13 Search Results for "Bentov, Iddo"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.116
Decentralized Data Archival: New Definitions and Constructions

Authors: Elaine Shi, Rose Silver, and Changrui Mu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
We initiate the study of a new abstraction called incremental decentralized data archival (iDDA). Specifically, imagine that there is an ever-growing, massive database such as a blockchain, a comprehensive human knowledge base like Wikipedia, or the Internet archive. We want to build a decentralized archival system for such datasets to ensure long-term robustness and sustainability. We identify several important properties that an iDDA scheme should satisfy. First, to promote heterogeneity and decentralization, we want to encourage even weak nodes with limited space (e.g., users' home computers) to contribute. The minimum space requirement to contribute should be approximately independent of the data size. Second, if a collection of nodes together receive rewards commensurate with contributing a total of m blocks of space, then we want the following reassurances: 1) if m is at least the database size, we should be able to reconstruct the entire dataset; and 2) these nodes should actually be committing roughly m space in aggregate - specifically, when m is much larger than the data size, these nodes cannot store only one copy of the database, and be able to impersonate arbitrarily many pseudonyms and get unbounded rewards. We propose new definitions that mathematically formalize the aforementioned requirements of an iDDA scheme. We also devise an efficient construction in the random oracle model which satisfies the desired security requirements. Our scheme incurs only Õ(1) audit cost, as well as Õ(1) update cost for both the publisher and each node, where Õ(⋅) hides polylogarithmic factors. Further, the minimum space provisioning required to contribute is as small as polylogarithmic. Our construction exposes several interesting technical challenges. Specifically, we show that a straightforward application of the standard hierarchical data structure fails, since both our security definition and the underlying cryptographic primitives we employ lack the desired compositional guarantees. We devise novel techniques to overcome these compositional issues, resulting in a construction with provable security while still retaining efficiency. Finally, our new definitions also make a conceptual contribution, and lay the theoretical groundwork for the study of iDDA. We raise several interesting open problems along this direction.
Cite as

Elaine Shi, Rose Silver, and Changrui Mu. Decentralized Data Archival: New Definitions and Constructions. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 116:1-116:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{shi_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.116,
  author =	{Shi, Elaine and Silver, Rose and Mu, Changrui},
  title =	{{Decentralized Data Archival: New Definitions and Constructions}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{116:1--116:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.116},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-254037},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.116},
  annote =	{Keywords: Decentralized Data Archival}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.36
BlindPerm: Efficient MEV Mitigation with an Encrypted Mempool and Permutation

Authors: Alireza Kavousi, Duc V. Le, Philipp Jovanovic, and George Danezis

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 361, 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)

Abstract
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) is a crucial challenge in blockchains and cryptocurrencies. A principal countermeasure is using encrypted mempools to hide the transaction payloads until they are committed in a block. However, the existing approaches based on encrypted mempools remain vulnerable to metadata leakage and may not provide sufficient mitigation against block producers due to their sole control in block preparation. In this paper, we propose techniques that utilize randomized permutation on the committed block, offering a multi-layer solution. With a focus on proof-of-stake (PoS) committee-based consensus, we then introduce BlindPerm, a framework that enhances an encrypted mempool with permutation and present various optimizations. Notably, we propose a construction where this enhancement comes at essentially no overhead by piggybacking on the encrypted mempool and without relying on any external entity such as randomness beacon. Further, we illustrate the effectiveness of our solutions by running simulations using historical Ethereum data.
Cite as

Alireza Kavousi, Duc V. Le, Philipp Jovanovic, and George Danezis. BlindPerm: Efficient MEV Mitigation with an Encrypted Mempool and Permutation. In 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 361, pp. 36:1-36:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{kavousi_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.36,
  author =	{Kavousi, Alireza and Le, Duc V. and Jovanovic, Philipp and Danezis, George},
  title =	{{BlindPerm: Efficient MEV Mitigation with an Encrypted Mempool and Permutation}},
  booktitle =	{29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)},
  pages =	{36:1--36:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-409-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{361},
  editor =	{Arusoaie, Andrei and Onica, Emanuel and Spear, Michael and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.36},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-252091},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.36},
  annote =	{Keywords: Encrypted mempool, maximal extractable value, distributed systems}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.23
Boosting Payment Channel Network Liquidity with Topology Optimization and Transaction Selection

