9 Search Results for "Ummels, Michael"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.9
ε-Stationary Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Stochastic Graph Games

Authors: Ali Asadi, Léonard Brice, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and K. S. Thejaswini

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 360, 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)

Abstract
A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an ε-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than ε by unilaterally deviating from their strategy. In this work, we use ε-Nash equilibria to approximate the computation of Nash equilibria. Specifically, we focus on turn-based, multiplayer stochastic games played on graphs, where players are restricted to stationary strategies - strategies that use randomness but not memory. The problem of deciding the constrained existence of stationary Nash equilibria - where each player’s payoff must lie within a given interval - is known to be ∃ℝ-complete in such a setting (Hansen and Sølvsten, 2020). We extend this line of work to stationary ε-Nash equilibria and present an algorithm that solves the following promise problem: given a game with a Nash equilibrium satisfying the constraints, compute an ε-Nash equilibrium that ε-satisfies those same constraints - satisfies the constraints up to an ε additive error. Our algorithm runs in FNP^NP time. To achieve this, we first show that if a constrained Nash equilibrium exists, then one exists where the non-zero probabilities are at least an inverse of a double-exponential in the input. We further prove that such a strategy can be encoded using floating-point representations, as in the work of Frederiksen and Miltersen (2013), which finally gives us our FNP^NP algorithm. We further show that the decision version of the promise problem is NP-hard. Finally, we show a partial tightness result by proving a lower bound for such techniques: if a constrained Nash equilibrium exists, then there must be one where the probabilities in the strategies are double-exponentially small.
Cite as

Ali Asadi, Léonard Brice, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and K. S. Thejaswini. ε-Stationary Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Stochastic Graph Games. In 45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 360, pp. 9:1-9:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{asadi_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.9,
  author =	{Asadi, Ali and Brice, L\'{e}onard and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Thejaswini, K. S.},
  title =	{{\epsilon-Stationary Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Stochastic Graph Games}},
  booktitle =	{45th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2025)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-406-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{360},
  editor =	{Aiswarya, C. and Mehta, Ruta and Roy, Subhajit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-250897},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2025.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Nash Equilibria, \epsilon-Nash equilibria, Approximation, Existential Theory of Reals}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31
Games with ω-Automatic Preference Relations

Authors: Véronique Bruyère, Christophe Grandmont, and Jean-François Raskin

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
This paper investigates Nash equilibria (NEs) in multi-player turn-based games on graphs, where player preferences are modeled as ω-automatic relations via deterministic parity automata. Unlike much of the existing literature, which focuses on specific reward functions, our results apply to any preference relation definable by an ω-automatic relation. We analyze the computational complexity of determining the existence of an NE (possibly under some constraints), verifying whether a given strategy profile forms an NE, and checking whether a specific outcome can be realized by an NE. When a (constrained) NE exists, we show that there always exists one with finite-memory strategies. Finally, we explore fundamental properties of ω-automatic relations and their implications in the existence of equilibria.
Cite as

Véronique Bruyère, Christophe Grandmont, and Jean-François Raskin. Games with ω-Automatic Preference Relations. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 31:1-31:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bruyere_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31,
  author =	{Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Grandmont, Christophe and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois},
  title =	{{Games with \omega-Automatic Preference Relations}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{31:1--31:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241381},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.31},
  annote =	{Keywords: Games played on graphs, Nash equilibrium, \omega-automatic relations, \omega-recognizable relations, constrained Nash equilibria existence problem}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.30
Finding Equilibria: Simpler for Pessimists, Simplest for Optimists

Authors: Léonard Brice, Thomas A. Henzinger, and K. S. Thejaswini

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 345, 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)

Abstract
We consider equilibria in multiplayer stochastic graph games with terminal-node rewards. In such games, Nash equilibria are defined assuming that each player seeks to maximise their expected payoff, ignoring their aversion or tolerance to risk. We therefore study risk-sensitive equilibria (RSEs), where the expected payoff is replaced by a risk measure. A classical risk measure in the literature is the entropic risk measure, where each player has a real valued parameter capturing their risk-averseness. We introduce the extreme risk measure, which corresponds to extreme cases of entropic risk measure, where players are either extreme optimists or extreme pessimists. Under extreme risk measure, every player is an extremist: an extreme optimist perceives their reward as the maximum payoff that can be achieved with positive probability, while an extreme pessimist expects the minimum payoff achievable with positive probability. We argue that the extreme risk measure, especially in multi-player graph based settings, is particularly relevant as they can model several real life instances such as interactions between secure systems and potential security threats, or distributed controls for safety critical systems. We prove that RSEs defined with the extreme risk measure are guaranteed to exist when all rewards are non-negative. Furthermore, we prove that the problem of deciding whether a given game contains an RSE that generates risk measures within specified intervals is decidable and NP-complete for our extreme risk measure, and even PTIME-complete when all players are extreme optimists, while that same problem is undecidable using the entropic risk measure or even the classical expected payoff. This establishes, to our knowledge, the first decidable fragment for equilibria in simple stochastic games without restrictions on strategy types or number of players.
Cite as

