23 Search Results for "Immorlica, Nicole"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.13
Inducing Efficient and Equitable Professional Networks Through Link Recommendations

Authors: Cynthia Dwork, Chris Hays, Lunjia Hu, Nicole Immorlica, and Juan Perdomo

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 368, 7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026)

Abstract
Professional networks are a key determinant of individuals’ labor market outcomes. They may also play a role in either exacerbating or ameliorating inequality of opportunity across social groups. We initiate an investigation into the positive role that a professional networking platform can play when network members have different degrees of off-platform privilege. In a theoretical model, we show that the set of link recommendation policies that reduce costs between privileged and unprivileged individuals yield equilibria that are welfare-improving over all possible equilibria, compared to those obtained when not recommending links or recommending some smaller fraction of cross-group links. We next investigate the implications of platforms that do not intervene on the network formation process. We show that, absent intervention, inequality can increase relative to starting privilege levels even without exogenous in-group preferences, confirming and complementing existing theoretical literature. Increased inequality emerges from the differential leverage privileged and unprivileged individuals have in forming connections due to their asymmetric ex ante prospects. This is a formalization of a source of inequality in the labor market which has not been previously explored. These two findings reveal a stark reality: professional networking platforms that fail to foster integration in the link formation process risk reducing the platform’s utility to its users and exacerbating existing labor market inequality.
Cite as

Cynthia Dwork, Chris Hays, Lunjia Hu, Nicole Immorlica, and Juan Perdomo. Inducing Efficient and Equitable Professional Networks Through Link Recommendations. In 7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 368, pp. 13:1-13:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{dwork_et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2026.13,
  author =	{Dwork, Cynthia and Hays, Chris and Hu, Lunjia and Immorlica, Nicole and Perdomo, Juan},
  title =	{{Inducing Efficient and Equitable Professional Networks Through Link Recommendations}},
  booktitle =	{7th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2026)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-419-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{368},
  editor =	{Lin, Huijia (Rachel)},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-259863},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2026.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Professional networks, Inequality, Link Recommendations}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94
Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion

Authors: Yingxi Li, Ellen Vitercik, and Mingwei Yang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
In the online metric matching problem, n servers and n requests lie in a metric space. Servers are available upfront, and requests arrive sequentially. An arriving request must be matched immediately and irrevocably to an available server, incurring a cost equal to their distance. The goal is to minimize the total matching cost. We study this problem in [0, 1]^d with the Euclidean metric, when servers are adversarial and requests are independently drawn from distinct distributions that satisfy a mild smoothness condition. Our main result is an O(1)-competitive algorithm for d ≠ 2 that requires no distributional knowledge, relying only on a single sample from each request distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first algorithm to achieve an o(log n) competitive ratio for non-trivial metrics beyond the i.i.d. setting. Our approach bypasses the Ω(log n) barrier introduced by probabilistic metric embeddings: instead of analyzing the embedding distortion and the algorithm separately, we directly bound the cost of the algorithm on the target metric space of a simple deterministic embedding. We then combine this analysis with lower bounds on the offline optimum for Euclidean metrics, derived via majorization arguments, to obtain our guarantees.
Cite as

Yingxi Li, Ellen Vitercik, and Mingwei Yang. Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 94:1-94:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{li_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94,
  author =	{Li, Yingxi and Vitercik, Ellen and Yang, Mingwei},
  title =	{{Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{94:1--94:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253815},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online algorithm, Metric matching, Competitive analysis, Smoothed analysis}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86
The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order

Authors: Helia Karisani, Mohammadreza Daneshvaramoli, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Mohammad Hajiesmaili, and Cameron Musco