Authors: Krishnendu Chatterjee, Jan Matyáš Křišťan, Stefan Schmid, Jakub Svoboda, and Michelle Yeo

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 356, 39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025)

Abstract
Payment channel networks (PCNs) are a promising technology that alleviates blockchain scalability by shifting the transaction load from the blockchain to the PCN. Nevertheless, the network topology has to be carefully designed to maximise the transaction throughput in PCNs. Additionally, users in PCNs also have to make optimal decisions on which transactions to forward and which to reject to prolong the lifetime of their channels. In this work, we consider an input sequence of transactions over p parties. Each transaction consists of a transaction size, source, and target, and can be either accepted or rejected (entailing a cost). The goal is to design a PCN topology among the p cooperating parties, along with the channel capacities, and then output a decision for each transaction in the sequence to minimise the cost of creating and augmenting channels, as well as the cost of rejecting transactions. Our main contribution is an 𝒪(p) approximation algorithm for the problem with p parties. We further show that with some assumptions on the distribution of transactions, we can reduce the approximation ratio to 𝒪(√p). We complement our theoretical analysis with an empirical study of our assumptions and approach in the context of the Lightning Network.
Cite as

Krishnendu Chatterjee, Jan Matyáš Křišťan, Stefan Schmid, Jakub Svoboda, and Michelle Yeo. Boosting Payment Channel Network Liquidity with Topology Optimization and Transaction Selection. In 39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 356, pp. 23:1-23:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{chatterjee_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2025.23,
  author =	{Chatterjee, Krishnendu and K\v{r}i\v{s}\v{t}an, Jan Maty\'{a}\v{s} and Schmid, Stefan and Svoboda, Jakub and Yeo, Michelle},
  title =	{{Boosting Payment Channel Network Liquidity with Topology Optimization and Transaction Selection}},
  booktitle =	{39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2025)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-402-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{356},
  editor =	{Kowalski, Dariusz R.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-248402},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchains, Cryptocurrencies, Payment Channel Networks, Throughput, Optimisation, Graph Algorithms, Approximation Algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.1
Cache Timing Leakages in Zero-Knowledge Protocols

Authors: Shibam Mukherjee, Christian Rechberger, and Markus Schofnegger

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
The area of modern zero-knowledge proof systems has seen a significant rise in popularity over the last couple of years, with new techniques and optimized constructions emerging on a regular basis. As the field matures, the aspect of implementation attacks becomes more relevant, however side-channel attacks on zero-knowledge proof systems have seen surprisingly little treatment so far. In this paper, we give an overview of potential attack vectors and show that some of the underlying finite field libraries, and implementations of heavily used components like hash functions using them, are vulnerable w.r.t. cache attacks on CPUs. On the positive side, we demonstrate that the computational overhead to protect against these attacks is relatively small.
Cite as

Shibam Mukherjee, Christian Rechberger, and Markus Schofnegger. Cache Timing Leakages in Zero-Knowledge Protocols. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 1:1-1:26, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{mukherjee_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.1,
  author =	{Mukherjee, Shibam and Rechberger, Christian and Schofnegger, Markus},
  title =	{{Cache Timing Leakages in Zero-Knowledge Protocols}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:26},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247201},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: zero-knowledge, protocol, cache timing, side-channel, leakage}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.18
From Permissioned to Proof-of-Stake Consensus

Authors: Jovan Komatovic, Andrew Lewis-Pye, Joachim Neu, Tim Roughgarden, and Ertem Nusret Tas

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
This paper presents the first generic compiler that transforms any permissioned consensus protocol into a proof-of-stake permissionless consensus protocol. For each of the following properties, if the initial permissioned protocol satisfies that property in the partially synchronous setting, the consequent proof-of-stake protocol also satisfies that property in the partially synchronous and quasi-permissionless setting (with the same fault-tolerance): consistency; liveness; optimistic responsiveness; every composable log-specific property; and message complexity of a given order. Moreover, our transformation ensures that the output protocol satisfies accountability (identifying culprits in the event of a consistency violation), whether or not the original permissioned protocol satisfied it.
Cite as

