17 Search Results for "Manlove, David"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.WG.2026.2
Optimal b-Colourings and Fall Colourings in H-Free Graphs

Authors: Jungho Ahn, Tala Eagling-Vose, Felicia Lucke, David Manlove, Fabricio Mendoza Granada, and Daniël Paulusma

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 376, 52nd International Workshop on Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science (WG 2026)

Abstract
In a colouring of a graph, a vertex is b-chromatic if it is adjacent to a vertex of every other colour. We consider four well-studied colouring problems: b-Chromatic Number, Tight b-Chromatic Number, Fall Chromatic Number and Fall Achromatic Number, which fit into a framework based on whether every colour class has (i) at least one b-chromatic vertex, (ii) exactly one b-chromatic vertex, or (iii) all of its vertices being b-chromatic. By combining known and new results, we fully classify the computational complexity of b-Chromatic Number, Fall Chromatic Number and Fall Achromatic Number in H-free graphs. For Tight b-Chromatic Number in H-free graphs, we develop a general technique to determine new graphs H, for which the problem is polynomial-time solvable, and we also determine new graphs H, for which the problem is still NP-complete. We show, for the first time, the existence of a graph H such that in H-free graphs, b-Chromatic Number is NP-hard, while Tight b-Chromatic Number is polynomial-time solvable.
Cite as

Jungho Ahn, Tala Eagling-Vose, Felicia Lucke, David Manlove, Fabricio Mendoza Granada, and Daniël Paulusma. Optimal b-Colourings and Fall Colourings in H-Free Graphs. In 52nd International Workshop on Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science (WG 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 376, pp. 2:1-2:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{ahn_et_al:LIPIcs.WG.2026.2,
  author =	{Ahn, Jungho and Eagling-Vose, Tala and Lucke, Felicia and Manlove, David and Mendoza Granada, Fabricio and Paulusma, Dani\"{e}l},
  title =	{{Optimal b-Colourings and Fall Colourings in H-Free Graphs}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Workshop on Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science (WG 2026)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-430-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{376},
  editor =	{Goedgebeur, Jan and Rz\k{a}\.{z}ewski, Pawe{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.WG.2026.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-261685},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.WG.2026.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: b-chromatic number, tight graph, fall achromatic number, fall chromatic number, H-free graph}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagRep.15.8.29
Frontiers of Parameterized Algorithmics of Matching under Preferences (Dagstuhl Seminar 25342)

Authors: Jiehua Chen, Christine Cheng, David Manlove, Ildikó Schlotter, and Manuel Sorge

Published in: Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 15, Issue 8 (2026)

Abstract
This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 25342 "Frontiers of Parameterized Algorithmics of Matching under Preferences", held from August 17-22, 2025. The seminar brought together researchers from the Matching Under Preferences (MATCH-UP) and Parameterized Complexity Theory (PCT) communities to systematically apply parameterized techniques to computationally hard matching problems. The program included tutorials on parameterized algorithmics, surveys on MATCH-UP complexity and structure of stable matchings, contributed talks, and intensive working group sessions that explored fundamental open problems. This seminar represents the first focused effort to comprehensively map the parameterized complexity landscape of matching markets, establishing frameworks for ongoing collaboration between these communities. The report presents abstracts of talks, tutorials, working groups, and open problems in alphabetical order by speaker.
Cite as

Jiehua Chen, Christine Cheng, David Manlove, Ildikó Schlotter, and Manuel Sorge. Frontiers of Parameterized Algorithmics of Matching under Preferences (Dagstuhl Seminar 25342). In Dagstuhl Reports, Volume 15, Issue 8, pp. 29-45, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@Article{chen_et_al:DagRep.15.8.29,
  author =	{Chen, Jiehua and Cheng, Christine and Manlove, David and Schlotter, Ildik\'{o} and Sorge, Manuel},
  title =	{{Frontiers of Parameterized Algorithmics of Matching under Preferences (Dagstuhl Seminar 25342)}},
  pages =	{29--45},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Reports},
  ISSN =	{2192-5283},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{15},
  number =	{8},
  editor =	{Chen, Jiehua and Cheng, Christine and Manlove, David and Schlotter, Ildik\'{o} and Sorge, Manuel},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.15.8.29},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-257744},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagRep.15.8.29},
  annote =	{Keywords: Algorithmic design and complexity analysis, Matching markets, Matching theory, Parameterizec complexity analysis}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.9
An ETH-Tight FPT Algorithm for Rejection-Proof Set Packing with Applications to Kidney Exchange

