11 Search Results for "Budish, Eric"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.93
Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users

Authors: Amit Levy, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Chenghan Zhou

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 362, 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)

Abstract
We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contest, and then price that space to users. When analyzing our distributed ledger model, we find: - A characterization of all possible pure equilibria (although pure equilibria are not guaranteed to exist). - A natural sufficient condition, implied by Regularity (à la [Myerson, 1981]), for existence of a "market-clearing" pure equilibrium where Miners choose to sell all space allocated by the Distributed Ledger Protocol, and that this equilibrium is unique. - The market share of the largest miner is the relevant "measure of decentralization" to determine whether a market-clearing pure equilibrium exists. - Block rewards do not impact users' prices at equilibrium, when pure equilibria exist. But, higher block rewards can cause pure equilibria to exist. We also discuss aspects of our model and how they relate to blockchains deployed in practice. For example, only "patient" users (who are happy for their transactions to enter the blockchain under any miner) would enjoy the conclusions highlighted by our model, whereas "impatient" users (who are interested only for their transaction to be included in the very next block) still face monopoly pricing.
Cite as

Amit Levy, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Chenghan Zhou. Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users. In 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 362, pp. 93:1-93:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2026)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{levy_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.93,
  author =	{Levy, Amit and Weinberg, S. Matthew and Zhou, Chenghan},
  title =	{{Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users}},
  booktitle =	{17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2026)},
  pages =	{93:1--93:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-410-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{362},
  editor =	{Saraf, Shubhangi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.93},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-253805},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2026.93},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, Blockspace Markets, Decentralization, Distributed Ledgers, Equilibrium Analysis, Tullock Contests}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15
Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes

Authors: Umang Bhaskar and Yeshwant Pandit

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
The existence of EFX allocations is one of the most significant open questions in fair division. Recent work by Christodoulou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa ("Fair allocation in graphs," EC 2023) establishes the existence of EFX allocations for graphical valuations, when agents are vertices in a graph, items are edges, and each item has zero value for all agents other than those at its endpoints. Thus, in this setting, each good has non-zero value for at most two agents, and there is at most one good valued by any pair of agents. This marks one of the few cases when an exact and complete EFX allocation is known to exist for more than three agents. In this work, we partially extend these results to multi-graphs, when each pair of vertices can have more than one edge between them. The existence of EFX allocations in multi-graphs is a natural open question given their existence in simple graphs. We show that EFX allocations exist, and can be computed in polynomial time, for agents with cancelable valuations in the following cases: (i) bipartite multi-graphs, (ii) multi-trees with monotone valuations, and (iii) multi-graphs with girth (2t-1), where t is the chromatic number of the multi-graph. The existence of EFX in cycle multi-graphs follows from (i), (iii), and the known existence of EFX for three agents.
Cite as

Umang Bhaskar and Yeshwant Pandit. Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 15:1-15:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{bhaskar_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15,
  author =	{Bhaskar, Umang and Pandit, Yeshwant},
  title =	{{Extending EFX Allocations to Further Multi-Graph Classes}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{15:1--15:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-250958},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fair Division, EFX, Multi-graphs}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29
Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division

Authors: Ajaykrishnan E S and Daniel Lokshtanov

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
We study the problem of Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, where exactly p vertices of an undirected graph must be allocated to agents such that each agent receives a connected share and does not envy another agent’s share. Focusing on agents with additive valuations, we show that the problem remains computationally hard when parameterized by p and the number of agents. This result holds even for star graphs and with the input numbers given in unary representation, thereby resolving an open problem posed by Gahlawat and Zehavi (FSTTCS 2023). In stark contrast, we show that if one is willing to tolerate even the slightest amount of envy, then the problem becomes efficient with respect to the natural parameters. Specifically, we design an Efficient Parameterized Approximation Scheme parameterized by p and the number of agent types. Our algorithm works on general graphs and remains efficient even when the input numbers are provided in binary representation.
Cite as

