29 Search Results for "Wooldridge, Michael"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.14
Computing Tarski Fixed Points in Financial Networks

Authors: Leander Besting, Martin Hoefer, and Lars Huth

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 364, 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)

Abstract
Modern financial networks are highly connected and result in complex interdependencies of the involved institutions. In the prominent Eisenberg-Noe model [Eisenberg and Noe, 2001], a fundamental aspect is clearing - to determine the amount of assets available to each financial institution in the presence of potential defaults and bankruptcy. A clearing state represents a fixed point that satisfies a set of natural axioms. Existence can be established (even in broad generalizations of the model) using Tarski’s theorem. While a maximal fixed point can be computed in polynomial time, the complexity of computing other fixed points is open. In this paper, we provide an efficient algorithm to compute a minimal fixed point. Our algorithm applies in a broad generalization of the Eisenberg-Noe model with any monotone, piecewise-linear payment functions and default costs. We also study claims trading, a local network adjustment to improve clearing, when networks are evaluated with minimal clearing. We provide an efficient algorithm to decide existence of Pareto-improving trades and compute optimal ones if they exist.
Cite as

Leander Besting, Martin Hoefer, and Lars Huth. Computing Tarski Fixed Points in Financial Networks. In 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 364, pp. 14:1-14:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{besting_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2026.14,
  author =	{Besting, Leander and Hoefer, Martin and Huth, Lars},
  title =	{{Computing Tarski Fixed Points in Financial Networks}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-412-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{364},
  editor =	{Mahajan, Meena and Manea, Florin and McIver, Annabelle and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-255038},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Tarski Fixed Points, Financial Networks, Minimal Clearing, Claims Trade}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38
Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets

Authors: Pallavi Jain, Palash Jha, and Shubham Solanki

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
We propose a new fairness notion, motivated by the practical challenge of allocating teaching assistants (TAs) to courses in a department. Each course requires a certain number of TAs and each TA has preferences over the courses they want to assist. Similarly, each course instructor has preferences over the TAs who applied for their course. We demand fairness and efficiency for both sides separately, giving rise to the following criteria: (i) every course gets the required number of TAs and the average utility of the assigned TAs meets a threshold; (ii) the allocation of courses to TAs is envy-free, where a TA envies another TA if the former prefers the latter’s course and has a higher or equal grade in that course. Note that the definition of envy-freeness here differs from the one in the literature, and we call it merit-based envy-freeness. We show that the problem of finding a merit-based envy-free and efficient matching is NP-hard even for very restricted settings, such as two courses and uniform valuations; constant degree, constant capacity of TAs for every course, valuations in the range {0,1,2,3}, identical valuations from TAs, and even more. To find tractable results, we consider some restricted instances, such as, strict valuation of TAs for courses, the difference between the number of positively valued TAs for a course and the capacity, the number of positively valued TAs/courses, types of valuation functions, and obtained some polynomial-time solvable cases, showing the contrast with intractable results. We further studied the problem in the paradigm of parameterized algorithms and designed some exact and approximation algorithms.
Cite as

Pallavi Jain, Palash Jha, and Shubham Solanki. Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 38:1-38:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{jain_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38,
  author =	{Jain, Pallavi and Jha, Palash and Solanki, Shubham},
  title =	{{Fairness and Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching Markets}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{38:1--38:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251186},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.38},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair Matching, Envy-Freeness, Efficiency}
}
Document
Invited Paper
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.RW.2024/2025.7
Modern Datalog: Concepts, Methods, Applications (Invited Paper)

Authors: Markus Krötzsch

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 138, Joint Proceedings of the 20th and 21st Reasoning Web Summer Schools (RW 2024 & RW 2025)