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
We study a learning-augmented variant of the secretary problem, recently introduced by Fujii and Yoshida (2023). In this variant, the decision-maker has access to machine-learned predictions of candidate values in advance. The key challenge is to balance consistency and robustness: when the predictions are accurate, the algorithm should hire a near-best secretary; however, if they are inaccurate, the algorithm should still achieve a bounded competitive ratio. We consider both the standard Random Order Secretary Problem (ROSP), where candidates arrive in a uniform random order, and a more natural model in the learning-augmented setting, where the decision-maker can choose the arrival order based on the predicted candidate values. This model, which we call the Chosen Order Secretary Problem (COSP), can capture scenarios such as an interview schedule that is set by the decision-maker. We propose a novel algorithm that applies to both ROSP and COSP. Building on the approach of Fujii and Yoshida, our method switches from fully trusting predictions to a threshold-based rule when a large deviation of a prediction is observed. Importantly, unlike the algorithm of Fujii and Yoshida, our algorithm uses randomization as part of its decision logic. We show that if ε ∈ [0,1] denotes the maximum multiplicative prediction error, then for ROSP our algorithm achieves competitive ratio max {0.221, (1-ε)/(1+ε)}, improving on a previous bound of max {0.215, (1-ε)/(1+ε)} due to Fujii and Yoshida [Fujii and Yoshida, 2023]. For COSP, our algorithm achieves max {0.262, (1-ε)/(1+ε)}. This surpasses a 0.25 upper bound on the worst-case competitive ratio that applies to the approach of Fujii and Yoshida, and gets closer to the classical secretary benchmark of 1/e ≈ 0.368, which is an upper bound for any algorithm. Our result for COSP highlights the benefit of integrating predictions with arrival-order control in online decision-making.
Cite as

Helia Karisani, Mohammadreza Daneshvaramoli, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Mohammad Hajiesmaili, and Cameron Musco. The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 86:1-86:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{karisani_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86,
  author =	{Karisani, Helia and Daneshvaramoli, Mohammadreza and Beyhaghi, Hedyeh and Hajiesmaili, Mohammad and Musco, Cameron},
  title =	{{The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{86:1--86:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253734},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.86},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secretary problem, learning-augmented algorithms, online algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.11
Stability Notions for Hospital Residents with Sizes

Authors: Haricharan Balasundaram, J. B. Krishnashree, Girija Limaye, and Meghana Nasre

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
The Hospital Residents problem with sizes (HRS) is a generalisation of the well-studied hospital residents (HR) problem. In the HRS problem, an agent a has a size s(a) and the agent occupies s(a) many positions of the hospital h when assigned to h. The notion of stability in this setting is suitably modified, and it is known that deciding whether an HRS instance admits a stable matching is NP-hard under severe restrictions. In this work, we explore a variation of stability, which we term occupancy-based stability. This notion was defined by McDermid and Manlove (J. of Comb. Opt. 2010) but remained unexplored to the best of our knowledge. In our work, we show that every HRS instance admits an occupancy-stable matching. We further show that computing a maximum-size occupancy-stable matching is NP-hard. We complement our hardness result by providing an approximation algorithm with a guarantee strictly better than 3 for the max-size occupancy-stable matching problem. Given that the classical notion of stability adapted for HRS is not guaranteed to exist in general, we show a practical restriction under which a stable matching is guaranteed to exist. We present an efficient algorithm to output a stable matching in the restricted HRS instances. We also provide an alternate NP-hardness proof for the decision version of the stable matching problem for HRS which imposes a severe restriction on the number of neighbours of non-unit sized agents.
Cite as

Haricharan Balasundaram, J. B. Krishnashree, Girija Limaye, and Meghana Nasre. Stability Notions for Hospital Residents with Sizes. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 11:1-11:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{balasundaram_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.11,
  author =	{Balasundaram, Haricharan and Krishnashree, J. B. and Limaye, Girija and Nasre, Meghana},
  title =	{{Stability Notions for Hospital Residents with Sizes}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{11:1--11:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-250914},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Stable matchings, Hospital Residents with sizes, Approximation algorithms, NP-hardness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52
Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary

Authors: Kiarash Banihashem, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Dariusz R. Kowalski, Piotr Krysta, Danny Mittal, and Jan Olkowski

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 351, 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)