Ajaykrishnan E S and Daniel Lokshtanov. Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 29:1-29:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{es_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29,
  author =	{E S, Ajaykrishnan and Lokshtanov, Daniel},
  title =	{{Beyond Exact Fairness: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{29:1--29:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251101},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.29},
  annote =	{Keywords: Envy-Free Incomplete Connected Fair Division, Efficient Parameterized Approximation Scheme, W\lbrack1\rbrack-hardness}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54
Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods

Authors: Sheung Man Yuen, Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama, and Warut Suksompong

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 359, 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)

Abstract
Fairly allocating indivisible goods is a frequently occurring task in everyday life. Given an initial allocation of the goods, we consider the problem of reforming it via a sequence of exchanges to attain fairness in the form of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). We present a vast array of results on the complexity of determining whether it is possible to reach an EF1 allocation from the initial allocation and, if so, the minimum number of exchanges required. In particular, we uncover several distinctions based on the number of agents involved and their utility functions. Furthermore, we derive essentially tight bounds on the worst-case number of exchanges needed to achieve EF1.
Cite as

Sheung Man Yuen, Ayumi Igarashi, Naoyuki Kamiyama, and Warut Suksompong. Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods. In 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 359, pp. 54:1-54:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{yuen_et_al:LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54,
  author =	{Yuen, Sheung Man and Igarashi, Ayumi and Kamiyama, Naoyuki and Suksompong, Warut},
  title =	{{Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)},
  pages =	{54:1--54:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-408-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{359},
  editor =	{Chen, Ho-Lin and Hon, Wing-Kai and Tsai, Meng-Tsung},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-249626},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.54},
  annote =	{Keywords: fair division, indivisible goods, envy-freeness, exchanges}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.44
Approximation Schemes for k-Subset Sum Ratio and k-Way Number Partitioning Ratio

Authors: Sotiris Kanellopoulos, Giorgos Mitropoulos, Antonis Antonopoulos, Nikos Leonardos, Aris Pagourtzis, Christos Pergaminelis, Stavros Petsalakis, and Kanellos Tsitouras

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 359, 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)

Abstract
The Subset Sum Ratio problem (SSR) asks, given a multiset A of positive integers, to find two disjoint subsets of A such that the largest-to-smallest ratio of their sums is minimized. In this paper we study the k-version of SSR, namely k-Subset Sum Ratio (k-SSR), which asks to minimize the largest-to-smallest ratio of sums of k disjoint subsets of A. We develop an approximation scheme for k-SSR running in O(n^{2k}/ε^{k-1}) time, where n = |A| and ε is the error parameter. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first FPTAS for k-SSR for fixed k > 2. We also study the k-way Number Partitioning Ratio (k-PART) problem, which differs from k-SSR in that the k subsets must constitute a partition of A; this problem in fact corresponds to the objective of minimizing the largest-to-smallest sum ratio in the family of Multiway Number Partitioning problems. We present a more involved FPTAS for k-PART, also achieving O(n^{2k}/ε^{k-1}) time complexity. Notably, k-PART is also equivalent to the Minimum Envy-Ratio problem with identical valuation functions, which has been studied in the context of fair division of indivisible goods. Thus, for the case of identical valuations, our FPTAS represents a significant improvement over the O(n^{4k²+1}/ε^{2k²}) bound obtained by Nguyen and Rothe’s FPTAS [Trung Thanh Nguyen and Jörg Rothe, 2014] for Minimum Envy-Ratio with general additive valuations. Lastly, we propose a second FPTAS for k-SSR, which employs carefully designed calls to the first one; the new scheme has a time complexity of Õ(n/ε^{3k-1}), thus being much faster when n≫ 1/ ε.
Cite as

