19 Search Results for "Jha, Somesh"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.17
Recoverable Lock-Free Locks

Authors: Hagit Attiya, Panagiota Fatourou, Eleftherios Kosmas, and Yuanhao Wei

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 361, 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)

Abstract
This paper presents the first transformation that introduces both lock-freedom and recoverability. Our transformation starts with a lock-based implementation, and provides a recoverable, lock-free substitution to lock acquire and lock release operations. The transformation supports nested locks for generality and ensures recoverability without jeopardising the correctness of the lock-based implementation it is applied on.
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Hagit Attiya, Panagiota Fatourou, Eleftherios Kosmas, and Yuanhao Wei. Recoverable Lock-Free Locks. In 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 361, pp. 17:1-17:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{attiya_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.17,
  author =	{Attiya, Hagit and Fatourou, Panagiota and Kosmas, Eleftherios and Wei, Yuanhao},
  title =	{{Recoverable Lock-Free Locks}},
  booktitle =	{29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2025)},
  pages =	{17:1--17:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-409-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2026},
  volume =	{361},
  editor =	{Arusoaie, Andrei and Onica, Emanuel and Spear, Michael and Tucci-Piergiovanni, Sara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.17},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251905},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.17},
  annote =	{Keywords: recoverable computing, NVM, lock, lock-freedom}
}
Document
PACE Solver Description
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.38
PACE Solver Description: HitS&DoSeS - Exact and Heuristic Solvers for the Dominating Set and Hitting Set Problems

Authors: Sylwester Swat

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 358, 20th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2025)

Abstract
This article briefly describes the most important algorithms and techniques used in HitS&DoSeS, a dominating set and hitting set solver submitted to the PACE 2025 contest (10th Parameterized Algorithms and Computational Experiments Challenge). Used approaches for the exact and heuristic tracks are described, for both the dominating set and the hitting set problems.
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Sylwester Swat. PACE Solver Description: HitS&DoSeS - Exact and Heuristic Solvers for the Dominating Set and Hitting Set Problems. In 20th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 358, pp. 38:1-38:4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{swat:LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.38,
  author =	{Swat, Sylwester},
  title =	{{PACE Solver Description: HitS\&DoSeS - Exact and Heuristic Solvers for the Dominating Set and Hitting Set Problems}},
  booktitle =	{20th International Symposium on Parameterized and Exact Computation (IPEC 2025)},
  pages =	{38:1--38:4},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-407-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{358},
  editor =	{Agrawal, Akanksha and van Leeuwen, Erik Jan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.38},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-251705},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.IPEC.2025.38},
  annote =	{Keywords: dominating set, hitting set, exact algorithms, heuristic algorithms, large graphs, combinatorial optimization}
}
Document
Invited Talk
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.2
Securing Dynamic Data: A Primer on Differentially Private Data Structures (Invited Talk)

Authors: Monika Henzinger and Roodabeh Safavi

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 351, 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)

Abstract
We give an introduction into differential privacy in the dynamic setting, called the continual observation setting.
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Monika Henzinger and Roodabeh Safavi. Securing Dynamic Data: A Primer on Differentially Private Data Structures (Invited Talk). In 33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 351, pp. 2:1-2:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{henzinger_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2025.2,
  author =	{Henzinger, Monika and Safavi, Roodabeh},
  title =	{{Securing Dynamic Data: A Primer on Differentially Private Data Structures}},
  booktitle =	{33rd Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2025)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:14},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-395-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{351},
  editor =	{Benoit, Anne and Kaplan, Haim and Wild, Sebastian and Herman, Grzegorz},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-244702},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2025.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Differential privacy, continual observation}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.31
Compositional Reasoning for Parametric Probabilistic Automata

Authors: Hannah Mertens, Tim Quatmann, and Joost-Pieter Katoen

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 348, 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)