Abstract
One of the classic problems in online decision-making is the secretary problem, where the goal is to hire the best secretary out of n rankable applicants or, in a natural extension, to maximize the probability of selecting the largest number from a sequence arriving in random order. Many works have considered generalizations of this problem where one can accept multiple values subject to a combinatorial constraint. The seminal work of Babaioff, Immorlica, Kempe, and Kleinberg (SODA'07, JACM'18) proposed the matroid secretary conjecture, suggesting that there exists an O(1)-competitive algorithm for the matroid constraint, and many works since have attempted to obtain algorithms for both general matroids and specific classes of matroids. The ultimate goal of these results is to obtain an e-competitive algorithm, and the strong matroid secretary conjecture states that this is possible for general matroids. One of the most important classes of matroids is the graphic matroid, where a set of edges in a graph is deemed independent if it contains no cycle. Given the rich combinatorial structure of graphs, obtaining algorithms for these matroids is often seen as a good first step towards solving the problem for general matroids. For matroid secretary, Babaioff et al. (SODA'07, JACM'18) first studied graphic matroid case and obtained a 16-competitive algorithm. Subsequent works have improved the competitive ratio, most recently to 4 by Soto, Turkieltaub, and Verdugo (SODA'18). In this paper, we break the 4-competitive barrier for the problem, obtaining a new algorithm with a competitive ratio of 3.95. For the special case of simple graphs (i.e., graphs that do not contain parallel edges) we further improve this to 3.77. Intuitively, solving the problem for simple graphs is easier as they do not contain cycles of length two. A natural question that arises is whether we can obtain a ratio arbitrarily close to e by assuming the graph has a large enough girth. We answer this question affirmatively, proving that one can obtain a competitive ratio arbitrarily close to e even for constant values of girth, providing further evidence for the strong matroid secretary conjecture. We further show that this bound is tight: for any constant g, one cannot obtain a competitive ratio better than e even if we assume that the input graph has girth at least g. To our knowledge, such a bound was not previously known even for simple graphs.
Cite as

Kiarash Banihashem, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Dariusz R. Kowalski, Piotr Krysta, Danny Mittal, and Jan Olkowski. Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary. In 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 351, pp. 52:1-52:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{banihashem_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52,
  author =	{Banihashem, Kiarash and Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi and Kowalski, Dariusz R. and Krysta, Piotr and Mittal, Danny and Olkowski, Jan},
  title =	{{Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary}},
  booktitle =	{33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)},
  pages =	{52:1--52:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-395-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{351},
  editor =	{Benoit, Anne and Kaplan, Haim and Wild, Sebastian and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-245205},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52},
  annote =	{Keywords: online algorithms, graphic matroids, secretary problem}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.19
Dynamic Algorithms for Submodular Matching

Authors: Kiarash Banihashem, Leyla Biabani, Samira Goudarzi, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Peyman Jabbarzade, and Morteza Monemizadeh

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
The Maximum Submodular Matching (MSM) problem is a generalization of the classical Maximum Weight Matching (MWM) problem. In this problem, given a monotone submodular function f: 2^E → ℝ^{≥ 0} defined over subsets of edges of a graph G(V, E), we are asked to return a matching whose submodular value is maximum among all matchings in graph G(V, E). In this paper, we consider this problem in a fully dynamic setting against an oblivious adversary. In this setting, we are given a sequence 𝒮 of insertions and deletions of edges of the underlying graph G(V, E), along with an oracle access to the monotone submodular function f. The goal is to maintain a matching M such that, at any time t of sequence 𝒮, its submodular value is a good approximation of the value of the optimal submodular matching while keeping the number of operations minimal. We develop the first dynamic algorithm for the submodular matching problem, in which we maintain a matching whose submodular value is within expected (8 + ε)-approximation of the optimal submodular matching at any time t of sequence 𝒮 using expected amortized poly(log n, 1/(ε)) update time. Our approach incorporates a range of novel techniques, notably the concept of Uniform Hierarchical Caches (UHC) data structure along with its invariants, which lead to the first algorithm for fully dynamic submodular matching and may be of independent interest for designing dynamic algorithms for other problems.
Cite as

Kiarash Banihashem, Leyla Biabani, Samira Goudarzi, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Peyman Jabbarzade, and Morteza Monemizadeh. Dynamic Algorithms for Submodular Matching. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 19:1-19:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{banihashem_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.19,
  author =	{Banihashem, Kiarash and Biabani, Leyla and Goudarzi, Samira and Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi and Jabbarzade, Peyman and Monemizadeh, Morteza},
  title =	{{Dynamic Algorithms for Submodular Matching}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{19:1--19:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-233969},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: Matching, Submodular, Dynamic, Polylogarithmic}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.18
q-Partitioning Valuations: Exploring the Space Between Subadditive and Fractionally Subadditive Valuations