Léonard Brice, Thomas A. Henzinger, and K. S. Thejaswini. Finding Equilibria: Simpler for Pessimists, Simplest for Optimists. In 50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 345, pp. 30:1-30:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{brice_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.30,
  author =	{Brice, L\'{e}onard and Henzinger, Thomas A. and Thejaswini, K. S.},
  title =	{{Finding Equilibria: Simpler for Pessimists, Simplest for Optimists}},
  booktitle =	{50th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2025)},
  pages =	{30:1--30:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-388-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{345},
  editor =	{Gawrychowski, Pawe{\l} and Mazowiecki, Filip and Skrzypczak, Micha{\l}},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.30},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-241371},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2025.30},
  annote =	{Keywords: Nash equilibria, stochastic games, graph games, risk-sensitive equilibria}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12
The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and ω-Regular Objectives

Authors: Véronique Bruyère, Jean-François Raskin, Alexis Reynouard, and Marie Van Den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 348, 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)

Abstract
This paper studies the rational synthesis problem for multi-player games played on graphs when rational players are following subgame perfect equilibria. In these games, one player, the system, declares his strategy upfront, and the other players, composing the environment, then rationally respond by playing strategies forming a subgame perfect equilibrium. We study the complexity of the rational synthesis problem when the players have ω-regular objectives encoded as parity objectives. Our algorithm is based on an encoding into a three-player game with imperfect information, showing that the problem is in 2ExpTime. When the number of environment players is fixed, the problem is in ExpTime and is NP- and coNP-hard. Moreover, for a fixed number of players and reachability objectives, we get a polynomial algorithm.
Cite as

Véronique Bruyère, Jean-François Raskin, Alexis Reynouard, and Marie Van Den Bogaard. The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and ω-Regular Objectives. In 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 348, pp. 12:1-12:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bruyere_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12,
  author =	{Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and Reynouard, Alexis and Van Den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{The Non-Cooperative Rational Synthesis Problem for SPEs and \omega-Regular Objectives}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-389-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{348},
  editor =	{Bouyer, Patricia and van de Pol, Jaco},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-239622},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: non-zero-sum games, subgame perfect equilibria, rational synthesis}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.9
A Direct Reduction from Stochastic Parity Games to Simple Stochastic Games

Authors: Raphaël Berthon, Joost-Pieter Katoen, and Zihan Zhou

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 348, 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)

Abstract
Significant progress has been recently achieved in developing efficient solutions for simple stochastic games (SSGs), focusing on reachability objectives. While reductions from stochastic parity games (SPGs) to SSGs have been presented in the literature through the use of multiple intermediate game models, a direct and simple reduction has been notably absent. This paper introduces a novel and direct polynomial-time reduction from quantitative SPGs to quantitative SSGs. By leveraging a gadget-based transformation that effectively removes the priority function, we construct an SSG that simulates the behavior of a given SPG. We formally establish the correctness of our direct reduction. Furthermore, we demonstrate that under binary encoding this reduction is polynomial, thereby directly corroborating the known NP ∩ coNP complexity of SPGs and providing new understanding in the relationship between parity and reachability objectives in turn-based stochastic games.
Cite as

Raphaël Berthon, Joost-Pieter Katoen, and Zihan Zhou. A Direct Reduction from Stochastic Parity Games to Simple Stochastic Games. In 36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 348, pp. 9:1-9:21, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{berthon_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.9,
  author =	{Berthon, Rapha\"{e}l and Katoen, Joost-Pieter and Zhou, Zihan},
  title =	{{A Direct Reduction from Stochastic Parity Games to Simple Stochastic Games}},
  booktitle =	{36th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2025)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:21},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-389-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{348},
  editor =	{Bouyer, Patricia and van de Pol, Jaco},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-239595},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2025.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: stochastic games, parity, reduction}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2025.23
Permissive Equilibria in Multiplayer Reachability Games

Authors: Aline Goeminne and Benjamin Monmege

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 326, 33rd EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2025)

Abstract
We study multi-strategies in multiplayer reachability games played on finite graphs. A multi-strategy prescribes a set of possible actions, instead of a single action as usual strategies: it represents a set of all strategies that are consistent with it. We aim for profiles of multi-strategies (a multi-strategy per player), where each profile of consistent strategies is a Nash equilibrium, or a subgame perfect equilibrium. The permissiveness of two multi-strategies can be compared with penalties, as already used in the two-player zero-sum setting by Bouyer, Duflot, Markey and Renault [Patricia Bouyer et al., 2009]. We show that we can decide the existence of a multi-strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium or a subgame perfect equilibrium, while satisfying some upper-bound constraints on the penalties in PSPACE, if the upper-bound penalties are given in unary. The same holds when we search for multi-strategies where certain players are asked to win in at least one play or in all plays.
Cite as