Authors: Bart M. P. Jansen, Jeroen S. K. Lamme, and Ruben F. A. Verhaegh

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 358, 20th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2025)

Abstract
We study the parameterized complexity of a recently introduced multi-agent variant of the Kidney Exchange problem. Given a directed graph G and integers d and k, the standard problem asks whether G contains a packing of vertex-disjoint cycles, each of length ≤ d, covering at least k vertices in total. In the multi-agent setting we consider, the vertex set is partitioned over several agents who reject a cycle packing as solution if it can be modified into an alternative packing that covers more of their own vertices. A cycle packing is called rejection-proof if no agent rejects it and the problem asks whether such a packing exists that covers at least k vertices. We exploit the sunflower lemma on a set packing formulation of the problem to give a kernel for this Σ₂^P-complete problem that is polynomial in k for all constant values of d. We also provide a 2^𝒪(k log k) + n^𝒪(1) algorithm based on it and show that this FPT algorithm is asymptotically optimal under the ETH. Further, we generalize the problem by including an additional positive integer c in the input that naturally captures how much agents can modify a given cycle packing to reject it. For every constant c, the resulting problem simplifies from being Σ₂^P-complete to NP-complete. The super-exponential lower bound already holds for c = 2, though. We present an ad-hoc single-exponential algorithm for c = 1. These results reveal an interesting discrepancy between the classical and parameterized complexity of the problem and give a good view of what makes it hard.
Cite as

Bart M. P. Jansen, Jeroen S. K. Lamme, and Ruben F. A. Verhaegh. An ETH-Tight FPT Algorithm for Rejection-Proof Set Packing with Applications to Kidney Exchange. In 20th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 358, pp. 9:1-9:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{jansen_et_al:LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.9,
  author =	{Jansen, Bart M. P. and Lamme, Jeroen S. K. and Verhaegh, Ruben F. A.},
  title =	{{An ETH-Tight FPT Algorithm for Rejection-Proof Set Packing with Applications to Kidney Exchange}},
  booktitle =	{20th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2025)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-407-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{358},
  editor =	{Agrawal, Akanksha and van Leeuwen, Erik Jan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251414},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Parameterized complexity, Multi-agent kidney exchange, Kernelization, Set packing}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38
Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets

Authors: Pallavi Jain, Palash Jha, and Shubham Solanki

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
We propose a new fairness notion, motivated by the practical challenge of allocating teaching assistants (TAs) to courses in a department. Each course requires a certain number of TAs and each TA has preferences over the courses they want to assist. Similarly, each course instructor has preferences over the TAs who applied for their course. We demand fairness and efficiency for both sides separately, giving rise to the following criteria: (i) every course gets the required number of TAs and the average utility of the assigned TAs meets a threshold; (ii) the allocation of courses to TAs is envy-free, where a TA envies another TA if the former prefers the latter’s course and has a higher or equal grade in that course. Note that the definition of envy-freeness here differs from the one in the literature, and we call it merit-based envy-freeness. We show that the problem of finding a merit-based envy-free and efficient matching is NP-hard even for very restricted settings, such as two courses and uniform valuations; constant degree, constant capacity of TAs for every course, valuations in the range {0,1,2,3}, identical valuations from TAs, and even more. To find tractable results, we consider some restricted instances, such as, strict valuation of TAs for courses, the difference between the number of positively valued TAs for a course and the capacity, the number of positively valued TAs/courses, types of valuation functions, and obtained some polynomial-time solvable cases, showing the contrast with intractable results. We further studied the problem in the paradigm of parameterized algorithms and designed some exact and approximation algorithms.
Cite as

Pallavi Jain, Palash Jha, and Shubham Solanki. Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 38:1-38:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{jain_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38,
  author =	{Jain, Pallavi and Jha, Palash and Solanki, Shubham},
  title =	{{Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{38:1--38:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251186},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair Matching, Envy-Freeness, Efficiency}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.11
Stability Notions for Hospital Residents with Sizes

