18 Search Results for "Cramton, Peter"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.33
Cuttlefish: A Fair, Predictable Execution Environment for Cloud-Hosted Financial Exchanges

Authors: Liangcheng Yu, Prateesh Goyal, Ilias Marinos, and Vincent Liu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
Recent years have seen a rising interest in cloud-hosted financial exchanges. While the public cloud platforms promise a cost-effective and more accessible option to traders, unfortunately, achieving fairness in cloud environments is challenging due to non-deterministic network latencies and execution times. This work presents Cuttlefish, a fair-by-design cloud execution environment for algorithmic trading. The idea behind Cuttlefish is the efficient and robust mapping of real operations to a novel formulation of "virtual time". With it, Cuttlefish abstracts out the variances of the underlying network communication and computation hardware. Our implementation and evaluation not only validate the practicality of Cuttlefish, but also show its operational efficiency on public cloud platforms.
Cite as

Liangcheng Yu, Prateesh Goyal, Ilias Marinos, and Vincent Liu. Cuttlefish: A Fair, Predictable Execution Environment for Cloud-Hosted Financial Exchanges. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 33:1-33:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{yu_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.33,
  author =	{Yu, Liangcheng and Goyal, Prateesh and Marinos, Ilias and Liu, Vincent},
  title =	{{Cuttlefish: A Fair, Predictable Execution Environment for Cloud-Hosted Financial Exchanges}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{33:1--33:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.33},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247521},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.33},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cloud-hosted exchanges, Financial exchanges, Computation and communication variances, Virtual time overlay}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21
Pool Formation in Oceanic Games: Shapley Value and Proportional Sharing

Authors: Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Evangelos Markakis, and Panagiotis Tsamopoulos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
We study a game-theoretic model for pool formation in Proof of Stake blockchain protocols. In such systems, stakeholders can form pools as a means of obtaining regular rewards from participation in ledger maintenance, with the power of each pool being dependent on its collective stake. The question we are interested in is the design of mechanisms, i.e., "reward sharing schemes," that suitably split rewards among pool members and achieve favorable properties in the resulting pool configuration. With this in mind, we initiate a non-cooperative game-theoretic analysis of the well known Shapley value scheme from cooperative game theory into the context of blockchains. In particular, we focus on the oceanic model of games, proposed by Milnor and Shapley (1978), which is suitable for populations where a small set of large players coexists with a big mass of rather small, negligible players. This provides an appropriate level of abstraction for pool formation processes that occur among the stakeholders of a blockchain. We provide comparisons between the Shapley mechanism and the more standard proportional scheme, in terms of attained decentralization, via a Price of Stability analysis and in terms of susceptibility to Sybil attacks, i.e., the strategic splitting of a players' stake with the intention of participating in multiple pools for increased profit. Interestingly, while the widely deployed proportional scheme appears to have certain advantages, the Shapley value scheme, which rewards higher the most pivotal players, emerges as a competitive alternative, by being able to bypass some of the downsides of proportional sharing in terms of Sybil attack susceptibility, while also not being far from optimal guarantees w.r.t. decentralization. Finally, we also complement our study with some variations of proportional sharing, where the profit is split in proportion to a superadditive or a subadditive function of the stake, showing that our results for the Shapley value scheme are maintained in comparison to these functions as well.
Cite as

Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Evangelos Markakis, and Panagiotis Tsamopoulos. Pool Formation in Oceanic Games: Shapley Value and Proportional Sharing. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 21:1-21:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{kiayias_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21,
  author =	{Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Markakis, Evangelos and Tsamopoulos, Panagiotis},
  title =	{{Pool Formation in Oceanic Games: Shapley Value and Proportional Sharing}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247409},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Shapley value, Nash equilibria, Price of Stability, Reward sharing schemes, Proof of Stake blockchains}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.1
07271 Abstracts Collection – Computational Social Systems and the Internet

Authors: Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
From 01.07. to 06.07.2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07271 ``Computational Social Systems and the Internet'' was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Cite as

Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz. 07271 Abstracts Collection – Computational Social Systems and the Internet. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{cramton_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.1,
  author =	{Cramton, Peter and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Tardos, Eva and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{07271 Abstracts Collection – Computational Social Systems and the Internet }},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--25},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11666},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design, Combinatorial Auctions, Social Choice Theory, Behavioral Economics, Computational Game Theory, Social Networks}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.2
07271 Summary – Computational Social Systems and the Internet

Authors: Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
The seminar "Computational Social Systems and the Internet" facilitated a very fruitful interaction between economists and computer scientists, which intensified the understanding of the other disciplines' tool sets. The seminar helped to pave the way to a unified theory of social systems on the Internet that takes into account both the economic and the computational issues---and their deep interaction.
Cite as

Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Eva Tardos, and Moshe Tennenholtz. 07271 Summary – Computational Social Systems and the Internet. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{cramton_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.2,
  author =	{Cramton, Peter and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Tardos, Eva and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{07271 Summary – Computational Social Systems and the Internet }},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11642},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design, Combinatorial Auctions, Social Choice Theory, Behavioral Economics, Computational Game Theory, Social Networks}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3
An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems

Authors: Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
Personalized ranking systems and trust systems are an essential tool for collaboration in a multi-agent environment. In these systems, trust relations between many agents are aggregated to produce a personalized trust rating of the agents. In this paper we introduce the first extensive axiomatic study of this setting, and explore a wide array of well-known and new personalized ranking systems. We adapt several axioms (basic criteria) from the literature on global ranking systems to the context of personalized ranking systems, and fully classify the set of systems that satisfy all of these axioms. We further show that all these axioms are necessary for this result.
Cite as

Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz. An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{altman_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.3,
  author =	{Altman, Alon and Tennenholtz, Moshe},
  title =	{{An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--25},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11527},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Ranking systems, trust, axiomatization, incentives, mechanism design, game theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.4
Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules

Authors: Vincent Conitzer

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
A (randomized, anonymous) voting rule maps any multiset of total orders of (aka. votes over) a fixed set of alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. A voting rule f is neutral if it treats all alternatives symmetrically. It satisfies participation if no voter ever benefits from not casting her vote. It is falsename-proof if no voter ever benefits from casting additional (potentially different) votes. It is anonymity-proof if it satisfies participation and it is false-name-proof. We show that the class of anonymity-proof neutral voting rules consists exactly of the rules of the following form. With some probability kf in [0, 1], the rule chooses an alternative at random. With probability 1-kf , the rule first draws a pair of alternatives at random. If every vote prefers the same alternative between the two (and there is at least one vote), then the rule chooses that alternative. Otherwise, the rule flips a fair coin to decide between the two alternatives.
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Vincent Conitzer. Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{conitzer:DagSemProc.07271.4,
  author =	{Conitzer, Vincent},
  title =	{{Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--15},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11658},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism design, social choice, false-name-proofness, verifying identities, combinatorial auctions}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5
Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach

Authors: Wedad Elmaghraby and Nathan Larson

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
Advances in information technology and computational power have opened the doors for auctioneers to explore a range of auction formats by considering varying degrees of bid expressivity and different payment rule, e.g., single price vs. discriminatory prices. While it is clear that one can design more complicated auctions, it is still not clear if should do so and which auction parameters have the greatest impact on the performance on cost and efficiency. The purpose of this paper is to gain some insight into this question, via analytical and experimental methods.
Cite as

Wedad Elmaghraby and Nathan Larson. Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{elmaghraby_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.5,
  author =	{Elmaghraby, Wedad and Larson, Nathan},
  title =	{{Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An Experimental Approach}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11579},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Experimental, Procurement, Synergies, Asymmetric Bidders}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.6
Incentive Compatible Regression Learning

Authors: Ofer Dekel, Felix Fischer, and Ariel D. Procaccia

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
We initiate the study of incentives in a general machine learning framework. We focus on a game theoretic regression learning setting where private information is elicited from multiple agents, which are interested in different distributions over the sample space. This conflict potentially gives rise to untruthfulness on the part of the agents. In the restricted but important case when distributions are degenerate, and under mild assumptions, we show that agents are motivated to tell the truth. In a more general setting, we study the power and limitations of mechanisms without payments. We finally establish that, in the general setting, the VCG mechanism goes a long way in guaranteeing truthfulness and efficiency.
Cite as

Ofer Dekel, Felix Fischer, and Ariel D. Procaccia. Incentive Compatible Regression Learning. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{dekel_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.6,
  author =	{Dekel, Ofer and Fischer, Felix and Procaccia, Ariel D.},
  title =	{{Incentive Compatible Regression Learning}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11622},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Machine learning, regression, mechanism design}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7
Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations

Authors: Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller, and Dries Vermeulen

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running time of the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. In contrast we show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate efficiency in equilibrium, while additionally the running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for all realizations of valuations.
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Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller, and Dries Vermeulen. Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-9, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{grigorieva_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.7,
  author =	{Grigorieva, Elena and Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Vermeulen, Dries},
  title =	{{Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--9},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11616},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Query auctions, ex post equilibrium, efficiency}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.8
Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions

Authors: Maria-Florina Balcan

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
Consider the problem of a retailer with various goods for sale, attempting to set prices to maximize revenue. If customers have separate valuations over the different goods, and these are known to the retailer, then the goods can be priced separately and the problem is not so difficult. However, when customers have valuations over sets of items, this becomes a combinatorial auction problem, and the problem becomes computationally hard even when valuations are fully known in advance. In this talk we present some simple randomized algorithms and mechanisms for a number of interesting cases of this problem, both in the limited and unlimited supply setting. This talk is based on joint work with Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour.
Cite as