Abstract
Pure Datalog is arguably the most fundamental rule language, elegant and simple, but also often too limited to be useful in practice. This has motivated the introduction of many new expressive features, ranging from datatypes and related functions, over aggregates and semi-ring generalisations, to existential quantifiers and complex terms. In spite of their variety, all these approaches remain true to the nature of Datalog as a direct, pattern-based way of computing on structured data. We therefore find that a modern notion of Datalog is emerging, distinctly different from other approaches of logic programming and with its own set of related methods and applications. In this course, we introduce Datalog and its most common extensions, and explain when and how these features can be used together (which is often, but not always, safe to do). We further look at modern Datalog systems and some of their primary use cases. Hands-on work with Datalog and its extensions is done with the free Datalog engine https://knowsys.github.io/nemo-doc/. The course is accessible to all audiences and does not assume specific prior knowledge.
Cite as

Markus Krötzsch. Modern Datalog: Concepts, Methods, Applications (Invited Paper). In Joint Proceedings of the 20th and 21st Reasoning Web Summer Schools (RW 2024 & RW 2025). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 138, pp. 7:1-7:41, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{krotzsch:OASIcs.RW.2024/2025.7,
  author =	{Kr\"{o}tzsch, Markus},
  title =	{{Modern Datalog: Concepts, Methods, Applications}},
  booktitle =	{Joint Proceedings of the 20th and 21st Reasoning Web Summer Schools (RW 2024 \& RW 2025)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:41},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-405-5},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{138},
  editor =	{Artale, Alessandro and Bienvenu, Meghyn and Garc{\'\i}a, Yazm{\'\i}n Ib\'{a}\~{n}ez and Murlak, Filip},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.RW.2024/2025.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-250524},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.RW.2024/2025.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Datalog, query language, knowlegde representation and reasoning, logic programming, Horn logic, SPARQL, datatypes and aggregation, lecture notes, tutorial}
}
Document
Survey
DOI: 10.4230/TGDK.3.2.1
Resilience in Knowledge Graph Embeddings

Authors: Arnab Sharma, N'Dah Jean Kouagou, and Axel-Cyrille Ngonga Ngomo

Published in: TGDK, Volume 3, Issue 2 (2025). Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge, Volume 3, Issue 2

Abstract
In recent years, knowledge graphs have gained interest and witnessed widespread applications in various domains, such as information retrieval, question-answering, recommendation systems, amongst others. Large-scale knowledge graphs to this end have demonstrated their utility in effectively representing structured knowledge. To further facilitate the application of machine learning techniques, knowledge graph embedding models have been developed. Such models can transform entities and relationships within knowledge graphs into vectors. However, these embedding models often face challenges related to noise, missing information, distribution shift, adversarial attacks, etc. This can lead to sub-optimal embeddings and incorrect inferences, thereby negatively impacting downstream applications. While the existing literature has focused so far on adversarial attacks on KGE models, the challenges related to the other critical aspects remain unexplored. In this paper, we, first of all, give a unified definition of resilience, encompassing several factors such as generalisation, in-distribution generalization, distribution adaption, and robustness. After formalizing these concepts for machine learning in general, we define them in the context of knowledge graphs. To find the gap in the existing works on resilience in the context of knowledge graphs, we perform a systematic survey, taking into account all these aspects mentioned previously. Our survey results show that most of the existing works focus on a specific aspect of resilience, namely robustness. After categorizing such works based on their respective aspects of resilience, we discuss the challenges and future research directions.
Cite as

Arnab Sharma, N'Dah Jean Kouagou, and Axel-Cyrille Ngonga Ngomo. Resilience in Knowledge Graph Embeddings. In Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge (TGDK), Volume 3, Issue 2, pp. 1:1-1:38, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@Article{sharma_et_al:TGDK.3.2.1,
  author =	{Sharma, Arnab and Kouagou, N'Dah Jean and Ngomo, Axel-Cyrille Ngonga},
  title =	{{Resilience in Knowledge Graph Embeddings}},
  journal =	{Transactions on Graph Data and Knowledge},
  pages =	{1:1--1:38},
  ISSN =	{2942-7517},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{3},
  number =	{2},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/TGDK.3.2.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-248117},
  doi =		{10.4230/TGDK.3.2.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Knowledge graphs, Resilience, Robustness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21
Pool Formation in Oceanic Games: Shapley Value and Proportional Sharing