Authors: Kiril Bangachev and S. Matthew Weinberg

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
For a set M of m elements, we define a decreasing chain of classes of normalized monotone-increasing valuation functions from 2^M to ℝ_{≥ 0}, parameterized by an integer q ∈ [2,m]. For a given q, we refer to the class as q-partitioning. A valuation function is subadditive if and only if it is 2-partitioning, and fractionally subadditive if and only if it is m-partitioning. Thus, our chain establishes an interpolation between subadditive and fractionally subadditive valuations. We show that this interpolation is smooth (q-partitioning valuations are "nearly" (q-1)-partitioning in a precise sense, Theorem 6), interpretable (the definition arises by analyzing the core of a cost-sharing game, à la the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem for fractionally subadditive valuations, Section 3.1), and non-trivial (the class of q-partitioning valuations is distinct for all q, Proposition 3). For domains where provable separations exist between subadditive and fractionally subadditive, we interpolate the stronger guarantees achievable for fractionally subadditive valuations to all q ∈ {2,…, m}. Two highlights are the following: 1) An Ω ((log log q)/(log log m))-competitive posted price mechanism for q-partitioning valuations. Note that this matches asymptotically the state-of-the-art for both subadditive (q = 2) [Paul Dütting et al., 2020], and fractionally subadditive (q = m) [Feldman et al., 2015]. 2) Two upper-tail concentration inequalities on 1-Lipschitz, q-partitioning valuations over independent items. One extends the state-of-the-art for q = m to q < m, the other improves the state-of-the-art for q = 2 for q > 2. Our concentration inequalities imply several corollaries that interpolate between subadditive and fractionally subadditive, for example: 𝔼[v(S)] ≤ (1 + 1/log q)Median[v(S)] + O(log q). To prove this, we develop a new isoperimetric inequality using Talagrand’s method of control by q points, which may be of independent interest. We also discuss other probabilistic inequalities and game-theoretic applications of q-partitioning valuations, and connections to subadditive MPH-k valuations [Tomer Ezra et al., 2019].
Cite as

Kiril Bangachev and S. Matthew Weinberg. q-Partitioning Valuations: Exploring the Space Between Subadditive and Fractionally Subadditive Valuations. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 18:1-18:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{bangachev_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.18,
  author =	{Bangachev, Kiril and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  title =	{{q-Partitioning Valuations: Exploring the Space Between Subadditive and Fractionally Subadditive Valuations}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{18:1--18:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.18},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-233956},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.18},
  annote =	{Keywords: Subadditive Functions, Fractionally Subadditive Functions, Posted Price Mechanisms, Concentration Inequalities}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.137
Universal Online Contention Resolution with Preselected Order

Authors: Junyao Zhao

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
Online contention resolution scheme (OCRS) is a powerful technique for online decision making, which - in the case of matroids - given a matroid and a prior distribution of active elements, selects a subset of active elements that satisfies the matroid constraint in an online fashion. OCRS has been studied mostly for product distributions in the literature. Recently, universal OCRS, that works even for correlated distributions, has gained interest, because it naturally generalizes the classic notion, and its existence in the random-order arrival model turns out to be equivalent to the matroid secretary conjecture. However, currently very little is known about how to design universal OCRSs for any arrival model. In this work, we consider a natural and relatively flexible arrival model, where the OCRS is allowed to preselect (i.e., non-adaptively select) the arrival order of the elements, and within this model, we design simple and optimal universal OCRSs that are computationally efficient. In the course of deriving our OCRSs, we also discover an efficient reduction from universal online contention resolution to the matroid secretary problem for any arrival model, answering a question posed in [Dughmi, 2020].
Cite as

Junyao Zhao. Universal Online Contention Resolution with Preselected Order. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 137:1-137:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{zhao:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.137,
  author =	{Zhao, Junyao},
  title =	{{Universal Online Contention Resolution with Preselected Order}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{137:1--137:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.137},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-235147},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.137},
  annote =	{Keywords: Matroids, online contention resolution schemes, secretary problems}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125
Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences

Authors: Aditya Potukuchi and Shikha Singh

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
Properties of stable matchings in the popular random-matching-market model have been studied for over 50 years. In a random matching market, each agent has complete preferences drawn uniformly and independently at random. Wilson (1972), Knuth (1976) and Pittel (1989) proved that in balanced random matching markets, the proposers are matched to their ln nth choice on average. In this paper, we consider competitive markets with n jobs and n+k candidates, and partial lists where each agent only ranks their top d choices. Despite the long history of the problem, the following fundamental question remains unanswered for these generalized markets: what is the tight threshold on list length d that results in a perfect stable matching with high probability? In this paper, we answer this question exactly - we prove a sharp threshold d₀ = ln n ⋅ ln (n+k)/(k+1) on the existence of perfect stable matchings when k = o(n). That is, we show that if d < (1-ε) d₀, then no stable matching matches all jobs; moreover, if d > (1+ ε) d₀, then all jobs are matched in every stable matching with high probability. This bound improves and generalizes recent results by Kanoria, Min and Qian (2021). Furthermore, we extend the line of work studying the effect of imbalance on the expected rank of the proposers (termed the "stark effect of competition"). We establish the regime in unbalanced markets that forces this stark effect to take shape in markets with partial preferences.
Cite as

