37 Search Results for "Sandholm, Tuomas"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.51
Near-Optimal Sparsifiers for Stochastic Knapsack and Assignment Problems

Authors: Shaddin Dughmi, Yusuf Hakan Kalayci, and Xinyu Liu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
When uncertainty meets costly information gathering, a fundamental question emerges: which data points should we probe to unlock near-optimal solutions? Sparsification of stochastic packing problems addresses this trade-off. The existing notions of sparsification measure the level of sparsity, called degree, as the ratio of queried items to the optimal solution size. While effective for matching and matroid-type problems with uniform structures, this cardinality-based approach fails for knapsack-type constraints where feasible sets exhibit dramatic structural variation. We introduce a polyhedral sparsification framework that measures the degree as the smallest scalar needed to embed the query set within a scaled feasibility polytope, naturally capturing redundancy without relying on cardinality. Our main contribution establishes that knapsack, multiple knapsack, and generalized assignment problems admit (1-ε)-approximate sparsifiers with degree polynomial in 1/p and 1/ε - where p denotes the independent activation probability of each element - remarkably independent of problem dimensions. The key insight involves grouping items with similar weights and deploying a charging argument: when our query set misses an optimal item, we either substitute it directly with a queried item from the same group or leverage that group’s excess contribution to compensate for the loss. This reveals an intriguing complexity-theoretic separation - while the multiple knapsack problem lacks an FPTAS and generalized assignment is APX-hard, their sparsification counterparts admit efficient (1-ε)-approximation algorithms that identify polynomial degree query sets. Finally, we raise an open question: can such sparsification extend to general integer linear programs with degree independent of problem dimensions?
Cite as

Shaddin Dughmi, Yusuf Hakan Kalayci, and Xinyu Liu. Near-Optimal Sparsifiers for Stochastic Knapsack and Assignment Problems. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 51:1-51:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

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@InProceedings{dughmi_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.51,
  author =	{Dughmi, Shaddin and Kalayci, Yusuf Hakan and Liu, Xinyu},
  title =	{{Near-Optimal Sparsifiers for Stochastic Knapsack and Assignment Problems}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{51:1--51:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.51},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253386},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.51},
  annote =	{Keywords: Packing Problems, Assignment Problems, Stochastic Selection, Sparsification}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.9
An ETH-Tight FPT Algorithm for Rejection-Proof Set Packing with Applications to Kidney Exchange

Authors: Bart M. P. Jansen, Jeroen S. K. Lamme, and Ruben F. A. Verhaegh

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 358, 20th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2025)

Abstract
We study the parameterized complexity of a recently introduced multi-agent variant of the Kidney Exchange problem. Given a directed graph G and integers d and k, the standard problem asks whether G contains a packing of vertex-disjoint cycles, each of length ≤ d, covering at least k vertices in total. In the multi-agent setting we consider, the vertex set is partitioned over several agents who reject a cycle packing as solution if it can be modified into an alternative packing that covers more of their own vertices. A cycle packing is called rejection-proof if no agent rejects it and the problem asks whether such a packing exists that covers at least k vertices. We exploit the sunflower lemma on a set packing formulation of the problem to give a kernel for this Σ₂^P-complete problem that is polynomial in k for all constant values of d. We also provide a 2^𝒪(k log k) + n^𝒪(1) algorithm based on it and show that this FPT algorithm is asymptotically optimal under the ETH. Further, we generalize the problem by including an additional positive integer c in the input that naturally captures how much agents can modify a given cycle packing to reject it. For every constant c, the resulting problem simplifies from being Σ₂^P-complete to NP-complete. The super-exponential lower bound already holds for c = 2, though. We present an ad-hoc single-exponential algorithm for c = 1. These results reveal an interesting discrepancy between the classical and parameterized complexity of the problem and give a good view of what makes it hard.
Cite as

Bart M. P. Jansen, Jeroen S. K. Lamme, and Ruben F. A. Verhaegh. An ETH-Tight FPT Algorithm for Rejection-Proof Set Packing with Applications to Kidney Exchange. In 20th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 358, pp. 9:1-9:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{jansen_et_al:LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.9,
  author =	{Jansen, Bart M. P. and Lamme, Jeroen S. K. and Verhaegh, Ruben F. A.},
  title =	{{An ETH-Tight FPT Algorithm for Rejection-Proof Set Packing with Applications to Kidney Exchange}},
  booktitle =	{20th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2025)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-407-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{358},
  editor =	{Agrawal, Akanksha and van Leeuwen, Erik Jan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251414},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Parameterized complexity, Multi-agent kidney exchange, Kernelization, Set packing}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.6
On the Complexity of Knapsack Under Explorable Uncertainty: Hardness and Algorithms