Authors: Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Evangelos Markakis, and Panagiotis Tsamopoulos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
We study a game-theoretic model for pool formation in Proof of Stake blockchain protocols. In such systems, stakeholders can form pools as a means of obtaining regular rewards from participation in ledger maintenance, with the power of each pool being dependent on its collective stake. The question we are interested in is the design of mechanisms, i.e., "reward sharing schemes," that suitably split rewards among pool members and achieve favorable properties in the resulting pool configuration. With this in mind, we initiate a non-cooperative game-theoretic analysis of the well known Shapley value scheme from cooperative game theory into the context of blockchains. In particular, we focus on the oceanic model of games, proposed by Milnor and Shapley (1978), which is suitable for populations where a small set of large players coexists with a big mass of rather small, negligible players. This provides an appropriate level of abstraction for pool formation processes that occur among the stakeholders of a blockchain. We provide comparisons between the Shapley mechanism and the more standard proportional scheme, in terms of attained decentralization, via a Price of Stability analysis and in terms of susceptibility to Sybil attacks, i.e., the strategic splitting of a players' stake with the intention of participating in multiple pools for increased profit. Interestingly, while the widely deployed proportional scheme appears to have certain advantages, the Shapley value scheme, which rewards higher the most pivotal players, emerges as a competitive alternative, by being able to bypass some of the downsides of proportional sharing in terms of Sybil attack susceptibility, while also not being far from optimal guarantees w.r.t. decentralization. Finally, we also complement our study with some variations of proportional sharing, where the profit is split in proportion to a superadditive or a subadditive function of the stake, showing that our results for the Shapley value scheme are maintained in comparison to these functions as well.
Cite as

Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Evangelos Markakis, and Panagiotis Tsamopoulos. Pool Formation in Oceanic Games: Shapley Value and Proportional Sharing. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 21:1-21:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{kiayias_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21,
  author =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Markakis, Evangelos and Tsamopoulos, Panagiotis},
  title =	{{Pool Formation in Oceanic Games: Shapley Value and Proportional Sharing}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247409},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Shapley value, Nash equilibria, Price of Stability, Reward sharing schemes, Proof of Stake blockchains}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.23
Transaction Fee Market Design for Parallel Execution

Authors: Bahar Acilan, Andrei Constantinescu, Lioba Heimbach, and Roger Wattenhofer

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
Given the low throughput of blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum, scalability - the ability to process an increasing number of transactions - has become a central focus of blockchain research. One promising approach is the parallelization of transaction execution across multiple threads. However, achieving efficient parallelization requires a redesign of the incentive structure within the fee market. Currently, the fee market does not differentiate between transactions that access multiple high-demand storage keys (i.e., unique identifiers for individual data entries) versus a single low-demand one, as long as they require the same computational effort. Addressing this discrepancy is crucial for enabling more effective parallel execution. In this work, we aim to bridge the gap between the current fee market and the need for parallel execution by exploring alternative fee market designs. To this end, we propose a framework consisting of two key components: a Gas Computation Mechanism (GCM), which quantifies the load a transaction places on the network in terms of parallelization and computation, measured in units of gas, and a Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM), which assigns a price to each unit of gas. We additionally introduce a set of desirable properties for a GCM, propose several candidate mechanisms, and evaluate them against these criteria. Our analysis highlights two strong candidates: the weighted area GCM, which integrates smoothly with existing TFMs such as EIP‑1559 and satisfies a broad subset of the outlined properties, and the time-proportional makespan GCM, which assigns gas costs based on the context of the entire block’s schedule and, through this dependence on the overall execution outcome, captures the dynamics of parallel execution more accurately.
Cite as

Bahar Acilan, Andrei Constantinescu, Lioba Heimbach, and Roger Wattenhofer. Transaction Fee Market Design for Parallel Execution. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 23:1-23:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{acilan_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.23,
  author =	{Acilan, Bahar and Constantinescu, Andrei and Heimbach, Lioba and Wattenhofer, Roger},
  title =	{{Transaction Fee Market Design for Parallel Execution}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247426},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, transaction fee mechanism, parallel execution}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.105
Parameterized Algorithms for Computing Pareto Sets

Authors: Joshua Marc Könen, Heiko Röglin, and Tarek Stuck

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 351, 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)