Aditya Potukuchi and Shikha Singh. Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 125:1-125:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{potukuchi_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125,
  author =	{Potukuchi, Aditya and Singh, Shikha},
  title =	{{Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{125:1--125:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-235025},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.125},
  annote =	{Keywords: stable matching, probabilistic method, Gale-Shapley algorithm}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.20
Group Fairness and Multi-Criteria Optimization in School Assignment

Authors: Santhini K. A., Kamesh Munagala, Meghana Nasre, and Govind S. Sankar

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 329, 6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025)

Abstract
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools when students have different utilities for schools and schools have limited capacities. The students belong to demographic groups, and fairness over these groups is captured either by concave objectives, or additional constraints on the utility of the groups. We present approximation algorithms for this assignment problem with group fairness via convex program rounding. These algorithms achieve various trade-offs between capacity violation and running time. We also show that our techniques easily extend to the setting where there are arbitrary constraints on the feasible assignment, capturing multi-criteria optimization. We present simulation results that demonstrate that the rounding methods are practical even on large problem instances, with the empirical capacity violation being much better than the theoretical bounds.
Cite as

Santhini K. A., Kamesh Munagala, Meghana Nasre, and Govind S. Sankar. Group Fairness and Multi-Criteria Optimization in School Assignment. In 6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 329, pp. 20:1-20:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{k.a._et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2025.20,
  author =	{K. A., Santhini and Munagala, Kamesh and Nasre, Meghana and S. Sankar, Govind},
  title =	{{Group Fairness and Multi-Criteria Optimization in School Assignment}},
  booktitle =	{6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025)},
  pages =	{20:1--20:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-367-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{329},
  editor =	{Bun, Mark},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-231471},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: School Assignment, Approximation Algorithms, Group Fairness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICDT.2025.16
Quantum Data Sketches

Authors: Qin Zhang and Mohsen Heidari

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 328, 28th International Conference on Database Theory (ICDT 2025)

Abstract
Recent advancements in quantum technologies, particularly in quantum sensing and simulation, have facilitated the generation and analysis of inherently quantum data. This progress underscores the necessity for developing efficient and scalable quantum data management strategies. This goal faces immense challenges due to the exponential dimensionality of quantum data and its unique quantum properties such as no-cloning and measurement stochasticity. Specifically, classical storage and manipulation of an arbitrary n-qubit quantum state requires exponential space and time. Hence, there is a critical need to revisit foundational data management concepts and algorithms for quantum data. In this paper, we propose succinct quantum data sketches to support basic database operations such as search and selection. We view our work as an initial step towards the development of quantum data management model, opening up many possibilities for future research in this direction.
Cite as

Qin Zhang and Mohsen Heidari. Quantum Data Sketches. In 28th International Conference on Database Theory (ICDT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 328, pp. 16:1-16:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{zhang_et_al:LIPIcs.ICDT.2025.16,
  author =	{Zhang, Qin and Heidari, Mohsen},
  title =	{{Quantum Data Sketches}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Database Theory (ICDT 2025)},
  pages =	{16:1--16:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-364-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{328},
  editor =	{Roy, Sudeepa and Kara, Ahmet},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICDT.2025.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-229570},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICDT.2025.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: quantum data representation, data sketching, query execution}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.32
A Faster Algorithm for Constrained Correlation Clustering

Authors: Nick Fischer, Evangelos Kipouridis, Jonas Klausen, and Mikkel Thorup

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 327, 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)

