{Keywords: Games played on graphs, Nash equilibrium, \omega-automatic relations, \omega-recognizable relations, constrained Nash equilibria existence problem}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.30
Finding Equilibria: Simpler for Pessimists, Simplest for Optimists

Authors: Léonard Brice, Thomas A. Henzinger, and K. S. Thejaswini

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
We consider equilibria in multiplayer stochastic graph games with terminal-node rewards. In such games, Nash equilibria are defined assuming that each player seeks to maximise their expected payoff, ignoring their aversion or tolerance to risk. We therefore study risk-sensitive equilibria (RSEs), where the expected payoff is replaced by a risk measure. A classical risk measure in the literature is the entropic risk measure, where each player has a real valued parameter capturing their risk-averseness. We introduce the extreme risk measure, which corresponds to extreme cases of entropic risk measure, where players are either extreme optimists or extreme pessimists. Under extreme risk measure, every player is an extremist: an extreme optimist perceives their reward as the maximum payoff that can be achieved with positive probability, while an extreme pessimist expects the minimum payoff achievable with positive probability. We argue that the extreme risk measure, especially in multi-player graph based settings, is particularly relevant as they can model several real life instances such as interactions between secure systems and potential security threats, or distributed controls for safety critical systems. We prove that RSEs defined with the extreme risk measure are guaranteed to exist when all rewards are non-negative. Furthermore, we prove that the problem of deciding whether a given game contains an RSE that generates risk measures within specified intervals is decidable and NP-complete for our extreme risk measure, and even PTIME-complete when all players are extreme optimists, while that same problem is undecidable using the entropic risk measure or even the classical expected payoff. This establishes, to our knowledge, the first decidable fragment for equilibria in simple stochastic games without restrictions on strategy types or number of players.
Cite as

Léonard Brice, Thomas A. Henzinger, and K. S. Thejaswini. Finding Equilibria: Simpler for Pessimists, Simplest for Optimists. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 30:1-30:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{brice_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.30,
  author =	{Brice, L\'{e}onard and Henzinger, Thomas A. and Thejaswini, K. S.},
  title =	{{Finding Equilibria: Simpler for Pessimists, Simplest for Optimists}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{30:1--30:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.30},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241371},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.30},
  annote =	{Keywords: Nash equilibria, stochastic games, graph games, risk-sensitive equilibria}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.37
Prophecies All the Way: Game-Based Model-Checking for HyperQPTL Beyond ∀*∃*

Authors: Sarah Winter and Martin Zimmermann

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 348, 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)

Abstract
Model-checking HyperLTL, a temporal logic expressing properties of sets of traces with applications to information-flow based security and privacy, has a decidable, but TOWER-complete, model-checking problem. While the classical model-checking algorithm for full HyperLTL is automata-theoretic, more recently, a game-based alternative for the ∀*∃*-fragment has been presented. Here, we employ imperfect information-games to extend the game-based approach to full HyperQPTL, which features arbitrary quantifier prefixes and quantification over propositions and can express every ω-regular hyperproperty. As a byproduct of our game-based algorithm, we obtain finite-state implementations of Skolem functions via transducers with lookahead that explain satisfaction or violation of HyperQPTL properties.
Cite as

Sarah Winter and Martin Zimmermann. Prophecies All the Way: Game-Based Model-Checking for HyperQPTL Beyond ∀*∃*. In 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 348, pp. 37:1-37:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{winter_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.37,
  author =	{Winter, Sarah and Zimmermann, Martin},
  title =	{{Prophecies All the Way: Game-Based Model-Checking for HyperQPTL Beyond \forall*\exists*}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)},
  pages =	{37:1--37:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-389-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{348},
  editor =	{Bouyer, Patricia and van de Pol, Jaco},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.37},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-239872},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.37},
  annote =	{Keywords: HyperLTL, HyperQPTL, model-checking games, prophecies}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12
The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and ω-Regular Objectives

