DROPS

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DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.47

On the Hardness of the One-Sided Code Sparsifier Problem

Authors: Elena Grigorescu and Alice Moayyedi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 364, 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)

Abstract

The notion of code sparsification was introduced by Khanna, Putterman and Sudan (SODA 2024) as an analogue to the more established notion of cut sparsification in graphs and hypergraphs. In particular, for α ∈ (0,1), an (unweighted) one-sided α-sparsifier for a linear code 𝒞 ⊆ 𝐅₂ⁿ is a subset S ⊆ [n] such that the weight of each codeword projected onto the coordinates in S is preserved up to an α fraction. Recently, Gharan and Sahami (arXiv:2502.02799) show the existence of one-sided 1/2-sparsifiers of size n/2+O(√{kn}) for any linear code, where k is the dimension of 𝒞. In this paper, we consider the computational problem of finding a one-sided 1/2-sparsifier of minimal size, and show that it is NP-hard, via a reduction from the classical nearest codeword problem. We also show hardness of approximation results.

Cite as

Elena Grigorescu and Alice Moayyedi. On the Hardness of the One-Sided Code Sparsifier Problem. In 43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 364, pp. 47:1-47:10, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{grigorescu_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2026.47,
  author =	{Grigorescu, Elena and Moayyedi, Alice},
  title =	{{On the Hardness of the One-Sided Code Sparsifier Problem}},
  booktitle =	{43rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2026)},
  pages =	{47:1--47:10},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-412-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{364},
  editor =	{Mahajan, Meena and Manea, Florin and McIver, Annabelle and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.47},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-255365},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2026.47},
  annote =	{Keywords: Code sparsifiers, NP-hardness, Approximation hardness}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.102

Smoothed Analysis of Dynamic Graph Algorithms

Authors: Uri Meir and Ami Paz

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

Recent years have seen significant progress in the study of dynamic graph algorithms, and most notably, the introduction of strong lower bound techniques for them (e.g., Henzinger, Krinninger, Nanongkai and Saranurak, STOC 2015; Larsen and Yu, FOCS 2023). As worst-case analysis (adversarial inputs) may lead to the necessity of high running times, a natural question arises: in which cases are high running times really necessary, and in which cases these inputs merely manifest unique pathological cases? Early attempts to tackle this question were made by Nikoletseas, Reif, Spirakis and Yung (ICALP 1995) and by Alberts and Henzinger (Algorithmica 1998), who considered models with very little adversarial control over the inputs, and showed fast algorithms exist for them. The question was then overlooked for decades, until Henzinger, Lincoln and Saha (SODA 2022) recently addressed uniformly random inputs, and presented algorithms and impossibility results for several subgraph counting problems. To tackle the above question more thoroughly, we employ smoothed analysis, a celebrated framework introduced by Spielman and Teng (J. ACM, 2004). An input is proposed by an adversary but then a noisy version of it is processed by the algorithm instead. This model of inputs is parameterized by the amount of adversarial control, and fully interpolates between worst-case inputs and a uniformly random input. Doing so, we extend impossibility results for some problems to the smoothed model with only a minor quantitative loss. That is, we show that partially-adversarial inputs suffice to impose high running times for certain problems. In contrast, we show that other problems become easy even with the slightest amount of noise. In addition, we study the interplay between the adversary and the noise, leading to three natural models of smoothed inputs, for which we show a hierarchy of increasing difficulty stretching between the average-case and the worst-case complexities.

Cite as

Uri Meir and Ami Paz. Smoothed Analysis of Dynamic Graph Algorithms. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 102:1-102:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{meir_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.102,
  author =	{Meir, Uri and Paz, Ami},
  title =	{{Smoothed Analysis of Dynamic Graph Algorithms}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{102:1--102:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.102},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253896},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.102},
  annote =	{Keywords: Dynamic graph algorithms, Smoothed analysis, Shortest paths}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.81

Supercritical Tradeoff Between Size and Depth for Resolution over Parities

Authors: Dmitry Itsykson and Alexander Knop

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

Alekseev and Itsykson (STOC 2025) proved the existence of an unsatisfiable CNF formula such that any resolution over parities (Res(⊕)) refutation must either have exponential size (in the formula size) or superlinear depth (in the number of variables). In this paper, we extend this result by constructing a formula with the same hardness properties, but which additionally admits a resolution refutation of quasi-polynomial size. This establishes a supercritical tradeoff between size and depth for resolution over parities. The proof builds on the framework of Alekseev and Itsykson and relies on a lifting argument applied to the supercritical tradeoff between width and depth in resolution, proposed by Buss and Thapen (IPL 2026).