Abstract
In the Correlation Clustering problem we are given n nodes, and a preference for each pair of nodes indicating whether we prefer the two endpoints to be in the same cluster or not. The output is a clustering inducing the minimum number of violated preferences. In certain cases, however, the preference between some pairs may be too important to be violated. The constrained version of this problem specifies pairs of nodes that must be in the same cluster as well as pairs that must not be in the same cluster (hard constraints). The output clustering has to satisfy all hard constraints while minimizing the number of violated preferences. Constrained Correlation Clustering is APX-Hard and has been approximated within a factor 3 by van Zuylen et al. [SODA '07]. Their algorithm is based on rounding an LP with Θ(n³) constraints, resulting in an Ω(n^{3ω}) running time. In this work, using a more combinatorial approach, we show how to approximate this problem significantly faster at the cost of a slightly weaker approximation factor. In particular, our algorithm runs in Õ(n³) time (notice that the input size is Θ(n²)) and approximates Constrained Correlation Clustering within a factor 16. To achieve our result we need properties guaranteed by a particular influential algorithm for (unconstrained) Correlation Clustering, the CC-PIVOT algorithm. This algorithm chooses a pivot node u, creates a cluster containing u and all its preferred nodes, and recursively solves the rest of the problem. It is known that selecting pivots at random gives a 3-approximation. As a byproduct of our work, we provide a derandomization of the CC-PIVOT algorithm that still achieves the 3-approximation; furthermore, we show that there exist instances where no ordering of the pivots can give a (3-ε)-approximation, for any constant ε. Finally, we introduce a node-weighted version of Correlation Clustering, which can be approximated within factor 3 using our insights on Constrained Correlation Clustering. As the general weighted version of Correlation Clustering would require a major breakthrough to approximate within a factor o(log n), Node-Weighted Correlation Clustering may be a practical alternative.
Cite as

Nick Fischer, Evangelos Kipouridis, Jonas Klausen, and Mikkel Thorup. A Faster Algorithm for Constrained Correlation Clustering. In 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 327, pp. 32:1-32:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{fischer_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2025.32,
  author =	{Fischer, Nick and Kipouridis, Evangelos and Klausen, Jonas and Thorup, Mikkel},
  title =	{{A Faster Algorithm for Constrained Correlation Clustering}},
  booktitle =	{42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)},
  pages =	{32:1--32:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-365-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{327},
  editor =	{Beyersdorff, Olaf and Pilipczuk, Micha{\l} and Pimentel, Elaine and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.32},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-228585},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.32},
  annote =	{Keywords: Clustering, Constrained Correlation Clustering, Approximation}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.59
Online Matching with Delays and Size-Based Costs

Authors: Yasushi Kawase and Tomohiro Nakayoshi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 327, 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)

Abstract
In this paper, we introduce the problem of Online Matching with Delays and Size-based Costs (OMDSC). The OMDSC problem involves m requests arriving online. At any time, a group can be formed by matching any number of requests that have been received but remain unmatched. The cost associated with each group is determined by the waiting time for each request within the group and size-dependent cost. The size-dependent cost is specified by a penalty function. Our goal is to partition all the incoming requests into multiple groups while minimizing the total associated cost. This problem is an extension of the TCP acknowledgment problem proposed by Dooly et al. (J. ACM, 2001). It generalizes the cost model for sending acknowledgments. This study reveals the competitive ratios for a fundamental case, in which the penalty function takes only values of either 0 or 1. We classify such penalty functions into three distinct cases: (i) a fixed penalty of 1 regardless of the group size, (ii) a penalty of 0 if and only if the group size is a multiple of a specific integer k, and (iii) other situations. The problem in case (i) is equivalent to the TCP acknowledgment problem, for which Dooly et al. proposed a 2-competitive algorithm. For case (ii), we first show that natural algorithms that match all remaining requests are Ω(√k)-competitive. We then propose an O(log k / log log k)-competitive deterministic algorithm by carefully managing the match size and timing, and prove its optimality. For any penalty function in case (iii), we demonstrate the non-existence of a competitive online algorithm. Additionally, we discuss competitive ratios for other typical penalty functions that are not restricted to take values of 0 or 1.
Cite as

Yasushi Kawase and Tomohiro Nakayoshi. Online Matching with Delays and Size-Based Costs. In 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 327, pp. 59:1-59:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{kawase_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2025.59,
  author =	{Kawase, Yasushi and Nakayoshi, Tomohiro},
  title =	{{Online Matching with Delays and Size-Based Costs}},
  booktitle =	{42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)},
  pages =	{59:1--59:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-365-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{327},
  editor =	{Beyersdorff, Olaf and Pilipczuk, Micha{\l} and Pimentel, Elaine and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.59},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-228846},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.59},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online matching, competitive analysis, delayed service}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.12
Stable Matching with Interviews