Sotiris Kanellopoulos, Giorgos Mitropoulos, Antonis Antonopoulos, Nikos Leonardos, Aris Pagourtzis, Christos Pergaminelis, Stavros Petsalakis, and Kanellos Tsitouras. Approximation Schemes for k-Subset Sum Ratio and k-Way Number Partitioning Ratio. In 36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 359, pp. 44:1-44:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{kanellopoulos_et_al:LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.44,
  author =	{Kanellopoulos, Sotiris and Mitropoulos, Giorgos and Antonopoulos, Antonis and Leonardos, Nikos and Pagourtzis, Aris and Pergaminelis, Christos and Petsalakis, Stavros and Tsitouras, Kanellos},
  title =	{{Approximation Schemes for k-Subset Sum Ratio and k-Way Number Partitioning Ratio}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2025)},
  pages =	{44:1--44:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-408-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{359},
  editor =	{Chen, Ho-Lin and Hon, Wing-Kai and Tsai, Meng-Tsung},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.44},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-249521},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2025.44},
  annote =	{Keywords: Fully polynomial-time approximation schemes, Subset Sum Ratio, Number Partitioning, Fair division, Envy minimization, Pseudo-polynomial time algorithms}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.33
Cuttlefish: A Fair, Predictable Execution Environment for Cloud-Hosted Financial Exchanges

Authors: Liangcheng Yu, Prateesh Goyal, Ilias Marinos, and Vincent Liu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
Recent years have seen a rising interest in cloud-hosted financial exchanges. While the public cloud platforms promise a cost-effective and more accessible option to traders, unfortunately, achieving fairness in cloud environments is challenging due to non-deterministic network latencies and execution times. This work presents Cuttlefish, a fair-by-design cloud execution environment for algorithmic trading. The idea behind Cuttlefish is the efficient and robust mapping of real operations to a novel formulation of "virtual time". With it, Cuttlefish abstracts out the variances of the underlying network communication and computation hardware. Our implementation and evaluation not only validate the practicality of Cuttlefish, but also show its operational efficiency on public cloud platforms.
Cite as

Liangcheng Yu, Prateesh Goyal, Ilias Marinos, and Vincent Liu. Cuttlefish: A Fair, Predictable Execution Environment for Cloud-Hosted Financial Exchanges. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 33:1-33:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{yu_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.33,
  author =	{Yu, Liangcheng and Goyal, Prateesh and Marinos, Ilias and Liu, Vincent},
  title =	{{Cuttlefish: A Fair, Predictable Execution Environment for Cloud-Hosted Financial Exchanges}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{33:1--33:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.33},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247521},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.33},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cloud-hosted exchanges, Financial exchanges, Computation and communication variances, Virtual time overlay}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.18
From Permissioned to Proof-of-Stake Consensus

Authors: Jovan Komatovic, Andrew Lewis-Pye, Joachim Neu, Tim Roughgarden, and Ertem Nusret Tas

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
This paper presents the first generic compiler that transforms any permissioned consensus protocol into a proof-of-stake permissionless consensus protocol. For each of the following properties, if the initial permissioned protocol satisfies that property in the partially synchronous setting, the consequent proof-of-stake protocol also satisfies that property in the partially synchronous and quasi-permissionless setting (with the same fault-tolerance): consistency; liveness; optimistic responsiveness; every composable log-specific property; and message complexity of a given order. Moreover, our transformation ensures that the output protocol satisfies accountability (identifying culprits in the event of a consistency violation), whether or not the original permissioned protocol satisfied it.
Cite as

Jovan Komatovic, Andrew Lewis-Pye, Joachim Neu, Tim Roughgarden, and Ertem Nusret Tas. From Permissioned to Proof-of-Stake Consensus. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 18:1-18:26, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{komatovic_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.18,
  author =	{Komatovic, Jovan and Lewis-Pye, Andrew and Neu, Joachim and Roughgarden, Tim and Tas, Ertem Nusret},
  title =	{{From Permissioned to Proof-of-Stake Consensus}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{18:1--18:26},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.18},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247373},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.18},
  annote =	{Keywords: Permissioned Consensus, Proof-of-Stake, generic Compiler, Blockchain}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.15
Beyond Optimal Fault-Tolerance