Authors: Haricharan Balasundaram, J. B. Krishnashree, Girija Limaye, and Meghana Nasre

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
The Hospital Residents problem with sizes (HRS) is a generalisation of the well-studied hospital residents (HR) problem. In the HRS problem, an agent a has a size s(a) and the agent occupies s(a) many positions of the hospital h when assigned to h. The notion of stability in this setting is suitably modified, and it is known that deciding whether an HRS instance admits a stable matching is NP-hard under severe restrictions. In this work, we explore a variation of stability, which we term occupancy-based stability. This notion was defined by McDermid and Manlove (J. of Comb. Opt. 2010) but remained unexplored to the best of our knowledge. In our work, we show that every HRS instance admits an occupancy-stable matching. We further show that computing a maximum-size occupancy-stable matching is NP-hard. We complement our hardness result by providing an approximation algorithm with a guarantee strictly better than 3 for the max-size occupancy-stable matching problem. Given that the classical notion of stability adapted for HRS is not guaranteed to exist in general, we show a practical restriction under which a stable matching is guaranteed to exist. We present an efficient algorithm to output a stable matching in the restricted HRS instances. We also provide an alternate NP-hardness proof for the decision version of the stable matching problem for HRS which imposes a severe restriction on the number of neighbours of non-unit sized agents.
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Haricharan Balasundaram, J. B. Krishnashree, Girija Limaye, and Meghana Nasre. Stability Notions for Hospital Residents with Sizes. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 11:1-11:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{balasundaram_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.11,
  author =	{Balasundaram, Haricharan and Krishnashree, J. B. and Limaye, Girija and Nasre, Meghana},
  title =	{{Stability Notions for Hospital Residents with Sizes}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{11:1--11:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-250914},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Stable matchings, Hospital Residents with sizes, Approximation algorithms, NP-hardness}
}
Document
Invited Paper
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.RW.2024/2025.4
Human-Centered ASP Applications: Representation & Reasoning (Invited Paper)

Authors: Aysu Boğatarkan, Müge Fidan, and Esra Erdem

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 138, Joint Proceedings of the 20th and 21st Reasoning Web Summer Schools (RW 2024 & RW 2025)

Abstract
As the objective of Artificial Intelligence (AI) changes towards building rational agents that are provably beneficial for humans, Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KRR) plays an important role in addressing the user-oriented challenges in applications, such as generality, flexibility, provability, hybridity, bi-directional interactions, robustness, and explainability. In this tutorial, we will introduce participants to modeling and solving problems in human-centered real-world applications, using KRR methods and tools of Answer Set Programming (ASP), while addressing such challenges for AI.
Cite as

Aysu Boğatarkan, Müge Fidan, and Esra Erdem. Human-Centered ASP Applications: Representation & Reasoning (Invited Paper). In Joint Proceedings of the 20th and 21st Reasoning Web Summer Schools (RW 2024 & RW 2025). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 138, pp. 4:1-4:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bogatarkan_et_al:OASIcs.RW.2024/2025.4,
  author =	{Bo\u{g}atarkan, Aysu and Fidan, M\"{u}ge and Erdem, Esra},
  title =	{{Human-Centered ASP Applications: Representation \& Reasoning}},
  booktitle =	{Joint Proceedings of the 20th and 21st Reasoning Web Summer Schools (RW 2024 \& RW 2025)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:14},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-405-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{138},
  editor =	{Artale, Alessandro and Bienvenu, Meghyn and Garc{\'\i}a, Yazm{\'\i}n Ib\'{a}\~{n}ez and Murlak, Filip},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.RW.2024/2025.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-250491},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.RW.2024/2025.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Answer set programming, human-centered applications, multi robot planning in warehouses, explainability, stable roommates problem, usefulness evaluations}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.21
Practically Feasible Proof Logging for Pseudo-Boolean Optimization

Authors: Wietze Koops, Daniel Le Berre, Magnus O. Myreen, Jakob Nordström, Andy Oertel, Yong Kiam Tan, and Marc Vinyals