Jovan Komatovic, Andrew Lewis-Pye, Joachim Neu, Tim Roughgarden, and Ertem Nusret Tas. From Permissioned to Proof-of-Stake Consensus. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 18:1-18:26, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{komatovic_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.18,
  author =	{Komatovic, Jovan and Lewis-Pye, Andrew and Neu, Joachim and Roughgarden, Tim and Tas, Ertem Nusret},
  title =	{{From Permissioned to Proof-of-Stake Consensus}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{18:1--18:26},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.18},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247373},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.18},
  annote =	{Keywords: Permissioned Consensus, Proof-of-Stake, generic Compiler, Blockchain}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.19
Two-Tier Black-Box Blockchains and Application to Instant Layer-1 Payments

Authors: Michele Ciampi, Yun Lu, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Vassilis Zikas

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
Common blockchain protocols are monolithic, i.e., their security relies on a single assumption, e.g., honest majority of hashing power (Bitcoin) or stake (Cardano, Algorand, Ethereum). In contrast, so-called optimistic approaches (Thunderella, Meshcash) rely on a combination of assumptions to achieve faster transaction liveness. We revisit, redesign, and augment the optimistic paradigm to a tiered approach. Our design assumes a primary (Tier 1) and a secondary (Tier 2, also referred to as fallback) blockchain, and achieves full security also in a tiered fashion: If the assumption underpinning the primary chain holds, then we guarantee safety, liveness and censorship resistance, irrespectively of the status of the fallback chain. And even if the primary assumption fails, all security properties are still satisfied (albeit with a temporary slow down) provided the fallback assumption holds. To our knowledge, no existing optimistic or tiered approach preserves both safety and liveness when any one of its underlying blockchain (assumptions) fails. The above is achieved by a new detection-and-recovery mechanism that links the two blockchains, so that any violation of safety, liveness, or censorship resistance on the (faster) primary blockchain is temporary - it is swiftly detected and recovered on the secondary chain - and thus cannot result in a persistent fork or halt of the blockchain ledger. We instantiate the above paradigm using a primary chain based on proof of reputation (PoR) and a fallback chain based on proof of stake (PoS). Our construction uses the PoR and PoS blockchains in a mostly black-box manner - where rather than assuming a concrete construction we distil abstract properties on the two blockchains that are sufficient for applying our tiered methodology. In fact, choosing reputation as the resource of the primary chain opens the door to an incentive mechanism - which we devise and analyze - that tokenizes reputation in order to deter cheating and boost participation (on both the primary/PoR and the fallback/PoS blockchain). As we demonstrate, such tokenization in combination with interpreting reputation as a built-in system-wide credit score, allows for embedding in our two-tiered methodology a novel mechanism which provides collateral-free, multi-use payment-channel-like functionality where payments can be instantly confirmed.
Cite as

Michele Ciampi, Yun Lu, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Vassilis Zikas. Two-Tier Black-Box Blockchains and Application to Instant Layer-1 Payments. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 19:1-19:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{ciampi_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.19,
  author =	{Ciampi, Michele and Lu, Yun and Ostrovsky, Rafail and Zikas, Vassilis},
  title =	{{Two-Tier Black-Box Blockchains and Application to Instant Layer-1 Payments}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{19:1--19:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247380},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fault tolerant blockchain, instantly confirmed payments}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16
Nakamoto Consensus from Multiple Resources

Authors: Mirza Ahad Baig, Christoph U. Günther, and Krzysztof Pietrzak

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
The blocks in the Bitcoin blockchain "record" the amount of work W that went into creating them through proofs of work. When honest parties control a majority of the work, consensus is achieved by picking the chain with the highest recorded weight. Resources other than work have been considered to secure such longest-chain blockchains. In Chia, blocks record the amount of disk-space S (via a proof of space) and sequential computational steps V (through a VDF). In this paper, we ask what weight functions Γ(S,V,W) (that assign a weight to a block as a function of the recorded space, speed, and work) are secure in the sense that whenever the weight of the resources controlled by honest parties is larger than the weight of adversarial parties, the blockchain is secure against private double-spending attacks. We completely classify such functions in an idealized "continuous" model: Γ(S,V,W) is secure against private double-spending attacks if and only if it is homogeneous of degree one in the "timed" resources V and W, i.e., αΓ(S,V,W) = Γ(S,α V, α W). This includes the Bitcoin rule Γ(S,V,W) = W and the Chia rule Γ(S,V,W) = S ⋅ V. In a more realistic model where blocks are created at discrete time-points, one additionally needs some mild assumptions on the dependency on S (basically, the weight should not grow too much if S is slightly increased, say linear as in Chia). Our classification is more general and allows various instantiations of the same resource. It provides a powerful tool for designing new longest-chain blockchains. E.g., consider combining different PoWs to counter centralization, say the Bitcoin PoW W₁ and a memory-hard PoW W₂. Previous work suggested to use W₁+W₂ as weight. Our results show that using e.g., √{W₁}⋅ √{W₂} or min{W₁,W₂} are also secure, and we argue that in practice these are much better choices.
Cite as