Cite as

Dmitry Itsykson and Alexander Knop. Supercritical Tradeoff Between Size and Depth for Resolution over Parities. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 81:1-81:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{itsykson_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.81,
  author =	{Itsykson, Dmitry and Knop, Alexander},
  title =	{{Supercritical Tradeoff Between Size and Depth for Resolution over Parities}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{81:1--81:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.81},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253680},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.81},
  annote =	{Keywords: lifting theorems, resolution depth, resolution over parities, resolution width, supercritical tradeoff}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.75

Prior-Independent and Subgame Optimal Online Algorithms

Authors: Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, and Anant Shah

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

This paper develops two game-theoretic notions of beyond worst-case analysis that give better than worst-case guarantees on natural inputs. We illustrate them through the finite-horizon ski-rental problem. First, we consider prior-independent design and analysis of online algorithms where, rather than choosing a worst-case input, the adversary chooses a worst-case independent and identical distribution over inputs. Prior-independent online algorithms are generally analytically intractable; instead we give a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme to compute them. Second, we consider the worst-case design of algorithms. We define "subgame optimality" which is stronger than worst-case optimality in that it requires the algorithm to take advantage of an adversary not playing a worst-case input. Algorithms that focus only on the worst case can be far from subgame optimal. Highlighting the potential improvement from these paradigms for the finite-horizon ski-rental problem, we empirically compare worst-case, subgame optimal, and prior-independent algorithms in the prior-independent framework. Finally, we analyze the structure of their decisions across input sequences: the prior-independent algorithm exhibits more extreme adaptations to observed data, in contrast with the more conservative behavior of worst-case and subgame optimal algorithms.

Cite as

Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, and Anant Shah. Prior-Independent and Subgame Optimal Online Algorithms. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 75:1-75:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{hartline_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.75,
  author =	{Hartline, Jason and Johnsen, Aleck and Shah, Anant},
  title =	{{Prior-Independent and Subgame Optimal Online Algorithms}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{75:1--75:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.75},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253622},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.75},
  annote =	{Keywords: online algorithms, prior-independent algorithm design, zero-sum games}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.55

Universally Optimal Streaming Algorithm for Random Walks in Dense Graphs

Authors: Klim Efremenko, Gillat Kol, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, and Zhijun Zhang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

Sampling a random walk is a fundamental primitive in many graph applications. In the streaming model, it is known that sampling an L-step random walk on an n-vertex directed graph requires Ω(n L) space, implying that no sublinear-space streaming algorithm exists for general graphs. We show that sublinear algorithms are possible for the case of dense graphs, where every vertex has out-degree at least Ω(n). In particular, we give a one-pass turnstile streaming algorithm that uses only 𝒪̃(L) memory for such graphs. More broadly, for graphs with minimum out-degree at least d, our streaming algorithm samples a random walk using 𝒪̃(n/d ⋅ L) memory. We show that our algorithm is optimal in a strong "beyond worst-case" sense. To formalize this, we introduce the notion of universal optimality for graph streaming algorithms. Informally, a streaming algorithm is universally optimal if it performs (almost) as well as possible on every graph, assuming a worst-case choice of the streaming order. This notion of universal optimality is a key conceptual contribution of our work.