Authors: Itai Ashlagi, Jiale Chen, Mohammad Roghani, and Amin Saberi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for medical residencies, where high application rates are followed by a large number of interviews. Yet, the extensive literature on two-sided matching primarily focuses on models where agents know their preferences, leaving the interactions necessary for preference discovery largely overlooked. This paper studies this problem using an algorithmic approach, extending Gale-Shapley’s deferred acceptance to this context. Two algorithms are proposed. The first is an adaptive algorithm that expands upon Gale-Shapley’s deferred acceptance by incorporating interviews between applicants and positions. Similar to deferred acceptance, one side sequentially proposes to the other. However, the order of proposals is carefully chosen to ensure an interim stable matching is found. Furthermore, with high probability, the number of interviews conducted by each applicant or position is limited to O(log² n). In many seasonal markets, interactions occur more simultaneously, consisting of an initial interview phase followed by a clearing stage. We present a non-adaptive algorithm for generating a single stage set of in tiered random markets. The algorithm finds an interim stable matching in such markets while assigning no more than O(log³ n) interviews to each applicant or position.
Cite as

Itai Ashlagi, Jiale Chen, Mohammad Roghani, and Amin Saberi. Stable Matching with Interviews. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 12:1-12:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{ashlagi_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.12,
  author =	{Ashlagi, Itai and Chen, Jiale and Roghani, Mohammad and Saberi, Amin},
  title =	{{Stable Matching with Interviews}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-226402},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Stable Matching, Gale–Shapley Algorithm, Algorithmic Game Theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84
Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions

Authors: Aviad Rubinstein and Zixin Zhou

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the fundamental, classical mechanism design problem of single-buyer multi-item Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity between the buyer and the seller. Specifically, we ask whether using quantum communication can be more efficient than classical communication. We have two sets of results, revealing a surprisingly rich landscape - which looks quite different from both quantum communication in non-strategic parties, and classical communication in mechanism design. We first study the expected communication complexity of approximately optimal auctions. We give quantum auction protocols for buyers with unit-demand or combinatorial valuations that obtain an arbitrarily good approximation of the optimal revenue while running in exponentially more efficient communication compared to classical approximately optimal auctions. However, these auctions come with the caveat that they may require the seller to charge exponentially large payments from a deviating buyer. We show that this caveat is necessary - we give an exponential lower bound on the product of the expected quantum communication and the maximum payment. We then study the worst-case communication complexity of exactly optimal auctions in an extremely simple setting: additive buyer’s valuations over two items. We show the following separations: - There exists a prior where the optimal classical auction protocol requires infinitely many bits, but a one-way message of 1 qubit and 2 classical bits suffices. - There exists a prior where no finite one-way quantum auction protocol can obtain the optimal revenue. However, there is a barely-interactive revenue-optimal quantum auction protocol with the following simple structure: the seller prepares a pair of qubits in the EPR state, sends one of them to the buyer, and then the buyer sends 1 qubit and 2 classical bits. - There exists a prior where no multi-round quantum auction protocol with a finite bound on communication complexity can obtain the optimal revenue.
Cite as

Aviad Rubinstein and Zixin Zhou. Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 84:1-84:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{rubinstein_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84,
  author =	{Rubinstein, Aviad and Zhou, Zixin},
  title =	{{Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{84:1--84:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-227124},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism design, Communication complexity, Quantum computing}
}
  • Refine by Type
  • 23 Document/PDF
  • 14 Document/HTML

  • Refine by Publication Year
  • 3 2026
  • 12 2025
  • 2 2024
  • 1 2023
  • 2 2021
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Author
  • 9 Immorlica, Nicole
  • 7 Lucier, Brendan
  • 3 Weinberg, S. Matthew
  • 2 Babaioff, Moshe
  • 2 Banihashem, Kiarash
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Series/Journal
  • 23 LIPIcs

  • Refine by Classification
  • 6 Theory of computation → Design and analysis of algorithms
  • 4 Theory of computation → Online algorithms
  • 3 Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
  • 3 Theory of computation → Algorithmic mechanism design
  • 3 Theory of computation → Computational pricing and auctions
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Keyword
  • 3 online algorithms
  • 2 Information Cascades
  • 2 Stochastic Processes
  • 2 non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning
  • 2 price of anarchy
  • Show More...

Any Issues?
X

Feedback on the Current Page

CAPTCHA

Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted to Dagstuhl Publishing

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2026 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH About DROPS Imprint Privacy Contact