Abstract
We establish an assume-guarantee (AG) framework for compositional reasoning about multi-objective queries in parametric probabilistic automata (pPA) - an extension to probabilistic automata (PA), where transition probabilities are functions over a finite set of parameters. We lift an existing framework for PA to the pPA setting, incorporating asymmetric, circular, and interleaving proof rules. Our approach enables the verification of a broad spectrum of multi-objective queries for pPA, encompassing probabilistic properties and (parametric) expected total rewards. Additionally, we introduce a rule for reasoning about monotonicity in composed pPAs.
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Hannah Mertens, Tim Quatmann, and Joost-Pieter Katoen. Compositional Reasoning for Parametric Probabilistic Automata. In 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 348, pp. 31:1-31:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{mertens_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.31,
  author =	{Mertens, Hannah and Quatmann, Tim and Katoen, Joost-Pieter},
  title =	{{Compositional Reasoning for Parametric Probabilistic Automata}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)},
  pages =	{31:1--31:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-389-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{348},
  editor =	{Bouyer, Patricia and van de Pol, Jaco},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.31},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-239810},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.31},
  annote =	{Keywords: Verification, Probabilistic systems, Assume-guarantee reasoning, Parametric Probabilistic Automata, Parameter synthesis}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.8
Model Checking as Program Verification by Abstract Interpretation

Authors: Paolo Baldan, Roberto Bruni, Francesco Ranzato, and Diletta Rigo

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 348, 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)

Abstract
Abstract interpretation offers a powerful toolset for static analysis, tackling precision, complexity and state-explosion issues. In the literature, state partitioning abstractions based on (bi)simulation and property-preserving state relations have been successfully applied to abstract model checking. Here, we pursue a different track in which model checking is seen as an instance of program verification. To this purpose, we introduce a suitable language - called MOKA (for MOdel checking as abstract interpretation of 𝖪leene 𝖠lgebras) - which is used to encode temporal formulae as programs. In particular, we show that (universal fragments of) temporal logics, such as ACTL or, more generally, universal μ-calculus can be transformed into MOKA programs. Such programs return all and only the initial states which violate the formula. By applying abstract interpretation to MOKA programs, we pave the way for reusing more general abstractions than partitions as well as for tuning the precision of the abstraction to remove or avoid false alarms. We show how to perform model checking via a program logic that combines under-approximation and abstract interpretation analysis to avoid false alarms. The notion of locally complete abstraction is used to dynamically improve the analysis precision via counterexample-guided domain refinement.
Cite as

Paolo Baldan, Roberto Bruni, Francesco Ranzato, and Diletta Rigo. Model Checking as Program Verification by Abstract Interpretation. In 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 348, pp. 8:1-8:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{baldan_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.8,
  author =	{Baldan, Paolo and Bruni, Roberto and Ranzato, Francesco and Rigo, Diletta},
  title =	{{Model Checking as Program Verification by Abstract Interpretation}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-389-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{348},
  editor =	{Bouyer, Patricia and van de Pol, Jaco},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-239583},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: ACTL, \mu-calculus, model checking, abstract interpretation, program analysis, local completeness, abstract interpretation repair, domain refinement, Kleene algebra with tests}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.8
Breaking Symmetries with Involutions

Authors: Michael Codish and Mikoláš Janota

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 340, 31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025)

Abstract
Symmetry breaking for graphs and other combinatorial objects is notoriously hard. On the one hand, complete symmetry breaks are exponential in size. On the other hand, current, state-of-the-art, partial symmetry breaks are often considered too weak to be of practical use. Recently, the concept of graph patterns has been introduced and provides a concise representation for (large) sets of non-canonical graphs, i.e. graphs that are not lex-leaders and can be excluded from search. In particular, four (specific) graph patterns apply to identify about 3/4 of the set of all non-canonical graphs. Taking this approach further, we discover that graph patterns that derive from permutations that are involutions play an important role in the construction of symmetry breaks for graphs. We take advantage of this to guide the construction of partial and complete symmetry-breaking constraints based on graph patterns. The resulting constraints are small in size and strong in the number of symmetries they break.
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Michael Codish and Mikoláš Janota. Breaking Symmetries with Involutions. In 31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 340, pp. 8:1-8:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{codish_et_al:LIPIcs.CP.2025.8,
  author =	{Codish, Michael and Janota, Mikol\'{a}\v{s}},
  title =	{{Breaking Symmetries with Involutions}},
  booktitle =	{31st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2025)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-380-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{340},
  editor =	{de la Banda, Maria Garcia},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-238699},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CP.2025.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: graph symmetry, patterns, permutation, Ramsey graphs, greedy, CEGAR}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.22
Quantifying Cache Side-Channel Leakage by Refining Set-Based Abstractions