Authors: Jens Schlöter

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 351, 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)

Abstract
In the knapsack problem under explorable uncertainty, we are given a knapsack instance with uncertain item profits. Instead of having access to the precise profits, we are only given uncertainty intervals that are guaranteed to contain the corresponding profits. The actual item profit can be obtained via a query. The goal of the problem is to adaptively query item profits until the revealed information suffices to compute an optimal (or approximate) solution to the underlying knapsack instance. Since queries are costly, the objective is to minimize the number of queries. In the offline variant of this problem, we assume knowledge of the precise profits and the task is to compute a query set of minimum cardinality that a third party without access to the profits could use to identify an optimal (or approximate) knapsack solution. We show that this offline variant is complete for the second-level of the polynomial hierarchy, i.e., Σ₂^p-complete, and cannot be approximated within a non-trivial factor unless Σ₂^p = Δ₂^p. Motivated by these strong hardness results, we consider a "resource-augmented" variant of the problem where the requirements on the query set computed by an algorithm are less strict than the requirements on the optimal solution we compare against. More precisely, a query set computed by the algorithm must reveal sufficient information to identify an approximate knapsack solution, while the optimal query set we compare against has to reveal sufficient information to identify an optimal solution. We show that this resource-augmented setting allows interesting non-trivial algorithmic results.
Cite as

Jens Schlöter. On the Complexity of Knapsack Under Explorable Uncertainty: Hardness and Algorithms. In 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 351, pp. 6:1-6:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{schloter:LIPIcs.ESA.2025.6,
  author =	{Schl\"{o}ter, Jens},
  title =	{{On the Complexity of Knapsack Under Explorable Uncertainty: Hardness and Algorithms}},
  booktitle =	{33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-395-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{351},
  editor =	{Benoit, Anne and Kaplan, Haim and Wild, Sebastian and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-244740},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Explorable uncertainty, knapsack, queries, approximation algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52
Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary

Authors: Kiarash Banihashem, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Dariusz R. Kowalski, Piotr Krysta, Danny Mittal, and Jan Olkowski

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 351, 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)

Abstract
One of the classic problems in online decision-making is the secretary problem, where the goal is to hire the best secretary out of n rankable applicants or, in a natural extension, to maximize the probability of selecting the largest number from a sequence arriving in random order. Many works have considered generalizations of this problem where one can accept multiple values subject to a combinatorial constraint. The seminal work of Babaioff, Immorlica, Kempe, and Kleinberg (SODA'07, JACM'18) proposed the matroid secretary conjecture, suggesting that there exists an O(1)-competitive algorithm for the matroid constraint, and many works since have attempted to obtain algorithms for both general matroids and specific classes of matroids. The ultimate goal of these results is to obtain an e-competitive algorithm, and the strong matroid secretary conjecture states that this is possible for general matroids. One of the most important classes of matroids is the graphic matroid, where a set of edges in a graph is deemed independent if it contains no cycle. Given the rich combinatorial structure of graphs, obtaining algorithms for these matroids is often seen as a good first step towards solving the problem for general matroids. For matroid secretary, Babaioff et al. (SODA'07, JACM'18) first studied graphic matroid case and obtained a 16-competitive algorithm. Subsequent works have improved the competitive ratio, most recently to 4 by Soto, Turkieltaub, and Verdugo (SODA'18). In this paper, we break the 4-competitive barrier for the problem, obtaining a new algorithm with a competitive ratio of 3.95. For the special case of simple graphs (i.e., graphs that do not contain parallel edges) we further improve this to 3.77. Intuitively, solving the problem for simple graphs is easier as they do not contain cycles of length two. A natural question that arises is whether we can obtain a ratio arbitrarily close to e by assuming the graph has a large enough girth. We answer this question affirmatively, proving that one can obtain a competitive ratio arbitrarily close to e even for constant values of girth, providing further evidence for the strong matroid secretary conjecture. We further show that this bound is tight: for any constant g, one cannot obtain a competitive ratio better than e even if we assume that the input graph has girth at least g. To our knowledge, such a bound was not previously known even for simple graphs.
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Kiarash Banihashem, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Dariusz R. Kowalski, Piotr Krysta, Danny Mittal, and Jan Olkowski. Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary. In 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 351, pp. 52:1-52:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{banihashem_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52,
  author =	{Banihashem, Kiarash and Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi and Kowalski, Dariusz R. and Krysta, Piotr and Mittal, Danny and Olkowski, Jan},
  title =	{{Beating Competitive Ratio 4 for Graphic Matroid Secretary}},
  booktitle =	{33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)},
  pages =	{52:1--52:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-395-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{351},
  editor =	{Benoit, Anne and Kaplan, Haim and Wild, Sebastian and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-245205},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.52},
  annote =	{Keywords: online algorithms, graphic matroids, secretary problem}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.SAT.2025.19
An Application of SAT Solvers in Integer Programming Games