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 340, 31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025)

Abstract
Certifying solvers have long been standard for decision problems in Boolean satisfiability (SAT), allowing for proof logging and checking with very limited overhead, but developing similar tools for combinatorial optimization has remained a challenge. A recent promising approach covering a wide range of solving paradigms is pseudo-Boolean proof logging, but this has mostly consisted of proof-of-concept works far from delivering the performance required for real-world deployment. In this work, we present an efficient toolchain based on VeriPB and CakePB for formally verified pseudo-Boolean optimization. We implement proof logging for the full range of techniques in the state-of-the-art solvers RoundingSat and Sat4j, including core-guided search and linear programming integration with Farkas certificates and cut generation. Our experimental evaluation shows that proof logging and checking performance in this much more expressive paradigm is now quite close to the level of SAT solving, and hence is clearly practically feasible.
Cite as

Wietze Koops, Daniel Le Berre, Magnus O. Myreen, Jakob Nordström, Andy Oertel, Yong Kiam Tan, and Marc Vinyals. Practically Feasible Proof Logging for Pseudo-Boolean Optimization. In 31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 340, pp. 21:1-21:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{koops_et_al:LIPIcs.CP.2025.21,
  author =	{Koops, Wietze and Le Berre, Daniel and Myreen, Magnus O. and Nordstr\"{o}m, Jakob and Oertel, Andy and Tan, Yong Kiam and Vinyals, Marc},
  title =	{{Practically Feasible Proof Logging for Pseudo-Boolean Optimization}},
  booktitle =	{31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-380-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{340},
  editor =	{de la Banda, Maria Garcia},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-238825},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: proof logging, certifying algorithms, combinatorial optimization, certification, pseudo-Boolean solving, 0-1 integer linear programming}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.45
Scarf’s Algorithm on Arborescence Hypergraphs

Authors: Karthekeyan Chandrasekaran, Yuri Faenza, Chengyue He, and Jay Sethuraman

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
Scarf’s algorithm - a pivoting procedure that finds a dominating extreme point in a down-monotone polytope - can be used to show the existence of a fractional stable matching in hypergraphs. The problem of finding a fractional stable matching in hypergraphs, however, is PPAD-complete. In this work, we study the behavior of Scarf’s algorithm on arborescence hypergraphs, the family of hypergraphs in which hyperedges correspond to the paths of an arborescence. For arborescence hypergraphs, we prove that Scarf’s algorithm can be implemented to find an integral stable matching in polynomial time. En route to our result, we uncover novel structural properties of bases and pivots for the more general family of network hypergraphs. Our work provides the first proof of polynomial-time convergence of Scarf’s algorithm on hypergraphic stable matching problems, giving hope to the possibility of polynomial-time convergence of Scarf’s algorithm for other families of polytopes.
Cite as

Karthekeyan Chandrasekaran, Yuri Faenza, Chengyue He, and Jay Sethuraman. Scarf’s Algorithm on Arborescence Hypergraphs. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 45:1-45:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{chandrasekaran_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.45,
  author =	{Chandrasekaran, Karthekeyan and Faenza, Yuri and He, Chengyue and Sethuraman, Jay},
  title =	{{Scarf’s Algorithm on Arborescence Hypergraphs}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{45:1--45:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.45},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234220},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.45},
  annote =	{Keywords: Scarf’s algorithm, Arborescence Hypergraphs, Stable Matchings}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.31
Stable Hypergraph Matching in Unimodular Hypergraphs