Authors: Véronique Bruyère, Jean-François Raskin, Alexis Reynouard, and Marie Van Den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 348, 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)

Abstract
This paper studies the rational synthesis problem for multi-player games played on graphs when rational players are following subgame perfect equilibria. In these games, one player, the system, declares his strategy upfront, and the other players, composing the environment, then rationally respond by playing strategies forming a subgame perfect equilibrium. We study the complexity of the rational synthesis problem when the players have ω-regular objectives encoded as parity objectives. Our algorithm is based on an encoding into a three-player game with imperfect information, showing that the problem is in 2ExpTime. When the number of environment players is fixed, the problem is in ExpTime and is NP- and coNP-hard. Moreover, for a fixed number of players and reachability objectives, we get a polynomial algorithm.
Cite as

Véronique Bruyère, Jean-François Raskin, Alexis Reynouard, and Marie Van Den Bogaard. The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and ω-Regular Objectives. In 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 348, pp. 12:1-12:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bruyere_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12,
  author =	{Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and Reynouard, Alexis and Van Den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and \omega-Regular Objectives}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-389-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{348},
  editor =	{Bouyer, Patricia and van de Pol, Jaco},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-239622},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: non-zero-sum games, subgame perfect equilibria, rational synthesis}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2025.23
Permissive Equilibria in Multiplayer Reachability Games

Authors: Aline Goeminne and Benjamin Monmege

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 326, 33rd EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2025)

Abstract
We study multi-strategies in multiplayer reachability games played on finite graphs. A multi-strategy prescribes a set of possible actions, instead of a single action as usual strategies: it represents a set of all strategies that are consistent with it. We aim for profiles of multi-strategies (a multi-strategy per player), where each profile of consistent strategies is a Nash equilibrium, or a subgame perfect equilibrium. The permissiveness of two multi-strategies can be compared with penalties, as already used in the two-player zero-sum setting by Bouyer, Duflot, Markey and Renault [Patricia Bouyer et al., 2009]. We show that we can decide the existence of a multi-strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium or a subgame perfect equilibrium, while satisfying some upper-bound constraints on the penalties in PSPACE, if the upper-bound penalties are given in unary. The same holds when we search for multi-strategies where certain players are asked to win in at least one play or in all plays.
Cite as

Aline Goeminne and Benjamin Monmege. Permissive Equilibria in Multiplayer Reachability Games. In 33rd EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 326, pp. 23:1-23:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{goeminne_et_al:LIPIcs.CSL.2025.23,
  author =	{Goeminne, Aline and Monmege, Benjamin},
  title =	{{Permissive Equilibria in Multiplayer Reachability Games}},
  booktitle =	{33rd EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2025)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-362-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{326},
  editor =	{Endrullis, J\"{o}rg and Schmitz, Sylvain},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2025.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-227801},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2025.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: multiplayer reachability games, penalties, permissive equilibria}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2023.26
Rational Verification for Nash and Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Graph Games

Authors: Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 272, 48th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2023)

Abstract
We study a natural problem about rational behaviors in multiplayer non-zero-sum sequential infinite duration games played on graphs: rational verification, that consists in deciding whether all the rational answers to a given strategy satisfy some specification. We give the complexities of that problem for two major concepts of rationality: Nash equilibria and subgame-perfect equilibria, and for three major classes of payoff functions: energy, discounted-sum, and mean-payoff.
Cite as

Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard. Rational Verification for Nash and Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Graph Games. In 48th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 272, pp. 26:1-26:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{brice_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2023.26,
  author =	{Brice, L\'{e}onard and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and van den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{Rational Verification for Nash and Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Graph Games}},
  booktitle =	{48th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2023)},
  pages =	{26:1--26:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-292-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{272},
  editor =	{Leroux, J\'{e}r\^{o}me and Lombardy, Sylvain and Peleg, David},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2023.26},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-185608},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2023.26},
  annote =	{Keywords: Games on graphs, Nash equilibria, subgame-perfect equilibria}
}
Document
Track B: Automata, Logic, Semantics, and Theory of Programming
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.116
The Complexity of SPEs in Mean-Payoff Games