Authors: Andrew Lewis-Pye and Tim Roughgarden

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 354, 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)

Abstract
One of the most basic properties of a consensus protocol is its fault-tolerance - the maximum fraction of faulty participants that the protocol can tolerate without losing fundamental guarantees such as safety and liveness. Because of its importance, the optimal fault-tolerance achievable by any protocol has been characterized in a wide range of settings. For example, for state machine replication (SMR) protocols operating in the partially synchronous setting, it is possible to simultaneously guarantee consistency against α-bounded adversaries (i.e., adversaries that control less than an α fraction of the participants) and liveness against β-bounded adversaries if and only if α + 2β ≤ 1. This paper characterizes to what extent "better-than-optimal" fault-tolerance guarantees are possible for SMR protocols when the standard consistency requirement is relaxed to allow a bounded number r of consistency violations, each potentially leading to the rollback of recently finalized transactions. We prove that bounded rollback is impossible without additional timing assumptions and investigate protocols that tolerate and recover from consistency violations whenever message delays around the time of an attack are bounded by a parameter Δ^* (which may be arbitrarily larger than the parameter Δ that bounds post-GST message delays in the partially synchronous model). Here, a protocol’s fault-tolerance can be a non-constant function of r, and we prove, for each r, matching upper and lower bounds on the optimal "recoverable fault-tolerance" achievable by any SMR protocol. For example, for protocols that guarantee liveness against 1/3-bounded adversaries in the partially synchronous setting, a 5/9-bounded adversary can always cause one consistency violation but not two, and a 2/3-bounded adversary can always cause two consistency violations but not three. Our positive results are achieved through a generic "recovery procedure" that can be grafted on to any accountable SMR protocol and restores consistency following a violation while rolling back only transactions that were finalized in the previous 2Δ^* timesteps.
Cite as

Andrew Lewis-Pye and Tim Roughgarden. Beyond Optimal Fault-Tolerance. In 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 354, pp. 15:1-15:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{lewispye_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2025.15,
  author =	{Lewis-Pye, Andrew and Roughgarden, Tim},
  title =	{{Beyond Optimal Fault-Tolerance}},
  booktitle =	{7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2025)},
  pages =	{15:1--15:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-400-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{354},
  editor =	{Avarikioti, Zeta and Christin, Nicolas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-247341},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Distributed computing, consensus, recovery}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.18
Loss-Versus-Fair: Efficiency of Dutch Auctions on Blockchains

Authors: Ciamac C. Moallemi and Dan Robinson

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
Milionis et al. (2023) studied the rate at which automated market makers leak value to arbitrageurs when block times are discrete and follow a Poisson process, and where the risky asset price follows a geometric Brownian motion. We extend their model to analyze another popular mechanism in decentralized finance for onchain trading: Dutch auctions. We compute the expected losses that a seller incurs to arbitrageurs and expected time-to-fill for Dutch auctions as a function of starting price, volatility, decay rate, and average interblock time. We also extend the analysis to gradual Dutch auctions, a variation on Dutch auctions for selling tokens over time at a continuous rate. We use these models to explore the tradeoff between speed of execution and quality of execution, which could help inform practitioners in setting parameters for starting price and decay rate on Dutch auctions, or help platform designers determine performance parameters like block times.
Cite as

Ciamac C. Moallemi and Dan Robinson. Loss-Versus-Fair: Efficiency of Dutch Auctions on Blockchains. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 18:1-18:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{moallemi_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.18,
  author =	{Moallemi, Ciamac C. and Robinson, Dan},
  title =	{{Loss-Versus-Fair: Efficiency of Dutch Auctions on Blockchains}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{18:1--18:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.18},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209541},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.18},
  annote =	{Keywords: Dutch auctions, blockchain, decentralized finance}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.24
Batching Trades on Automated Market Makers

Authors: Andrea Canidio and Robin Fritsch

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 282, 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)