Abstract
The problem of computing the set of Pareto-optimal solutions has been studied for a variety of multiobjective optimization problems. For many such problems, algorithms are known that compute the Pareto set in (weak) output-polynomial time. These algorithms are often based on dynamic programming and by weak output-polynomial time, we mean that the running time depends polynomially on the size of the Pareto set but also on the sizes of the Pareto sets of the subproblems that occur in the dynamic program. For some problems, like the multiobjective minimum spanning tree problem, such algorithms are not known to exist and for other problems, like multiobjective versions of many NP-hard problems, such algorithms cannot exist, unless 𝒫 = 𝒩𝒫. Dynamic programming over tree decompositions is a common technique in parameterized algorithms. In this paper, we study whether this technique can also be applied to compute Pareto sets of multiobjective optimization problems. We first derive an algorithm to compute the Pareto set for the multicriteria s-t cut problem and show how this result can be applied to a polygon aggregation problem arising in cartography that has recently been introduced by Rottmann et al. (GIScience 2021). We also show how to apply these techniques to also compute the Pareto set of the multiobjective minimum spanning tree problem and for the multiobjective TSP. The running time of our algorithms is O(f(w)⋅poly(n,p_{max})), where f is some function in the treewidth w, n is the input size, and p_{max} is an upper bound on the size of the Pareto sets of the subproblems that occur in the dynamic program. Finally, we present an experimental evaluation of computing Pareto sets on real-world instances of polygon aggregation problems. For this matter we devised a task-specific data structure that allows for efficient storage and modification of large sets of Pareto-optimal solutions. Throughout the implementation process, we incorporated several improved strategies and heuristics that significantly reduced both runtime and memory usage, enabling us to solve instances with treewidth of up to 22 within reasonable amount of time. Moreover, we conducted a preprocessing study to compare different tree decompositions in terms of their estimated overall runtime.
Cite as

Joshua Marc Könen, Heiko Röglin, and Tarek Stuck. Parameterized Algorithms for Computing Pareto Sets. In 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 351, pp. 105:1-105:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{konen_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2025.105,
  author =	{K\"{o}nen, Joshua Marc and R\"{o}glin, Heiko and Stuck, Tarek},
  title =	{{Parameterized Algorithms for Computing Pareto Sets}},
  booktitle =	{33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)},
  pages =	{105:1--105:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-395-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{351},
  editor =	{Benoit, Anne and Kaplan, Haim and Wild, Sebastian and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.105},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-245749},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.105},
  annote =	{Keywords: parameterized algorithms, treewidth, multicriteria optimization problems, multicriteria MST, multicriteria TSP, polygon aggregation}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.Programming.2025.10
Shica - Improving the Programming Experience for Agent-Based, Distributed, Physical Computing Systems

Authors: Hiroto Shikada and Ian Piumarta

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 134, Companion Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on the Art, Science, and Engineering of Programming (Programming 2025)

Abstract
Agent-based and distributed computing systems play an important role in many fields. Programming these systems can be annoying because of the complexity of managing multiple asynchronous processes and state transitions, sometimes hidden inter-dependencies between program elements, and (often) unnecessarily terse, un-intuitive syntax. In this paper we describe the design and implementation of Shica, an experimental language designed for physical computing that is fun to program. Shica unifies state-based, event-based, and distributed programming along with some elements of context-oriented. We informally evaluate Shica’s characteristics including its suitability for deployment on resource-constrained, embedded devices and its contribution to improving the quality of the programming experience by maximizing scope, economy, and elegance of expression.
Cite as

Hiroto Shikada and Ian Piumarta. Shica - Improving the Programming Experience for Agent-Based, Distributed, Physical Computing Systems. In Companion Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on the Art, Science, and Engineering of Programming (Programming 2025). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 134, pp. 10:1-10:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{shikada_et_al:OASIcs.Programming.2025.10,
  author =	{Shikada, Hiroto and Piumarta, Ian},
  title =	{{Shica - Improving the Programming Experience for Agent-Based, Distributed, Physical Computing Systems}},
  booktitle =	{Companion Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on the Art, Science, and Engineering of Programming (Programming 2025)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:22},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-382-9},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{134},
  editor =	{Edwards, Jonathan and Perera, Roly and Petricek, Tomas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Programming.2025.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-242948},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.Programming.2025.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Programming Languages, run-time Systems, agent-based Programming}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.WADS.2025.20
Routing Few Robots in a Crowded Network