Authors: Pravesh Koirala, Aditya Shrey, and Forrest Laine

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 341, 28th International Conference on Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing (SAT 2025)

Abstract
Integer programming games (IPGs) are a popular game-theoretic tool to model an array of games where each player has a discrete strategy set. These games arise in important domains such as economics, transportation, cybersecurity, etc., but solving them is non-trivial as it is known that checking for the existence of pure Nash equilibria in an IPG is Σ₂^p-complete. Recent works have proposed a class of relaxed solution concepts for IPGs called locally optimal integer solutions (LOIS) and shown it to be an efficient alternative for pure Nash equilibria. While LOIS are significantly simpler to compute, they still do not scale when solved using traditional mathematical solvers, especially when high-quality solutions are desired. In this paper, we apply commercially available SAT solvers to find LOIS in IPGs. We investigate efficient encodings for a cybersecurity game and compare solution times when using SAT solvers vs mathematical program solvers. We also investigate the application of SAT solvers in graph games using a graph interdiction example and compare against the obtained LOI solutions against existing heuristics-based solutions. Our results indicate that with appropriate encodings, large-scale IPGs can be solved much more efficiently using SAT solvers. We also show that SAT solvers can be applied to graph games in conjunction with LOIS for obtaining high-quality solutions. Our results emphasize the potential of SAT solvers combined with LOIS to solve significant game theory problems.
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Pravesh Koirala, Aditya Shrey, and Forrest Laine. An Application of SAT Solvers in Integer Programming Games. In 28th International Conference on Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing (SAT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 341, pp. 19:1-19:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{koirala_et_al:LIPIcs.SAT.2025.19,
  author =	{Koirala, Pravesh and Shrey, Aditya and Laine, Forrest},
  title =	{{An Application of SAT Solvers in Integer Programming Games}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing (SAT 2025)},
  pages =	{19:1--19:12},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-381-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{341},
  editor =	{Berg, Jeremias and Nordstr\"{o}m, Jakob},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.SAT.2025.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-237534},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.SAT.2025.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: Game Theory, Integer Programming Games, SAT Solvers, Local Solutions, Graph Games}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.58
A New Impossibility Result for Online Bipartite Matching Problems

Authors: Flavio Chierichetti, Mirko Giacchini, Alessandro Panconesi, and Andrea Vattani

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
Online Bipartite Matching with random user arrival is a fundamental problem in the online advertisement ecosystem. Over the last 30 years, many algorithms and impossibility results have been developed for this problem. In particular, the latest impossibility result was established by Manshadi, Oveis Gharan and Saberi [Manshadi et al., 2011] in 2011. Since then, several algorithms have been published in an effort to narrow the gap between the upper and the lower bounds on the competitive ratio. In this paper we show that no algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than 1- e/(e^e) = 0.82062…, improving upon the 0.823 upper bound presented in [Manshadi et al., 2011]. Our construction is simple to state, accompanied by a fully analytic proof, and yields a competitive ratio bound intriguingly similar to 1 - 1/e, the optimal competitive ratio for the fully adversarial Online Bipartite Matching problem. Although the tightness of our upper bound remains an open question, we show that our construction is extremal in a natural class of instances.
Cite as