Authors: Jacqueline L. Mitchell and Chao Wang

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 333, 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)

Abstract
We propose an improved abstract interpretation based method for quantifying cache side-channel leakage by addressing two key components of precision loss in existing set-based cache abstractions. Our method targets two key sources of imprecision: (1) imprecision in the abstract transfer function used to update the abstract cache state when interpreting a memory access and (2) imprecision due to the incompleteness of the set-based domain. At the center of our method are two key improvements: (1) the introduction of a new transfer function for updating the abstract cache state which carefully leverages information in the abstract state to prevent the spurious aging of memory blocks and (2) a refinement of the set-based domain based on the finite powerset construction. We show that both the new abstract transformer and the domain refinement enjoy certain enhanced precision properties. We have implemented the method and compared it against the state-of-the-art technique on a suite of benchmark programs implementing both sorting algorithms and cryptographic algorithms. The experimental results show that our method is effective in improving the precision of cache side-channel leakage quantification.
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Jacqueline L. Mitchell and Chao Wang. Quantifying Cache Side-Channel Leakage by Refining Set-Based Abstractions. In 39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 333, pp. 22:1-22:28, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{mitchell_et_al:LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.22,
  author =	{Mitchell, Jacqueline L. and Wang, Chao},
  title =	{{Quantifying Cache Side-Channel Leakage by Refining Set-Based Abstractions}},
  booktitle =	{39th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2025)},
  pages =	{22:1--22:28},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-373-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{333},
  editor =	{Aldrich, Jonathan and Silva, Alexandra},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.22},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-233140},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2025.22},
  annote =	{Keywords: Abstract interpretation, side-channel, leakage quantification, cache}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.3
Private Estimation When Data and Privacy Demands Are Correlated

Authors: Syomantak Chaudhuri and Thomas A. Courtade

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 329, 6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025)

Abstract
Differential Privacy (DP) is the current gold-standard for ensuring privacy for statistical queries. Estimation problems under DP constraints appearing in the literature have largely focused on providing equal privacy to all users. We consider the problems of empirical mean estimation for univariate data and frequency estimation for categorical data, both subject to heterogeneous privacy constraints. Each user, contributing a sample to the dataset, is allowed to have a different privacy demand. The dataset itself is assumed to be worst-case and we study both problems under two different formulations - first, where privacy demands and data may be correlated, and second, where correlations are weakened by random permutation of the dataset. We establish theoretical performance guarantees for our proposed algorithms, under both PAC error and mean-squared error. These performance guarantees translate to minimax optimality in several instances, and experiments confirm superior performance of our algorithms over other baseline techniques.
Cite as

Syomantak Chaudhuri and Thomas A. Courtade. Private Estimation When Data and Privacy Demands Are Correlated. In 6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 329, pp. 3:1-3:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{chaudhuri_et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2025.3,
  author =	{Chaudhuri, Syomantak and Courtade, Thomas A.},
  title =	{{Private Estimation When Data and Privacy Demands Are Correlated}},
  booktitle =	{6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-367-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{329},
  editor =	{Bun, Mark},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-231305},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Differential Privacy, Personalized Privacy, Heterogeneous Privacy, Correlations in Privacy}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.8
Differential Privacy Under Multiple Selections

Authors: Ashish Goel, Zhihao Jiang, Aleksandra Korolova, Kamesh Munagala, and Sahasrajit Sarmasarkar

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 329, 6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025)

Abstract
We consider the setting where a user with sensitive features wishes to obtain a recommendation from a server in a differentially private fashion. We propose a "multi-selection" architecture where the server can send back multiple recommendations and the user chooses one from these that matches best with their private features. When the user feature is one-dimensional - on an infinite line - and the accuracy measure is defined w.r.t some increasing function 𝔥(.) of the distance on the line, we precisely characterize the optimal mechanism that satisfies differential privacy. The specification of the optimal mechanism includes both the distribution of the noise that the user adds to its private value, and the algorithm used by the server to determine the set of results to send back as a response. We show that Laplace is an optimal noise distribution in this setting. Furthermore, we show that this optimal mechanism results in an error that is inversely proportional to the number of results returned when the function 𝔥(.) is the identity function.
Cite as