Authors: Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Robert Ganian, Iyad Kanj, Dominik Leko, and M. S. Ramanujan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 349, 19th International Symposium on Algorithms and Data Structures (WADS 2025)

Abstract
In Graph Coordinated Motion Planning, we are given a graph G some of whose vertices are occupied by robots, and we are asked to route k marked robots to their destinations while avoiding collisions and without exceeding a given budget 𝓁 on the number of robot moves. We continue the recent investigation of the problem [ICALP 2024], focusing on the parameter k that captures the task of routing a small number of robots in a possibly crowded graph. We prove that the problem is W[1]-hard parameterized by 𝓁 even for k = 1, but fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by k plus the treedepth of G. We complement the latter algorithm with an NP-hardness reduction which shows that both parameters are necessary to achieve tractability.
Cite as

Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Robert Ganian, Iyad Kanj, Dominik Leko, and M. S. Ramanujan. Routing Few Robots in a Crowded Network. In 19th International Symposium on Algorithms and Data Structures (WADS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 349, pp. 20:1-20:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{deligkas_et_al:LIPIcs.WADS.2025.20,
  author =	{Deligkas, Argyrios and Eiben, Eduard and Ganian, Robert and Kanj, Iyad and Leko, Dominik and Ramanujan, M. S.},
  title =	{{Routing Few Robots in a Crowded Network}},
  booktitle =	{19th International Symposium on Algorithms and Data Structures (WADS 2025)},
  pages =	{20:1--20:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-398-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{349},
  editor =	{Morin, Pat and Oh, Eunjin},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.WADS.2025.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-242516},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.WADS.2025.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: graph coordinated motion planning, parameterized complexity, treedepth}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31
Games with ω-Automatic Preference Relations

Authors: Véronique Bruyère, Christophe Grandmont, and Jean-François Raskin

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
This paper investigates Nash equilibria (NEs) in multi-player turn-based games on graphs, where player preferences are modeled as ω-automatic relations via deterministic parity automata. Unlike much of the existing literature, which focuses on specific reward functions, our results apply to any preference relation definable by an ω-automatic relation. We analyze the computational complexity of determining the existence of an NE (possibly under some constraints), verifying whether a given strategy profile forms an NE, and checking whether a specific outcome can be realized by an NE. When a (constrained) NE exists, we show that there always exists one with finite-memory strategies. Finally, we explore fundamental properties of ω-automatic relations and their implications in the existence of equilibria.
Cite as

Véronique Bruyère, Christophe Grandmont, and Jean-François Raskin. Games with ω-Automatic Preference Relations. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 31:1-31:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bruyere_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31,
  author =	{Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Grandmont, Christophe and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois},
  title =	{{Games with \omega-Automatic Preference Relations}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{31:1--31:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241381},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31},
  annote =	{Keywords: Games played on graphs, Nash equilibrium, \omega-automatic relations, \omega-recognizable relations, constrained Nash equilibria existence problem}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21
On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games

Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, and Giuseppe F. Italiano

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the performance of mildly greedy players in k-coloring games, a relevant subclass of anti-coordination games. A mildly greedy player is a selfish agent who is willing to deviate from a certain strategy profile only if her payoff improves by a factor of more than ε, for some given ε ≥ 0. In presence of mildly greedy players, stability is captured by the concept of (1+ε)-approximate Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we first show that, for any k-coloring game, the (1+ε)-approximate price of anarchy, i.e., the price of anarchy of (1+ε)-approximate pure Nash equilibria, is at least (k-1)/((k-1)ε +k), and that this bound is tight for any ε ≥ 0. Then, we evaluate the approximation ratio of the solutions achieved after a (1 + ϵ)-approximate one-round walk starting from any initial strategy profile, where a (1 + ϵ)-approximate one-round walk is a sequence of (1 + ε)-approximate best-responses, one for each player. We provide a lower bound of min{(k-2)/k, (k-1)/((k-1)ε+k)} on this ratio, for any ε ≥ 0 and k ≥ 5; for the cases of k = 3 and k = 4, we give finer bounds depending on ε. Our work generalizes the results known for cut games, the special case of k-coloring games restricted to k = 2.
Cite as