Authors: Péter Biró, Gergely Csáji, and Ildikó Schlotter

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
We study the NP-hard Stable Hypergraph Matching (SHM) problem and its generalization allowing capacities, the Stable Hypergraph b-Matching (SHbM) problem, and investigate their computational properties under various structural constraints. Our study is motivated by the fact that Scarf’s Lemma [Scarf, 1967] together with a result of Lovász [Lovász, 1972] guarantees the existence of a stable matching whenever the underlying hypergraph is normal. Furthermore, if the hypergraph is unimodular (i.e., its incidence matrix is totally unimodular), then even a stable b-matching is guaranteed to exist. However, no polynomial-time algorithm is known for finding a stable matching or b-matching in unimodular hypergraphs. We identify subclasses of unimodular hypergraphs where SHM and SHbM are tractable such as laminar hypergraphs or so-called subpath hypergraphs with bounded-size hyperedges; for the latter case, even a maximum-weight stable b-matching can be found efficiently. We complement our algorithms by showing that optimizing over stable matchings is NP-hard even in laminar hypergraphs. As a practically important special case of SHbM for unimodular hypergraphs, we investigate a tripartite stable matching problem with students, schools, and companies as agents, called the University Dual Admission problem, which models real-world scenarios in higher education admissions. Finally, we examine a superclass of subpath hypergraphs that are normal but not necessarily unimodular, namely subtree hypergraphs where hyperedges correspond to subtrees of a tree. We establish that for such hypergraphs, stable matchings can be found in polynomial time but, in the setting with capacities, finding a stable b-matching is NP-hard.
Cite as

Péter Biró, Gergely Csáji, and Ildikó Schlotter. Stable Hypergraph Matching in Unimodular Hypergraphs. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 31:1-31:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{biro_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.31,
  author =	{Bir\'{o}, P\'{e}ter and Cs\'{a}ji, Gergely and Schlotter, Ildik\'{o}},
  title =	{{Stable Hypergraph Matching in Unimodular Hypergraphs}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{31:1--31:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.31},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234086},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.31},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable hypergraph matching, Scarf’s Lemma, unimodular hypergraphs, university dual admission}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125
Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences

Authors: Aditya Potukuchi and Shikha Singh

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
Properties of stable matchings in the popular random-matching-market model have been studied for over 50 years. In a random matching market, each agent has complete preferences drawn uniformly and independently at random. Wilson (1972), Knuth (1976) and Pittel (1989) proved that in balanced random matching markets, the proposers are matched to their ln nth choice on average. In this paper, we consider competitive markets with n jobs and n+k candidates, and partial lists where each agent only ranks their top d choices. Despite the long history of the problem, the following fundamental question remains unanswered for these generalized markets: what is the tight threshold on list length d that results in a perfect stable matching with high probability? In this paper, we answer this question exactly - we prove a sharp threshold d₀ = ln n ⋅ ln (n+k)/(k+1) on the existence of perfect stable matchings when k = o(n). That is, we show that if d < (1-ε) d₀, then no stable matching matches all jobs; moreover, if d > (1+ ε) d₀, then all jobs are matched in every stable matching with high probability. This bound improves and generalizes recent results by Kanoria, Min and Qian (2021). Furthermore, we extend the line of work studying the effect of imbalance on the expected rank of the proposers (termed the "stark effect of competition"). We establish the regime in unbalanced markets that forces this stark effect to take shape in markets with partial preferences.
Cite as

Aditya Potukuchi and Shikha Singh. Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 125:1-125:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{potukuchi_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125,
  author =	{Potukuchi, Aditya and Singh, Shikha},
  title =	{{Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{125:1--125:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-235025},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matching, probabilistic method, Gale-Shapley algorithm}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.36
MaxMin Separation Problems: FPT Algorithms for st-Separator and Odd Cycle Transversal

Authors: Ajinkya Gaikwad, Hitendra Kumar, Soumen Maity, Saket Saurabh, and Roohani Sharma

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 327, 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)

Abstract
In this paper, we study the parameterized complexity of the MaxMin versions of two fundamental separation problems: Maximum Minimal st-Separator and Maximum Minimal Odd Cycle Transversal (OCT), both parameterized by the solution size. In the Maximum Minimal st-Separator problem, given a graph G, two distinct vertices s and t and a positive integer k, the goal is to determine whether there exists a minimal st-separator in G of size at least k. Similarly, the Maximum Minimal OCT problem seeks to determine if there exists a minimal set of vertices whose deletion results in a bipartite graph, and whose size is at least k. We demonstrate that both problems are fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by k. Our FPT algorithm for Maximum Minimal st-Separator answers the open question by Hanaka, Bodlaender, van der Zanden & Ono [TCS 2019]. One unique insight from this work is the following. We use the meta-result of Lokshtanov, Ramanujan, Saurabh & Zehavi [ICALP 2018] that enables us to reduce our problems to highly unbreakable graphs. This is interesting, as an explicit use of the recursive understanding and randomized contractions framework of Chitnis, Cygan, Hajiaghayi, Pilipczuk & Pilipczuk [SICOMP 2016] to reduce to the highly unbreakable graphs setting (which is the result that Lokshtanov et al. tries to abstract out in their meta-theorem) does not seem obvious because certain "extension" variants of our problems are W[1]-hard.
Cite as