Ashish Goel, Zhihao Jiang, Aleksandra Korolova, Kamesh Munagala, and Sahasrajit Sarmasarkar. Differential Privacy Under Multiple Selections. In 6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 329, pp. 8:1-8:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{goel_et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2025.8,
  author =	{Goel, Ashish and Jiang, Zhihao and Korolova, Aleksandra and Munagala, Kamesh and Sarmasarkar, Sahasrajit},
  title =	{{Differential Privacy Under Multiple Selections}},
  booktitle =	{6th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2025)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-367-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{329},
  editor =	{Bun, Mark},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-231353},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2025.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Differential Privacy, Mechanism Design and Multi-Selection}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.49
Cycle Counting Under Local Differential Privacy for Degeneracy-Bounded Graphs

Authors: Quentin Hillebrand, Vorapong Suppakitpaisarn, and Tetsuo Shibuya

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 327, 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)

Abstract
We propose an algorithm for counting the number of cycles under local differential privacy for degeneracy-bounded input graphs. Numerous studies have focused on counting the number of triangles under the privacy notion, demonstrating that the expected 𝓁₂-error of these algorithms is Ω(n^{1.5}), where n is the number of nodes in the graph. When parameterized by the number of cycles of length four (C₄), the best existing triangle counting algorithm has an error of O(n^{1.5} + √C₄) = O(n²). In this paper, we introduce an algorithm with an expected 𝓁₂-error of O(δ^1.5 n^0.5 + δ^0.5 d_max^0.5 n^0.5), where δ is the degeneracy and d_{max} is the maximum degree of the graph. For degeneracy-bounded graphs (δ ∈ Θ(1)) commonly found in practical social networks, our algorithm achieves an expected 𝓁₂-error of O(d_{max}^{0.5} n^{0.5}) = O(n). Our algorithm’s core idea is a precise count of triangles following a preprocessing step that approximately sorts the degree of all nodes. This approach can be extended to approximate the number of cycles of length k, maintaining a similar 𝓁₂-error, namely O(δ^{(k-2)/2} d_max^0.5 n^{(k-2)/2} + δ^{k/2} n^{(k-2)/2}) or O(d_max^0.5 n^{(k-2)/2}) = O(n^{(k-1)/2}) for degeneracy-bounded graphs.
Cite as

Quentin Hillebrand, Vorapong Suppakitpaisarn, and Tetsuo Shibuya. Cycle Counting Under Local Differential Privacy for Degeneracy-Bounded Graphs. In 42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 327, pp. 49:1-49:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{hillebrand_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2025.49,
  author =	{Hillebrand, Quentin and Suppakitpaisarn, Vorapong and Shibuya, Tetsuo},
  title =	{{Cycle Counting Under Local Differential Privacy for Degeneracy-Bounded Graphs}},
  booktitle =	{42nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2025)},
  pages =	{49:1--49:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-365-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{327},
  editor =	{Beyersdorff, Olaf and Pilipczuk, Micha{\l} and Pimentel, Elaine and Thắng, Nguy\~{ê}n Kim},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.49},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-228748},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2025.49},
  annote =	{Keywords: Differential privacy, triangle counting, degeneracy, arboricity, graph theory, parameterized accuracy}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.38
Backdoor Defense, Learnability and Obfuscation

Authors: Paul Christiano, Jacob Hilton, Victor Lecomte, and Mark Xu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
We introduce a formal notion of defendability against backdoors using a game between an attacker and a defender. In this game, the attacker modifies a function to behave differently on a particular input known as the "trigger", while behaving the same almost everywhere else. The defender then attempts to detect the trigger at evaluation time. If the defender succeeds with high enough probability, then the function class is said to be defendable. The key constraint on the attacker that makes defense possible is that the attacker’s strategy must work for a randomly-chosen trigger. Our definition is simple and does not explicitly mention learning, yet we demonstrate that it is closely connected to learnability. In the computationally unbounded setting, we use a voting algorithm of [Hanneke et al., 2022] to show that defendability is essentially determined by the VC dimension of the function class, in much the same way as PAC learnability. In the computationally bounded setting, we use a similar argument to show that efficient PAC learnability implies efficient defendability, but not conversely. On the other hand, we use indistinguishability obfuscation to show that the class of polynomial size circuits is not efficiently defendable. Finally, we present polynomial size decision trees as a natural example for which defense is strictly easier than learning. Thus, we identify efficient defendability as a notable intermediate concept in between efficient learnability and obfuscation.
Cite as