Cite as

Klim Efremenko, Gillat Kol, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, and Zhijun Zhang. Universally Optimal Streaming Algorithm for Random Walks in Dense Graphs. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 55:1-55:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{efremenko_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.55,
  author =	{Efremenko, Klim and Kol, Gillat and Saxena, Raghuvansh R. and Zhang, Zhijun},
  title =	{{Universally Optimal Streaming Algorithm for Random Walks in Dense Graphs}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{55:1--55:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.55},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253423},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.55},
  annote =	{Keywords: Random Walk, streaming Algorithm, universal Optimality}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.58

One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts

Authors: Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, and Maya Schlesinger

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

We study multi-agent contract design with combinatorial actions, under budget constraints, and for a broad class of objective functions, including profit (principal’s utility), reward, and welfare. Our first result is a strong impossibility: For submodular reward functions, no randomized poly-time algorithm can approximate the optimal budget-feasible value within any finite factor, even with demand-oracle access. This result rules out extending known constant-factor guarantees from either (i) unbudgeted settings with combinatorial actions or (ii) budgeted settings with binary actions, to their combination. The hardness is tight: It holds even when all but one agent have binary actions and the remaining agent has just one additional action. On the positive side, we show that gross substitutes rewards (a well-studied strict subclass of submodular functions) admit a deterministic poly-time O(1)-approximation, using only value queries. Our results thus draw the first sharp separation between budgeted and unbudgeted settings in combinatorial contracts, and identifies gross substitutes as a tractable frontier for budgeted combinatorial contracts. Finally, we present an FPTAS for additive rewards, demonstrating that arbitrary approximation is tractable under any budget. This constitutes the first FPTAS for the multi-agent combinatorial-actions setting, even in the absence of budget constraints.

Cite as

Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, and Maya Schlesinger. One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 58:1-58:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{feldman_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.58,
  author =	{Feldman, Michal and Gal-Tzur, Yoav and Ponitka, Tomasz and Schlesinger, Maya},
  title =	{{One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{58:1--58:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.58},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253459},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.58},
  annote =	{Keywords: Combinatorial Contracts, Algorithmic Contract Design, Budget-Feasible Contracts}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.20

Samplability Makes Learning Easier

Authors: Guy Blanc, Caleb Koch, Jane Lange, Carmen Strassle, and Li-Yang Tan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

The standard definition of PAC learning (Valiant 1984) requires learners to succeed under all distributions - even ones that are intractable to sample from. This stands in contrast to samplable PAC learning (Blum, Furst, Kearns, and Lipton 1993), where learners only have to succeed under samplable distributions. We study this distinction and show that samplable PAC substantially expands the power of efficient learners. We first construct a concept class that requires exponential sample complexity in standard PAC but is learnable with polynomial sample complexity in samplable PAC. We then lift this statistical separation to the computational setting and obtain a separation relative to a random oracle. Our proofs center around a new complexity primitive, explicit evasive sets, that we introduce and study. These are sets for which membership is easy to determine but are extremely hard to sample from. Our results extend to the online setting to similarly show that its landscape changes when the adversary is assumed to be efficient instead of computationally unbounded.

Cite as

Guy Blanc, Caleb Koch, Jane Lange, Carmen Strassle, and Li-Yang Tan. Samplability Makes Learning Easier. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 20:1-20:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{blanc_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.20,
  author =	{Blanc, Guy and Koch, Caleb and Lange, Jane and Strassle, Carmen and Tan, Li-Yang},
  title =	{{Samplability Makes Learning Easier}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{20:1--20:12},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253071},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: PAC learning, Samplable distributions}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.65

Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms

Authors: Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, and S. Matthew Weinberg