Mirza Ahad Baig, Christoph U. Günther, and Krzysztof Pietrzak. Nakamoto Consensus from Multiple Resources. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 16:1-16:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{baig_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16,
  author =	{Baig, Mirza Ahad and G\"{u}nther, Christoph U. and Pietrzak, Krzysztof},
  title =	{{Nakamoto Consensus from Multiple Resources}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{16:1--16:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247353},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Nakamoto Consensus, Heaviest-chain Rule, Resource Theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.27
Unravelling the Probabilistic Forest: Arbitrage in Prediction Markets

Authors: Oriol Saguillo, Vahid Ghafouri, Lucianna Kiffer, and Guillermo Suarez-Tangil

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market on Polymarket is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper market resolution, the condition set must be exhaustive - collectively accounting for all possible outcomes - and mutually exclusive - only one condition may resolve as true. Thus, the collective prices (probabilities) of all related outcomes (whether in a condition or market) should be $1, representing a combined probability of 1 of any outcome. Despite this design, Polymarket exhibits cases where dependent assets are mispriced, allowing for purchasing (or selling) a certain outcome for less than (or more than) $1, guaranteeing profit. This phenomenon, known as arbitrage, could enable sophisticated participants to exploit such inconsistencies. In this paper, we conduct an empirical arbitrage analysis on Polymarket data to answer three key questions: (Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage? (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket?, and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities? A major challenge in analyzing arbitrage between related markets lies in the scalability of comparisons across a large number of markets and conditions, with a naive analysis requiring O(2^{n+m}) comparisons. To overcome this, we employ a heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, further validated by expert input. Our study reveals two distinct forms of arbitrage on Polymarket: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which occurs within a single market or condition (intra-market), and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which spans across multiple markets (inter-market). We use on-chain historical order book data to analyze when these types of arbitrage opportunities have existed, and when they have been executed by users. We find a realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted across both types of arbitrage during our measurement period.
Cite as

Oriol Saguillo, Vahid Ghafouri, Lucianna Kiffer, and Guillermo Suarez-Tangil. Unravelling the Probabilistic Forest: Arbitrage in Prediction Markets. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 27:1-27:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{saguillo_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.27,
  author =	{Saguillo, Oriol and Ghafouri, Vahid and Kiffer, Lucianna and Suarez-Tangil, Guillermo},
  title =	{{Unravelling the Probabilistic Forest: Arbitrage in Prediction Markets}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{27:1--27:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.27},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247468},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.27},
  annote =	{Keywords: Prediction Markets, Maximal Extractable Value, Large Language Models}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.28
Optimistic MEV in Ethereum Layer 2s: Why Blockspace Is Always in Demand

Authors: Ozan Solmaz, Lioba Heimbach, Yann Vonlanthen, and Roger Wattenhofer

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
Layer 2 rollups are rapidly absorbing DeFi activity, securing over $40 billion and accounting for nearly half of Ethereum’s DEX volume by Q1 2025, yet their MEV dynamics remain understudied. We address this gap by defining and quantifying optimistic MEV, a form of speculative, on-chain MEV whose detection and execution logic reside largely on-chain in smart contracts. As a result of their speculative nature and lack of off-chain opportunity verification, optimistic MEV transactions frequently decide not to execute any trades. In this work, we focus on cyclic arbitrage, which we find is predominantly executed as optimistic MEV on Layer 2s. Using our multi-stage identification pipeline on Arbitrum, Base, and Optimism, we show that in Q1 2025, transactions from cyclic arbitrage contracts account for over 50% of on-chain gas on Base and Optimism and 7% on Arbitrum, driven mainly by "interaction" probes (on-chain computations searching for arbitrage). This speculative probing indicates that cyclic arbitrage on Layer 2s is predominantly executed as optimistic MEV and contributes to generally keeping blocks on Base and Optimism persistently full. Despite consuming over half of on-chain gas, these optimistic MEV transactions pay less than one quarter of total gas fees. Cross-network comparison reveals divergent success rates, differing patterns of code reuse, and sensitivity to varying sequencer ordering and block production times. Finally, OLS regressions link optimistic MEV trade count to ETH volatility, retail trading activity, and DEX aggregator usage. Together, these findings show that optimistic MEV has become a major source of persistent spam-like transaction activity on Layer 2s, dominating blockspace with low-value probes and reshaping the composition of on-chain activity.
Cite as