Flavio Chierichetti, Mirko Giacchini, Alessandro Panconesi, and Andrea Vattani. A New Impossibility Result for Online Bipartite Matching Problems. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 58:1-58:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{chierichetti_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.58,
  author =	{Chierichetti, Flavio and Giacchini, Mirko and Panconesi, Alessandro and Vattani, Andrea},
  title =	{{A New Impossibility Result for Online Bipartite Matching Problems}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{58:1--58:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.58},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234354},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.58},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bipartite Matching, Random Graphs, Competitive Ratio}
}
Document
Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.67
Query Efficient Weighted Stochastic Matching

Authors: Mahsa Derakhshan and Mohammad Saneian

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 334, 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)

Abstract
In this paper, we study the weighted stochastic matching problem. Let G = (V, E) be a given edge-weighted graph, and let its realization 𝒢 be a random subgraph of G that includes each edge e ∈ E independently with a known probability p_e. The goal in this problem is to pick a sparse subgraph Q of G without prior knowledge of 𝒢, such that the maximum weight matching among the realized edges of Q (i.e., the subgraph Q ∩ 𝒢) in expectation approximates the maximum weight matching of the entire realization 𝒢. It is established by previous work that attaining any constant approximation ratio for this problem requires selecting a subgraph of max-degree Ω(1/p), where p = min_{e ∈ E} p_e. On the positive side, there exists a (1-ε)-approximation algorithm by Behnezhad and Derakhshan [FOCS'20], albeit at the cost of a max-degree having exponential dependence on 1/p. Within the O(1/p) query regime, however, the best-known algorithm achieves a 0.536 approximation ratio due to Dughmi, Kalayci, and Patel [ICALP'23], improving over the 0.501 approximation algorithm by Behnezhad, Farhadi, Hajiaghayi, and Reyhani [SODA'19]. In this work, we present a 0.68-approximation algorithm with the asymptotically optimal O(1/p) queries per vertex. Our result not only substantially improves the approximation ratio for weighted graphs, but also breaks the well-known 2/3 barrier with the optimal number of queries - even for unweighted graphs. Our analysis involves reducing the problem to designing a randomized matching algorithm on a given stochastic graph with some variance-bounding properties. To achieve these properties, we leverage a randomized algorithm by MacRury and Ma [STOC'24] for a variant of online stochastic matching.
Cite as

Mahsa Derakhshan and Mohammad Saneian. Query Efficient Weighted Stochastic Matching. In 52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 334, pp. 67:1-67:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{derakhshan_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.67,
  author =	{Derakhshan, Mahsa and Saneian, Mohammad},
  title =	{{Query Efficient Weighted Stochastic Matching}},
  booktitle =	{52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2025)},
  pages =	{67:1--67:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-372-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{334},
  editor =	{Censor-Hillel, Keren and Grandoni, Fabrizio and Ouaknine, Jo\"{e}l and Puppis, Gabriele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.67},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-234445},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.67},
  annote =	{Keywords: Sublinear algorithms, Stochastic, Matching}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.4
A Bicriterion Concentration Inequality and Prophet Inequalities for k-Fold Matroid Unions

Authors: Noga Alon, Nick Gravin, Tristan Pollner, Aviad Rubinstein, Hongao Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Qianfan Zhang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
We investigate prophet inequalities with competitive ratios approaching 1, seeking to generalize k-uniform matroids. We first show that large girth does not suffice: for all k, there exists a matroid of girth ≥ k and a prophet inequality instance on that matroid whose optimal competitive ratio is 1/2. Next, we show k-fold matroid unions do suffice: we provide a prophet inequality with competitive ratio 1-O(√{(log k)/k}) for any k-fold matroid union. Our prophet inequality follows from an online contention resolution scheme. The key technical ingredient in our online contention resolution scheme is a novel bicriterion concentration inequality for arbitrary monotone 1-Lipschitz functions over independent items which may be of independent interest. Applied to our particular setting, our bicriterion concentration inequality yields "Chernoff-strength" concentration for a 1-Lipschitz function that is not (approximately) self-bounding.
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Noga Alon, Nick Gravin, Tristan Pollner, Aviad Rubinstein, Hongao Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Qianfan Zhang. A Bicriterion Concentration Inequality and Prophet Inequalities for k-Fold Matroid Unions. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 4:1-4:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{alon_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.4,
  author =	{Alon, Noga and Gravin, Nick and Pollner, Tristan and Rubinstein, Aviad and Wang, Hongao and Weinberg, S. Matthew and Zhang, Qianfan},
  title =	{{A Bicriterion Concentration Inequality and Prophet Inequalities for k-Fold Matroid Unions}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{4:1--4:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-226329},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Prophet Inequalities, Online Contention Resolution Schemes, Concentration Inequalities}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84
Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions

Authors: Aviad Rubinstein and Zixin Zhou

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the fundamental, classical mechanism design problem of single-buyer multi-item Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity between the buyer and the seller. Specifically, we ask whether using quantum communication can be more efficient than classical communication. We have two sets of results, revealing a surprisingly rich landscape - which looks quite different from both quantum communication in non-strategic parties, and classical communication in mechanism design. We first study the expected communication complexity of approximately optimal auctions. We give quantum auction protocols for buyers with unit-demand or combinatorial valuations that obtain an arbitrarily good approximation of the optimal revenue while running in exponentially more efficient communication compared to classical approximately optimal auctions. However, these auctions come with the caveat that they may require the seller to charge exponentially large payments from a deviating buyer. We show that this caveat is necessary - we give an exponential lower bound on the product of the expected quantum communication and the maximum payment. We then study the worst-case communication complexity of exactly optimal auctions in an extremely simple setting: additive buyer’s valuations over two items. We show the following separations: - There exists a prior where the optimal classical auction protocol requires infinitely many bits, but a one-way message of 1 qubit and 2 classical bits suffices. - There exists a prior where no finite one-way quantum auction protocol can obtain the optimal revenue. However, there is a barely-interactive revenue-optimal quantum auction protocol with the following simple structure: the seller prepares a pair of qubits in the EPR state, sends one of them to the buyer, and then the buyer sends 1 qubit and 2 classical bits. - There exists a prior where no multi-round quantum auction protocol with a finite bound on communication complexity can obtain the optimal revenue.
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Aviad Rubinstein and Zixin Zhou. Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 84:1-84:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{rubinstein_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84,
  author =	{Rubinstein, Aviad and Zhou, Zixin},
  title =	{{Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{84:1--84:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-227124},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.84},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism design, Communication complexity, Quantum computing}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.41
Query Complexity of Stochastic Minimum Vertex Cover

Authors: Mahsa Derakhshan, Mohammad Saneian, and Zhiyang Xun

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the stochastic minimum vertex cover problem for general graphs. In this problem, we are given a graph G = (V, E) and an existence probability p_e for each edge e ∈ E. Edges of G are realized (or exist) independently with these probabilities, forming the realized subgraph 𝒢. The existence of an edge in 𝒢 can only be verified using edge queries. The goal of this problem is to find a near-optimal vertex cover of 𝒢 using a small number of queries. Previous work by Derakhshan, Durvasula, and Haghtalab [STOC 2023] established the existence of 1.5 + ε approximation algorithms for this problem with O(n/ε) queries. They also show that, under mild correlation among edge realizations, beating this approximation ratio requires querying a subgraph of size Ω(n ⋅ RS(n)). Here, RS(n) refers to Ruzsa-Szemerédi Graphs and represents the largest number of induced edge-disjoint matchings of size Θ(n) in an n-vertex graph. In this work, we design a simple algorithm for finding a (1 + ε) approximate vertex cover by querying a subgraph of size O(n ⋅ RS(n)) for any absolute constant ε > 0. Our algorithm can tolerate up to O(n ⋅ RS(n)) correlated edges, hence effectively completing our understanding of the problem under mild correlation.
Cite as

Mahsa Derakhshan, Mohammad Saneian, and Zhiyang Xun. Query Complexity of Stochastic Minimum Vertex Cover. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 41:1-41:12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{derakhshan_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.41,
  author =	{Derakhshan, Mahsa and Saneian, Mohammad and Xun, Zhiyang},
  title =	{{Query Complexity of Stochastic Minimum Vertex Cover}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{41:1--41:12},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.41},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-226691},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.41},
  annote =	{Keywords: Sublinear algorithms, Vertex cover, Query complexity}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.10
Algorithmic Collusion Without Threats

Authors: Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Sampath Kannan, Aaron Roth, and Juba Ziani