Authors: Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 229, 49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022)

Abstract
We establish that the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) threshold problem for mean-payoff games is NP-complete. While the SPE threshold problem was recently shown to be decidable (in doubly exponential time) and NP-hard, its exact worst case complexity was left open.
Cite as

Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard. The Complexity of SPEs in Mean-Payoff Games. In 49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 229, pp. 116:1-116:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{brice_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.116,
  author =	{Brice, L\'{e}onard and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and van den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{The Complexity of SPEs in Mean-Payoff Games}},
  booktitle =	{49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022)},
  pages =	{116:1--116:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-235-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{229},
  editor =	{Boja\'{n}czyk, Miko{\l}aj and Merelli, Emanuela and Woodruff, David P.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.116},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-164574},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.116},
  annote =	{Keywords: Games on graphs, subgame-perfect equilibria, mean-payoff objectives}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2022.10
On the Complexity of SPEs in Parity Games

Authors: Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 216, 30th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2022)

Abstract
We study the complexity of problems related to subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) in infinite duration non zero-sum multiplayer games played on finite graphs with parity objectives. We present new complexity results that close gaps in the literature. Our techniques are based on a recent characterization of SPEs in prefix-independent games that is grounded on the notions of requirements and negotiation, and according to which the plays supported by SPEs are exactly the plays consistent with the requirement that is the least fixed point of the negotiation function. The new results are as follows. First, checking that a given requirement is a fixed point of the negotiation function is an NP-complete problem. Second, we show that the SPE constrained existence problem is NP-complete, this problem was previously known to be ExpTime-easy and NP-hard. Third, the SPE constrained existence problem is fixed-parameter tractable when the number of players and of colors are parameters. Fourth, deciding whether some requirement is the least fixed point of the negotiation function is complete for the second level of the Boolean hierarchy. Finally, the SPE-verification problem - that is, the problem of deciding whether there exists a play supported by a SPE that satisfies some LTL formula - is PSpace-complete, this problem was known to be ExpTime-easy and PSpace-hard.
Cite as

Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard. On the Complexity of SPEs in Parity Games. In 30th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 216, pp. 10:1-10:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{brice_et_al:LIPIcs.CSL.2022.10,
  author =	{Brice, L\'{e}onard and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and van den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{On the Complexity of SPEs in Parity Games}},
  booktitle =	{30th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2022)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-218-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{216},
  editor =	{Manea, Florin and Simpson, Alex},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2022.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-157306},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2022.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Games on graphs, subgame-perfect equilibria, parity objectives}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2021.8
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Mean-Payoff Games

Authors: Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 203, 32nd International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2021)

Abstract
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with the least fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we show that the negotiation function is piecewise linear, and can be analyzed using the linear algebraic tool box. As a corollary, we prove the decidability of the SPE constrained existence problem, whose status was left open in the literature.
Cite as

Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard. Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Mean-Payoff Games. In 32nd International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 203, pp. 8:1-8:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{brice_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2021.8,
  author =	{Brice, L\'{e}onard and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and van den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Mean-Payoff Games}},
  booktitle =	{32nd International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2021)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-203-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{203},
  editor =	{Haddad, Serge and Varacca, Daniele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2021.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-143854},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2021.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Games on graphs, subgame-perfect equilibria, mean-payoff objectives.}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2019.13
The Complexity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Reachability Games

Authors: Thomas Brihaye, Véronique Bruyère, Aline Goeminne, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 140, 30th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2019)