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

Roughgarden [Roughgarden, 2020] initiates the study of Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs), and posits that the on-chain game of a "good" TFM should be on-chain simple (OnC-S), i.e., incentive compatible for both the users and the miner. Recent work of Ganesh, Thomas an Weinberg [Ganesh et al., 2024] posit that they should additionally be Off-Chain Influence-Proof (OffC-IP), which means that the miner cannot achieve any additional revenue by separately conducting an off-chain auction to determine on-chain inclusion. They observe that a cryptographic second-price auction satisfies both properties, but leave open the question of whether other mechanisms (such as those not dependent on cryptography) satisfy these properties. In this paper, we characterize OffC-IP TFMs: They are those satisfying a burn identity relating the burn rule to the allocation rule. In particular, we show that auction is OffC-IP if and only if its (induced direct-revelation) allocation rule X̄(⋅) and burn rule B̅(⋅) (both of which take as input users' values v₁, … , v_n) are truthful when viewing (X̄(⋅), B̅(⋅)) as the allocation and pricing rule of a multi-item auction for a single additive buyer with values (φ(v₁),…, φ(v_n)) equal to the users' virtual values. Building on this burn identity, we characterize OffC-IP and OnC-S TFMs that are deterministic and do not use cryptography: They are posted-price mechanisms with specially-tuned burns. As a corollary, we show that such TFMs can only exist with infinite supply and prior-dependence. However, we show that for randomized TFMs, there are additional OnC-S and OffC-IP auctions that do not use cryptography (even when there is {finite} supply, under prior-dependence with a bounded prior distribution). Holistically, our results show that while OffC-IP is a fairly stringent requirement, families of OffC-IP mechanisms can be found for a variety of settings.

Cite as

Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 65:1-65:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{ganesh_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.65,
  author =	{Ganesh, Aadityan and Thomas, Clayton and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  title =	{{Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{65:1--65:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.65},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253527},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.65},
  annote =	{Keywords: Transaction Fee Mechanism Design, Off-Chain Influence Proofness, Blockchain, Decentralized Finance, Simple Auctions}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.31

Delaunay Triangulations with Predictions

Authors: Sergio Cabello, Timothy M. Chan, and Panos Giannopoulos

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

We investigate algorithms with predictions in computational geometry, specifically focusing on the basic problem of computing 2D Delaunay triangulations. Given a set P of n points in the plane and a triangulation G that serves as a "prediction" of the Delaunay triangulation, we would like to use G to compute the correct Delaunay triangulation DT(P) more quickly when G is "close" to DT(P). We obtain a variety of results of this type, under different deterministic and probabilistic settings, including the following: 1) Define D to be the number of edges in G that are not in DT(P). We present a deterministic algorithm to compute DT(P) from G in O(n + Dlog³ n) time, and a randomized algorithm in O(n+Dlog n) expected time, the latter of which is optimal in terms of D. 2) Let R be a random subset of the edges of DT(P), where each edge is chosen independently with probability ρ. Suppose G is any triangulation of P that contains R. We present an algorithm to compute DT(P) from G in O(nlog log n + nlog(1/ρ)) time with high probability. 3) Define d_{vio} to be the maximum number of points of P strictly inside the circumcircle of a triangle in G (the number is 0 if G is equal to DT(P)). We present a deterministic algorithm to compute DT(P) from G in O(nlog^*n + nlog d_{vio}) time. We also obtain results in similar settings for related problems such as 2D Euclidean minimum spanning trees, and hope that our work will open up a fruitful line of future research.

Cite as

Sergio Cabello, Timothy M. Chan, and Panos Giannopoulos. Delaunay Triangulations with Predictions. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 31:1-31:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{cabello_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.31,
  author =	{Cabello, Sergio and Chan, Timothy M. and Giannopoulos, Panos},
  title =	{{Delaunay Triangulations with Predictions}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{31:1--31:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.31},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253186},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.31},
  annote =	{Keywords: Delaunay Triangulation, Minimum Spanning Tree, Algorithms with Predictions}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.93

Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users

Authors: Amit Levy, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Chenghan Zhou

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contest, and then price that space to users. When analyzing our distributed ledger model, we find: - A characterization of all possible pure equilibria (although pure equilibria are not guaranteed to exist). - A natural sufficient condition, implied by Regularity (à la [Myerson, 1981]), for existence of a "market-clearing" pure equilibrium where Miners choose to sell all space allocated by the Distributed Ledger Protocol, and that this equilibrium is unique. - The market share of the largest miner is the relevant "measure of decentralization" to determine whether a market-clearing pure equilibrium exists. - Block rewards do not impact users' prices at equilibrium, when pure equilibria exist. But, higher block rewards can cause pure equilibria to exist. We also discuss aspects of our model and how they relate to blockchains deployed in practice. For example, only "patient" users (who are happy for their transactions to enter the blockchain under any miner) would enjoy the conclusions highlighted by our model, whereas "impatient" users (who are interested only for their transaction to be included in the very next block) still face monopoly pricing.