Paul Christiano, Jacob Hilton, Victor Lecomte, and Mark Xu. Backdoor Defense, Learnability and Obfuscation. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 38:1-38:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{christiano_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.38,
  author =	{Christiano, Paul and Hilton, Jacob and Lecomte, Victor and Xu, Mark},
  title =	{{Backdoor Defense, Learnability and Obfuscation}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{38:1--38:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.38},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-226662},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.38},
  annote =	{Keywords: backdoors, machine learning, PAC learning, indistinguishability obfuscation}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.39
Data Reconstruction: When You See It and When You Don't

Authors: Edith Cohen, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Shay Moran, Kobbi Nissim, Uri Stemmer, and Eliad Tsfadia

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
We revisit the fundamental question of formally defining what constitutes a reconstruction attack. While often clear from the context, our exploration reveals that a precise definition is much more nuanced than it appears, to the extent that a single all-encompassing definition may not exist. Thus, we employ a different strategy and aim to "sandwich" the concept of reconstruction attacks by addressing two complementing questions: (i) What conditions guarantee that a given system is protected against such attacks? (ii) Under what circumstances does a given attack clearly indicate that a system is not protected? More specifically, - We introduce a new definitional paradigm - Narcissus Resiliency - to formulate a security definition for protection against reconstruction attacks. This paradigm has a self-referential nature that enables it to circumvent shortcomings of previously studied notions of security. Furthermore, as a side-effect, we demonstrate that Narcissus resiliency captures as special cases multiple well-studied concepts including differential privacy and other security notions of one-way functions and encryption schemes. - We formulate a link between reconstruction attacks and Kolmogorov complexity. This allows us to put forward a criterion for evaluating when such attacks are convincingly successful.
Cite as

Edith Cohen, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Shay Moran, Kobbi Nissim, Uri Stemmer, and Eliad Tsfadia. Data Reconstruction: When You See It and When You Don't. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 39:1-39:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{cohen_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.39,
  author =	{Cohen, Edith and Kaplan, Haim and Mansour, Yishay and Moran, Shay and Nissim, Kobbi and Stemmer, Uri and Tsfadia, Eliad},
  title =	{{Data Reconstruction: When You See It and When You Don't}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{39:1--39:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.39},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-226674},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.39},
  annote =	{Keywords: differential privacy, reconstruction}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.25
Locally Private Histograms in All Privacy Regimes

Authors: Clément L. Canonne and Abigail Gentle

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 325, 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)

Abstract
Frequency estimation, a.k.a. histograms, is a workhorse of data analysis, and as such has been thoroughly studied under differentially privacy. In particular, computing histograms in the local model of privacy has been the focus of a fruitful recent line of work, and various algorithms have been proposed, achieving the order-optimal 𝓁_∞ error in the high-privacy (small ε) regime while balancing other considerations such as time- and communication-efficiency. However, to the best of our knowledge, the picture is much less clear when it comes to the medium- or low-privacy regime (large ε), despite its increased relevance in practice. In this paper, we investigate locally private histograms, and the very related distribution learning task, in this medium-to-low privacy regime, and establish near-tight (and somewhat unexpected) bounds on the 𝓁_∞ error achievable. As a direct corollary of our results, we obtain a protocol for histograms in the shuffle model of differential privacy, with accuracy matching previous algorithms but significantly better message and communication complexity. Our theoretical findings emerge from a novel analysis, which appears to improve bounds across the board for the locally private histogram problem. We back our theoretical findings by an empirical comparison of existing algorithms in all privacy regimes, to assess their typical performance and behaviour beyond the worst-case setting.
Cite as

Clément L. Canonne and Abigail Gentle. Locally Private Histograms in All Privacy Regimes. In 16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 325, pp. 25:1-25:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{canonne_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.25,
  author =	{Canonne, Cl\'{e}ment L. and Gentle, Abigail},
  title =	{{Locally Private Histograms in All Privacy Regimes}},
  booktitle =	{16th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2025)},
  pages =	{25:1--25:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-361-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{325},
  editor =	{Meka, Raghu},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.25},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-226532},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2025.25},
  annote =	{Keywords: Differential Privacy, Local Differential Privacy, Histograms, Frequency Estimation, Lower Bounds, Maximum Error}
}
Document
Academic Track
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.SAIA.2024.1
On Assessing ML Model Robustness: A Methodological Framework (Academic Track)