Ajinkya Gaikwad, Hitendra Kumar, Soumen Maity, Saket Saurabh, and Roohani Sharma. MaxMin Separation Problems: FPT Algorithms for st-Separator and Odd Cycle Transversal. In 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 327, pp. 36:1-36:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{gaikwad_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2025.36,
  author =	{Gaikwad, Ajinkya and Kumar, Hitendra and Maity, Soumen and Saurabh, Saket and Sharma, Roohani},
  title =	{{MaxMin Separation Problems: FPT Algorithms for st-Separator and Odd Cycle Transversal}},
  booktitle =	{42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)},
  pages =	{36:1--36:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-365-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{327},
  editor =	{Beyersdorff, Olaf and Pilipczuk, Micha{\l} and Pimentel, Elaine and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.36},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-228622},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.36},
  annote =	{Keywords: Parameterized Complexity, FPT, MaxMin problems, Maximum Minimal st-separator, Maximum Minimal Odd Cycle Transversal, Unbreakable Graphs, CMSO, Long Induced Odd Cycles, Sunflower Lemma}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30
Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences

Authors: Juho Hirvonen and Sara Ranjbaran

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 324, 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)

Abstract
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair of agents prefer each other over their current matches. The deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley solves this problem in polynomial time. Further, it is a mechanism: the proposing side in the algorithm is always incentivised to report their preferences truthfully. The deferred acceptance algorithm has a natural interpretation as a distributed algorithm (and thus a distributed mechanism). However, the algorithm is slow in the worst case and it is known that the stable matching problem cannot be solved efficiently in the distributed setting. In this work we study a natural special case of the stable matching problem where all agents on one of the two sides share common preferences. We show that in this case the deferred acceptance algorithm does yield a fast and truthful distributed mechanism for finding a stable matching. We show how algorithms for sampling random colorings can be used to break ties fairly and extend the results to fractional stable matching.
Cite as

Juho Hirvonen and Sara Ranjbaran. Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences. In 28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 324, pp. 30:1-30:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{hirvonen_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30,
  author =	{Hirvonen, Juho and Ranjbaran, Sara},
  title =	{{Fast, Fair and Truthful Distributed Stable Matching for Common Preferences}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2024)},
  pages =	{30:1--30:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-360-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{324},
  editor =	{Bonomi, Silvia and Galletta, Letterio and Rivi\`{e}re, Etienne and Schiavoni, Valerio},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-225666},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2024.30},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matching, deferred acceptance, local algorithm, mechanism design}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2022.36
Multi-Dimensional Stable Roommates in 2-Dimensional Euclidean Space

Authors: Jiehua Chen and Sanjukta Roy

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 244, 30th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2022)

Abstract
We investigate the Euclidean 𝖽-Dimensional Stable Roommates problem, which asks whether a given set V of 𝖽⋅ n points from the 2-dimensional Euclidean space can be partitioned into n disjoint (unordered) subsets Π = {V₁,…,V_{n}} with |V_i| = 𝖽 for each V_i ∈ Π such that Π is {stable}. Here, {stability} means that no point subset W ⊆ V is blocking Π, and W is said to be {blocking} Π if |W| = 𝖽 such that ∑_{w' ∈ W}δ(w,w') < ∑_{v ∈ Π(w)}δ(w,v) holds for each point w ∈ W, where Π(w) denotes the subset V_i ∈ Π which contains w and δ(a,b) denotes the Euclidean distance between points a and b. Complementing the existing known polynomial-time result for 𝖽 = 2, we show that such polynomial-time algorithms cannot exist for any fixed number 𝖽 ≥ 3 unless P=NP. Our result for 𝖽 = 3 answers a decade-long open question in the theory of Stable Matching and Hedonic Games [Iwama et al., 2007; Arkin et al., 2009; Vladimir G. Deineko and Gerhard J. Woeginger, 2013; Vladimir G. Deineko and Gerhard J. Woeginger, 2013; David F. Manlove, 2013].
Cite as