Maria-Florina Balcan. Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{balcan:DagSemProc.07271.8,
  author =	{Balcan, Maria-Florina},
  title =	{{Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--2},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11534},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Item Pricing, Revenue Maximizing, Combinatorial Auctions}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.9
License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers

Authors: Elmar Wolfstetter and Thomas Giebe

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
This paper revisits the licensing of a non--drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed--fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.
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Elmar Wolfstetter and Thomas Giebe. License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{wolfstetter_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.9,
  author =	{Wolfstetter, Elmar and Giebe, Thomas},
  title =	{{License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11514},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Patents, Licensing}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.10
Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness

Authors: Vincent Conitzer

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
In open, anonymous environments such as the Internet, mechanism design is complicated by the fact that a single agent can participate in the mechanism under multiple identifiers. One way to address this is to design false-name-proof mechanisms, which choose the outcome in such a way that agents have no incentive to use more than one identifier. Unfortunately, there are inherent limitations on what can be achieved with false-name-proof mechanisms, and at least in some cases, these limitations are crippling. An alternative approach is to verify the identities of all agents. This imposes significant overhead and removes any benefits from anonymity. In this paper, we propose a middle ground. Based on the reported preferences, we check, for various subsets of the reports, whether the reports in the subset were all submitted by different agents. If they were not, then we discard some of them. We characterize when such a limited verification protocol induces false-name-proofness for a mechanism, that is, when the combination of the mechanism and the verification protocol gives the agents no incentive to use multiple identi- fiers. This characterization leads to various optimization problems for minimizing verification effort. We study how to solve these problems. Throughout, we use combinatorial auctions (using the Clarke mechanism) and majority voting as examples.
Cite as

Vincent Conitzer. Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-10, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{conitzer:DagSemProc.07271.10,
  author =	{Conitzer, Vincent},
  title =	{{Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--10},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11569},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism design, social choice, false-name-proofness, verifying identities, combinatorial auctions}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.11
On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms

Authors: Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz, and Rakesh Vohra

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenue equivalence are immediate consequences.
Cite as

Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz, and Rakesh Vohra. On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{heydenreich_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.11,
  author =	{Heydenreich, Birgit and M\"{u}ller, Rudolf and Uetz, Marc and Vohra, Rakesh},
  title =	{{On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11581},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design, Revenue Equivalence, Graph Theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.12
Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions

Authors: Kate Larson

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
Most auction research assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for an item. In reality, bidders often have to go through a costly information-gathering process in order to learn their valuations. Recent attempts at modelling this phenomena has brought to light complex strategic behavior arising from information-gathering, and has shown that traditional approaches to auction and mechanism design are not able to overcome it.
Cite as

Kate Larson. Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-7, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{larson:DagSemProc.07271.12,
  author =	{Larson, Kate},
  title =	{{Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--7},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11592},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Auctions, Information Gathering}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.13
Signalling Preferences in Interviewing Markets

Authors: Robin S. Lee and Michael A. Schwarz

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
The process of match formation in matching markets can be divided into three parts: information sharing, investments in information acquisition, and the formation of matches based on available information. The last stage where agents are assumed to know their preferences has been studied in seminal work of Gale and Shapley (1962), and a model of second stage costly information acquisition is introduced and studied in Lee and Schwarz (2007). This paper focuses on the first stage – information sharing – and examines mechanisms which allow workers to signal their preferences over matching partners prior to the assignment of interviews. The incentives of firms and workers vis-a-vis information revelation are partially aligned – all other things being equal, a worker prefers to have an interview with a firm that is high in his preference ranking and a firm prefers to invest in interviewing a worker who ranks a firm highly because such worker is more likely to accept a job if offered. However, the incentives are far from being perfectly aligned. For instance, if firms pay the full cost of interviewing, each worker would prefer to have as many interviews as possible, and in a world with bilateral communication no information is revealed as each workers would want to tell each firm that it is his first choice. But if communication is moderated through an intermediary or there is a restriction on the number of messages a worker can send, then cheap talk becomes informative. Currently existing market institutions that facilitate information exchange prior to interviewing are discussed.
Cite as

Robin S. Lee and Michael A. Schwarz. Signalling Preferences in Interviewing Markets. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{lee_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.13,
  author =	{Lee, Robin S. and Schwarz, Michael A.},
  title =	{{Signalling Preferences in Interviewing Markets}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--12},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11635},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cheap talk, job search, labor market, matching,}
}
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