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
There has been substantial recent concern that automated pricing algorithms might learn to "collude." Supra-competitive prices can emerge as a Nash equilibrium of repeated pricing games, in which sellers play strategies which threaten to punish their competitors if they ever "defect" from a set of supra-competitive prices, and these strategies can be automatically learned. But threats are anti-competitive on their face. In fact, a standard economic intuition is that supra-competitive prices emerge from either the use of threats, or a failure of one party to correctly optimize their payoff. Is this intuition correct? Would explicitly preventing threats in algorithmic decision-making prevent supra-competitive prices when sellers are optimizing for their own revenue? No. We show that supra-competitive prices can robustly emerge even when both players are using algorithms which do not explicitly encode threats, and which optimize for their own revenue. Since deploying an algorithm is a form of commitment, we study sequential Bertrand pricing games (and a continuous variant) in which a first mover deploys an algorithm and then a second mover optimizes within the resulting environment. We show that if the first mover deploys any algorithm with a no-regret guarantee, and then the second mover even approximately optimizes within this now static environment, monopoly-like prices arise. The result holds for any no-regret learning algorithm deployed by the first mover and for any pricing policy of the second mover that obtains them profit at least as high as a random pricing would - and hence the result applies even when the second mover is optimizing only within a space of non-responsive pricing distributions which are incapable of encoding threats. In fact, there exists a set of strategies, neither of which explicitly encode threats that form a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous pricing game in algorithm space, and lead to near monopoly prices. This suggests that the definition of "algorithmic collusion" may need to be expanded, to include strategies without explicitly encoded threats.
Cite as

Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Sampath Kannan, Aaron Roth, and Juba Ziani. Algorithmic Collusion Without Threats. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 10:1-10:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{arunachaleswaran_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.10,
  author =	{Arunachaleswaran, Eshwar Ram and Collina, Natalie and Kannan, Sampath and Roth, Aaron and Ziani, Juba},
  title =	{{Algorithmic Collusion Without Threats}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-226386},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Algorithmic Game Theory, Algorithmic Collusion, No-Regret Dynamics}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.52
Combinatorial Pen Testing (Or Consumer Surplus of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions)

Authors: Aadityan Ganesh and Jason Hartline

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
Pen testing is the problem of selecting high-capacity resources when the only way to measure the capacity of a resource expends its capacity. We have a set of n pens with unknown amounts of ink and our goal is to select a feasible subset of pens maximizing the total ink in them. We are allowed to learn about the ink levels by writing with them, but this uses up ink that was previously in the pens. We identify optimal and near optimal pen testing algorithms by drawing analogues to auction theoretic frameworks of deferred-acceptance auctions and virtual values. Our framework allows the conversion of any near optimal deferred-acceptance mechanism into a near optimal pen testing algorithm. Moreover, these algorithms guarantee an additional overhead of at most (1+o(1)) ln n in the approximation factor to the omniscient algorithm that has access to the ink levels in the pens. We use this framework to give pen testing algorithms for various combinatorial constraints like matroid, knapsack, and general downward-closed constraints, and also for online environments.
Cite as

Aadityan Ganesh and Jason Hartline. Combinatorial Pen Testing (Or Consumer Surplus of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions). In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 52:1-52:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{ganesh_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.52,
  author =	{Ganesh, Aadityan and Hartline, Jason},
  title =	{{Combinatorial Pen Testing (Or Consumer Surplus of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions)}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{52:1--52:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.52},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-226808},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.52},
  annote =	{Keywords: Pen testing, consumer surplus, money-burning, deferred-acceptance auctions}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.5
On the Complexity of Computing Sparse Equilibria and Lower Bounds for No-Regret Learning in Games

Authors: Ioannis Anagnostides, Alkis Kalavasis, Tuomas Sandholm, and Manolis Zampetakis

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 287, 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024)