Vittorio Bilò, Andrea D'Ascenzo, Mattia D'Emidio, and Giuseppe F. Italiano. On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 21:1-21:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bilo_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21,
  author =	{Bil\`{o}, Vittorio and D'Ascenzo, Andrea and D'Emidio, Mattia and Italiano, Giuseppe F.},
  title =	{{On the Performance of Mildly Greedy Players in k-Coloring Games}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241287},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Coloring games, (Approximate) Nash Equilibria, Price of Anarchy}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12
The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and ω-Regular Objectives

Authors: Véronique Bruyère, Jean-François Raskin, Alexis Reynouard, and Marie Van Den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 348, 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)

Abstract
This paper studies the rational synthesis problem for multi-player games played on graphs when rational players are following subgame perfect equilibria. In these games, one player, the system, declares his strategy upfront, and the other players, composing the environment, then rationally respond by playing strategies forming a subgame perfect equilibrium. We study the complexity of the rational synthesis problem when the players have ω-regular objectives encoded as parity objectives. Our algorithm is based on an encoding into a three-player game with imperfect information, showing that the problem is in 2ExpTime. When the number of environment players is fixed, the problem is in ExpTime and is NP- and coNP-hard. Moreover, for a fixed number of players and reachability objectives, we get a polynomial algorithm.
Cite as

Véronique Bruyère, Jean-François Raskin, Alexis Reynouard, and Marie Van Den Bogaard. The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and ω-Regular Objectives. In 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 348, pp. 12:1-12:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bruyere_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12,
  author =	{Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and Reynouard, Alexis and Van Den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and \omega-Regular Objectives}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-389-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{348},
  editor =	{Bouyer, Patricia and van de Pol, Jaco},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-239622},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: non-zero-sum games, subgame perfect equilibria, rational synthesis}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.15
Symmetric Core Learning for Pseudo-Boolean Optimization by Implicit Hitting Sets

Authors: Hannes Ihalainen, Jeremias Berg, Matti Järvisalo, and Bart Bogaerts

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 340, 31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025)

Abstract
We propose symmetric core learning (SCL) as a novel approach to making the implicit hitting set approach (IHS) to constraint optimization more symmetry-aware. SCL has the potential of significantly reducing the number of iterations and, in particular, the number of calls to an NP decision solver for extracting individual unsatisfiable cores. As the technique is focused on generating symmetric cores to the hitting set component of IHS, SCL is generally applicable in IHS-style search for essentially any constraint optimization paradigm. In this work, we focus in particular on integrating SCL to IHS for pseudo-Boolean optimization (PBO), as earlier proposed static symmetry breaking through lex-leader constraints generated before search turns out to often degrade the performance of the IHS approach to PBO. In contrast, we show that SCL can improve the runtime performance of a state-of-the-art IHS approach to PBO and generally does not impose significant overhead in terms of runtime performance.
Cite as

Hannes Ihalainen, Jeremias Berg, Matti Järvisalo, and Bart Bogaerts. Symmetric Core Learning for Pseudo-Boolean Optimization by Implicit Hitting Sets. In 31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 340, pp. 15:1-15:26, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{ihalainen_et_al:LIPIcs.CP.2025.15,
  author =	{Ihalainen, Hannes and Berg, Jeremias and J\"{a}rvisalo, Matti and Bogaerts, Bart},
  title =	{{Symmetric Core Learning for Pseudo-Boolean Optimization by Implicit Hitting Sets}},
  booktitle =	{31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025)},
  pages =	{15:1--15:26},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-380-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{340},
  editor =	{de la Banda, Maria Garcia},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-238767},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Implicit hitting sets, symmetries, unsatisfiable cores, pseudo-Boolean optimization}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SAT.2025.19
An Application of SAT Solvers in Integer Programming Games