Aline Goeminne and Benjamin Monmege. Permissive Equilibria in Multiplayer Reachability Games. In 33rd EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2025). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 326, pp. 23:1-23:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{goeminne_et_al:LIPIcs.CSL.2025.23,
  author =	{Goeminne, Aline and Monmege, Benjamin},
  title =	{{Permissive Equilibria in Multiplayer Reachability Games}},
  booktitle =	{33rd EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2025)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-362-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{326},
  editor =	{Endrullis, J\"{o}rg and Schmitz, Sylvain},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2025.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-227801},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2025.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: multiplayer reachability games, penalties, permissive equilibria}
}
Document
Invited Talk
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.TIME.2019.3
On the Computation of Nash Equilibria in Games on Graphs (Invited Talk)

Authors: Patricia Bouyer

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 147, 26th International Symposium on Temporal Representation and Reasoning (TIME 2019)

Abstract
In this talk, I will show how one can characterize and compute Nash equilibria in multiplayer games played on graphs. I will present in particular a construction, called the suspect game construction, which allows to reduce the computation of Nash equilibria to the computation of winning strategies in a two-player zero-sum game.
Cite as

Patricia Bouyer. On the Computation of Nash Equilibria in Games on Graphs (Invited Talk). In 26th International Symposium on Temporal Representation and Reasoning (TIME 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 147, pp. 3:1-3:3, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{bouyer:LIPIcs.TIME.2019.3,
  author =	{Bouyer, Patricia},
  title =	{{On the Computation of Nash Equilibria in Games on Graphs}},
  booktitle =	{26th International Symposium on Temporal Representation and Reasoning (TIME 2019)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:3},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-127-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2019},
  volume =	{147},
  editor =	{Gamper, Johann and Pinchinat, Sophie and Sciavicco, Guido},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.TIME.2019.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-113616},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.TIME.2019.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Multiplayer games, Nash equilibria}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2012.534
The Complexity of Quantitative Information Flow in Recursive Programs

Authors: Rohit Chadha and Michael Ummels

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 18, IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2012)

Abstract
Information-theoretic measures based upon mutual information can be employed to quantify the information that an execution of a program reveals about its secret inputs. The information leakage bounding problem asks whether the information leaked by a program does not exceed a given threshold. We consider this problem for two scenarios: a) the outputs of the program are revealed, and b)the timing (measured in the number of execution steps) of the program is revealed. For both scenarios, we establish complexity results in the context of deterministic boolean programs, both for programs with and without recursion. In particular, we prove that for recursive programs the information leakage bounding problem is no harder than checking reachability.
Cite as

Rohit Chadha and Michael Ummels. The Complexity of Quantitative Information Flow in Recursive Programs. In IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2012). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 18, pp. 534-545, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2012)

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@InProceedings{chadha_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2012.534,
  author =	{Chadha, Rohit and Ummels, Michael},
  title =	{{The Complexity of Quantitative Information Flow in Recursive Programs}},
  booktitle =	{IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2012)},
  pages =	{534--545},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-47-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2012},
  volume =	{18},
  editor =	{D'Souza, Deepak and Radhakrishnan, Jaikumar and Telikepalli, Kavitha},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2012.534},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-38872},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2012.534},
  annote =	{Keywords: quantitative information flow, recursive programs, program analysis, verification, computational complexity}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2011.375
Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Games with Büchi Objectives

Authors: Patricia Bouyer, Romain Brenguier, Nicolas Markey, and Michael Ummels

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 13, IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2011)

Abstract
We study the problem of computing pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with Büchi-definable objectives. First, when the objectives are Büchi conditions on the game, we prove that the existence problem can be solved in polynomial time. In a second part, we extend our technique to objectives defined by deterministic Büchi automata, and prove that the problem then becomes EXPTIME-complete. We prove PSPACE-completeness for the case where the Büchi automata are 1-weak.
Cite as

Patricia Bouyer, Romain Brenguier, Nicolas Markey, and Michael Ummels. Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Games with Büchi Objectives. In IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2011). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 13, pp. 375-386, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2011)

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@InProceedings{bouyer_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2011.375,
  author =	{Bouyer, Patricia and Brenguier, Romain and Markey, Nicolas and Ummels, Michael},
  title =	{{Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Games with B\"{u}chi Objectives}},
  booktitle =	{IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2011)},
  pages =	{375--386},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-939897-34-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2011},
  volume =	{13},
  editor =	{Chakraborty, Supratik and Kumar, Amit},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2011.375},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-33340},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2011.375},
  annote =	{Keywords: Concurrent games, Nash equilibria, B\"{u}chi Objectives}
}
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