Authors: Afef Awadid and Boris Robert

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 126, Symposium on Scaling AI Assessments (SAIA 2024)

Abstract
Due to their uncertainty and vulnerability to adversarial attacks, machine learning (ML) models can lead to severe consequences, including the loss of human life, when embedded in safety-critical systems such as autonomous vehicles. Therefore, it is crucial to assess the empirical robustness of such models before integrating them into these systems. ML model robustness refers to the ability of an ML model to be insensitive to input perturbations and maintain its performance. Against this background, the Confiance.ai research program proposes a methodological framework for assessing the empirical robustness of ML models. The framework encompasses methodological processes (guidelines) captured in Capella models, along with a set of supporting tools. This paper aims to provide an overview of this framework and its application in an industrial setting.
Cite as

Afef Awadid and Boris Robert. On Assessing ML Model Robustness: A Methodological Framework (Academic Track). In Symposium on Scaling AI Assessments (SAIA 2024). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 126, pp. 1:1-1:10, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{awadid_et_al:OASIcs.SAIA.2024.1,
  author =	{Awadid, Afef and Robert, Boris},
  title =	{{On Assessing ML Model Robustness: A Methodological Framework}},
  booktitle =	{Symposium on Scaling AI Assessments (SAIA 2024)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:10},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-357-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{126},
  editor =	{G\"{o}rge, Rebekka and Haedecke, Elena and Poretschkin, Maximilian and Schmitz, Anna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.SAIA.2024.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-227410},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.SAIA.2024.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: ML model robustness, assessment, framework, methodological processes, tools}
}
Document
Academic Track
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.SAIA.2024.12
A View on Vulnerabilites: The Security Challenges of XAI (Academic Track)

Authors: Elisabeth Pachl, Fabian Langer, Thora Markert, and Jeanette Miriam Lorenz

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 126, Symposium on Scaling AI Assessments (SAIA 2024)

Abstract
Modern deep learning methods have long been considered as black-boxes due to their opaque decision-making processes. Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), however, has turned the tables: it provides insight into how these models work, promoting transparency that is crucial for accountability. Yet, recent developments in adversarial machine learning have highlighted vulnerabilities in XAI methods, raising concerns about security, reliability and trustworthiness, particularly in sensitive areas like healthcare and autonomous systems. Awareness of the potential risks associated with XAI is needed as its adoption increases, driven in part by the need to enhance compliance to regulations. This survey provides a holistic perspective on the security and safety landscape surrounding XAI, categorizing research on adversarial attacks against XAI and the misuse of explainability to enhance attacks on AI systems, such as evasion and privacy breaches. Our contribution includes identifying current insecurities in XAI and outlining future research directions in adversarial XAI. This work serves as an accessible foundation and outlook to recognize potential research gaps and define future directions. It identifies data modalities, such as time-series or graph data, and XAI methods that have not been extensively investigated for vulnerabilities in current research.
Cite as

Elisabeth Pachl, Fabian Langer, Thora Markert, and Jeanette Miriam Lorenz. A View on Vulnerabilites: The Security Challenges of XAI (Academic Track). In Symposium on Scaling AI Assessments (SAIA 2024). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 126, pp. 12:1-12:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{pachl_et_al:OASIcs.SAIA.2024.12,
  author =	{Pachl, Elisabeth and Langer, Fabian and Markert, Thora and Lorenz, Jeanette Miriam},
  title =	{{A View on Vulnerabilites: The Security Challenges of XAI}},
  booktitle =	{Symposium on Scaling AI Assessments (SAIA 2024)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:23},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-357-7},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{126},
  editor =	{G\"{o}rge, Rebekka and Haedecke, Elena and Poretschkin, Maximilian and Schmitz, Anna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.SAIA.2024.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-227523},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.SAIA.2024.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Explainability, XAI, Transparency, Adversarial Machine Learning, Security, Vulnerabilities}
}
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