Abstract
We study multiplayer quantitative reachability games played on a finite directed graph, where the objective of each player is to reach his target set of vertices as quickly as possible. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), a refinement of NE well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. It is known that there always exists an SPE in quantitative reachability games and that the constrained existence problem is decidable. We here prove that this problem is PSPACE-complete. To obtain this result, we propose a new algorithm that iteratively builds a set of constraints characterizing the set of SPE outcomes in quantitative reachability games. This set of constraints is obtained by iterating an operator that reinforces the constraints up to obtaining a fixpoint. With this fixpoint, the set of SPE outcomes can be represented by a finite graph of size at most exponential. A careful inspection of the computation allows us to establish PSPACE membership.
Cite as

Thomas Brihaye, Véronique Bruyère, Aline Goeminne, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard. The Complexity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Reachability Games. In 30th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 140, pp. 13:1-13:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{brihaye_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2019.13,
  author =	{Brihaye, Thomas and Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Goeminne, Aline and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and van den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{The Complexity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Reachability Games}},
  booktitle =	{30th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2019)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-121-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{140},
  editor =	{Fokkink, Wan and van Glabbeek, Rob},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2019.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-109153},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2019.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: multiplayer non-zero-sum games played on graphs, quantitative reachability objectives, subgame perfect equilibria, constrained existence problem}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2018.10
Beyond Admissibility: Dominance Between Chains of Strategies

Authors: Nicolas Basset, Ismaël Jecker, Arno Pauly, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie Van den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 119, 27th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2018)

Abstract
Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing that any strategy is admissible or dominated by an admissible strategy. However, in games played on finite graphs with quantitative objectives (as used for reactive synthesis), this is not the case. We consider increasing chains of strategies instead to recover a satisfactory rationality notion based on dominance in such games. We start with some order-theoretic considerations establishing sufficient criteria for this to work. We then turn our attention to generalised safety/reachability games as a particular application. We propose the notion of maximal uniform chain as the desired dominance-based rationality concept in these games. Decidability of some fundamental questions about uniform chains is established.
Cite as

Nicolas Basset, Ismaël Jecker, Arno Pauly, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie Van den Bogaard. Beyond Admissibility: Dominance Between Chains of Strategies. In 27th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 119, pp. 10:1-10:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{basset_et_al:LIPIcs.CSL.2018.10,
  author =	{Basset, Nicolas and Jecker, Isma\"{e}l and Pauly, Arno and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and Van den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{Beyond Admissibility: Dominance Between Chains of Strategies}},
  booktitle =	{27th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2018)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-088-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{119},
  editor =	{Ghica, Dan R. and Jung, Achim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2018.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-96774},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2018.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: dominated strategies, admissible strategies, games played on finite graphs, reactive synthesis, reachability games, safety games, cofinal, order theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.307
Games with Delays - A Frankenstein Approach

Authors: Dietmar Berwanger and Marie van den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 45, 35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015)

Abstract
We investigate infinite games on finite graphs where the information flow is perturbed by non- deterministic signalling delays. It is known that such perturbations make synthesis problems virtually unsolvable, in the general case. On the classical model where signals are attached to states, tractable cases are rare and difficult to identify. In this paper, we propose a model where signals are detached from control states, and we identify a subclass on which equilibrium outcomes can be preserved, even if signals are delivered with a delay that is finitely bounded. To offset the perturbation, our solution procedure combines responses from a collection of virtual plays following an equilibrium strategy in the instant- signalling game to synthesise, in a Dr. Frankenstein manner, an equivalent equilibrium strategy for the delayed-signalling game.
Cite as

Dietmar Berwanger and Marie van den Bogaard. Games with Delays - A Frankenstein Approach. In 35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 45, pp. 307-319, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2015)

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@InProceedings{berwanger_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.307,
  author =	{Berwanger, Dietmar and van den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{Games with Delays - A Frankenstein Approach}},
  booktitle =	{35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015)},
  pages =	{307--319},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-97-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2015},
  volume =	{45},
  editor =	{Harsha, Prahladh and Ramalingam, G.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.307},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-56575},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.307},
  annote =	{Keywords: infinite games on graphs, imperfect information, delayed monitoring, distributed synthesis}
}
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