Cite as

Amit Levy, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Chenghan Zhou. Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 93:1-93:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{levy_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.93,
  author =	{Levy, Amit and Weinberg, S. Matthew and Zhou, Chenghan},
  title =	{{Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{93:1--93:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.93},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253805},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.93},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, Blockspace Markets, Decentralization, Distributed Ledgers, Equilibrium Analysis, Tullock Contests}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94

Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion

Authors: Yingxi Li, Ellen Vitercik, and Mingwei Yang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract

In the online metric matching problem, n servers and n requests lie in a metric space. Servers are available upfront, and requests arrive sequentially. An arriving request must be matched immediately and irrevocably to an available server, incurring a cost equal to their distance. The goal is to minimize the total matching cost. We study this problem in [0, 1]^d with the Euclidean metric, when servers are adversarial and requests are independently drawn from distinct distributions that satisfy a mild smoothness condition. Our main result is an O(1)-competitive algorithm for d ≠ 2 that requires no distributional knowledge, relying only on a single sample from each request distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first algorithm to achieve an o(log n) competitive ratio for non-trivial metrics beyond the i.i.d. setting. Our approach bypasses the Ω(log n) barrier introduced by probabilistic metric embeddings: instead of analyzing the embedding distortion and the algorithm separately, we directly bound the cost of the algorithm on the target metric space of a simple deterministic embedding. We then combine this analysis with lower bounds on the offline optimum for Euclidean metrics, derived via majorization arguments, to obtain our guarantees.

Cite as

Yingxi Li, Ellen Vitercik, and Mingwei Yang. Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 94:1-94:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{li_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94,
  author =	{Li, Yingxi and Vitercik, Ellen and Yang, Mingwei},
  title =	{{Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{94:1--94:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253815},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.94},
  annote =	{Keywords: Online algorithm, Metric matching, Competitive analysis, Smoothed analysis}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.36

BlindPerm: Efficient MEV Mitigation with an Encrypted Mempool and Permutation

Authors: Alireza Kavousi, Duc V. Le, Philipp Jovanovic, and George Danezis

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 361, 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)

Abstract

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) is a crucial challenge in blockchains and cryptocurrencies. A principal countermeasure is using encrypted mempools to hide the transaction payloads until they are committed in a block. However, the existing approaches based on encrypted mempools remain vulnerable to metadata leakage and may not provide sufficient mitigation against block producers due to their sole control in block preparation. In this paper, we propose techniques that utilize randomized permutation on the committed block, offering a multi-layer solution. With a focus on proof-of-stake (PoS) committee-based consensus, we then introduce BlindPerm, a framework that enhances an encrypted mempool with permutation and present various optimizations. Notably, we propose a construction where this enhancement comes at essentially no overhead by piggybacking on the encrypted mempool and without relying on any external entity such as randomness beacon. Further, we illustrate the effectiveness of our solutions by running simulations using historical Ethereum data.

Cite as

Alireza Kavousi, Duc V. Le, Philipp Jovanovic, and George Danezis. BlindPerm: Efficient MEV Mitigation with an Encrypted Mempool and Permutation. In 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 361, pp. 36:1-36:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{kavousi_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.36,
  author =	{Kavousi, Alireza and Le, Duc V. and Jovanovic, Philipp and Danezis, George},
  title =	{{BlindPerm: Efficient MEV Mitigation with an Encrypted Mempool and Permutation}},
  booktitle =	{29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)},
  pages =	{36:1--36:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-409-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{361},
  editor =	{Arusoaie, Andrei and Onica, Emanuel and Spear, Michael and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.36},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-252091},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.36},
  annote =	{Keywords: Encrypted mempool, maximal extractable value, distributed systems}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.37

Communication Complexity of Equality and Error-Correcting Codes

Authors: Dale Jacobs, John Jeang, Vladimir Podolskii, Morgan Prior, and Ilya Volkovich