Authors: Pravesh Koirala, Aditya Shrey, and Forrest Laine

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 341, 28th International Conference on Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing (SAT 2025)

Abstract
Integer programming games (IPGs) are a popular game-theoretic tool to model an array of games where each player has a discrete strategy set. These games arise in important domains such as economics, transportation, cybersecurity, etc., but solving them is non-trivial as it is known that checking for the existence of pure Nash equilibria in an IPG is Σ₂^p-complete. Recent works have proposed a class of relaxed solution concepts for IPGs called locally optimal integer solutions (LOIS) and shown it to be an efficient alternative for pure Nash equilibria. While LOIS are significantly simpler to compute, they still do not scale when solved using traditional mathematical solvers, especially when high-quality solutions are desired. In this paper, we apply commercially available SAT solvers to find LOIS in IPGs. We investigate efficient encodings for a cybersecurity game and compare solution times when using SAT solvers vs mathematical program solvers. We also investigate the application of SAT solvers in graph games using a graph interdiction example and compare against the obtained LOI solutions against existing heuristics-based solutions. Our results indicate that with appropriate encodings, large-scale IPGs can be solved much more efficiently using SAT solvers. We also show that SAT solvers can be applied to graph games in conjunction with LOIS for obtaining high-quality solutions. Our results emphasize the potential of SAT solvers combined with LOIS to solve significant game theory problems.
Cite as

Pravesh Koirala, Aditya Shrey, and Forrest Laine. An Application of SAT Solvers in Integer Programming Games. In 28th International Conference on Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing (SAT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 341, pp. 19:1-19:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{koirala_et_al:LIPIcs.SAT.2025.19,
  author =	{Koirala, Pravesh and Shrey, Aditya and Laine, Forrest},
  title =	{{An Application of SAT Solvers in Integer Programming Games}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing (SAT 2025)},
  pages =	{19:1--19:12},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-381-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{341},
  editor =	{Berg, Jeremias and Nordstr\"{o}m, Jakob},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SAT.2025.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-237534},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SAT.2025.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: Game Theory, Integer Programming Games, SAT Solvers, Local Solutions, Graph Games}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SAT.2025.9
CNFs and DNFs with Exactly k Solutions

Authors: L. Sunil Chandran, Rishikesh Gajjala, and Kuldeep S. Meel

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 341, 28th International Conference on Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing (SAT 2025)

Abstract
Model counting is a fundamental problem that consists of determining the number of satisfying assignments for a given Boolean formula. The weighted variant, which computes the weighted sum of satisfying assignments, has extensive applications in probabilistic reasoning, network reliability, statistical physics, and formal verification. A common approach for solving weighted model counting is to reduce it to unweighted model counting, which raises an important question: What is the minimum number of terms (or clauses) required to construct a DNF (or CNF) formula with exactly k satisfying assignments? In this paper, we establish both upper and lower bounds on this question. We prove that for any natural number k, one can construct a monotone DNF formula with exactly k satisfying assignments using at most O(√{log k}log log k) terms. This construction represents the first o(log k) upper bound for this problem. We complement this result by showing that there exist infinitely many values of k for which any DNF or CNF representation requires at least Ω(log log k) terms or clauses. These results have significant implications for the efficiency of model counting algorithms based on formula transformations.
Cite as

L. Sunil Chandran, Rishikesh Gajjala, and Kuldeep S. Meel. CNFs and DNFs with Exactly k Solutions. In 28th International Conference on Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing (SAT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 341, pp. 9:1-9:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{chandran_et_al:LIPIcs.SAT.2025.9,
  author =	{Chandran, L. Sunil and Gajjala, Rishikesh and Meel, Kuldeep S.},
  title =	{{CNFs and DNFs with Exactly k Solutions}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing (SAT 2025)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-381-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{341},
  editor =	{Berg, Jeremias and Nordstr\"{o}m, Jakob},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SAT.2025.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-237433},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SAT.2025.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Model counting, #SAT, Set Systems, Combinatorics}
}
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