Abstract
Characterizing the performance of no-regret dynamics in multi-player games is a foundational problem at the interface of online learning and game theory. Recent results have revealed that when all players adopt specific learning algorithms, it is possible to improve exponentially over what is predicted by the overly pessimistic no-regret framework in the traditional adversarial regime, thereby leading to faster convergence to the set of coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) - a standard game-theoretic equilibrium concept. Yet, despite considerable recent progress, the fundamental complexity barriers for learning in normal- and extensive-form games are poorly understood. In this paper, we make a step towards closing this gap by first showing that - barring major complexity breakthroughs - any polynomial-time learning algorithms in extensive-form games need at least 2^{log^{1/2 - o(1)} |𝒯|} iterations for the average regret to reach below even an absolute constant, where |𝒯| is the number of nodes in the game. This establishes a superpolynomial separation between no-regret learning in normal- and extensive-form games, as in the former class a logarithmic number of iterations suffices to achieve constant average regret. Furthermore, our results imply that algorithms such as multiplicative weights update, as well as its optimistic counterpart, require at least 2^{(log log m)^{1/2 - o(1)}} iterations to attain an O(1)-CCE in m-action normal-form games under any parameterization. These are the first non-trivial - and dimension-dependent - lower bounds in that setting for the most well-studied algorithms in the literature. From a technical standpoint, we follow a beautiful connection recently made by Foster, Golowich, and Kakade (ICML '23) between sparse CCE and Nash equilibria in the context of Markov games. Consequently, our lower bounds rule out polynomial-time algorithms well beyond the traditional online learning framework, capturing techniques commonly used for accelerating centralized equilibrium computation.
Cite as

Ioannis Anagnostides, Alkis Kalavasis, Tuomas Sandholm, and Manolis Zampetakis. On the Complexity of Computing Sparse Equilibria and Lower Bounds for No-Regret Learning in Games. In 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 287, pp. 5:1-5:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{anagnostides_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.5,
  author =	{Anagnostides, Ioannis and Kalavasis, Alkis and Sandholm, Tuomas and Zampetakis, Manolis},
  title =	{{On the Complexity of Computing Sparse Equilibria and Lower Bounds for No-Regret Learning in Games}},
  booktitle =	{15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2024)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-309-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{287},
  editor =	{Guruswami, Venkatesan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-195334},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2024.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: No-regret learning, extensive-form games, multiplicative weights update, optimism, lower bounds}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2022.3
Improved Sample Complexity Bounds for Branch-And-Cut

Authors: Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm, and Ellen Vitercik

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 235, 28th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2022)

Abstract
The branch-and-cut algorithm for integer programming has a wide variety of tunable parameters that have a huge impact on its performance, but which are challenging to tune by hand. An increasingly popular approach is to use machine learning to configure these parameters based on a training set of integer programs from the application domain. We bound how large the training set should be to ensure that for any configuration, its average performance over the training set is close to its expected future performance. Our guarantees apply to parameters that control the most important aspects of branch-and-cut: node selection, branching constraint selection, and cut selection, and are sharper and more general than those from prior research.
Cite as

Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm, and Ellen Vitercik. Improved Sample Complexity Bounds for Branch-And-Cut. In 28th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 235, pp. 3:1-3:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{balcan_et_al:LIPIcs.CP.2022.3,
  author =	{Balcan, Maria-Florina and Prasad, Siddharth and Sandholm, Tuomas and Vitercik, Ellen},
  title =	{{Improved Sample Complexity Bounds for Branch-And-Cut}},
  booktitle =	{28th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2022)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-240-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{235},
  editor =	{Solnon, Christine},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2022.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-166321},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2022.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Automated algorithm configuration, integer programming, machine learning theory, tree search, branch-and-bound, branch-and-cut, cutting planes, sample complexity, generalization guarantees, data-driven algorithm design}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07431.1
07431 Abstracts Collection – Computational Issues in Social Choice

Authors: Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, and Tuomas Sandholm

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7431, Computational Issues in Social Choice (2007)

Abstract
From the 21st to the 26th of October 2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07431 on ``Computational Issues in Social Choice'' was held at the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their recent research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. The abstracts of the talks given during the seminar are collected in this paper. The first section summarises the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to full papers are provided where available.
Cite as

Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, and Tuomas Sandholm. 07431 Abstracts Collection – Computational Issues in Social Choice. In Computational Issues in Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7431, pp. 1-19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{endriss_et_al:DagSemProc.07431.1,
  author =	{Endriss, Ulle and Lang, J\'{e}r\^{o}me and Rossi, Francesca and Sandholm, Tuomas},
  title =	{{07431 Abstracts Collection – Computational Issues in Social Choice}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Issues in Social Choice},
  pages =	{1--19},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7431},
  editor =	{Ulle Endriss and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Francesca Rossi and Tuomas Sandholm},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07431.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12736},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07431.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Computational social choice, voting theory, fair division, mechanism design, coalition formation, complexity theory, preference representation, algorithms}
}
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