Jiehua Chen and Sanjukta Roy. Multi-Dimensional Stable Roommates in 2-Dimensional Euclidean Space. In 30th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 244, pp. 36:1-36:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{chen_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2022.36,
  author =	{Chen, Jiehua and Roy, Sanjukta},
  title =	{{Multi-Dimensional Stable Roommates in 2-Dimensional Euclidean Space}},
  booktitle =	{30th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2022)},
  pages =	{36:1--36:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-247-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{244},
  editor =	{Chechik, Shiri and Navarro, Gonzalo and Rotenberg, Eva and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2022.36},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-169741},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2022.36},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matchings, multidimensional stable roommates, Euclidean preferences, coalition formation games, stable cores, NP-hardness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2020.19
An Algorithm for the Exact Treedepth Problem

Authors: James Trimble

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 160, 18th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2020)

Abstract
We present a novel algorithm for the minimum-depth elimination tree problem, which is equivalent to the optimal treedepth decomposition problem. Our algorithm makes use of two cheaply-computed lower bound functions to prune the search tree, along with symmetry-breaking and domination rules. We present an empirical study showing that the algorithm outperforms the current state-of-the-art solver (which is based on a SAT encoding) by orders of magnitude on a range of graph classes.
Cite as

James Trimble. An Algorithm for the Exact Treedepth Problem. In 18th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 160, pp. 19:1-19:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{trimble:LIPIcs.SEA.2020.19,
  author =	{Trimble, James},
  title =	{{An Algorithm for the Exact Treedepth Problem}},
  booktitle =	{18th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2020)},
  pages =	{19:1--19:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-148-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{160},
  editor =	{Faro, Simone and Cantone, Domenico},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2020.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-120938},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2020.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: Treedepth, Elimination Tree, Graph Algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2020.20
Algorithms for New Types of Fair Stable Matchings

Authors: Frances Cooper and David Manlove

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 160, 18th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2020)

Abstract
We study the problem of finding "fair" stable matchings in the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI). For an instance I of SMI there may be many stable matchings, providing significantly different outcomes for the sets of men and women. We introduce two new notions of fairness in SMI. Firstly, a regret-equal stable matching minimises the difference in ranks of a worst-off man and a worst-off woman, among all stable matchings. Secondly, a min-regret sum stable matching minimises the sum of ranks of a worst-off man and a worst-off woman, among all stable matchings. We present two new efficient algorithms to find stable matchings of these types. Firstly, the Regret-Equal Degree Iteration Algorithm finds a regret-equal stable matching in O(d₀ nm) time, where d₀ is the absolute difference in ranks between a worst-off man and a worst-off woman in the man-optimal stable matching, n is the number of men or women, and m is the total length of all preference lists. Secondly, the Min-Regret Sum Algorithm finds a min-regret sum stable matching in O(d_s m) time, where d_s is the difference in the ranks between a worst-off man in each of the woman-optimal and man-optimal stable matchings. Experiments to compare several types of fair optimal stable matchings were conducted and show that the Regret-Equal Degree Iteration Algorithm produces matchings that are competitive with respect to other fairness objectives. On the other hand, existing types of "fair" stable matchings did not provide as close an approximation to regret-equal stable matchings.
Cite as

Frances Cooper and David Manlove. Algorithms for New Types of Fair Stable Matchings. In 18th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 160, pp. 20:1-20:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{cooper_et_al:LIPIcs.SEA.2020.20,
  author =	{Cooper, Frances and Manlove, David},
  title =	{{Algorithms for New Types of Fair Stable Matchings}},
  booktitle =	{18th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms (SEA 2020)},
  pages =	{20:1--20:13},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-148-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{160},
  editor =	{Faro, Simone and Cantone, Domenico},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2020.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-120945},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SEA.2020.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: Stable marriage, Algorithms, Optimality, Fair stable matchings, Regret-equality, Min-regret sum}
}
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