Abstract
We consider an automated market maker (AMM) in which all trades are batched and executed at a price equal to the marginal price (i.e., the price of an arbitrarily small trade) after the batch trades. We show that such an AMM is a function maximizing AMM (or FM-AMM): for given prices, it trades to reach the highest possible value of a given function. Competition between arbitrageurs guarantees that an FM-AMM always trades at a fair, equilibrium price, and arbitrage profits (also known as LVR) are eliminated. Sandwich attacks are also eliminated because all trades occur at the exogenously-determined equilibrium price. Finally, we show that our results are robust to the case where the batch has exclusive access to the FM-AMM, but can also trade on a traditional constant function AMM.
Cite as

Andrea Canidio and Robin Fritsch. Batching Trades on Automated Market Makers. In 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 282, pp. 24:1-24:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{canidio_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2023.24,
  author =	{Canidio, Andrea and Fritsch, Robin},
  title =	{{Batching Trades on Automated Market Makers}},
  booktitle =	{5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023)},
  pages =	{24:1--24:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-303-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{282},
  editor =	{Bonneau, Joseph and Weinberg, S. Matthew},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.24},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-192139},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.24},
  annote =	{Keywords: Arbitrage profits, Loss-vs-Rebalancing (LVR), MEV, Sandwich attacks, AMM, Mechanism design, Batch trading}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.15
Strategic Behavior in Multi-unit Assignment Problems: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocations

Authors: Eric Budish and Estelle Cantillon

Published in: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Computational Social Systems and the Internet (2007)

Abstract
This paper analyses the assignment problem when agents have multi-unit demand. Applications include task assignment in a team, course allocation, sport drafts and any other allocation problem where money does not play a role in balancing supply and demand. There is no known allocation mechanism that is ex-post efficient, strategyproof and minimally fair, and practical solutions must therefore trade off these different aspects. We study such a specific mechanism used at Harvard Business School to allocate courses to students. We argue that students in the HBS mechanism have an incentive to overreport their preferences for popular courses, that this incentive does not vanish with the size of the market and that it results in increased congestion. We confirm these predictions with detailed data on reported preferences and behavior in the HBS mechanism. We show that strategic behavior hurts students but that it might still be preferable to random serial dictatorship over course bundles, a strategyproof alternative.
Cite as

Eric Budish and Estelle Cantillon. Strategic Behavior in Multi-unit Assignment Problems: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocations. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, p. 1, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{budish_et_al:DagSemProc.07271.15,
  author =	{Budish, Eric and Cantillon, Estelle},
  title =	{{Strategic Behavior in Multi-unit Assignment Problems: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocations}},
  booktitle =	{Computational Social Systems and the Internet},
  pages =	{1--1},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7271},
  editor =	{Peter Cramton and Rudolf M\"{u}ller and Eva Tardos and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11544},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Course allocation, market design, assignment, multi-unit demand}
}
  • Refine by Type
  • 11 Document/PDF
  • 8 Document/HTML

  • Refine by Publication Year
  • 1 2026
  • 7 2025
  • 1 2024
  • 1 2023
  • 1 2007

  • Refine by Author
  • 2 Lewis-Pye, Andrew
  • 2 Roughgarden, Tim
  • 1 Antonopoulos, Antonis
  • 1 Bhaskar, Umang
  • 1 Budish, Eric
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Series/Journal
  • 10 LIPIcs
  • 1 DagSemProc

  • Refine by Classification
  • 2 Applied computing → Online auctions
  • 2 Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory
  • 2 Theory of computation → Distributed algorithms
  • 1 Applied computing → Digital cash
  • 1 Applied computing → Economics
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Keyword
  • 2 Blockchain
  • 1 AMM
  • 1 Arbitrage profits
  • 1 Batch trading
  • 1 Blockspace Markets
  • Show More...

Any Issues?
X

Feedback on the Current Page

CAPTCHA

Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted to Dagstuhl Publishing

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2026 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH About DROPS Imprint Privacy Contact