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract

We study the public-coin randomized communication complexity of the equality function. The communication complexity of this function is known to be low when the error probability is constant and the players have access to many random bits. The complexity grows, however, if the allowed error probability and the amount of randomness are restricted. We show that public-coin randomized protocols for equality and error-correcting codes are essentially the same object. That is, given a protocol for equality, we can construct a code, and vice versa. We substantially extend the protocol-implies-code direction: any protocol computing a function with a large fooling set can be converted into an error-correcting code. As a corollary, we show that among functions with a fooling set of size s, equality on log s bits has the least randomized communication complexity, regardless of the restrictions on the error probability and the amount of randomness. Finally, we use the connection to error-correcting codes to analyze the randomized communication complexity of equality for varying restrictions on the error probability and the amount of randomness. In most cases, we provide tight bounds. We pinpoint the setting in which tight bounds are still unknown.

Cite as

Dale Jacobs, John Jeang, Vladimir Podolskii, Morgan Prior, and Ilya Volkovich. Communication Complexity of Equality and Error-Correcting Codes. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 37:1-37:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{jacobs_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.37,
  author =	{Jacobs, Dale and Jeang, John and Podolskii, Vladimir and Prior, Morgan and Volkovich, Ilya},
  title =	{{Communication Complexity of Equality and Error-Correcting Codes}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{37:1--37:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.37},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251175},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.37},
  annote =	{Keywords: communication complexity, randomized communication complexity, error-correcting codes}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15

Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes

Authors: Umang Bhaskar and Yeshwant Pandit

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract

The existence of EFX allocations is one of the most significant open questions in fair division. Recent work by Christodoulou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa ("Fair allocation in graphs," EC 2023) establishes the existence of EFX allocations for graphical valuations, when agents are vertices in a graph, items are edges, and each item has zero value for all agents other than those at its endpoints. Thus, in this setting, each good has non-zero value for at most two agents, and there is at most one good valued by any pair of agents. This marks one of the few cases when an exact and complete EFX allocation is known to exist for more than three agents. In this work, we partially extend these results to multi-graphs, when each pair of vertices can have more than one edge between them. The existence of EFX allocations in multi-graphs is a natural open question given their existence in simple graphs. We show that EFX allocations exist, and can be computed in polynomial time, for agents with cancelable valuations in the following cases: (i) bipartite multi-graphs, (ii) multi-trees with monotone valuations, and (iii) multi-graphs with girth (2t-1), where t is the chromatic number of the multi-graph. The existence of EFX in cycle multi-graphs follows from (i), (iii), and the known existence of EFX for three agents.

Cite as

Umang Bhaskar and Yeshwant Pandit. Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 15:1-15:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bhaskar_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15,
  author =	{Bhaskar, Umang and Pandit, Yeshwant},
  title =	{{Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{15:1--15:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-250958},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair Division, EFX, Multi-graphs}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29

Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division

Authors: Ajaykrishnan E S and Daniel Lokshtanov

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract

We study the problem of Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, where exactly p vertices of an undirected graph must be allocated to agents such that each agent receives a connected share and does not envy another agent’s share. Focusing on agents with additive valuations, we show that the problem remains computationally hard when parameterized by p and the number of agents. This result holds even for star graphs and with the input numbers given in unary representation, thereby resolving an open problem posed by Gahlawat and Zehavi (FSTTCS 2023). In stark contrast, we show that if one is willing to tolerate even the slightest amount of envy, then the problem becomes efficient with respect to the natural parameters. Specifically, we design an Efficient Parameterized Approximation Scheme parameterized by p and the number of agent types. Our algorithm works on general graphs and remains efficient even when the input numbers are provided in binary representation.

Cite as

Ajaykrishnan E S and Daniel Lokshtanov. Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 29:1-29:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{es_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29,
  author =	{E S, Ajaykrishnan and Lokshtanov, Daniel},
  title =	{{Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{29:1--29:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251101},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29},
  annote =	{Keywords: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, Efficient Parameterized Approximation Scheme, W\lbrack1\rbrack-hardness}
}

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