Ozan Solmaz, Lioba Heimbach, Yann Vonlanthen, and Roger Wattenhofer. Optimistic MEV in Ethereum Layer 2s: Why Blockspace Is Always in Demand. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 28:1-28:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{solmaz_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.28,
  author =	{Solmaz, Ozan and Heimbach, Lioba and Vonlanthen, Yann and Wattenhofer, Roger},
  title =	{{Optimistic MEV in Ethereum Layer 2s: Why Blockspace Is Always in Demand}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{28:1--28:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.28},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247479},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.28},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, MEV, Layer 2, Ethereum}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26
Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest

Authors: Fei Wu, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Mallesh Pai

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics and dynamics behind arbitrages between centralized and decentralized exchanges (CEX-DEX) on Ethereum. We refine heuristics to identify arbitrage transactions from on-chain data and introduce a robust empirical framework to estimate arbitrage revenue without knowing traders' actual behaviors on CEX. Leveraging an extensive dataset spanning 19 months from August 2023 to March 2025, we estimate a total of 233.8M USD extracted by 19 major CEX-DEX searchers from 7,203,560 identified CEX-DEX arbitrages. Our analysis reveals increasing centralization trends as three searchers captured three-quarters of both volume and extracted value. We also demonstrate that searchers' profitability is tied to their integration level with block builders and uncover exclusive searcher-builder relationships and their market impact. Finally, we correct the previously underestimated profitability of block builders who vertically integrate with a searcher. These insights illuminate the darkest corner of the MEV landscape and highlight the critical implications for Ethereum’s decentralization.
Cite as

Fei Wu, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Mallesh Pai. Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 26:1-26:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{wu_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26,
  author =	{Wu, Fei and Sui, Danning and Thiery, Thomas and Pai, Mallesh},
  title =	{{Measuring CEX-DEX Extracted Value and Searcher Profitability: The Darkest of the MEV Dark Forest}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{26:1--26:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247450},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.26},
  annote =	{Keywords: Decentralized Finance, Maximal Extractable Value, CEX-DEX arbitrages}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.20
Selfish Mining Under General Stochastic Rewards

Authors: Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, and S. Matthew Weinberg

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
Selfish miners selectively withhold blocks to earn disproportionately high revenue. The vast majority of the selfish mining literature focuses exclusively on block rewards. [Carlsten et al., 2016] is a notable exception, observing that similar strategic behavior is profitable in a zero-block-reward regime (the endgame for Bitcoin’s quadrennial halving schedule) if miners are compensated with transaction fees alone. Neither model fully captures miner incentives today. The block reward remains 3.125 BTC, yet some blocks yield significantly higher revenue. For example, congestion during the launch of the Babylon protocol in August 2024 caused transaction fees to spike from 0.14 BTC to 9.52 BTC, a 68× increase in fees within two blocks. Our results are both practical and theoretical. Of practical interest, we study selfish mining profitability under a combined reward function that more accurately models miner incentives. This analysis enables us to make quantitative claims about protocol risk (e.g., the mining power at which a selfish strategy becomes profitable is reduced by 22% when optimizing over the combined reward function versus block rewards alone) and qualitative observations (e.g., a miner considering both block rewards and transaction fees will mine more or less aggressively respectively than if they cared about either alone). These practical results follow from our novel model and methodology, which constitute our theoretical contributions. We model general, time-accruing stochastic rewards in the Nakamoto Consensus Game, which requires explicit treatment of difficult adjustment and randomness; we characterize reward function structure through a set of properties (e.g., that rewards accrue only as a function of time since the parent block). We present a new methodology to analytically calculate expected selfish miner rewards under a broad class of stochastic reward functions and validate our method numerically by comparing it with the existing literature and simulating the combined reward sources directly.
Cite as

Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Selfish Mining Under General Stochastic Rewards. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 20:1-20:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bahrani_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.20,
  author =	{Bahrani, Maryam and Neuder, Michael and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  title =	{{Selfish Mining Under General Stochastic Rewards}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{20:1--20:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247396},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: Proof-of-Work, Selfish Mining, MEV}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.23
Accumulation Without Homomorphism

Authors: Benedikt Bünz, Pratyush Mishra, Wilson Nguyen, and William Wang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
Accumulation schemes are a simple yet powerful primitive that enable highly efficient constructions of incrementally verifiable computation (IVC). Unfortunately, all prior accumulation schemes rely on homomorphic vector commitments whose security is based on public-key assumptions. It is an interesting open question to construct efficient accumulation schemes that avoid the need for such assumptions. In this paper, we answer this question affirmatively by constructing an accumulation scheme from non-homomorphic vector commitments which can be realized from solely symmetric-key assumptions (e.g., Merkle trees). We overcome the need for homomorphisms by instead performing spot-checks over error-correcting encodings of the committed vectors. Unlike prior accumulation schemes, our scheme only supports a bounded number of accumulation steps. We show that such bounded-depth accumulation still suffices to construct proof-carrying data (a generalization of IVC). We also demonstrate several optimizations to our PCD construction which greatly improve concrete efficiency.
Cite as

Benedikt Bünz, Pratyush Mishra, Wilson Nguyen, and William Wang. Accumulation Without Homomorphism. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 23:1-23:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bunz_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.23,
  author =	{B\"{u}nz, Benedikt and Mishra, Pratyush and Nguyen, Wilson and Wang, William},
  title =	{{Accumulation Without Homomorphism}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-226510},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: Proof-carrying data, incrementally verifiable computation, accumulation schemes}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.14
Fast Reed-Solomon Interactive Oracle Proofs of Proximity

Authors: Eli Ben-Sasson, Iddo Bentov, Yinon Horesh, and Michael Riabzev

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 107, 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)

Abstract
The family of Reed-Solomon (RS) codes plays a prominent role in the construction of quasilinear probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) and interactive oracle proofs (IOPs) with perfect zero knowledge and polylogarithmic verifiers. The large concrete computational complexity required to prove membership in RS codes is one of the biggest obstacles to deploying such PCP/IOP systems in practice. To advance on this problem we present a new interactive oracle proof of proximity (IOPP) for RS codes; we call it the Fast RS IOPP (FRI) because (i) it resembles the ubiquitous Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and (ii) the arithmetic complexity of its prover is strictly linear and that of the verifier is strictly logarithmic (in comparison, FFT arithmetic complexity is quasi-linear but not strictly linear). Prior RS IOPPs and PCPs of proximity (PCPPs) required super-linear proving time even for polynomially large query complexity. For codes of block-length N, the arithmetic complexity of the (interactive) FRI prover is less than 6 * N, while the (interactive) FRI verifier has arithmetic complexity <= 21 * log N, query complexity 2 * log N and constant soundness - words that are delta-far from the code are rejected with probability min{delta * (1-o(1)),delta_0} where delta_0 is a positive constant that depends mainly on the code rate. The particular combination of query complexity and soundness obtained by FRI is better than that of the quasilinear PCPP of [Ben-Sasson and Sudan, SICOMP 2008], even with the tighter soundness analysis of [Ben-Sasson et al., STOC 2013; ECCC 2016]; consequently, FRI is likely to facilitate better concretely efficient zero knowledge proof and argument systems. Previous concretely efficient PCPPs and IOPPs suffered a constant multiplicative factor loss in soundness with each round of "proof composition" and thus used at most O(log log N) rounds. We show that when delta is smaller than the unique decoding radius of the code, FRI suffers only a negligible additive loss in soundness. This observation allows us to increase the number of "proof composition" rounds to Theta(log N) and thereby reduce prover and verifier running time for fixed soundness.
Cite as

Eli Ben-Sasson, Iddo Bentov, Yinon Horesh, and Michael Riabzev. Fast Reed-Solomon Interactive Oracle Proofs of Proximity. In 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 107, pp. 14:1-14:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{bensasson_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.14,
  author =	{Ben-Sasson, Eli and Bentov, Iddo and Horesh, Yinon and Riabzev, Michael},
  title =	{{Fast Reed-Solomon Interactive Oracle Proofs of Proximity}},
  booktitle =	{45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-076-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{107},
  editor =	{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Kaklamanis, Christos and Marx, D\'{a}niel and Sannella, Donald},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-90183},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Interactive proofs, low degree testing, Reed Solomon codes, proximity testing}
}
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